

PRG REPORT



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The Progressive Party Campaign of 1912 and the Birth of Modern American Politics

by Sidney Milkis

The 1912 election showcased four impressive candidates who engaged in a remarkable debate about the future of American politics. Besides William Howard Taft, the incumbent Republican president, the campaign was joined by Theodore Roosevelt, who bolted from the Republicans and ran as the champion of the Progressive Party; Eugene Debs, who ran on the Socialist Party ticket; and Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic governor of New Jersey, who was elected president. All four candidates acknowledged that fundamental changes were occurring in the American political landscape, and each attempted to define the Progressive era's answer to the questions raised by the new industrial order that had grown up with the American constitutional system.

That the 1912 election registered, and inspired, fundamental changes in American politics suggests, in particular, the historical importance of the Progressive party. Not only was it the driving force of this election, but it remains the most important third party to appear on the American political landscape in the 20th century. With the celebrated former president Roosevelt (the most important figure of his age) as its candidate, the Progressives won 27.4 percent of the popular vote and eighty eight

electoral votes. This was extraordinary for a third party: with the important exception of the Republican party of the 1850s, no third party candidate for the presidency, before or since, has received so large a percentage of the popular vote or as many electoral votes as did TR.

This essay is drawn from a talk Professor Milkis delivered on March 5, 2003, at the University of Texas.

More important, the Progressive Party initiated and advanced a new form of "modern" politics. Before the Progressive Party's transformation of the American model of politics, the United States was a traditional localized democracy. In the "state of courts and parties," as Skowronek has termed it, presidential candidates were the instruments of their parties, and "plebiscite" merely a foreign sounding word (Skworonek). As a result of the election of 1912, a new form of politics began to emerge, and continued to evolve over the century.

Many characteristics of contemporary politics, conventionally understood as new, or of very recent origin were in fact born of the Progressive campaign of 1912. Having been denied the Republican nomination in spite of trouncing incumbent President William H. Taft in the primaries, for the first

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Teddy Roosevelt Campaigning in 1912.

Call for Papers

A special issue of White House Studies is being planned on the topic of the presidency and health care. Papers and proposals are welcomed on a variety of bio-ethics issues including stemcell research, physician-assisted suicide, and cloning, as well as health care initiatives and reforms.

Address all questions and proposals to:

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Truman Legacy Symposium

June 13 & 14, 2003

Harry S. Truman Little White House
Key West, Florida

A two-day program in honor of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Truman presidency will be held in Key West, Florida. The symposium will assess Truman's national security legacy, 1953-2003, and the 175 days Truman spent during his presidency at the "Little White House" in Key West.

The program will feature a reception and tour of the Harry S. Truman Little White House, panels by former aides to President Truman, panels by national security scholars, and keynote addresses by Gen. Brent Scowcroft and Clifton Truman Daniel, Pres. Truman's grandson. The cost of the symposium is \$25.

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From the White House to the Palais Élysée:

Divided Government, the Legislative Presidency, and Prospects for Comparing Presidential Politics in the U.S. and France

by Richard S. Conley

David Prindle's (1986) lament nearly two decades ago still holds true today. Presidency scholars have yet to exploit the significant opportunities for theory-building that the comparative study of executive politics may offer. The relatively few, recent comparative studies of executive leadership, although estimable in their own right, have focused on U.S. presidents and their counterparts in Westminster-style parliamentary institutions such as Britain, Australia, and Canada (Campbell 1998; Foley 1993; Sykes 2000). The problem is that however norms of leadership in other Anglo democracies have changed over time, *the defining characteristic of the Westminster system remains intact*—the fusion of the executive in the legislature—as Foley (1993) readily admits in his “presidentialization” thesis concerning the British prime minister. This factor, more than any other, complicates direct comparisons of the British-style premier to U.S. presidents in the analysis of many facets of institutional politics, including legislative leadership.

Scholars of the U.S. presidency would do well to look

beyond the White Cliffs of Dover and across the Channel to France as they extend the comparative study of executive politics. The French Fifth Republic (1958-) is an obvious choice for cross-national comparison. Rather surprisingly, there is to date little systematic, comparative research on the presidencies of the two countries. Filling this void could greatly enhance scholars' understanding of presidential behavior in constitutional and contextual settings that are more similar in many respects than those represented by a comparison of the US presidency with Westminster parliamentary arrangements.

Evolving Norms and The Institutional Setting

France has a *separated institutional and electoral structure* with significant analogies to the United States. Moreover, norms and expectations have developed in a similar direction in both countries—toward a presidency-centered, plebiscitarian model of executive leadership.

French presidents in the Fifth Republic were supposed to act as “arbiters of

republican institutions.” The expectations of many of the framers of the Fifth Republic concerning legislative dominance and separation between institutions were rather akin to eighteenth and early nineteenth century views of the American presidency (see Tulis 1987). Their objective was to balance legislative government with a functional executive and avoid the inertia and deadlock for which the Fourth Republic was well known (Teyssier 1995, Chapter 2).

Charles De Gaulle, the first president of the Fifth Republic, quickly dispelled notions that a parliamentary-centered regime would predominate. De Gaulle swiftly moved the system in the direction of France's long tradition of plebiscitarian tendencies (Ehrmann 1983, 7-11). In 1962 he won a referendum on direct election of the president as a means of enhancing his—and future presidents'—claims to be the only representative of all the people. Unwittingly, perhaps, De Gaulle also opened up the possibility of divided control of the presidency and the legislature (see Duverger 1986). He also established the precedent that the president could “fire” prime minis-

ters at will—as he did Michel Debré and Georges Pompidou, despite any such formal-constitutional authority. In sum, De Gaulle effectively placed the legislature in an inferior institutional position in the Fifth Republic's constitutional order. He solidified the presidency and the *Palais Élysée* as the locus of power and the institution to which the electorate looks for policy leadership.

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French “semi-presidential” system, the president and the prime minister have *not* been de facto co-equals for much of the Fifth Republic. When the president enjoys a parliamentary majority the prime minister manages day-to-day legislative affairs of the *Assemblée nationale* from the *Hôtel Matignon* in much the same manner as congressional leaders in the American context—although the prime minister

is endowed with extraordinary tools to legislate by decree or *ordonnance* (with the president's consent) and through expedited legislative processes that go well beyond congressional analogies. The essential point is that this structure gives a president working with a majority in the legislature extraordinary possibility for control of the legislative agenda that is unknown to American presidents (Schain and Keeler 1995).

It is under conditions of outright split-party control of the presidency and the legislature that the “double executive” in France has become most meaningful. Under these conditions comparisons to the U.S. case seem particularly apt. Both Socialist President François Mitterrand and Gaullist President Jacques Chirac endured divided government—*cohabitation* in French parlance—at some length in the last two decades. During periods of cohabitation, the system has approximated dominance by the legislature envisaged by many of the framers of the Fifth Republic (see Andrews 1982, 25-33). The president has been placed in an inferior position in domestic affairs and has occasionally sustained significant challenges by prime ministers to preeminence in De Gaulle's sacrosanct *domaine réservé* (reserved domain) of foreign affairs.

The recent experiences with cohabitation confirm the degree to which a French president's legislative leadership is contingent on party control of the legislature. He holds a constitutionally “weak” office. His formal legislative powers are minimal—even more so than his American counterpart. He possesses no veto over legislation, only delaying tactics, and he is not ascribed any particular constitutional equivalent to the opportunities for legislative leadership afforded by an American president's State of the Union address. As a result, like American presidents, French presidents in the Fifth Republic have recourse to “go public” (Kernell 1997), criticize the opposition, and build grassroots support. Media relations have taken on greater importance and public approval figures prominently in French presidents' electoral calculus (see Kaid et al. 1991).

Divided Government & the Legislative Presidency

The French experience with cohabitation offers one of the few close analogies to divided government in the U.S. (but see Elgie 2001, and Laver and Shepsle 1991, for a broader conceptual comparison of divided government). Cohabitation has occurred three times in France with

two differing partisan configurations. From 1987-88 and from 1993-95 Socialist President François Mitterrand confronted a center-right majority in the *Assemblée nationale* following votes in non-presidential election years (an analogy to mid-term elections in the U.S.), while Gaullist President Jacques Chirac, upon dissolving parliament a year early without adequate explanation to the electorate, was penalized with a leftist majority coalition from 1997-2002 (Goldey 1998). The first experience with cohabitation provoked scholarly and public concerns of a constitutional crisis (Zorgribe 1986; Colombani and Lhomeau 1986). By the third incident of divided government in 1997, there was little doubt that the Fifth Republic would remain intact, even if the president was often relegated to an uncomfortable and inferior position in domestic affairs.

In each case of cohabitation the institutional arrangement functioned relatively well and constitutional crisis was avoided because policymaking largely reverted to the legislature, as the framers of the Fifth Republic intended. Cohabitation also worked because the occupants of Matignon had

presidential ambitions and did not wish to weaken the office to which they aspired. Nonetheless, divided government in France amounted to an “‘Aronian’ Cold War: peace impossible, war improbable” (Bell 2000, 193) between the president and prime minister. The situation engendered a search for mutual weaknesses, much public posturing, and occasional conflict that scholars of the American presidency and executive-legislative relations would recognize as commonplace in the presidential-congressional rivalry in the United States.

In the first case of cohabitation domestic affairs fell to Prime Minister Chirac, while President Mitterrand focused on the *domaine réservé* of foreign affairs. Mitterrand, as David Bell notes, “intended to leave to the Prime Minister the prose of government and arrogate to himself the poetry of campaign...he was able to play on the two registers: setting the Presidency up as the ‘arbiter’ above the battle and as an impartial moderating force” (Bell 2000, 176). Mitterrand was quite content to allow Chirac opportunities to get bogged down in management of his relatively thin parliamentary coalition, and Chirac faced the disadvantage of having

a very narrow two-year window of opportunity to make significant policy accomplishments before the presidential election of 1988. Mitterrand took the opportunity to selectively criticize Chirac and his policies. On several occasions Mitterrand used his constitutional power to refuse to sign decrees enabling Chirac to expedite domestic legislation (Elgie 2001a). These actions did not constitute a “veto” in the American sense of the word, but had the effect of delaying Chirac’s agenda, forcing the prime minister to employ regular legislative processes, and giving Mitterrand public attention from which to criticize Chirac. The plural left regained a working legislative majority in 1988 after Mitterrand’s reelection.

In the second round of cohabitation from 1993-95, Chirac stepped aside to campaign for president and left the prime ministership to his rival Édouard Balladur, who also had presidential aspirations. Balladur, like Chirac, wanted divided government to work. The prime minister sought to take credit for policy accomplishments and accentuate his ability to govern as a means of expanding

his electoral appeal. Once again, Mitterrand cast de facto "vetoes" on select elements of Balladur's agenda. By drawing media and public attention to the prime minister's plans for education reform, for example, Mitterrand forced Balladur to back away from the legislation. Mitterrand also selectively threatened dissolution of the *Assemblée nationale* when he felt the Prime Minister was overstepping his boundaries in foreign affairs (Bell 2000, 214).

The third cohabitation to date lasted two and a half times longer than the preceding two cases, spanning 1997 to 2002—what Robert Elgie (2002) has called cohabitation *de longue durée*.¹ For five years Jacques Chirac faced a leftist parliament headed by Socialist Lionel Jospin as Prime Minister. In 1997 Chirac made a significant miscalculation by calling early legislative elections in the hope of catching the left off guard. The strategy backfired (Daniels 2000). The ensuing situation, as one scholar described it, was of "two men for one chair" as Chirac and Jospin jockeyed toward the 2002 presidential election (Malouines 2001). One interesting development in the management of cohabitation during this period was Chirac's attempt to use bicameralism to his advantage. Although the

indirectly-elected French Senate is the inferior chamber to the National Assembly, the Senate had a majority of the right. Chirac used that majority in a strategic way to delay elements of the Jospin government's agenda (see Verdier 1998).

Toward A Comparative Research Agenda

For scholars of the American presidency and executive-legislative relations, a "degree of gridlock, the increased use of extraordinary constitutional, administrative, and political procedures, and the ongoing battle for public opinion" (Elgie 2001a, 120) that has marked the French experience with divided government should look rather familiar. Such similarities call out for the application of concepts from American political science research to systematic cross-national inquiry.

Several avenues of research seem promising. Scholars might compare how veto threats operate in similar and dissimilar ways in the two systems under divided government. In the United States growing partisanship in Congress has fundamentally altered the ways in which presidents seek to negotiate with opposition majorities (Bond and Fleisher 2000; Cameron 2000; Conley 2002). Presidents wield the veto or the threat of the veto as a means

of gaining influence over the legislative process "quietly" behind the scenes, as well as through public pronouncements (Conley 2003; Deen and Arnold 2002). French presidents have no formal veto power, but have employed a range of delaying tactics that are tantamount to vetoes, including the attempted manipulation of bicameral politics. Moreover, French presidents can threaten the ultimate sanction during periods of high-stakes politics: Dissolution of the legislature, though they are limited to one dissolution in an electoral period.

In modeling such strategic behavior, scholars might apply the concepts of "strategic disagreement" or "blame-game" politics between presidents and opposition leaders in the legislature (Gilmour 1995; Groseclose and McCarty 2001). By delaying or halting policy decisions, presidents in both systems have capitalized on opportunities to criticize the opposition majority for potential electoral advantage. Here the experiences of Bill Clinton seem roughly comparable both to Mitterrand in 1988 and Chirac in 2002.

Notably, in France as in the United States, presidents have used divided government and the "bully-pulpit" to relocate themselves to

the center of the political spectrum and improve their standing with the public, despite a weakened institutional position. The approval ratings of Mitterrand and Chirac variably increased under cohabitation (Parodi 1988; Zarka 1992; Fontaine 2002). Analyzing the basis for such improvements could help solve the puzzle of Bill Clinton's approval ratings from 1995-2000. In addition, the most recent period of cohabitation witnessed extraordinary personal antagonism between Chirac and Jospin and a focus on scandal that is reminiscent of the institutional combat between congressional Republicans and Bill Clinton, including—but not limited to—the Lewinsky ordeal.

The Fifth Republic's separated institutional structure suggests other potential bases for comparison beyond those afforded by Westminster parliamentary systems. For example, many French presidents, including De Gaulle and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, did not enjoy large parliamentary majorities and had to act as coalition-builders (*rassembleurs* in French) in much the same way that U.S. presidents need to negotiate with members of Congress, despite mathematical "unified government." Moreover, the application of a "two presidencies"

(Wildavsky 1975) framework to the French presidency may also be useful. Constitutionally, the French president occupies a predominant position in foreign affairs, but prime ministers can also claim authority (Elgie 2001a, 120). Comparing how and when presidents have focused more closely on either foreign affairs or legislative challenges could prove illuminating.

Such suggestions represent just the tip of the iceberg for comparative research. Significant progress on comparing the French presidency will require extensive data gathering on legislative politics (e.g., legislative agendas and defining presidential legislative "success"), analyzing the development of the institutional presidency as Andrews (1982) attempted for the early Fifth Republic (i.e., staffing, advisory structures, etc.), compiling survey data and accompanying indicators of presidential and prime ministerial approval in the absence of a single organization in France such as Gallup that conducts regular surveys, and charting French presidents' media and public activities.

As Arend Lijphart (1971) argued more than three decades ago, the comparative method is a powerful means to enhance our research approaches, build arguments,

and test theories. Clearly, scholarship by Roy Pierce (1995) and Michael Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice (1992) on electoral politics in France and the U.S. demonstrates the potential for systematic comparative research on the two countries. Presidency scholars interested in institutional dynamics must begin to apply and develop comparative frameworks in a similar way. The comparative method has great potential to complement and extend recent innovative work that has emphasized the constraints and opportunities presidents face as institutional actors. Such research has facilitated cross-comparisons among modern U.S. presidents as well as between modern and "pre-modern" presidents (Cameron 2000; Crockett 2002; Rudalevige 2002; Shapiro et al. 2000; Skowronek 1993). Moving in the direction of cross-national research is a logical next step.

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¹ The 2002 election placed into effect constitutional reform reducing the president's elective mandate from 7 years (*septennat*) to 5 years (*cinquennat*). Part of the rationale for the reform was to insure that presidential and legislative elections would take place simultaneously the same year in the hope of avoiding future incidences of cohabitation. However, because the president can still dissolve the legislature and thereby throw off the electoral cycle for legislative elections, the preclusion of cohabitation appears doubtful in the long run.

The Making of a Foreign-Policy President

The Evolution of the Bush Approach

by David Clinton

More than three decades ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski, later to gain first-hand exposure to a presidency himself, wrote an evaluation of the Nixon administration's foreign policy. Brzezinski preemptively defended himself against charges of a rush to judgment—though he really did not need to worry about being thought too harsh, since the article was on balance a rather favorable depiction of what Nixon and Kissinger had accomplished—by noting, “Whether President Nixon is re-elected or not, his first administration has passed its halfway mark. His foreign policy is on the record—both in words and in deeds.”¹ As this piece is composed in the midst of a war as well as a presidential term, it may be thought similarly premature. Yet, perhaps even more than in 1971, enough is known, through both words and actions, to suggest an idea of the trajectory of the George W. Bush approach to foreign affairs. Assessments will come later; what can be traced now is the path that American foreign policy has followed over the past two years and two months. What it reveals is related both to the mind of a man and to the necessities (real and perceived) of the international setting.

Things Look Different From the Inside

The changes that have marked the attitude toward the great external realm taken by the

President and his people before they assumed office, as compared with today, are easily noted. In a campaign not remembered for any consuming interest in foreign policy by either candidate or by the electorate at large, Governor Bush did not have to lay out a comprehensive diplomatic prescription. Vice President Gore made some efforts at warning voters about the asserted dangers of electing a governor with little experience in foreign affairs, but this tactic seemed to have no more success in 2000 than similar efforts had had in preventing the ascension to the presidency of Governors Carter, Reagan, and Clinton. (The charge of innocence in matters of global politics leveled against Governor Dukakis may have had more effect—or the lesson of 1988 may simply be that candidates should stay out of tanks.) Yet one theme that did come through in Bush's pronouncements on world affairs was a caution against triumphalism; the flaunting of both America's power and America's purity was, he warned, an unpleasant combination, off-putting to other countries and unworthy of the United States' own best traditions. To watch a Texan giving sober strictures against boastfulness was no doubt a novel experience for many observers of the campaign, but it was a note that the Governor struck more than once, and apparently in a heart-felt way. In answer to a question during the debates, he advocated hu-

mility and contended that under his leadership the U.S. would show that it was a great nation by being “a humble nation”. The strong but restrained character played by John Wayne (most of the way through) “The Quiet Man” would have approved.

The rhetoric of the Bush administration once in office has been somewhat different. To some extent, this evolution has been understandable, because presidents wishing to prod the country into action over the long term have often found that it was, in President Bush's phrases, “losing focus” or “losing [its] edge”. Particularly in the realm of foreign affairs, presidents find that they need to be inspiring in order to obtain prolonged action, and the language of humility is more likely to evoke malaise, or at least charges that the presidents are themselves subject to malaise. A more full-throated evocation of American virtue—an effort, in a phrase associated with a previous Texas president, at “making the eagle scream”—became the hallmark of an administration at war. Even in times of peace, humbleness is rarely the attitude struck by great powers, for whom power may well depend on credibility and credibility on prestige. Even less so in times of conflict: self-abnegation is not the mode when one feels oneself to be fighting for one's life or wishes to convince others that they must fight for the lives of all of them. For the duration, “a humble nation” seems to have

been emboldened.

Likewise, candidate Bush was highly skeptical of "nation-building", seeing in it a misuse of American military resources, which were stretched thin by exercises in international humanitarianism. Humility was called for here as well, for Washington often had little idea of the real forces at work inside other societies, and less notion of the levers of power that could successfully influence them. Whatever those levers were, they were assuredly not to be found in the precincts of the United States defense establishment, which had its hands full in maintaining the ability to project power globally in support of American national interests. (In fact, Condoleezza Rice, soon to become national security adviser, charged in early 2000 that the Clinton administration had, in its distracted pursuit of nation-building from Haiti to Kosovo, lost sight of the national interest, and that the next administration would have to "refocus" on this vital concept.²) Diverting military personnel in this way dulled their concentration on their primary responsibility, the winning of wars, and, by diminishing the effectiveness of this deterrent force, actually made wars of miscalculation more likely.

Contrast this determination to keep the military and humanitarian functions from mixing in the difficult, dangerous, and ultimately delusory effort to create nations where none existed nat-

urally with the readiness to rebuild both Afghanistan and Iraq seen in 2003. These very different countries were to be thoroughly reconstructed with honest administrations, competitive politics, and free economies, and the United States was to be so heavily involved in the effort that an observer of the President described him as "at times acting like the Afghan budget director and bill collector."³

As nations were built, they would necessarily be built as democracies, and where states already possessed functioning institutions of government they would be pressed to adopt democracy. This Wilsonian conception of a national responsibility to work actively for the spread of democratic societies around the world sat oddly with the impatience expressed earlier about such Clinton-era slogans as "engagement and enlargement" by associates of the succeeding president, who viewed themselves as more hard-headed, with a clearer appreciation for limitations—limitations on human foresight that prevented any government from knowing whether and how democratic institutions could be implanted in wholly different cultures, and limitations on diplomatic practice that undermined any confidence that democratic states would always be friendly partners of the United States. Nevertheless, President Bush in his national security strategy released in late 2002 asserted that "democracy and eco-

nomics openness. . . are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order," and accepted that "the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages."⁴ Such far-reaching obligations went well beyond what might have been predicted from the cautionary notes sounded before and during 2000.

The Great Divide

No prizes need be awarded for identifying the reason lying behind these shifts in tone and, more, these significant changes in course. The grim shadow of September 11 fell between the more modest, restrained, and limited Bush foreign-policy agenda beforehand, and the more ambitious, vigorous, and expansive course of action afterwards. A national shock of such magnitude went well beyond the usual incremental process of disappointment, adaptation, and familiarization that marked any new president's encounter with the ongoing realities of the outside world; rather, it was a watershed event that made the previously unthinkable seem natural and the hitherto reasonable appear inadequate. If the prospect of

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hanging concentrates the mind, the immediate fear of being blown up sharply changes it.

The most obvious effect of the disaster only eight months into the Bush presidency was the creation of an enormously heightened sense of threat; the world was simply a far more dangerous place than it had seemed before. The national security strategy bristles with such concerns about "the common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos." Gone are the rather academic discussions of terrorism that characterized much American attention to that phenomenon over the previous two decades. Instead, we see language that repeatedly identifies the threat as real, palpable, and deadly. So, too, the response, we are told, must be unmistakable, swift, and punishing. "We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best," the statement warns. "History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action." An array of "new deadly challenges" have made the "security environment more complex and dangerous" and "the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather." The implication is obvious: "Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive pos-

ture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first."⁵

Muscular action around the world in the face of looming perils, confidence that the spread of democracy will in and of itself help to stem the danger of international conflict, and a ready acceptance of the responsibility to remake other governments, both for reasons of American security and in the service of ideas that are "right and true for every person, in every society" all lead to the same conclusion on one consequence of 9-11: that it represents the victory of the neo-conservatives over the realists in a struggle for the mind of the President and the direction of his government. Observers inside and outside the administration take note and adjust their own actions accordingly; essays in *The National Interest* grow more critical, while even those who, like the National Security Adviser, had always identified themselves as realists make room for a greater role for ideas and a larger scope for the exercise of American power.

Such changes in relative influence between two groups that in reality share much in the way of policy prescription and—always vital in Washington and abroad—in

the identification of their mutual enemies might seem a paltry result of a cataclysmic attack and the even more serious danger that lies behind it. They are not, for ideas *do* matter. Because of this shift in the climate of ideas, American foreign policy will be bolder, if less nuanced; perhaps more consistent, though less self-critical. It will be ready to take greater risks in the pursuit of greater rewards, for evidence of which one need look no further than the struggle being waged in Iraq as these lines are being written. The changes will make Washington's actions more interesting to watch, though for some foreign powers the prospect will be a bit frightening—as it may be intended to be.

Familiar Landmarks

As important as these developments may be, however, they do not indicate that every aspect of the United States' foreign policy has been turned upside down—how could it, if we are not to say that the entire country has been altered beyond recognition?—and they do not mean that every guidepost dated before September 11, 2001 must be discarded. For one thing, the President remains the same—a soberer, more mature version, perhaps, but recognizably the same man in many of his attitudes and his beliefs. It

has been observed that a curious effect of the terrorist attacks has been to confirm all sides of every question in their beliefs: if one was convinced before that terrible day that more money needed to be spent on foreign aid, then one will cite those events to argue even more strongly for more aid; those who supported gun control prior to September 11 take it as a reason to redouble their efforts. So, too, it would not be surprising that the President, at the center of the maelstrom, would stiffen his resolve to stand by certain already formed ideas or habits of mind.

One example of the latter would be Bush the risk-taker. Here again, the non-Texan cannot say with confidence whether the willingness to take a chance is a birthright of every citizen of the Lone Star State⁶, but it seems long to have been part of the approach of a certain former governor now occupying the White House. It made itself known during the 2000 campaign in ways large and serious (candidate Bush's repeated emphasis on an ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs that would require dramatic transformation of American armed forces—a somewhat abstruse topic for a campaign speech, with no obvious appeal to identifiable voting blocs) and tactical, even quotidian (the decision to spend time at the conclusion of the campaign in California, in an

unsuccessful gamble or show of bravado). These examples of a readiness to roll the dice found echoes in the darker days following 2001. The forming of a tactical partnership with the Northern Alliance brought unexpectedly rapid victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 with only a small commitment of American forces. Overshadowing all other instances, however, is the decision to launch a campaign to overthrow Saddam Hussein and his regime with only a handful of allies in the field, with a prior air bombardment of much shorter duration than in 1990-91, and with considerably smaller ground forces than in that earlier confrontation with Iraq. Critics charged that the course chosen in Afghanistan, by relying on Afghan allies of uncertain allegiance, may have allowed Osama bin Laden to slip away, and the outcome of the drive on Baghdad is yet to be determined, but the fact that the costs could not be calculated with precision beforehand only demonstrates the President's occasional dalliance with *fortuna*. (Of slightly different emphasis but similar import is the comment by Fred Greenstein on the war with Iraq: "I view it as a very big gamble, but, judging from his equanimity, Bush seems not to—or perhaps is fatalistic."⁷) Gamblers rarely attribute their success to any fully rational calculation—

otherwise, their actions would not be a gamble—and Bush is no exception, saying of his own decision-making style, "I just think it's instinctive. I'm not a textbook player. I'm a gut player."⁸

The casino and the chapel rarely walk hand in hand, but it may be somewhat easier to associate two related characteristics of the Bush view of the world, a readiness to take risks, on the one hand, and a serene confidence and faith, on the other. It may be the certitude that one is in the hands of larger forces and the willingness to place one's future in the hands of those forces that imparts a toleration for what other, less certain persons might regard as unacceptable risks. Bush's religious faith is, to all outward appearances, sincere and deep-seated. His references to prayer and piety may grate on the sensibilities of leaders from a largely post-Christian Europe, they may draw fulminations from the *New York Times*, but there seems no reason to doubt that they represent the man himself. Nor is it implausible that a trust in the Deity over the snares and temptations of this world would have implications for public policy, as one Bush statement on the interrelationship between secular materialism in the United States and lack of credibility by the United States might indicate: "I do believe there is the image of America out there that we are so materialistic, that we're almost hedonistic, that we don't have values, and that when struck, we

wouldn't fight back. It was clear that bin Laden felt emboldened and didn't feel threatened by the United States."⁹ From an abiding faith one might draw the certitude that makes bearable the risks with which any president, and particularly any wartime president, must live. Certain matters may be taken out of one's hands, as a recent interpreter observes: "Practically, Bush's faith means that he does not tolerate, or even recognize, ambiguity: there is an all-knowing God who decrees certain behaviors, and leaders must obey."¹⁰

A leader who reckons chances with an *insouciance* not for the faint of heart and who trusts in the control over events exercised by a Power beyond space and time is not likely to fret over isolation in a good cause. Here, then, is a third trait that carries over from pre- to post-September 11 days: the readiness, indeed even perhaps the eagerness, to act alone. The famous charge of unilateralism is one to which Bush would plead unrepentantly guilty, over a long time. The bill of particulars brought against him on this score is familiar; it includes the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the refusal to join the International Criminal Court (and, going further, the withdrawal of the last-minute Clinton signature on the treaty establishing the ICC), the rejection of the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty, and the withdrawal from the ABM treaty, among other actions. It might be noted that in all these instances the United States was declining to sign up for a new international commitment or taking advantage of the provision in a treaty that allowed it to pull back from an existing commitment—actions the wisdom of which might be debated case by case, but not such as to justify the frequently heard charge that Washington had become an inveterate violator of international law. What bound these actions together, then, was that they all represented instances of a kind of unilateralism of restraint, in which the country, or the President, informed other capitals that they might do as they wished on these matters and the United States would not interfere, but that it did not intend to participate itself.

What was new after September 11 was that unilateralism became mixed with activism. The national security statement leaves its readers in no doubt on this score. In the matter of terrorism, it puts other states on notice that "we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country." In the matter of weapons of mass destruction (which could, of course, fall into the hands of terrorists as well as states), it sounds this theme even more insistently:

"The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." Finally, it gives notice to allies, concluding, "In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require. When we disagree on particulars, we will explain forthrightly the grounds for our concerns and strive to forge viable alternatives."¹¹

Such are the words of a public pronouncement, the product of months of committee deliberations and arguments. The striking point is that the same theme repeatedly finds its way into the President's own remarks in private settings. In a meeting with his highest-level advisers four days after September 11, he is quoted as recognizing that other states might drop out of a war on terrorism the terms of

which were dictated by Washington: "At some point, we may be the only ones left. That's okay with me. We are America."¹² On another occasion, he takes a different tack, arguing that unilateralism is another name for leadership that will bring other states along in support: "I mean, you know, if you want to hear resentment, just listen to the word unilateralism. I mean, that's resentment. If somebody wants to try to say something ugly about us, 'Bush is a unilateralist, America is unilateral.' You know, which I find amusing. But . . . I've been to meetings where there's a kind of 'we must not act until we're all in agreement,'" a sentiment the President obviously found a formula for paralysis. "Well, we're never going to get people all in agreement about force and use of force. But action—confident action that will yield positive results provides kind of a slipstream into which reluctant nations and leaders can get behind and show themselves that . . . something positive has happened toward peace."¹³

New Orders from the Helm

It goes without saying that the great bulk of foreign policy does not change dramatically, either in the transition from one president to another or over the course of a single presidential term. A hundred thousand routine actions take place daily regardless of the occupant of the

White House. A select few areas of policy in which a president chooses to concentrate time, attention, and publicity, nonetheless, may make a profound difference in the course of the country and, in the case of a country as powerful as the United States, the shape of the international system. In the case of George W. Bush, one event, comparable to almost no other single instance in any other presidency, has brought about a wrenching shift in direction. Important elements of continuity remain, and some contend that even now there has been no final bridging of "the deeper fault line that has lurked below the surface of George W. Bush's foreign policy from the day he took office—the struggle between the realist philosophy of his father and the competing pull of neo-Reaganism."¹⁴ It is the contention of this essay that the contest has been more definitively decided than that, with significant implications for every question of foreign policy, including ultimate issues of war and peace. Yet what Brzezinski said of Nixon's Doctrine more than thirty years ago remains true of Bush's innovations in an unprecedented era of peril—that even the most dramatic announcements are no more than part of "a continuous process of redefinition of American foreign policy in the light of new domestic and international circumstances."¹⁵

1.Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Half Past Nixon," *Foreign Policy* 3 (Summer 1971): 3-21, p. 3.

2.Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (January/February 2000): 45-62, p. 46.

3.Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), p. 339.

4.Office of the President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* [hereafter *NSS*], September 2002.

5.Ibid.

6. The editor, being a Texan, can attest that it is.

7."Gambling on war, Bush puts presidency on line," *The Times-Picayune* (New Orleans), 23 March 2003, p. A20.

8.Bernstein, *Bush at War*, p. 137.

9.Ibid., pp. 38-39.

10.Richard Brookhiser, "The Mind of George W. Bush," *The Atlantic Monthly* (April 2003), p. 63.

Brookhiser adds, in a comment that bears on the contemporary Anglo-American military action against Iraq, "Such beliefs, however much they may alienate him from opinion-makers, are part of his bond with one other leader—the devout Anglican Tony Blair."

11.*NSS*.

12.Bernstein, *Bush at War*, p. 81. See also p. 106. But see the cautionary response made by Secretary of State Colin Powell at a later meeting (p. 333).

13.Ibid., p. 341.

14.Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 82 (January/February 2003): 84-97, p. 97.

15.Brzezinski, "Half Past Nixon," p. 20.

Teaching the Presidency at the U.S. Military Academy

by Meena Bose

When I joined the United States Military Academy in Fall 2000, I never imagined that I would be teaching the American presidency in an historic year. After all, the United States had not witnessed a presidential election in which the popular and electoral college votes conflicted since 1888. Cadets frequently asked whether I thought Al Gore would win the electoral college vote and George W. Bush would win the popular vote, and I confidently said we would wake up Wednesday after Election Day and know without a doubt who was the president-elect.

I tell this story to my presidency course every fall, and cadets gleefully delight in this tale of a political scientist's prediction gone awry.¹ They ask why political science focuses on analysis and generalization when history is so interesting, especially in presidency studies. My challenge is to teach them to enjoy thinking critically and to understand how they can employ evidence to develop broader arguments about

presidential leadership and power.

After reading Professor Doug Brattebo's fine article on teaching the American presidency at the United States Naval Academy, I thought presidency scholars might enjoy the perspective of another civilian who teaches at a service academy, in my case the United States Military Academy at West Point. I have taught the basic American presidency course here three times, as well as three times at Hofstra University, and each time I find that I tinker with about twenty percent of the course. Most recently, I created a group exercise based upon the experience of Professor Charles Walcott at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, as discussed in the Fall 2000 PRG Report.

In what follows, I provide some basic information about teaching political science at West Point, and then present the goals and structure of my American presidency course. I also summarize my experience with the group exercise in two settings, my presidency course and my American foreign policy course. After seven years of teaching, I have found that undergraduates learn most about the American presidency when they write research papers with an analytical, not purely descriptive, focus, and when they concentrate on case studies.

Teaching at West Point

West Point is composed of thirteen academic departments, seven in scientific fields (Chemistry and Life Science, Civil and Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, Geography and Environmental Engineering, Mathematical Sciences, Physics, Systems Engineering) and six in the humanities and social sciences (Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, En-

Professor Brattebo's article, "Teaching the Presidency at the U.S. Naval Academy," appears on page 29 of the Fall 2002 PRG Report.

Professor Walcott's article, "Teaching the Presidency: Presidential Advising Simulation," appears on page 11 of the Fall 2000 PRG Report.

Both articles are available at the PRG Report's online home at: www.tulane.edu/~polisci

glish, Foreign Languages, History, Law, Social Sciences). All cadets take a thirty-one-course core curriculum, of which sixteen courses are in the humanities and social sciences, and fifteen are in math, science, and engineering. They may specialize in a major, or they can elect to complete a field of study, which requires slightly fewer courses than a major. West Point faculty are both civilian and military, with approximately twenty-two percent civilians, sixty percent rotating military faculty (whom the Army typically sends to graduate school to complete a master's degree and then brings to West Point to teach for three years), and eighteen percent senior military faculty (who, like civilians, have doctoral degrees).²

The Department of Social Sciences, in which I teach, offers both economics and political science courses. We offer majors in American Politics, Comparative Politics, Economics, and International Relations. West Point's first, second, and sixth most popular majors are International Relations, Economics, and American Politics, respectively. The department offers sixty-one courses, of which two political science courses are required for all cadets: American Politics,

usually taken in the second year, and International Relations, usually taken in the third year. In their first two years at West Point, cadets typically take core courses, and electives are reserved primarily for their junior and senior years. Of the 40-60 cadets I teach each fall in the American Presidency course, usually in sections of 12-15, most are seniors, though we have recently had more juniors take electives as well.³

Presidency Studies

The basic American presidency course is largely a survey of presidency studies, though I do devote one quarter of the semester to intensive case studies. For the past two years, I also have taught an advanced presidency research seminar, in which cadets examine transcripts of conversations from the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, and evaluate the implications of the material for presidential leadership and decision making. This seminar provides a foundation for students considering graduate study to experience the challenges and joys of primary research, and also prepares juniors for writing a senior thesis.

The goals of my basic

American presidency course are fourfold: to examine the historical development of the presidency and presidential power; to study the presidential selection process, presidential public relations, and presidential governance with other institutions; to analyze the challenges of modern presidential leadership through detailed case studies; and to improve cadets' analytical reasoning and oral and written communication skills. Throughout the course, we consider the following questions:

How has the massive increase in resources and responsibilities since Franklin D. Roosevelt's (FDR's) administration shaped the presidency as an institution? To what degree is presidential power still dependent on the person in the Oval Office? Of what consequence are differences in presidential leadership styles and advisory systems, and can we reach broad conclusions about those differences?

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To address these questions, we begin by analyzing the constitutional origins of the presidency and the evolution of presidential power from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century. In so doing, we focus particularly on the development of the "modern" presidency.⁴ We next turn to presidential selection and governance, examining the election process (nomination, campaign, and general election), as well as presidential interaction with the public and media. We conclude the first half of the course by examining how the presidency operates in conjunction with other national institutions, namely the executive office, federal bureaucracy, Congress, and Supreme Court.⁵

In the second half of the course, we analyze the institution of the presidency more closely, focusing on presidential policy making. We examine how presidents make decisions about policy options, how the president's personality shapes performance in office, and how presidential power influences civil-military relations. We then evaluate the development of the modern presidency through case

studies. We examine the growth of the presidency as an institution in the past seventy years and compare how individual presidents from FDR to George W. Bush have used their increased power.⁶

Our class meets for forty, 55-minute lessons, and I usually assign about 50-75 pages of reading per class. (I have long given up on responding to student complaints about too much reading; at a recent lunch celebration with cadets, I mentioned that I had organized a book group and that participants think my assignments are too long. A cadet aptly pointed out that "they're not the first.") In the midterm exam, I include quotation identification (from classic texts such as *Federalist 70*, Thomas Jefferson's Inaugural Address, etc.), short answers, and an essay question. The final exam is usually a take-home essay evaluating the challenges of presidential leadership in the twenty-first century, with some focus on current events.

I usually have a small writing/presentation exercise early in the term, and the capstone experience of the course is a

12-15 page research paper analyzing a case study in the modern presidency. Students must examine a question with an analytical basis in presidency studies – for example, "What happened to President Clinton's health care reform initiative" is insufficient because it is a descriptive question, but "Why was President Clinton unable to pass a major health care reform bill in his first term?" raises questions about presidential vision and political skill that can provide larger lessons about presidential leadership. Students are expected to use an analytical framework to organize their argument, and cadets often apply Richard E. Neustadt's model of presidential power or Fred I. Greenstein's criteria for presidential leadership to their case study. They must use an extensive bibliography in their research, including books, scholarly journals, newspaper/magazine articles, and government documents, such as presidential speeches, congressional hearings, or sources from presidential library websites.

When I query cadets about their favorite part of the course, their an-

swer is consistently "case studies." As students of leadership, cadets are particularly interested in learning about both successes and failures in presidential leadership and policy making, from the passage of FDR's New Deal legislation to Richard M. Nixon's resignation. They are keen to identify the extent of and limits to presidential power, especially in foreign policy. For example, after reading Neustadt's study of why and how President Harry Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur from command in 1951, several cadets invariably choose to examine that topic further for their research paper. Our discussion of presidential foreign policy making centers on the president's role as commander in chief of the armed forces, and the necessary subordination of the military to civilian leadership in American democracy. The presidential selection process also fascinates cadets, from fundraising to primaries to the electoral college. About fifteen percent of West Point cadets are women, and discussion of future presidential candidates always sparks questions about when we are likely to see a woman president.

To enliven our classes, I

typically show short video clips every few meetings, and the most popular ones are presidential campaign ads from 1952 to the present, excerpts from presidential debates, John F. Kennedy's press conferences, and the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates. I also show excerpts from the "recent" past, such as Ronald Reagan's D-Day anniversary speech in Normandy on June 6, 1984. PBS's American Experience documentaries on the presidency provide a wealth of material from which to glean excerpts that tie into class discussions.

Whenever possible, I also bring in guest speakers, and I try to arrange at least one cadet trip for the course. In Fall 2000, my class accompanied me to Hofstra University's symposium on presidential leadership and ratings, which I had helped organize. Last fall we had the unique opportunity to visit the Secret Service and White House, and also to participate in the Center for the Study of the Presidency's Fall Conference. Our guest speakers have included journalists, presidential speech writers, military leaders, and political commentators.

Group Exercise

Another way in which I vary cadet learning is through a group exercise, usually one each semester. I developed the exercise after reading Professor Walcott's thoughtful analysis of the presidential advising simulation he employs in his presidency course. I always include at least one assignment in my courses in which students work together, and in the past I have relied on policy debates, which force students to present and defend a position, and to respond to each other's views. The small class size at West Point, however, makes debate part of our daily class routine, so I decided to try a more formal exercise.

The group project requires students to work together in groups of 5-8 to evaluate a high-priority policy issue on the president's agenda. Like Professor Walcott, I assign students in each group to evaluate the issue from the perspective of one of the president's advisers, such as chief of staff, director of communications, congressional liaison, etc. The groups (usually two per class) prepare a twenty-minute briefing for the class, in which each member participates, and students

independently write a two-page paper summarizing their own key findings and conclusions. Thus, students are graded both collectively on the presentation and individually on their papers. Because cadets also write a research paper in the course, I require only a short written assignment for this project, and I hold the exercise early in the semester, so I can begin to assess their analytical skills.

I have tried the group exercise four times, both in American Presidency and American Foreign Policy, and each time the exercise has improved. In Fall 2001, I had expected students to focus on tax cuts and education, but after September 11, students chose to analyze the battle against terrorism and the challenges of airline security. I made the mistake of describing the writing assignment as a "memo," which has a specific meaning in the Army, namely numbered points, not an essay format. Therefore, the written part of the group exercise was not as thorough as I would have liked. Since then, I have described the writ-

ing assignment as a "position paper," for which students are expected to conduct outside research in newspapers and other periodicals, and they typically don't have any problem finding a diverse range of sources to make their arguments. For the group presentation, students use PowerPoint slides to highlight key points, but they may use slides for outline purposes only. The slides therefore serve to help organize the presentation without overwhelming the audience with too much information.

Cadets enjoy discussing current events, and they appreciate the opportunity to evaluate current issues of interest (in American Foreign Policy, they have most recently examined U.S. policy toward Iraq) in a formal presentation. They also like to focus on one adviser's perspective, though sometimes they try to adhere too closely to the views of the individual currently in that role, rather than the constraints and demands of the role itself. After witnessing this effort on a few occasions, I now tell cadets to concentrate on both the office and the individual,

and to discuss potential conflicts with other advisers.

The most frequent requests are for more class time to work together and more time to ask questions of each group. Although I am sympathetic to the first challenge, cadets all live on post and generally can find time to meet together if they plan in advance. The syllabus discusses the group exercise, and I assign roles about three weeks before presentations. Therefore, I do not assign class time for them to prepare for the exercise, but I expect that would be necessary if several students lived off campus. I always try to leave more time for questions, but each group takes about twenty minutes, and with two groups in a class, that leaves only about 5-7 minutes for questions per group. I have considered holding the group exercise over two class periods, but other class requirements make that difficult. I certainly plan to continue using the group exercise, as it requires students to think systematically about current policy questions, and to work together to present their findings. Another possibility

would be to have students work together to teach a class, but I am still developing that idea (perhaps a future PRG article!).

Conclusion

Every time I teach the American Presidency, I am inspired and encouraged by student enthusiasm for the subject. Students at West Point are especially keen to understand successes and failures of presidential leadership, and to evaluate the power of the presidency as an institution. Several students have told me after taking the course that they find lessons of presidential leadership applicable to their future military careers. Their dedication to unearthing how presidents make and implement decisions most effectively makes this course challenging and rewarding for all of us who teach them.

¹I also share with them the conclusions of an American Political Science Association panel from September 2000, in which political scientists agreed that Al Gore would likely win the

election, and differed only on the percentage of the popular vote they thought he would garner. See Adam Clymer, "And the Winner is Gore, If They Got the Math Right," *New York Times*, 4 September 2000, A15.

² Basic information about West Point's curriculum is available at <http://www.usma.edu/academics.asp>. Also see James JF Forest, "Service Academies in the United States: Issues of Context, Curriculum, and Assessment," in *Studying Diverse Students and Institutions: New Directions for Institutional Research*, eds. C. Brown and F. Laanan (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, forthcoming).

³ To learn more about the Department of Social Sciences's course offerings and activities, see <http://www.dean.usma.edu/sosh/index>.

⁴ Sample texts for this portion of the course include Michael A. Genovese, *The Power of the American Presidency* (Oxford University Press, 2001); Sidney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson, *The American Presidency: Origins and Development 1776-2002*,

4th ed. (CQ Press, 2003); Michael Nelson, ed., *The Evolving Presidency* (CQ Press, 1999); Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents* (Free Press, 1990).

⁵ Sample texts for this section of the course include George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne, *Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policymaking*, 6th ed. (Wadsworth, 2003); James P. Pfiffner, *The Modern Presidency*, 3rd ed. (Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999); Stephen J. Wayne, *The Road to the White House 2000* (Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001).

⁶ For case studies, we read Fred I. Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference* (Princeton University Press, 2001), and David Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power* (Simon and Schuster, 2000).

(Cont'd) The Progressive Party Campaign of 1912 and the Birth of Modern American Politics

(Continued from page 1)

time an important factor in a presidential nomination contest, TR bolted the Republican Party. He then stood at Armageddon ready to battle not just for the Lord, but for a new idea and practice of democracy. TR's crusade made universal use of the direct primary a celebrated cause; assaulted traditional partisan loyalties;

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took advantage of the centrality of the newly emergent mass media; and convened an energetic but uneasy coalition of self-styled public advocacy groups — all of which make the election of 1912 look more like that of 2000 than that of 1896, the last presidential election unaffected by the Progressive impulse. As a party that embraced and went far in legitimizing new social movements and candidate-centered campaigns, the Progressive party animated a plebiscitary form of popular rule that evolved over the course of the twentieth century and, appears, for better or worse, to have come into its own in recent elections.

embraced and went far in legitimizing new social movements and candidate-centered campaigns, the Progressive party animated a plebiscitary form of popular rule that evolved over the course of the twentieth century and, appears, for better or worse, to have come into its own in recent elections.

I.

The Progressive party's enduring legacy defies its brief existence. When TR refused to run again in 1916, he doomed the Progressive party to the dustbin of history.

Still, the platform of the Progressive Party would endure. The party itself was an extension of the candidate, but its platform represented the culmination of a collective programmatic effort that included many reformers who were at the vanguard of progressive reform. For example, the celebrated social worker Jane Addams and the highly regarded journalist William Allen White played critical parts in the platform's creation. Among its planks were proposals for national regulations and social welfare that would not be enacted until the New Deal. There are indeed striking parallels between the Bull Moose platform of 1912 and the platform of the Democratic Party of 1936.

Moreover, the Progressive Party advocated measures for so-called "pure" democracy, including not only the direct election of Senators and women's suffrage, but also the universal use of the direct primary, the initiative and referendum (including referenda on laws that state courts declared unconstitutional), and an easier method to amend the Constitution. As we know from recent events across the country, it is these same measures that continue to inspire and propel activists across the political spectrum. Militant conservatives no less than militant liberals carry on the progressive crusade, often through means made possible by progressive victories of the past, to further decrease the constitutional distance that separates the cup of power from the lips of the people

(Ellis, Broder).

II.

The Progressive Party's political program had such enduring effects because it was oriented towards constitutional change, and was, contrary to common suppositions, was not an elite-centered agenda. Its declaration of "pure democracy" was sanctified as a "covenant with the people," a deep and abiding pledge to make the people the "masters of their Constitution." In truth, it was the reformers' commitment to mass democracy rather than their dedication to build a modern state that aroused the enthusiasm behind the Progressive Party's crusade (Sanders, Ritter). The profound shift in regime norms and practices represented by progressivism did not entail a straightforward evolution from localized to "Big Government."

The Progressive Party was badly crippled by fundamental disagreements among its supporters over issues that betrayed an acute sensitivity, if not attachment to the deep roots of local self-government. The party was bitterly divided over civil rights, leading to struggles at the Progressive party convention over delegate selection rules and the platform that turned on whether the party should confront the shame of Jim Crow. In the end, it did not, and accepted the right of states and localities to resolve the matter of race relations.

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On civil rights, the Progressives in 1912 came down on the side of localism and tradition. In the party's effort to forge a common strategy on the Trusts, the party veered in an opposite direction, leaving the localist position available for cooption by the Democrats. At the 1912 convention, the Progressive Party waged an enervating struggle over the appropriate method to tame the Trusts. Some delegates wished to push for energetic antitrust enforcement, which would break up the biggest and most offensive trusts. Others thought a solution that would expand the power of the central government through an interstate trade commission. The commission would decide which trusts should be tolerated and which should not. New Nationalists, led by Roosevelt, prevailed, pledging the party to regulate rather than dismantle corporate power. As a consequence, the Democrats and Wilson, influenced by the tutorials of his advisor Louis Brandeis, embraced the New Freedom version of progressivism, which prescribed antitrust measures and state regulations as an alternative to the expansion of national administrative power. Like their Jeffersonian and Jacksonian forbears, New Freedom progressives believed constitutional government had to be decentralized to make popular sovereignty effective. The split between New Nationalism and New Freedom progressives cut to very core of the modern state that, ostensibly, the programmatic initiatives touted by Progressives anticipated. Just as the issues of race and states rights have hindered contemporary

progressivism, i.e., "liberalism," so this was true at the very birth of twentieth century reform.

Nevertheless, there was one party doctrine that unified the disparate strands of progressivism: "the rule of the people." Sensing that "pure democracy" was the glue that held together the movement he sought to lead, Roosevelt made the cause of popular rule the centerpiece of his insurgent presidential campaign. As TR said in his "Confession of Faith" speech at the Progressive party convention of 1912 (his stand at Armageddon): "(T)he first essential of the Progressive program is the right of the people to rule." TR's very appearance at the Progressive Party's convention symbolized a new relationship between leader and led. He, not his cousin Franklin, was the first major candidate for president to accept the nomination of his party in person. TR's appearance with his running mate, California Governor Hiram Johnson, was meant to signal a new, more direct relationship between presidential candidates and the people (Record of Proceedings). TR's appearance at the convention so aroused the Progressive party delegates' passion that it could only be calmed by their singing the Battle Hymn of the Republic, repeatedly. The delegates' reverence for their candidate expressed a collective identity. The Progressives viewed themselves as the carriers of the flame of American unity and reconciliation.

The program of direct rule of the people that became the Progressive Plat-

form of 1912 was highly controversial, especially its call for referenda on court decisions. But TR's campaign was even more controversial than the Progressive platform. To the surprise of his progressive rival, Robert LaFollette, TR did not temporize; instead, his defense of direct democracy became bolder during the general election. He announced toward the end of September, in a speech at Phoenix, Arizona, that if elected he "would go even further than the Progressive party platform." For example, he would apply the "recall to everybody [to all public officials], including the President." Even the Great Commoner, the Populist Democrat, William Jennings Bryan, blushed. Populist methods such as the recall, Bryan insisted, should not be nationalized; they should be confined to the States.

III.

TR's success in the primaries, combined with his steadfast defense of pure democracy during the general election campaign, made the contest of 1912 unusually important. Like the elections of 1800, 1860, and 1936, the election of 1912 was a rare campaign in the United States that touched on first principles. Unlike 1800, 1860, and 1936, the 1912 contest did not bring about a full-scale partisan realignment, which in part explains why its significance has so far been obscured. It does, however, have a place in the history of partisan realignments, for it set in motion critical secular developments that would weaken the

party system and make less likely the partisan realignments it provided for.

Because of Wilson's willingness to coopt portions of the Progressive agenda, there is a real sense in which the most important exchange in this surrogate constitutional convention of 1912 was between TR and Taft. Taft, ridiculed by TR supporters as "the hereditary heretic of American political history," had actually supported and extended the pragmatic progressivism that characterized Roosevelt's presidency. Despite this, Taft now found himself castigated as an unworthy heir of the great Roosevelt. Roosevelt, now the champion of direct democracy and peoples' rights, labeled his Republican opponent a "conservative," a pejorative signifying to all good Progressives that Taft was an enemy of the people

In the end, however, Taft found honor in the charge of conservatism leveled against him. Facing sure electoral defeat, he stood pat in defense of the Constitution, which, he insisted, the Progressive idea of democracy threatened to destroy. In doing so, he tried to formulate a position of conservative progressivism. Taft agreed that some reform of the national convention system was necessary, perhaps through state primaries, but never a national primary. And, while admitting that no political system could avoid completely the effects of corruption, he urged his fellow Republicans to rise above the patronage politics that had so long dominated party government. In response to TR's attack on political parties, Taft emphasized that parties had the responsibility to endorse and defend constitutional principles. More

pointedly, Taft argued that the Progressive's attack on the very idea of representation called for a new understanding of Republican conservatism. He sought in this way to hitch, or elevate, the Republican Party's commitment to industrial capitalism, the cause of McKinley and Hanna, to a Whiggish defense of ordered liberty. If Taft were an enemy of the people, Roosevelt was an enemy of order and the Constitution itself. "It was unthinkable," he told an audience in Boston, MA, "that Roosevelt should seriously propose to have a plebiscite on questions involving the construction of the Constitution."

Despite Taft's indictment that the Progressives threatened to trash the Constitution, despite the hope of TR's political enemies that such a bold campaign would kill him politically, the Progressive party campaign of 1912 had an enduring influence on American politics and government. It was not Roosevelt, but Taft who suffered a humiliating defeat; Taft won only 2 states (Utah and Vermont) and 23.2% of the popular vote. In contrast, TR's strong showing, and his dominant presence in that campaign, signaled the beginnings of an important change in American democracy, the birth of modern democracy.

IV.

The message of direct democracy resonated in the country. Progressives insisted, with considerable political effect, that the political reforms they championed were not a radical rejection of the American constitutional tradition, but an effort to strengthen it in the face of the hard challenges thrown up by the new industrial order. In fact, they claimed, it was an effort to fulfill

the true purpose of the Constitution. The obstacle to Progressive Democracy, Progressives insisted, was not the Constitution; rather it was the extra-constitutional party system. The decentralized party system (born of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy), they argued, had perverted the original design of the Constitution, which was dedicated to emancipating the democratic individual from provincial and sectional interests. Significantly, the primary, referendum, and recall were devices that asked citizens to vote as individuals. Progressives scorned the Democratic and Republican parties – formed on personal, family, and community attachments. By the same token, they found repugnant the idea of sectarian partisanship – where individual voting decisions were submerged in class or racial conflicts. Put simply, the Progressive campaign of 1912 was an attack on the whole concept of political parties. In its celebration of devices such as the direct primary, initiative, recall, and referenda (even on court rulings), the Progressive party was a party to end party politics. This was not an attack on the Constitution, Progressives insisted, but a rejection of the way Jeffersonians and Jacksonians had misinterpreted it.

In the final analysis, the Progressive attack on political parties, and the Progressive faith in public opinion, can be viewed as a compromise with the American people's fear of a centralized state. While on the one hand the Progressives would strengthen national administrative power; on the other hand they would ensure that the people have command of it. Support for measures such as the primary, recall, and referendum

displayed a willingness on the part of reformers to accommodate fears engendered by other aspects of their agenda. Jane Adams, who became the first woman to nominate a presidential candidate when she seconded TR's nomination at the Bull Moose, stated this concession to public opinion clearly in a 1914 Lincoln day address. A welfare state could not be created in the United States, she insisted, through the sort of corporatist arrangements that were being formed in Europe and Great Britain. A welfare state could be formed in the United States only when "the power of direct legislation is placed in the hands of the people, in order that these changes may come, not as the centralized government [has] given them, from above down, but may come from the people up; that the people shall be the directing and controlling factors in this legislation."

The Progressive Party received welcome acknowledgment of its support for American democracy in its well-publicized endorsement by Thomas Edison (the most "useful" man in America). Edison's allegiance was announced with great fanfare by the New York Times in an article with the appropriate headline, "Edison Discovers He is A Bull Mooser" His experiments led to electric bulbs replacing gas lights; by the same token, Edison claimed, the Progressive Party heralded the displacement of party politics by democratic innovations such as the referendum and recall. Such political experimentation, Edison insisted, celebrated, rather than diminished, American individu-

alism.

TR's more radical critics agreed, although grumpily, that progressive democracy posed no threat to the American political heritage. The Socialist candidate Eugene Debs attacked the Progressive party as "a reactionary protest of the middle classes, built largely upon the personality of one man and not destined for permanence." Progressive fragility stemmed not just from TR's notoriety, Debs argued, but also from the flimsy doctrine that underlay it. Although supportive of political reform, Debs had long considered devices such as the referendum a very small part of the Socialist party program. Adding insult to injury, the Progressives chose the red bandanna as the symbol of their party. Understandably, Debs was furious. Not only did TR "steal the red flag of socialism," but also the Socialists' thunder, just when they seemed to be emerging as an important influence in the country. Why no socialism in America? The Progressive party is an important part of that complex story.

V.

The Progressive Party's compromise" with public opinion speaks to its legacy for American politics and government. Although the Progressive Party was forlorn by 1916, it advanced the fortunes of a movement of public opinion that affected the prestige and fortunes of all political leaders. The Progressives dominated the debate of the 1912 election, and beyond the 1912 election, its program of political and social reform has been an enduring fea-

ture of American political discourse and electoral struggle. The Progressive party forged a path that left both conservatism (Taft's constitutional sobriety) and social democracy (Debs) behind. Similarly, TR's celebrity, and the popularity of his doctrine of the right of the people to rule, tended to subordinate the more populist to the most plebiscitary schemes in his party's platform – such as the initiative, the referendum, and direct primary, which exalted not the "grass roots" but mass opinion. In the wake of the excitement the Progressive party aroused, Wilson, whose New Freedom campaign was far more sympathetic to the localized democracy of the nineteenth century than TR's, felt compelled to govern more as a New Nationalist than a New Freedom progressive; by the same token, he considered it appropriate to justify and to advance the executive's responsibility to be a leader of mass opinion (Tulis). With the celebration of public opinion spawned by the Progressive party campaign of 1912, even conservatives like Coolidge were forced to go directly to the public to ensure support for themselves and their policies. LaFollette's insurgent campaign of 1924, in which he earned 16% of the popular vote, is further evidence that Progressivism did not go into hibernation during the 1920s. LaFollette in that year ran a truly independent campaign. His candidacy lacked any semblance of a party organization. As such, it advanced further the progressive concept of direct democracy.

Of course, the Progressive Party campaign and its aftermath is only the beginning of the story of the birth of modern

(Continued from page 26)
 American politics. It fell to FDR, who was inspired by TR's campaign, to consolidate the developments begun by the Progressive party. Like the Progressive party, the New Deal Democratic Party was formed to advance the personal and nonpartisan responsibility of the executive at the expense of collective and partisan responsibility. (It, too, was a party to end party politics.) Understood within the context of the Progressive tradition, the New Deal is appropriately viewed as the completion of a realignment that would make future partisan realignments unnecessary. It was to be but a way station on the road to progressive democracy, where, to quote the important New Deal Brownlow Committee report on administrative reform: "Our national will must be expressed not merely in a brief exultant moment of electoral decision, but in persistent, determined, competent day-by-day administration of what the nation has decided to do."

This hope speaks tellingly of the strengths and weaknesses of progressive democracy. The expansion of national administrative power that followed the New Deal realignment did not result in the form of national state progressive reformers had championed -- one that established regulation and social welfare policy that could be expressions of national unity and popular commitment. Rather, a study of the Progressive Party sheds light on the love-hate relationship Americans forged with the state in the twentieth

century. Certainly, our current politics does not confidently presume the existence of a national state. The 1996 and 2000 presidential elections revealed that middle class entitlements, such as Social Security and Medicare, are still popular. At the same time, the rejection of national health care reform and the devolution of responsibility for welfare (AFDC) to the states show that Americans continue to abhor in principle the national administrative power that they embrace in many important particulars. The state's fragile foundation is further tested by the political formula we have adopted to ease our anxiety about national administrative power -- to give the "people" more control over it. "Pure" democracy has evolved, or degenerated, into a plebiscitary form of politics that mocks the Progressive concept of "enlightened administration" and exposes citizens to the sort of public figures (Ross Perot most recently) who will exploit their impatience with the difficult tasks involved in sustaining a healthy democracy.

There is not enough space here to consider how the momentous events of September 11th and their aftermath have ameliorated what Putnam and others have identified as a crisis of American citizenship. But the debates over homeland security [and the potential shift to a preemptive posture in world affairs] suggest that our schizophrenic relationship with the state has not been overcome, but rather deepened by the war between freedom and fear now going on in America. The Bush Administration's brand of conservatism, in fact, confirms what we have known since Proposition 13 (if not

Calvin Coolidge): that contemporary conservatives, no less than liberals now choose to draw on progressive solutions; that the conservative movement is now dominated by activists who rest their hopes for change in the possibility that Progressive politics and institutions can be reinvented as agents of conservatism.

Those who blame television or campaign finance practices for this development would be well served by a careful study of the deep roots of the progressive tradition. For better or worse, the Progressive democracy championed by TR in 1912, and the love-hate relationship with the state it has led to, now seem to be coming into their own. In this sense, the Progressive Party campaign of 1912 might very well provide useful - and troubling -- insights into the future of American politics.

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Book Scan — Books on the Presidency

by Meena Bose

The following list was compiled through a search of <http://www.amazon.com> for books on the American presidency published in late 2002 or early 2003, or scheduled for publication in the next few months. Due to space constraints, the list focuses on books that may be useful for research and/or teaching, and books listed in previous issues are not included again, unless a new edition is available. Whenever possible, entries include page count, price, and ISBN number.

Bose, Meena, and Rosanna Perotti, eds. *From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George Bush*. Greenwood Publishing Group. 584 pp. \$94.95 cloth, ISBN 0313316821.

Bromley, Michael L. *William Howard Taft and the First Motor- ing Presidency, 1909-1913*. McFarland and Co. 400 pp. \$49.95 cloth, ISBN 0786414758.

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Buhite, Russell D., ed. *Call to Arms: Presidential Speeches, Messages, and Declarations of War*. Scholarly Resources. 358 pp. \$65 cloth, ISBN 0842025928; \$22.95 paper, ISBN 0842025936.

Campbell, Colin, and Bert A. Rockman, eds. *The George W. Bush Presidency: First Appraisals*. Chatham House. 320 pp. \$24.95 paper, ISBN 1889119865.

Carter, John J. *Covert Operations and the Emergence of the Modern American Presidency, 1920-1960*. Edwin Mellen Press. 197 pp. \$109.95 cloth, ISBN 0773469370.

Conley, Richard Steven, ed. *Reassessing the Reagan Presidency*. Rowman & Littlefield. \$43 cloth, ISBN 0761824839.

Denton, Robert E., and Rachel L. Holloway. *Images, Scandal, and Communication Strategies of the Clinton Presidency*. Praeger. \$75 cloth, ISBN 0275971759; \$29.95 paper, ISBN 0275971767.

Eisinger, Robert M. *The Evolution of Presidential Polling*. Cambridge University Press. 220 pp. \$60 cloth, ISBN 0521816807; \$22 paper, ISBN 0521017009.

Feldman, Leslie D., and Rosanna Perotti, eds. *Honor and Loyalty: Inside the Politics of the Bush White House*. Greenwood Publishing Group. \$94.95 cloth, ISBN 0313316848.

Fife, Brian L, and GERALYN M. MILLER. *Political Culture and Voting Systems in the United States: An Examination of the 2000 Presidential Election*. Praeger. 112 pp. \$57.95 cloth, ISBN 0275975800.

Frum, David. *The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush*. Random House. 384 pp. \$25.95 cloth, ISBN 0375509038.

Giglio, James N., and Stephen G. Rabe. *Debating the Kennedy Presidency*. Rowman & Littlefield. 208 pp. \$65 cloth, ISBN 0742508331; \$17.95 paper, ISBN 074250834X.

Gould, Lewis L., and Richard Norton Smith. *The Modern American Presidency*. University Press of Kansas. 296 pp. \$29.95 cloth, ISBN 0700612521.

Holland, Barbara. *Hail to the Chiefs: Presidential Michief, Morals, and Malarkey from George W. to George W.* Permanent Press. 280 pp. \$28 cloth, ISBN 1579620817.

Horn, Geoffrey M. *The Presidency*. World Almanac Education. \$14.60 cloth, ISBN 0836854632;

Howard, Thomas C., and William D. Pederson, eds. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Formation of the Modern World*. M.E. Sharpe. 268 pp. \$64.95 cloth, ISBN 0765610302; \$23.95 paper, ISBN 0765610310.

Hubbard, Charles M., ed. *Lincoln Reshapes the Presidency*. Mercer University Press. \$29.95 cloth, ISBN 086554817X.

Jones, Howard. *Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War*. Oxford University Press. 640 pp. \$35 cloth, ISBN 0195052862.

Klein, Joe. *The Natural: The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton*. Broadway Books. 240 pp. \$14 paper, 0767914120.

Kumar, Martha Joynt, and Terry Sullivan, eds. *White House World: Transitions, Organizations, and Office Operations*. Texas A&M University Press. 432 pp. \$49.95 cloth, ISBN 1585442232; \$19.95 paper, ISBN 1585442275.

Langston, Thomas S. with the assistance of Michael G. Sherman. *George Washington*. CQ Press. 320 pp. \$89.95 Hardbound, ISBN 156802763X.

Martin, Janet M., and Margaret Coel. *The American Presidency and Women: Promise, Performance, and Illusion*. Texas A&M University Press. 416 pp. \$55 cloth, ISBN

1585442453.

Milkis, Sidney M., and Michael Nelson. *The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776-2002*. 4th ed. Congressional Quarterly. \$41.95 cloth, ISBN 1568027397.

Moore, James C., and Wayne Slater. *Bush's Brain: How Karl Rove Made George W. Bush President*. John Wiley & Sons. 400 pp. \$27.95 cloth, ISBN 0471423270.

Nelson, Michael, and Anne M. Khademian, eds. *The Presidency and the Political System*. 7th ed. 544 pp. \$44.95 cloth, ISBN 1568026730.

Pacelle, Richard L. *Between Law and Politics: The Solicitor General and the Structuring of Race, Gender, and Reproductive Rights Legislation*. Texas A&M University Press. 342 pp. \$50 cloth, ISBN 1585442348.

Roberts, John B., II. *Rating the First Ladies: The Women Who Influenced the Presidency*. Citadel Press. 288 pp. \$22.95 cloth, ISBN 0806523875.

Rollins, Peter C., and John E. O'Connor, eds. *Hollywood's White House: The American Presidency in Film and History*. University Press of Kentucky. 368 pp. \$32 cloth, ISBN 0813122708.

Rollins, Peter C., and John E. O'Connor, eds. *The West Wing: The American Presidency as Television Drama*. Syracuse University Press. 272 pp. \$45 cloth, ISBN 0815630263; \$19.95 paper, ISBN 081563031X.

Small, Melvin. *The Presidency of Richard Nixon*. Reprint ed. University Press of Kansas. 388 pp. \$17.95 paper, ISBN 0700612556.

Wallison, Peter J. *Ronald Reagan: The Power of Conviction and the Success of His Presidency*. Westview Press. 304 pp. \$27 cloth, ISBN 0813340462.

Watson, Robert P., and Anthony J. Eks-terowicz, eds. *The Presidential Companion: Readings on the First Ladies*.

Journal Scan — Articles on the Presidency

by Meena Bose

The following list of articles on the presidency was compiled through a review of recent issues of the following scholarly journals: *American Journal of Political Science*, *American Political Science Review*, *Journal of Politics*, *Political Research Quarterly*, and *Political Science Quarterly*. Whenever possible, entries include page numbers. Also listed are the contents of the December 2002 and March 2003 issues of *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, the Fall 2002 issue of *Congress and the Presidency*, and the Spring 2003 and Fall 2002 issues of *White House Studies*.

Adams, James, and Samuel Merrill III. "Voter Turnout and Candidate Strategies in American Elections." *Journal of Politics* 65 (February 2003): 161-89.

Alvarez, R. Michael, and Lisa Garcia Bedolla. "The Foundations of Latino Voter Partisanship: Evidence from the 2000 Election." *Journal of Politics* 65 (February 2003): 31-49.

Bell, Laurence Cohen. "Senatorial Discourtesy: The Senate's Use of Delay to Shape the Federal Judiciary." *Political Research Quarterly* 55 (September 2002): 589-608.

Bond, Jon R., Richard Fleisher, and B. Dan Wood. "The Marginal and Time-Varying Effect of Public Approval on Presidential Success in Congress." *Journal of Politics* 65 (February 2003): 92-110.

Damore, David F. "Candidate Strategy and the Decision to Go Negative." *Political Research Quarterly* 55 (September 2002): 669-86.

Druckman, James N., and Michael F. Thies. "The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and

Duration." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (October 2002): 760-71.

Gay, Claudine. "Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship Between Citizens and Their Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (October 2002): 717-32.

Haynes, Audrey, Julianne F. Flowers, and Paul-Henri Gurian. "Getting the Message Out: Candidate Communication Strategy During the Invisible Primary." *Political Research Quarterly* 55 (September 2002): 633-52.

Lieberman, Robert C. "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change." *American Political Science Review* 96 (December 2002): 697-712.

Newman, Brian. "Bill Clinton's Approval Ratings: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same." *Political Research Quarterly* 55 (December 2002): 781-804.

Munoz, Vincent Phillip. "James Madison's Principle of Religious Liberty." *American Political Science Review* 97 (February 2003): 17-32.

Price, Kevin S. "The Partisan Legacies of Preemptive Leadership: Assessing the Eisenhower Cohorts in the U.S. House." *Political Research Quarterly* 55 (September 2002): 609-32.

Rudolph, Thomas J., and J. Tobin Grant. "An Attributional Model of Economic Voting: Evidence from the 2000 Presidential Election." *Political Research Quarterly* 55 (December 2002): 805-24.

Sigelman, Lee, and Mark Kugler. "Why is Research on the Effects of Negative Campaigning So Inconclusive? Understanding Citizens' Perceptions of Negativity." *Journal of Politics* 65 (February 2003): 142-60.

Wedgwood, Ruth. "Al Qaeda, Military Commissions, and American Self-Defense." *Political Science Quarterly* 117 (Fall 2002): 357-72.

**Presidential Studies Quarterly,
December 2002**

Special issue: What Do We Want to Know About the Presidency?

ARTICLES

Beschloss, Michael. "Knowing What Really Happened."

Cameron, Charles M. "Studying the Polarized Presidency."

Ferrell, Robert H. "Who Are These People?"

Fisher, Louis. "A Dose of Law and Realism for Presidential Studies."

Hart, Roderick P. "Why Do They Talk That Way? A Research Agenda for the Presidency."

Jones, Charles O. "Knowing What We Want to Know About the Presidency."

Neustadt, Richard E. "*Presidential Power* and the Research Agenda."

Pious, Richard M. "Why Do Presidents Fail?"

Skowronek, Stephen. "Presidency and American Political Development: A Third Look."

FEATURES

The Contemporary Presidency: Cook, Corey. "The Permanence of the 'Permanent Campaign': George W. Bush's Public Presidency."

The Law: Baker, Nancy V. "The Impact of Antiterrorism Policies on Separation of Powers: Assessing John Ashcroft's Role."

The Polls: Cohen, Jeffrey E. "Policy-Specific Presidential Approval, Part 2."

Source Material: Montgomery, Bruce P. "Nixon's Ghost Haunts the Presidential Records Act: The Reagan and George W. Bush Administrations."

REVIEW ESSAY

Lawrence, Mark Atwood. "The Kennedy Tapes."

**Presidential Studies Quarterly,
March 2003**

Special Issue: 2000 Presidential Election

ARTICLES

Luks, Samantha, Joanne M. Miller, and Lawrence R. Jacobs. "Who Wins? Campaigns and the Third Party Vote."

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