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## *Decision Making in the Presidency: A Way Out of the Thicket*

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Almost three decades after Graham Allison published *Essence of Decision* (1971), presidency and policy scholars continue to wrestle with how to better understand and to generalize about presidential decision making. Meanwhile, despite Paul Quirk's 1989 call in these pages to treat presidential decisions - instead of presidents - as the units of analysis, examination of decision making too often ends up using decisions primarily as vehicles for commenting on, for example, presidential personality (e.g., Steinberg, 1996), managerial or organizational style (Johnson, 1974), or presidential-congressional relations (Peterson, 1990). One need not minimize the significance of these latter subjects to observe that presidential decision making

has not received the sort of theoretically-informed and methodologically self-conscious attention that could further understanding and indicate the extent and nature of any patterning in presidential decision processes. In what follows, we briefly identify several evident weaknesses in current works and then sketch ways of beginning to rethink how presidential decision making is studied.

Perhaps the most visible feature of scholarship on presidential decision making is the almost impregnable wall that separates analyses of foreign and national security policy decisions from studies of domestic and economic policy decisions. Certainly, the dynamics within these policy arenas may be characteristically different. Yet, typically, this is assumed rather than tested or demonstrated. Moreover, as

commentators have noted at least since the oil crises of the 1970s, analytical distinctions between foreign and domestic policy make less and less empirical sense with each passing day. Meanwhile, variation within policy spheres is mostly ignored.

Even if one accepts a foreign-domestic division as frequently useful, one still might be troubled by the tendency (especially of students of national security decision making) to focus more on policy substance than on theoretically-grounded views of, say, decision structuring or prevailing constructions of policy problems. Theoretical emphases might apply to a range of decision settings within and between administrations; they also might help one begin to sort out more "systematic" variation in decision making from "non-systematic" variation (see, e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994).

More generally, many studies of presidential decision making suffer from usually unacknowledged selection bias (King, et al., 1994). Examining decisions chosen because of their significance (to, e.g., the public, presidential success in Congress, the prosecution of a war) can be justified on numerous grounds. It should be clear, however, that the results of such studies can be extended only to similar instances (and even

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"... presidential decision making has not received the sort of theoretically-informed and methodologically self-conscious attempt that could further understanding... of any patterning in presidential decision making."

then, with considerable tentativeness). Too often, these findings evidently serve as the basis both for (textbook and other) discussions of how decisions typically are made and for prescriptions about how decisions should be made. Also deserving more careful attention are the meanings of "crisis" versus "routine" decisions, and how "cases" are defined and chosen for further investigation and comparison.

Additional concerns revolve around conceptualization and measurement. Most are familiar with terms like decision, decision making, decision process, and decision outcome. Less frequently are such concepts used in clearly defined and consistent ways, even within the same study. This does more than complicate replication and extension of analyses. It also may obscure a general neglect of whether and how presidential decisions are implemented, of possible "non-decisions," and of the potential effects of the "third face of power."

One final curiosity is many presidency scholars' apparent lack of familiarity with work on decision making in cognate fields such as cognitive psychology and organization studies. Only a handful of analyses, for example, explore the relevance and impact of simplification processes like editing, framing, and decomposition, which decision makers may use to cope with information complexity, overload, or ambiguity (see, for example, Fiske, 1993; Pfeffer, 1997). Nor do many analyses explicitly distinguish between variance and process

approaches to decision making (e.g., Mohr, 1982, 1996; Scott, 1995), each with differing demands on theory and research design.

To move from the relatively easy job of diagnosing weaknesses to the much harder task of advising on possible scholarly responses initially involves some narrowing of focus. The suggestions that follow reflect, first, our view that explanation and description are still needed before presidency scholars can credibly "speak truth to power," at least in the sphere of decision making. Second, although we continue to find Quirk's (1989) recommendation that presidency scholars focus on decisions to be a useful one, we would amend it to distinguish between decision processes (or, decision making and implementation) and decision outcomes as possible units of analysis. Third, we contend that presidential decision making is most profitably viewed as a multiple actor decision process that unfolds within the organizational contexts of, inter alia, the White House Office, the EOP, and the executive branch. Individual presidents, then, are actors whose participation and influence vary (within and between terms and administrations, across decisions, within decision settings over time). Fourth, and relatedly, a helpful simplifying premise appears to us to be to look for possible continuities across presidents rather than to center analysis on the effects of the idiosyncratic psyches, "styles," or skills of those who become president.

At the outset, it seems to us that more careful examination of the premises that undergird presidency scholars' views of decision making is needed (cf. Bendor and Hammond, 1992).

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Before plunging into how one might study either decision outcomes or decision processes, a prior question might be considered: what does the concept "decision" mean? Most presidency scholars (like many contemporary decision theorists) appear to assume that decisions centrally involve choice and intentional action (Chia, 1994). But decisions need not precede action; they can serve instead to rationalize, announce, or legitimate action (Chia, 1994; Miller, Hickson, and Wilson, 1997). Focusing on decisions may "over-concretize the rather ambiguous, uncertain processes of change and underplay the continual redefinition, reshaping, and reformulation which commitments to action constantly undergo" (Miller, et al., 1997, p. 305).

Nor does shifting to an emphasis on decision process remove the problem. For doing so still entails determining where a decision process begins and ends as well as identifying the multiple other processes it likely encompasses (see, e.g., Weiss, 1993). Meanwhile, the danger of reifying the decision process lurks throughout (Vayda, McKay, and Eghenter, 1991).

Nonetheless, more explicit concentration on decision processes appears warranted. In part, this seems a reasonable response to the considerable empirical and ontological difficulties involved in defining and identifying a "decision." It also provides a way of postponing overhasty assessments of decision outcomes (see, e.g., March, 1994, p. 222). In addition, how political and policy processes unfold remain important normative concerns in a representative democracy.

Yet, at least as important in our view is that explicit process analysis may pro-

vide a means of further enriching understanding of the dynamics of (and the causal mechanisms linking) presidential behavior and institutional action or inaction. Much work on presidential decision making not only has focused on explaining and evaluating the results of decisions; it typically has done so relying on what Lawrence Mohr (1982, 1996) has termed a variance approach, detecting the factors that help account for the final decision or decision outcomes. Thus, for example, Alexander George (1980) explores the impact of psychological, small group, and organizational variables on the quality of foreign policy decisions; Paul Light (1991) presents several "situational determinants" of presidential domestic policy choice; and Janet Weiss (1993) examines the effects of information load on "decision quality." In contrast, a process approach directs attention to identifying and tracing (over time and space) some process(es) of interest. At a minimum, a process explanation identifies key events or actions, and provides evidence and arguments about the "mechanisms linking the actions or events" (Vayda, et al., p. 323; Hult, Walcott, and Weko, 1997, pp. 3-4). Process approaches also appear more sensitive to endogenous change. For example, "when preferences and identities are enacted from beliefs about them that are developed within the decision making system, inconsistencies are no longer exogenous to decision making but are created within the process of acting" (March, 1994, p. 113).

An example of a process theory that might be usefully applied to presidential decision processes is the garbage can decision making model (see, e.g., Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1976). "Garbage cans" in this view are "choice opportunities," which "collect decision makers, problems and solutions" (March, 1994, p. 200). Participants vary in their formal and informal

access to decision arenas, in their interest in and expertise on particular issues, and in the time and energy they have to devote to any given problem. Results (which frequently are expected to be closer to Allison's Model III "resultants" than Model I "decisions") "depend on the timing of the various flows [of people, problems, and solutions] and on the structural constraints of the organization" (March, 1994, p. 201). Using a "process tracing" method (George and McKeon, 1985), one can track such flows (of, e.g., presidential attention, advisers, documents, e-mails, press inquiries, interest group recommendations, foreign summits), noting time ordering, interaction, shocks or key events, and the features of prevailing "decision structures" that specify actors' access to varying choice situations. Nor is all likely to be "anarchic" (as, e.g., Light, 1991, seems to assume): presidents seem to regularly face settings "in which garbage can processes exist but are constrained by social norms, organizational structures, and networks of connections that restrict the process" (March, 1994, p. 204; cf. Durant, 1992, ch. 10; Kingdon, 1995). Competing propositions about the influence on presidential decision processes of varying kinds of decision structures [including the hierarchical, segmented, and unsegmented structures Cohen, et al. (1976) introduce] might be tested, for example. Relevant as well may be efforts to extend work on the "economy of presidential attention" to presidential decision processes more generally (Wood and Peake, 1998).

In addition, students of presidential decision making might usefully ponder whether decision making is preference-based or rule-based, driven by a "logic of

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consequence or by a logic of appropriateness." Scholars of presidential decision making - whether we ground our analyses in "pure" or in "limited" rationality - tend to rely on the former: we see decisions "as based in an evaluation of alternatives in terms of their consequences for preferences" (March, 1994, p. 57).

In contrast, a logic of appropriateness views decision making as rule-following, where the "reasoning process is one of establishing identities and matching rules to recognized situations" (March, 1994, p. 58). Studies grounded in this latter logic might examine how rules (about, e.g., factors to consider and people to consult in particular policy arenas) are constructed and evolve, or which rules are evoked by whom in a given situation. To the extent that as political scientists, presidency scholars are "enthusiasts for consequential analy-

sis and the pursuit of preferences, ... ordinary good sense" (March 1994, p. 102) may call for some of us to explore theorizing grounded in a different logic.

A final illustrative issue returns us to the nagging debate over presidential agency. Are decision processes or outcomes to be primarily "attributed to the actions of autonomous actors or to the systemic properties of an interacting ecology?" (March, 1994, pp. viii-ix). Garbage can theorists are mostly agnostic on this point, although they caution that the involvement and influence of any individual actor depend on numerous factors, including structural constraints and the temporal ordering of activities.

In any event, it seems possible to explore the agency issue empirically by, for instance, comparing presidential decision processes along dimensions like the extent and nature of participation, consistency of interpretations of problems, degree of consensus on alternatives, actors'

views of situations, and time spent talking and acting on related topics. In examining these dynamics, one might pursue the "modus operandi method," seeking to follow the "signature" of particular influences within and between decision processes (Mohr, 1996, p. 121). Alternatively, the "countdown approach," by examining decision processes from the perspective of a president (or key advisers) operating in real time, might highlight key constraints on and opportunities for presidential impact (Drachman and Shank, 1997).

Explicit, theoretically-driven decision process analysis scarcely is a panacea. Yet, it may well hold promise as a way to break out of the fragmentation and stagnation that currently weaken much of the literature on presidential decision making.

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## Congratulations!

Congratulations to Professor Stanley Renshon, whose book *High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition* has been named the 1998 winner of the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis' Gradiva Award for the best published work that advances psychoanalysis in the category of biography.

# The President's Judgment \*

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“. . . rational choice theorists . . . find the president interesting largely because he can veto legislation.” (Terry Moe, *PRG Report* 20:2).

In Barry Levinson's new, delicious, and slightly unnerving political satire "Wag the Dog," the president has a problem. He has been accused of fondling a young campfire girl, part of a visiting group delegation, in the privacy of the Oval Office. Faced with a meltdown of his campaign for a second term (his rival runs commercials to the tune of "Thank Heaven for Little Girls"), the president does what any modern president would (and the one currently in office has) - he calls in his fixers and spin doctors.

In an opening scene that is astounding in its prescience, Stanley Motss (Dustin Hoffman), recruited from Hollywood to help rescue the president, walks past a large cardboard picture of the president greeting adoring crowds. In the picture, very clearly visible, is the dark-haired "campfire girl" who latter found herself in the Oval Office. She is wearing a jaunty beret and smiling admiringly at the president - a picture eerily parallel to the one of Monica Lewinsky admiring President Clinton that graced the cover of *Newsweek* and numerous other news outlets. Nor do the uncanny parallels stop there.

What is the one event guaranteed to turn the public's attention away from presidential fondling, asks Hollywood consultant Motss. The answer - a war, with Albania. Why Albania? Why not? answers Conrad Bean (Robert DeNiro), the president's chief fixer. Besides, the war will be produced solely for television - a fake Albanian battle scene, an inspirational "We Are the World"-type song specifically concocted to arouse public patriotism and, of

course, a fake war hero. Wicked satire, you say, until you realize that as the movie was being screened, President Clinton, in the midst of his own unfolding "campfire" scandal, was considering launching a war against Iraq.

Clinton aides publicly fretted about the effect of the coincidence on the president's ability to rally the public should a war be necessary. Iraq insisted that the only reason that president would attack would be to divert attention from his personal troubles. And the *Wall Street Journal* argued that the president should ignore both and attack.

The intersection of these major public dilemmas, one a product of the president's interior psychology, the other of his policy judgment, underscores why an interest in the office which stems principally from his power to veto is about as close to the mark of what is important in the presidency as looking for palm trees in northern Alaska.

## The Presidency-Awesome Discretionary Power, Scarcely Contained

Skeptics ask, how much does any president matter? Certainly, presidents are limited by law, precedent, public sentiment, and competing institutional centers of political power and authority. Furthermore, no president fully controls his own, or our, destiny. Yet, the presidency, any presidency, is central to American political life. Why? Primarily because the responsibilities of the office, its vast resources, and its location at the center and pinnacle of governance and public decision making insure that every modern presidency is consequential.

No president operates in a psychological vacuum. No president controls all the forces or conditions he faces. However, between constraint and fate lies a vast arena of presidential discretion. The president's discretion lies in what he chooses to do or not, in how he pursues his public and political ambitions, and the ideals, values, and views that shape his political and

policy decisions.

The "many-hats theory" of presidential importance - his role as commander-in-chief, titular head of his political party, and even more recent inventions of the president such as "interpreter-in-chief" describe role constructions that leave a great deal of personal leeway to a president as to whether, to what extent, and how he chooses (or is able) to carry them out. Most presidents try to shape or respond selectively to circumstances in order to accomplish their purposes. The attempt to do so ordinarily presents the president, as it would any person, with a range of possible ways to act. By examining the range of choices available to the president and those he selects both within and across circumstances, one can begin to discern the underlying patterns of psychology that shape his behavior.

The president's choices, even when he is responding to circumstances, ultimately rest on him - his vision, convictions, and ideals. The adequacy of his choices rest on his powers of social and political analysis and ultimately on the quality of his judgment. His ability to translate his choices into policies rest on his political skills - his capacities to mobilize, orchestrate, and consolidate public acceptance of his views of what needs to be done. Ultimately, his ability to lead and govern rest on his ambitions, courage, and integrity. In short, the presidency is an office where its occupant's psychology counts.

## Why Character Counts

Character is the answer to the question of how we can best understand a president's, or any person's, psychology. It is the foundation of his stance toward the world. It reflects the fundamental elements at his core as a person - his basic ambitions,

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the ideals and values he lives by (if he does), and the real nature of his relationships with others.

A frequent mistake is to assume that because character runs deep, it requires "couch questions" (how did you feel about your mother?). In truth, character is reflected as much in a president's observable behavior as it is in the deepest recesses of his psyche. All that is needed is knowledge of where to look and how to understand what you see.

We get to know a person's character in the presidency, and in ordinary life, by paying attention to the steady accumulation of choices we see them make, both in and away from the public spotlight. A president's responses to circumstances help define character, but so do the continued circumstances that arise out of a president's own choices to which he must then respond. And, most importantly, both aspects of character are embedded in observable behavior.

The public evidence regarding Bill Clinton's character six years into his presidency and after an adulthood in public life, for example, is fairly clear. He is a man of enormous ambition. There is nothing inherently wrong with having ambition, even lots of it. It is the life blood of achievement and no modern president has been without ample amounts of it. The problems with the president's ambition do not lie in its quantity - they lie elsewhere.

The realization of ambition requires talent and skills. Without them, ambition is an empty vessel for accomplishing purposes. In this area too, Mr. Clinton is amply endowed. He is a man of enormous charm and intellect and a loquacious but eloquent advocate of his views.

Yet, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that a president's skills and talents, as substantial as they might be, are embed-

ded in, and not independent of, his interior psychology. They do not exist independently of his character structure and overall psychology - his ambitions, ideals, and connections with others. This is why talents and skills, even those that would ordinarily be considered virtues, can lead to difficulties.

Neither ambition nor the talents that support it can be understood without asking to what purposes are they put. To answer this central question, we must look to ideals and values that guide a president, and when they do so. We must not be misled by what presidents say of their lofty ideals - no one should expect them to say otherwise. Rather, it is the ability to maintain fidelity to their ideals when to do so risks personal or political losses that defines character integrity. In short, for a president to have the courage of his convictions, he must first have both. Character integrity helps to answer an absolutely central question about presidential ambition. How can we distinguish between dangerous and necessary ambition? The answer turns out to be quite simple. Ambition is dangerous when it is unguided by ideals and values and the capacity to be faithful to them. The dangers of ambition are defused when they are firmly guided by a strong sense of values and the willingness to stick with them though adversity. Indeed, the larger the ambition, the more consolidated a president's ideals and values have to be in order to anchor it.

The question simply put is this: Is the president's ambition in the service of his ideals, or are his ideals subservient to his ambitions? This is the fundamental question of character whose convincing answer has eluded Bill Clinton in his public and private life. It is also the basis of the question with which we began on the possible relationship between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Hussein, which would have never be seriously raised about an Eisenhower or Truman.

## **Character and Presidential Performance**

Character is of interest to presidential scholars primarily because it shapes the two fundamental domains of his performance, decision and leadership. At the heart of leadership lies choice. And at the heart of choice lies judgment. Central to both are presidential perception, inference, and preference. Judgment is the quality of analysis, reflection, and ultimately insight that informs the making of consequential decisions. Assessing a president's judgment requires a focus on three related considerations: the problem itself (included the domain within which it is placed by the president), the basis of the decisions, and their results. In analyzing the problem, we must know what fundamental issues it raises. In analyzing the basis of the decisions, we need to understand what factors were weighed (for example the relative weight given to policy and political concerns) and with what results. And lastly, in analyzing outcomes we need to appreciate the consequences of the decision.

Is good judgment situational? To some degree, yes. A president's judgment is related to his experience with (and understanding) of problems of this sort. A president could have very good judgment on domestic issues and politics but lack the experiential frame to have equally good judgment on national security or foreign policy issues, and vice versa. Even within one domain, say international relations, it seems possible for different problems to result in different levels of judgment in response. A president might be very well-positioned to exercise good judgment in the areas of international political competition and conflict, but not be well prepared if the major international challenge were, say, primarily economic. This is not to contend that good judgments cannot be reached in

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unfamiliar areas, only that it is facilitated by understanding that has been refined by experience.

## Intelligence = Good Judgment?

Do good judgment frameworks require a complex mind? On first glance, it appears that they do. After all, the ability to hold and synthesize alternative frameworks is partially a reflection of cognitive capacity. However, it is not clear that cognitive complexity is necessary for high-quality decisions, or that complex thinking necessarily leads to better policy judgment.

Obsessive thinkers, for example, usually exhibit highly complex and differentiated thinking. However, they do not as a rule have good judgment. Although their thinking may be complex, it often lacks depth, flexibility, and sophistication. It is the latter three qualities, not the first, that help to define the quality of good judgment. It is understanding, not complexity per se, that is crucial to good judgment. The amount of reflective insight that a president brings to bear on a problem may prove more important than the degree of complexity in his thinking. Reflective insight, a crucial element of good judgment, is not directly related to intelligence or complexity. Nor does intelligence necessary facilitate the perspective necessary to distinguish between personal and public motives. It can be used to inhibit it.

## Character and Good Judgment

Character, in favorable circumstances, is reflected in, and reflects, a president's realistic sense of himself as an able, honest, and related person. It includes the methods (style) that he has developed to engage the world. His feelings of capacity and worth, and the psychological structures that support them, are linked to judgment in a number of ways. Most theory and research exploring this linkage has focused on feelings of inadequacy or low self-regard, and found them associated with decision-making difficulties. Presidents without a consolidated

sense of self-worth or ideals to buttress or guide them will be too inhibited to respond boldly or directly to an issue and prefer optimism to realism. Similarly, the optimistic weighing of sobering information (wishful thinking), a dislike of conflict, a strong sensitivity to criticism, or a strong need to be liked can inhibit good judgment.

Less recognized, but perhaps more important in a context in which only the relentlessly determined or optimistic seek the office, is the problem of feelings of hyperadequacy or positive self-regard. When a president's confidence or ambition exceeds his reach, poor judgment is a result. In such cases, a president may realize the risks but, because of overconfidence, feel he will be able to overcome them. Consider in this context an interview President Clinton gave before his inauguration regarding the possibility of a new relationship with Saddam Hussein. After talking about the need for Hussein to change his behavior, and about his not being obsessed with the man, he goes on to state:

*I think that if he were sitting here on the couch I would further the change in his behavior. You know if he spent half the time, just a half, or even a third of the time worrying about the welfare of his people that he spends worrying about where to place his SAM missiles and whether he can aggravate Bush by violating the cease-fire agreement, what he's going to do with the people who don't agree with him in the South and in Iraq, I think he'd be a stronger leader and be in a lot better shape over the long run. (1993, A14, emphasis mine)*

In this interview President-elect Clinton reflects a remarkable self-assurance about his ability to change the Iraqi leader and his pattern of behavior; he appears to believe that he personally can bring about this change. How? By persuading Mr. Hussein that he would be a better leader and as well be better off if he followed Clinton's advice. There is an element of naivete but also grandiosity to be found in Mr. Clinton's apparent belief that he would be

able to overcome, indeed reverse, the character patterns that have been evident in Mr. Hussein's adult career and behavior, and that he could do so by appealing to what he sees as Hussein's long-term interests by chatting with him on a sofa.

The expectation that people can be won over by words is an understandable and plausible premise given Mr. Clinton's personal and political experience, but it is a potentially dangerous misapplication in this context. The danger in the high confidence that Mr. Clinton expresses, in this and similar cases, in his ability to bring about such change, is not that he will discount Mr. Hussein's shrewdness but that he will overestimate his own potential impact.

A president's feelings that he possesses unusual competence, or is beyond the reach of ordinary circumstances is also damaging to good judgment, because he may discern the facts but discount their consequences. Consider, for example, the now documented public knowledge that President Clinton met with twenty-one year old Monica Lewinsky, with whom he is accused of having a sexual relationship (which he denies), at least 27 times after she was no longer employed at the White House. Moreover, there is additional evidence that he called Ms. Lewinsky at home and left messages on her answering machine, messages that she played for others. Why, when he had reached the pinnacle of his life-long ambition, would he jeopardize it, and his reputation, legitimacy and legacy for her?

Character is also related to a president's ability to learn from his experience. Learning requires that making mistakes be tolerable and not indictments of competence and respect. On the other hand, presidents with an inflated sense of their



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own virtue couples with a strong intellectual ability can learn, but learn the wrong things from their experiences. Rather than integrating real lessons about themselves from their setbacks, they can be prone to focusing on avoiding their past mistakes, while remaining as they were.

Why would a president who has barely survived allegations of sexual and other improprieties before and during his 1992 presidential campaign risk providing this, and so much other, evidence of a relationship that would, at best, be difficult to explain and legitimize? Why would a president, whose calls to Jennifer Flowers had been taped by her and made public, call and leave messages on an answering machine of Ms. Lewinsky?

The fact that these questions need to be raised is itself reflective of a pattern of behavior that requires some attempt to address them. It is not a pattern or a set of questions that arises with every president.

## **Good Judgment and Character Integrity**

It is important to know the extent to which a president's character structure has revolved, integrated, and consolidated the diverse demands with which it must deal. A president must be able to modulate but satisfy basic (developmentally normal and appropriate) wishes for accomplishment and recognition. He must have satisfactorily resolved sometimes conflicting needs and their resulting dilemmas - for interpersonal connectedness versus personal autonomy, approval versus independence, or self-interest versus a concern for others. Finally, he must have developed a set of ideals and values and consolidated them in the process of resolving the dilemmas noted above.

Presidents with more developed and

consolidated operating character structures have also developed a personal and professional identity, which provide a vehicle for the expression of themselves in the world, and which is in turn voluntarily recognized and validated by others. This identity includes the ideals and values that provide the president with an internal compass for evaluation. These serve as an anchor, a frame through which myriad facts can be evaluated and pressures withstood. A president without a coherent personal or political identity, and the strong ideals and values that underlie it, is like a ship without a rudder. He runs the danger of drift and being subject to the strongest current, or confusing, inadvertently or otherwise, the public on where he stands.

Mr. Clinton ran for office promising to be a "New Democrat," but once elected reneged and governed like an old one. After the direction of his administration was overwhelming repudiated in 1994, he survived by appearing to borrow the policies and premises of his opponents. He managed to win reelection in 1996 by promising, again, to govern from the political center.

In his 1996 State of the Union address, the president announced that "the era of big government is over." At the same time, his speech contained a substantial list of major new government initiatives for his second term, to which he has been busy adding ever since. His 1998 State of the Union address proposed a large expansion of government responsibility for areas that were traditionally taken care of by the states (for example, regulating private health insurance and the nation's child care arrangements - totaling over \$20 billion over five years). Is it possible to end "big government" while vigorously adding to it?

## **Good Judgment and Empathy**

Good judgment requires reflection, and that in turn requires the capacity to weigh information from a series of perspectives that make intellectual, experiential, emotional, and ethical sense not only to the president but also to those

whom the decisions affect. Does the president give more or less weight to his own policy ambitions, the policy concerns of others, his standing with the public, or his calculations for reelection? No president can keep from making political calculations. The question for assessing any president is how often and how much weight does he give his own political prospects and how does he resolve the tensions between good politics (for him) and good policy?

Empathy is not an uncomplicated "virtue." Too much of it can be paralyzing. On the other hand, its relentless pursuit can easily mask less altruistic feelings like personal ambition and subtle dishonesties. Good judgment does not require that a president be devoid of self-interest, which would be impossible anyway, only that he be able to acknowledge and, if necessary, suppress it.

Why is empathetic attunement important in making policy judgments? One reason is that citizens cede power to a president with the expectation that it will be used for their good rather than his. Since every policy decision a president makes affects others, the real ability to consider how others might feel and maintain fidelity to that understanding helps distinguish effective presidents from their counterparts.

Here too, character counts. Presidents whose ambitions and sense of entitlement lead them to view their actions as inherently justified do not worry much about the real effects of their acts on others. To do so might require them to reconsider or moderate their ambitions. Such presidents often offer strategic empathy, whose basic purpose is advantage rather than understanding. It is reflective of the third basic domain of character - relatedness.

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One motivation for strategic empathy is to use understanding to get others to do what you want and what they might not necessarily wish to do. Strategic empathy in this instance is a sophisticated form of manipulation for political or personal gain. The president who uses this form sees others as objects whose primary function is to provide what he wants or needs. There is no real consideration of the other, since to do so might interfere with a person's use.

## **Character and Presidential Leadership**

What the president chooses to do is one question, how he chooses to carry out it is another. Presidents must find means to implement their judgments. That of course is the province of leadership, and it is no more isolated from character than is judgment. It could not help but be so, since it involves discretionary choice.

Are a president's means adequate and appropriate to the task? Are they honest and straightforward or do they attempt to obscure or otherwise mask what the president wants to accomplish? Does a president choose to talk, to threaten, to fight? Does he concentrate on one or choose a mix? Are there other less costly means that could accomplish the same ends? The means a president chooses to exercise his leadership and implement his judgments also reflect his character.

The president's supporters argue that the current sexual allegations, even if true, are irrelevant to his performance and insist on a distinction between his private, very human failings and his public virtues. The potentially fatal flaw in this argument is the assumption that Mr. Clinton has been any more forthright with the public in his policy dealings than he has been in explaining his personal behavior.

Was it an example of effective, princi-

pled leadership to characterize a world-class medical system, albeit one with pockets of problems, as having a major "crisis?" Was it forthright to design a solution behind illegally closed doors ("regional alliances) that was consciously designed to obscure a wholesale federalization of the health care system? Was it trustworthy to promise a middle class tax cut in 1992, only to institute tax increases instead and then rely on a subtle distinction between tax increases that were specifically targeted for new programs and increases that would just add to government revenues, and indirectly fund new programs? Was it candid to prepare the public for long-term intervention in Bosnia by promising that we would send troops there for only one year? Was it sincere, when the president changed this policy after his reelection, to say that he had not prepared the American people for this shift, which had been planned for some time, because the public already knew about it as he had mentioned it once? Was it a useful solution to the country's attempt to address and resolve some difficult and divisive issues associated with its increasing diversity to appoint a panel to develop and promote public discussion that systematically and publicly excluded those who disagreed?

Here again, whatever one's answer to these questions, the fact that these questions can or need be raised is itself reflective of a pattern of behavior that requires some attempt to address them.

## **Presidential Psychology and the Future of Presidential Studies**

The last minute agreement between Saddam Hussein and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan spared us, at least momentarily, from having to answer the question posed at the start of this paper. Perhaps, even had we been forced by events to do so, we could not have been able to do so in a definitive, or even moderately self-confident way.

But would our inability to provide simple,

abstract, quantitatively based and (therefore in the view of some) "rigorous" answers make the question less relevant or important to frame and try to answer? I think not. By focusing on what we can measure, we run the risk of confounding the sophistication of our instruments with that of our theories. In doing so, we may place ourselves in the position of learning more and more about what matters less and less.

I share what I believe to be Terry Moe's view that the primary purpose of scholarship, as a collective enterprise, is to develop powerful understandings and explanations. But I fail to see how this can be accomplished by relying on models that are rigorous descriptions of what no one does, or which represent narrow models of motivation and psychology.

Long ago, psychologists alerted us to the dangers of the primary attribution fallacy - attributing too much causal power to individual attributes and too little to circumstances. Rational choice theory runs the risk of standing this caution on its head by requiring of others that they behave as we, or other similarly "rational" actors, would. We might label this the fundamental narcissistic fallacy. Models that require others to act as we believe they ought to, if they actually motivated by the theories we are using to explain them, also involve the risk of circularity.

Sure, thick descriptions are a basis of good theory, not synonymous with it. Certainly, actual data is a critical check on generalizing too much from to little. And clearly, rigorous thinking and analysis, buttressed with data (and I use this term to cover a wide range of evidentiary material) that can withstand the test of alternative explanations is a critical and indispensable path for knowing which flowers should be

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tended and which should be left to wither. The best scholarship begins with questions, not theories. And the presidency is a field in which many can be asked. In this end, perhaps the best road to progress may be the asking of a range of substantive and politically important questions coupled with a self-conscious gathering and use of evidence to answer them.

And surely, the field will not develop, prosper, or answer a large number of important and interesting questions about the presidency without sustained focus on the persons who occupy it.

## Notes:

1. Janet Maslin, "Wag the Dog: If the Going Gets Tough, Get a Pet or Start a War," *New York Times*, December 26, 1977, p. B10.

2. This has led some to question whether any president can be a true "event-making" man. However, the importance of a president's psychology, judgment, and leadership does not rest on an acceptance of any "great man" theory of presidential impact. A president does not have to change history in order for his presidency to have consequences. So-called "great man" theories of leadership argued that such persons set in motion sweeping causal tides. Others, most notably scholars influenced by Marxist theory, saw leaders as themselves hemmed in by large social economic and political forces.

In an attempt to refine this overly broad debate, Hook (1943, 154) distinguished the eventful from the event-making man. The former was anyone who because they were at a particular place at a particular time influenced subsequent developments. Hook gives as an illustration the Dutch boy who stuck his finger in the dike and re-

marks that anyone could have done it (ignoring the important question of whether everyone would have). The event-making man is the eventful man whose impact is a result of outstanding personal attributes like intelligence, will, or character, and not dependent on accidents of position. While not denying that the eventful man's actions have causal consequences, Hook's focus is on "greatness," that combination of characteristics that lifts event-making man above circumstances as he finds them.

Hook's analysis points to a distinction that later theorists of political psychology have utilized (Cf. Greenstein 1969, 40-57) between action and actor dispensability, between those who effect events because of where they happen to be and those who effect events because of who they are. The argument for causal impact that I am advancing relies on both.

3. George (1980, 1-3) has discussed the tradeoff that often occurs between the quality of a decision and its acceptability. A decision might be sound but not feasible or, alternatively, feasible but not sound. Reconciling these two is a critical task of any president. A similar tradeoff may be seen to operate in the tradeoff between judgment and politics. During the 1992 check cashing scandal in Congress, some congressmen faulted the House Speaker "for being thoughtful and judicious but not political enough" (Clymer 1992, A1).

4. The extent to which good judgment is possible in the absence of accumulated experience in a major area (e.g., domestic politics or foreign policy) is an open question. When experience is lacking, sophisticated judgment frameworks are difficult to develop. Certainly experience, even highly successfully experience in another area, is no guarantee of good judgment or of successful presidential performance. In the 1992 presidential election, Ross Perot argued that his experience running large corporations and "getting things done" were sufficient qualifications for

him to be seriously considered for president. Perhaps. But what experience provides are judgment frameworks developed and refined in the same contexts in which they will be applied. Ross Perot's business experience, however successful, would not necessarily prepare him for the political and military complexities of possible military intervention in Bosnia. Or, to approach the issue from another perspective, owning one's business often involves making "command decisions." One may solicit advice, but ultimately what one says goes. As many presidents have learned, politics, especially presidential politics, is rarely a command experience. Congress, the courts, public opinion, bureaucracies, and special interest advocacy groups also expect to have their views taken seriously.

5. A president's grandiosity and accompanying sense of invulnerability and entitlement can often reflect an underlying masked anxiety and/or an insufficiently consolidated sense of self-esteem. This anxiety may arise from the direct personal and political implications of events themselves or may be related to the steps that may need to be taken if events are viewed clearly and seriously.

6. Describing persons as having some degree of psychological maturity does not mean such persons are conflict free. Psychologically developed persons have areas of conflict, emotional and interpersonal difficulties like everyone else. However, their difficulties take place in the more general context of psychological accomplishment, rather than vice versa.

\*Note: This paper draws on discussions in Renshon (1996a 1996b).

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### A Query from Matthew Holden, Jr., University of Virginia

I would appreciate having citations for empirical research studies (qualitative or quantitative) within the past four presidential administrations showing problems and issues considered and/or decided by (a) Secretaries of a given department, (b) Undersecretaries ditto, (c) Assistant Secretaries ditto, (d) Bureau Chiefs ditto, and/or (e) agency officials below the Bureau Chief level. I want to keep the department constant.

- Do such studies exist in our field?
- Do these studies exist in the better political journalism?
- Do these studies exist in Congressional and/or judicial sources?

I would be grateful for any advice from any colleague.

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# *An Evolutionary Epistemological Perspective on Presidency Research*

**Wayne Steger**

De Paul University

The essays by Terry Moe, Bruce Miroff, and Mary Stuckey in the fall issue of the *PRG Report* raise important epistemological questions about how knowledge grows and how research should progress in the subfield. Moe and Stuckey's essays implicitly reflect the view that the subfield would be better off if presidency research were directed toward the collective building of a theoretical framework. Rejecting the notion of a unifying theoretical framework, Miroff argues that several perspectives are needed to cope with the multiple dimensions of the presidency. Though seemingly contradictory, these views can be reconciled if we evaluate presidency research from an evolutionary epistemological perspective. The evolutionary epistemological approach is arguably better suited to the social sciences than the traditional epistemological perspective and it provides a prescriptively more appropriate way to evaluate the progress of presidency research.

The Kuhnian epistemological perspective holds that (scientific) research progresses and knowledge cumulates when there is a paradigm with a common set of assumptions and general agreement on what questions are worth studying and the methods appropriate for studying these questions. The idea is that knowledge will cumulate more efficiently if individual studies are geared toward a collective theory-building and theory-testing effort (e.g., Holt and Turner, 1974). The central epistemological concern from this perspective is that presidency research is progressing in an ad hoc, non-cumulative manner. Rather than a prevailing theoretical approach, presidency scholars employ a variety of approaches and have produced a large number of atheoretical, or at least

theoretically under-specified, studies. Prescriptively then, constructing a unifying theoretical framework, which accounts for diverse phenomena in terms of an underlying principle or set of principles, should be the order of the day. For Terry Moe and Mary Stuckey, new institutionalism and the rhetorical presidency, respectively, offer promise for this kind of theoretical development.

Though useful, presidency scholars do not necessarily need a unifying theoretical framework to conduct meaningful research—that which is theoretically relevant, is empirically rigorous, and contributes to the growth of knowledge. Whether a given study contributes to the growth of knowledge depends more on how it is conducted than it does on its teleological fit with a broader theoretical framework. An alternative epistemological perspective views the growth of knowledge as an evolutionary process that may or may not give rise to a unifying theoretical framework.<sup>1</sup> I will briefly discuss the evolutionary epistemological approach before elaborating on two aspects of this perspective as it pertains to presidency research.

### **Evolutionary Epistemological Perspective**

Evolutionary epistemologists contend that knowledge grows according to an evolutionary process. The process of growth of knowledge, like animal adaptation, is the product of blind variation and selective retention (Campbell 1987a; Campbell 1987b). Blind variation means that ideas and claims (propositions or hypotheses) are generated without knowing the

<sup>1</sup> *I prefer the term growth as opposed to cumulation knowledge because of the additive connotations of the later term—connotations which are not warranted because they can be construed to imply a point of actualization that is itself an unjustified claim.*

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idea or claim is true.<sup>2</sup> As such, the validity of claims must be evaluated empirically. The validity of a claim is determined by exposure to the pressures of natural selection - attempted criticism and refutation (Campbell 1987b, 70-73; Popper 1968). Knowledge thus grows by a method of trial and error - of learning from our mistakes and tentatively selecting that which is not shown to be inconsistent with or contradicted by observation (Campbell 1974, 1987b; Bartely 1987, 23).

Political scientists do not lack for the creation of ideas and claims. We adduce ideas and claims through a variety of means. We may generate ideas and claims inductively through observation and experience, deductively from existing thoughts and claims, or some combination of both (e.g., Goldberg 1968). We also generate ideas and claims by adapting the ideas and models of other areas of study to presidency research (e.g., public choice models). We also develop claims by mutating existing ideas and models, often by reapplying or evaluating an existing claim in a unique way (e.g., studies on the two-presidencies thesis). By innovation, adaptation, or mutation, we have developed a variety of approaches in presidency research. It does not matter from this perspective if ideas and claims are created in an ad hoc and haphazard manner. The important question for the growth of knowledge is not how we create ideas and claims but how we select them.

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<sup>2</sup> *The creation of ideas is blind in that we lack the prescience or foresight to know if ideas and claims are true prior to empirical assessment (Campbell 1987b, 97).*

The process of "selective retention" in evolutionary epistemology derives from Poppers' (1961, 1968) arguments about falsification or refutation. As Hume, Popper, and others have demonstrated, we cannot prove our claims conclusively since we cannot test claims in all of their possible instances - past, present, and future. We can, however, attempt to identify instances in which we are in error. Errors in logic or incongruities between the conceptual and empirical worlds may be revealed as we subject our ideas to scrutiny. Since we tend to dismiss error-prone scholarship (that which fails to stand up to theoretical and/or empirical scrutiny), imprecise thinking and methodologically and/or observationally flawed studies tend to fall by the wayside. Research thus is judged by its ability to survive scrutiny. The evolution of knowledge is not necessarily the survival of the fittest à la Herbert Spencer, but the survival of the less error prone in a scrutinizing world.

Selective retention occurs on a number of levels. Many of the ideas and claims we develop as individuals never see the light of day as we come to recognize flaws in the ideas, encounter dead-ends, or discover that we are wrong. As a community of scholars, we further subject ideas and claims to scrutiny through peer review and other forms of feedback prior to publication. Competition for publication often means that less theoretically relevant and/or less innovative empirical findings are less likely to make it into print. After publication, ideas and claims may be refuted or at least disputed by others. Some studies simply fail to attract much attention and fall by the wayside over time. Thus as Donald Campbell (1987, 105) notes, of our thoughts, "what a small portion gets uttered, and what a still smaller fragment gets published, and of what is published is used by the next intellectual generation."

In principle, claims are discarded or at least reformulated as errors are revealed. We gain

confidence in our claims when we try but fail to falsify them. As we know in practice, however, some ideas and claims survive despite errors--recognized or not. Survival of the fittest (most rigorous theoretical and empirical) research is not guaranteed. The evolution of knowledge is imperfect. Our decentralized processes of selective retention are themselves subject to error in practice. Imprecise thinking and conceptually ambiguous research may make identifying errors difficult. Intuitive findings and persuasively written arguments may survive scrutiny even if erroneous in logic or observation. The processes of review and evaluation are uneven in their rigor. We have multiple outlets for communicating our ideas and observations. The degree of scrutiny of claims varies from outlet to outlet - witness the difference in difficulty of publishing an article in a peer-reviewed journal versus an edited volume (depending of course on the particular editor and reviewers). These problems, however, stem not so much from the approach as it does the lack of conceptual and methodological rigor in scrutinizing ideas and claims. The advantages of systematic inquiry and attempted refutation are that precise thinking and rigorous methodology more efficiently contribute to the growth of knowledge, first by reducing errors through rigorous inquiry, and second, by making more apparent the identification of errors. It behooves us to be vigilant in our efforts to be more precise in our thinking and rigorous in our scrutiny of our own work and of others.

The evolutionary growth of knowledge may be less efficient than that occurring within a paradigmatic framework since a unifying theoretical framework provides scholars with common guidelines and stan-

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dards for evaluating research. A more coherent research program, however, does not necessarily mean that the research agenda is proceeding in the "right" direction. The research efficiencies gained from a paradigmatic framework presupposes to some extent that the framework is on the right track in terms of arriving at the truth. Such a supposition is unwarranted a priori and accords to such a framework an intellectual superiority that cannot be justified.<sup>3</sup> An evolutionary process of knowledge growth offers the advantage of avoiding premature and potentially inappropriate rejection of ideas and claims simply because they do not fit with the assumptions and expectations of such a framework.

## **Evolutionary Epistemology and the Multidimensionality of Political Phenomena**

The evolutionary epistemological perspective is well suited to political science with its changing, multidimensional subject matter. The multidimensionality of political phenomena combined with the limits of human cognition and observation means that there will be a variety of ways to observe, interpret, and theorize about what we study. Since we cannot know a priori which approaches or interpretations, if any, are the truth, we should be willing to accept the possible validity of a number of theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches.

Research often becomes segmented into narrower scopes of inquiry that are roughly analogous to eco-niches in evolutionary theory. Research niches make inquiry manageable and allow the investiga-

tion of many topics simultaneously. Professional socialization, norms, and incentives reinforce the segmentation of inquiry into relatively narrow areas of specialization. We can conceive of niches in presidency research organized in several ways. Research niches can be divided temporally by individual presidents (e.g., studies on Nixon), or by eras defined by events (e.g., the post-World War II era), technological innovations (e.g., the television era), partisan regimes (e.g., the third party era), and so on. Much, if not most, presidency research seems to fit into such temporal categories. Scholarly niches in presidency research also are organized around subject matter. Research on presidential-congressional relations (e.g., Neustadt 1960; Edwards 1980), presidential election studies (e.g., Wayne 1997; Wildavsky 1980), organizational studies (e.g., Hess 1988) can be viewed as forming niches organized around subject matter. Such studies extend the temporal scope of inquiry while narrowing the focus of inquiry substantively. A third type of research niche is formed by studies employing a conceptual framework. Conceptual frameworks, at least those more clearly and precisely defined, narrow the scope of inquiry through statements of assumptions and the definition of theoretically relevant factors. Stephen Skowronek's (1993) politics of disjuncture, in which presidents influence and are influenced by the coalescence and fragmentation of political party coalitions, forms such a framework. Applications of the new institutionalist and public choice perspectives to presidency phenomena also form this kind of niche.

How knowledge grows depends on the degree of isolation or overlap across niches of study. For research conducted in relative isolation from other research activity, knowledge may grow within the niche without contributing to the growth of knowledge in other areas. Historical studies of individual presidencies, for example,

often fall into traditional and revisionist interpretations of what happened and why. Both interpretations exist as separate niches of study nested within a broader niche defined by the boundaries of an individual president's tenure. These interpretations of history are elaborated to form a richer picture of what happened within a given presidential administration. By deepening our conceptual picture of a presidency, these studies may contribute to the growth of knowledge within the niche, even if such research does not contribute to the collective building of a coherent set of interrelated propositions about the presidency and presidential behavior.

The inconclusiveness of debates, when they occur, usually reflects an absence of testable claims or an inability to test claims rather than a problem with the substantive focus or theoretical perspective. The failure to produce or conduct testable hypotheses is problematic from an evolutionary perspective because such studies fail to provide a selection mechanism, or a clear-cut decision rule for accepting or rejecting the claims advanced. Such studies often take the form of a persuasive or at least a plausible argument rather than an attempt to falsify.

It should be noted that the concept of scholarly niches does not preclude collective theory development. To the extent that such research in different niches does overlap and relate, there may be created a nested hierarchy of research activity which collectively creates an elaborate mosaic or picture of the presidency. Ideally, the pieces would fit together nicely into a broader research system but that need not be the case at any given time. Research that employs or contributes to a theoretically generalizable perspective, such as rational choice, may lead

<sup>3</sup> By *justification* I mean known with certainty as the truth.

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to the creation of a set of interrelated statements about the presidency, but this need not be the case at a given time nor does it mean that other research is less valued.

## **An Evolving Subfield for an Evolving Presidency**

An evolutionary epistemological perspective also is useful for evaluating presidency research because presidency scholarship evolves as the presidency evolves. Our empirical observations and our theoretical constructions should change over time as the phenomena we study changes, and independently of phenomena as researchers innovate, learn, and adapt ideas from other areas of study.

Presidency research evolves in recognition of changes in real world phenomena. Consider, for example, research on presidential leadership in Congress. Neustadt's (1960) seminal work on presidential leadership focused scholarly attention on presidential influence with others in government. One of Neustadt's conclusions was that a president's power hinged on his ability to bargain. Neustadt adduced his argument from observations and from his thinking about the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administrations. Writing in the 1950s, Neustadt's presidents dealt with a Congress in which powerful committee chairs held great sway over policies in their jurisdictions. In this context, interpersonal bargaining was an efficient and effective way to move the legislative process.

Though still important to a president's influence, bargaining is arguably a less central means of influence today than it was during the 1940s and 1950s. The circumstances in which Neustadt drew his conclusions have changed in numerous respects. Within Congress, policy-making authority

decentralized during the 1960s and early 1970s. Members of Congress became more independent with the rise of candidate-centered campaigns and the decline of local and state party organizations (e.g., Wattenberg 1991). Presidents have to bargain with more members of Congress with a position of power and who are less attached to their party affiliations. Bargaining thus has become more costly in terms of time and exchanges, perhaps narrowing the range of instances in which bargaining is effective.

The institutional context of presidential-congressional relations has also evolved in ways that affect the nature of presidential leadership of Congress. The institutional composition of government has grown dramatically. Informal and ad hoc organizational units have evolved into institutionalized units within the E.O.P. Ad hoc procedures have become routinized. Presidential policy formation and lobbying, for example, became institutionalized (e.g., Wayne 1978; Moe 1985). These developments have changed the relations between the presidency and Congress. The growth of the Executive also has created new problems of management, coordination, and control for the president. Presidents' bargaining leverage accruing from information advantages vis-a-vis Congress have declined as Congress increased its informational capacities with more personal and committee staff and support agencies (e.g., the GAO) that provide information to Congress independent of the Executive. The growth in the number and resources of interest groups and consulting firms further lessened congressional reliance on the Executive for information by providing additional sources of information. Secular changes outside Washington further changed the relations between presidents, members of Congress, and the public.

Communications technologies, for example, have advanced and the national broadcast news media have proliferated and become more cynical. As the political and institutional environ-

ments have changed, so have the needs and abilities of the president for influencing others in government and beyond. Presidents, for example, have increasingly used television to take their case directly to the public in order to pressure indirectly members of Congress (e.g., Kernell 1986).

The perspectives and foci of presidency scholars have changed with these changing circumstances. The growth of the institution of government has coincided, not accidentally, with increased scholarly attention to institutions and the relations between institutions and the people within them. Presidency scholars have become more concerned empirically and theoretically with symbolism, media-relations, going-public, and agenda-control as means of influencing congressional activity (e.g., Hinckley 1990; Tulis 1987). Research in the new institutionalism and the rhetorical presidency perspectives reflect a recognition by presidency scholars of such changing conditions and leadership strategies. These perspectives do not supplant scholarly concerns with bargaining. The survival of Neustadt's work as a central theme in presidency research testifies to its strength as an idea. Rather, the growth of these perspectives reflect a growth in our knowledge of a presidency which has become more complex and employs more diversified methods of influence.

## **Conclusions**

The evolutionary epistemological perspective does have a number of important implications for presidency research. First, as noted, multiple perspectives can coexist. Indeed, multiple perspectives may make the subfield dynamic, not moribund as some might have it. Second, the evolutionary epistemological perspective sees learning



# *An Evolutionary Epistemology of Presidency Research*

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as a key phenomenon to be studied. Learning is a complex phenomena that occurs at both the individual and institutional levels. Learning and adaptive behavior by individuals and institutions would seem to be an avenue of study with considerable potential for significant theoretical and empirical research.

An evolutionary perspective cautions against static perspectives and models. A theoretical perspective, such as rational choice, which tends to assume or predict outcomes in equilibrium is limited not only because of the difficulty of testing proposi-

tions derived in a stylized world, but also because it fails to appreciate the evolutionary nature of the presidency. The idea of continual (though not constant) change means that inferences predicted or derived from a static equilibria will not likely be of enduring validity. The inferences gained may become dated or incongruous with reality as circumstances (depicted in assumptions) change. Both statistical models such as OLS and public choice models can be affected in this regard. Complicating the matter is that institutions and individuals within them exist in mutually endogenous relationships. Rules and structures constrain the behavior of

people, but people can and do change the rules and structures to suit their needs. The endogeneity of individuals and institutions is an aspect of the presidency which we have yet to resolve. Future research needs to be more attentive to evolutionary change and learning and to the endogeneity of relations between individuals and institutions.

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## 1998 APSA Short Course

### *Improving Qualitative and Quantitative Inference in Presidency Research*

**Renee M. Smith**

University of Rochester

On Wednesday afternoon before the Boston APSA meeting, the PRG will sponsor a short course on Improving Qualitative and Quantitative Inference in Presidency Research. This half-day, afternoon course will focus on the similarities between quantitative and qualitative analyses of data (see also King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) as well as on appropriate techniques for collecting, coding, and drawing inferences from such data. The general goal of the course is to improve the quality of presidency research by providing students with practical guidelines and advice for the systematic collection and analysis of empirical data, regardless of whether inferences are to be drawn from qualitative or quantitative data. Handouts will be used to provide information. The instructor will draw examples from the presidency literature as well as from the general political science literature.

The course will be divided into three parts. Part one of the course will focus on the issues of

bias, efficiency, and controlling for outside factors via research design as they relate both to quantitative and qualitative research. In part two, the instructor will introduce students to sampling techniques that can be used to avoid bias when selecting items such as documents or cases to study or people to interview. In addition, Martha Joynt Kumar, of Towson University and organizer of the White House Interview Project, will discuss successful data collection via interviews with elites.

In part three, we will undertake an introduction and review of basic statistical techniques that one might use to draw inferences from qualitative or quantitative data. We will discuss when qualitative data can be reliably turned into quantitative data, the use of reliability statistics for scales and for content analysis coding, and new computer technology for content analysis. Another emphasis in this third portion of the course is to make students better consumers of statistical inferences. At

all points during the course, the instructor will emphasize the importance of research design and theoretically driven research.

**Instructor:**

Renée M. Smith,  
University of Rochester

**Registration Fee:**

\$5 graduate students  
\$15 faculty

Make checks payable to the PRG and send them to Professor Robert Spitzer, PRG treasurer, Department of Political Science, SUNY-Cortland, P.O. Box 2000, Cortland, New York, 13045. He will forward a list of those registering to me, and I will be distributing additional course information in July and August. Please include your SUMMER email and mailing addresses.

# Finding Funding and Research Agendas

Janet M. Martin

Bowdoin College

Report from the Committee on Funding Presidency Research: Janet M. Martin, Chair; Paul Light, Lyn Ragsdale, M. Stephen Weatherford, Terry Sullivan, ex officio.

The Committee on Funding Presidency Research was created following the 1996 APSA meetings as a complement to the work being done by the PRG in establishing a White House Interview Program and in monitoring the National Archives' plans for the presidential libraries.

## 1996-97 Activities

The Committee set out to determine where research dollars have been going and the potential implications for the type of research undertaken and subsequently published. In addition, Martha Kumar, then chair of the PRG, asked the committee to assess the state of presidency research - where are we weak and how we can strengthen our subfield. This was in response to criticism that we lag behind parties and Congress scholars in the research we produce. The work of the committee in 1996-97 focused on gathering the following information: publication of presidency research in scholarly journals; research being funded; funding sources; links between the types of research published and funded; types of research questions that presidency scholars should ask; and potential avenues for outside funding.

Systematic efforts at data collection on research funding proved challenging. An attempt was made to survey PRG members about their own research and funding that may have helped in that research. Bob Spitzer placed a large box in the PRG Newsletter and we requested input from

PRG members by e-mail, but no one responded. However, presidency scholars have received funding over the years, so several indirect approaches were tried. Presidential library foundations (as well as the National Archives) were contacted to ascertain who had received travel grants, but none of these organizations provided a list of those who had received such grants.

The grants and awards section of *PS* was consulted, going back to 1990, and we discovered that APSA does not provide any systematic record of grants awarded. On occasion, there is a listing of NSF award recipients or recipients of grants from the Ford Presidential Library Foundation, but the list appears to reflect (1) What an individual or their institution reports; or (2) lists submitted by a granting institution. The lists are difficult to use in any systematic way since teaching awards, NSF grants, and awards to non-political scientists may be all jumbled together, depending on the *PS* issue. In addition, some awards are announced in more than one issue. In more recent years, one can go to the Web sites of some funding sources and identify grant recipients, although not all awards may be organized by discipline or subfield.

We have asked the PRG Board to request APSA to regularly and systematically list in *PS* at least the awards made to political scientists by NSF; NEH; ACLS; Presidential Library Foundations; Woodrow Wilson Center; APSA; and the Dirksen Center. The titles of funded projects should also be included in order to learn the nature of projects that have received support.

## Publication of Presidency Research in Scholarly Journals

In an effort to get a handle on the type of submissions versus articles published by presidency scholars in political science journals, we conducted an informal survey and obtained the following observations from journal editors:

- Lyn Ragsdale, co-editor of *Political Research Quarterly*, observed that while the quality

of submissions in the area of presidency research is comparable to material submitted by those in other subfields, *there are fewer submissions than one might expect.*

- Martha Kumar, editor of presidency articles for *Congress and the Presidency*, was also surprised to find *far fewer submissions of presidency articles* than Congress articles (about 1/3 presidency; 2/3 Congress)

- Ken Meier, the editor of the *American Journal of Political Science* noted that only about *ten submissions are received per year in the area of presidency research.*

- In order for more work by presidency scholars to be published in the political science journals, more needs to be submitted for review. If fear of rejection is holding back submissions, this statistic may be of help: *AJPS* has only accepted one article in the past four years without a "revise and resubmit" request.

The following gives some indication of the number of presidency articles appearing in political science journals (including election studies):

*American Journal of Political Science* (1992-1996): 22 articles

*Journal of Politics* (1994-1996): 19 articles

*American Politics Quarterly* (1993-96, excluding Vol. 24, No. 4, a special issue on forecasting the 1996 election): 15 articles

*Presidential Studies Quarterly* (by political scientists; 1992-1996, 1997 issue 1): 84 articles

*Studies in American Political Development* (1995-1996): 3 articles

Some observations about funding sources acknowledged in these articles:

- ♦ Presidency research is funded through a diversity of sources, including NSF, ACLS, Brookings, Dirksen Center, Albert Center, LBJ Library Foundation, Eisenhower Library Foundation, Ford Library Foundation, Olin Foundation, Lily Foundation, Ford Found-

# Finding Funding and Research Agendas

(continued from page 19)

tion, Russell Sage, Gallup/CBS/NYT, Caterpillar, Freedom Forum, and the George and Eliza Gardner Howard Foundation.

- ◆ Funding by the NSF has been for studies involving elections or formal models of political control.
- ◆ There is an absence of presidential library foundations cited in acknowledgments.
- ◆ There is an absence of NEH funding cited in acknowledgments.
- ◆ *Presidential Studies Quarterly* has been the primary journal in which political scientists publish on the presidency. However, compared to research published in other journals, disproportionately few studies in *PSQ* result from funded research. The articles in *Presidential Studies Quarterly* represent a far broader range of research than the articles on the presidency in other journals. This suggests there is research that deserves support and which should be more widely read.

## NSF, NEH, and ACLS: Opportunities for Presidency Scholars

The 1997 APSA meeting provided an opportunity for the committee to continue its data collection process, as well as discuss the best means for sharing the results of our work. Several members of the committee met with Kenneth Kolson and Douglas Arnold of the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the PRG board met with Rick Wilson of the National Science Foundation.

In the meeting with Kenneth Kolson and Douglas Arnold, we learned more about funding opportunities for presidency scholars whose research has a humanistic component. The NEH has individual research grants, summer stipends, and collaborative research support. A major structural differ-

ence to note is that the NEH does not organize its grants around disciplines (as does the NSF) but around types of grants. In the prior year 600 applications for the summer stipend program were received, and 125 stipends were awarded. Overall, about 1200 proposals are received per year (with only about 70 coming from political scientists in any field). One hundred and seventy-five are picked to receive awards. Our committee members disseminated this information at the 1997 meeting, and we distributed applications to those who might be interested in serving as panel reviewers, since the review process is a crucial step in gaining recognition for presidency scholarship by political scientists. To learn more about NEH funding opportunities you can access information at [www.neh.fed.us](http://www.neh.fed.us).

Rick Wilson, from NSF, noted the absence of presidency proposals to the NSF. Projects gaining support tend to focus less on straight data collection, but have good theoretical questions and useful data that specifically address those questions. According to the NSF, "the Political Science program promotes basic scientific research on politics: political behavior, processes, and institutions. The program solicits research proposals of theoretical importance in all empirical subfields within the discipline of political science." Presidency scholars can consider collaborative research projects that might bring together groups of researchers, addressing questions with broader implications for the broader scholarly community, with different researchers focusing on parts of the larger questions.

Both the NEH and NSF recommend that grant seekers begin communicating with appropriate program officers early in the research planning stage in order to help shape a proposal that would meet the research objectives and funding requirements of the respective agencies. To learn more about NSF funding opportunities, you can access information at [www.nsf.gov](http://www.nsf.gov).

According to the Consortium of Social Sci-

ence Associations (APSA's major lobbying and information arm in Washington), the NSF has just announced a proposed 10% increase in funding in Clinton's FY99 budget, with a 15% increase in the social, behavioral, and economic sciences directorate. The three major survey projects--the National Election Studies, General Social Survey, and the Panel Study on Income Dynamics--have all been renewed for an additional four years. "During the winter and spring of 1998, social scientists are invited to make suggestions to the directorate concerning the process of recompetition and to begin writing proposals that could be submitted in the fall of 1998. Several groups of scholars are planning to present new ideas for large scale data collection in fields not currently represented by the three now-funded surveys." APSA suggests that scholars "think collaboratively with other political and social scientists about the infrastructure needs in political and social science . . . suggest procedures for (re) competition for new large scale data projects, and consider writing a proposal for a major infrastructure project." For more information on NSF funding opportunities go to [www.nsf.gov](http://www.nsf.gov) or contact Frank Scioli at [fscioli@nsf.gov](mailto:fscioli@nsf.gov) or Rick Wilson (before his tenure ends in June) at [rwilson@nsf.gov](mailto:rwilson@nsf.gov).

Political scientists undertaking research with a humanistic component [history, political institutions, feminism, race and ethnicity, constitutionalism] should consider applying for American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) fellowships. According to the ACLS (a non-profit federation of 60 national scholarly organizations), its mission "is to advance humanistic studies in all fields of learning in the humanities and related social sciences, and to maintain and strengthen relations among national soci-

# Finding Funding and Research Agendas

(continued from page 20)

eties devoted to such studies. Recently, the ACLS received \$10 million in grants from several foundations, marking the start of a campaign to increase the number of fellowships awarded each year from 55 at present, and increase stipends from \$20,000 to \$30,000 for junior scholars, and to \$50,000 for senior scholars.

## What's Ahead: The 1998 APSA Meetings in Boston

The following events have been scheduled:

### I. "Finding Funding: Successful Approaches to Foundation Support"

This is a short course sponsored by the PRG, on Wednesday, September 2, 1998, 1:00 to 4:00 p.m. (the day before the start of the APSA meeting). This workshop will provide an overview of foundations and their role in political science research. The workshop will feature Paul C. Light, Director of the Public Policy Program at the Pew Charitable Trusts, talking about the view from inside philanthropy, and Cal Mackenzie, a former Vice President for Development at Colby College, discussing strategies for raising money.

Participants will gain insight into the role of foundations in funding research through discussion of the following: How and when to approach foundations? Which ones and at what point in time? What types of projects are foundations looking to support? Which projects are likely to get funding and why? What can one do to enhance the likelihood of obtaining funding? What role can a university or college development office or office of institutional support play? What costs should be built into a grant proposal? Are collaborative

projects more likely to get funding?

The registration fee is \$25.00, and checks can be made payable to "Presidency Research Group," and sent, along with your mailing address, e-mail address, and phone number to:

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Phone: 207-725-3618

### II. "Roundtable on Presidency Research: Research Agendas, Institutionalized Support, and Private and Public Sector Funding"

The Committee on Funding Presidency Research has also organized a panel for the 1998 APSA meetings. The panel will be chaired by Janet M. Martin, and feature the following panelists, with Lyn Ragsdale and M. Stephen Weatherford as discussants:

- ◆ Paul Light, addressing the role of foundations.
- ◆ Martha Kumar, talking about the White House Interview Program as an example of institutionalized collaborative research.
- ◆ Terry Sullivan, discussing larger research questions, and institutionalized support (ongoing, large collaborative projects), what don't we do, such as a Presidency Fellowship program like the Congressional Fellowship program.
- ◆ Kathleen Hall Jamieson, explaining how to get research out in to the public domain, and discussing a new data base on presidential elections.

As part of the panel (and for distribution to those in attendance), I would like to prepare a

list of funding sources that presidency scholars have successfully used. If you have successfully received any funding outside of your own institution in support of a project, please give me a call at 207-725-3618 or e-mail me at [jmartin@polar.bowdoin.edu](mailto:jmartin@polar.bowdoin.edu).

The list will include foundations, government sources, think tanks, and presidential library foundations that have helped fund presidency research. I envision creating a list that would identify the funding source and the resulting project. This will help us identify the types of projects that have been successfully funded and scholars who have been successful in writing grants and in obtaining funds, creating a network of presidency scholars who may be able to offer both advice and encouragement to others. One possible outcome of this endeavor could be the creating of a PRG website with links to these funding entities. (You can also view this as an opportunity to promote any forthcoming books/articles that have benefited from such funding when submitting your lists!)

# *Managing FOIA Cases for Presidential Records - New Strategies at the Reagan Library*

## **Sherrie M. Fletcher and the Archival Team of the Reagan Library**

The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, opened for research in November 1991, is one of the presidential libraries administered by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The Reagan Library has the largest holdings of any presidential library, with approximately 50 million pages of presidential records and personal papers and an extensive audiovisual collection. The presidential records, which constitute some 90% of the Library's holdings, are administered under the 1978 Presidential Records Act (PRA). Since its opening, the Reagan Library has been a testing ground for the application of the PRA and the administration of presidential records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The archival staff is also the first to operate fully under a team concept, establishing its own goals and implementing work procedures.

Beginning in January 1994, under the provisions of the PRA, researchers have been able to access unprocessed Reagan Presidential records by filing a FOIA request. Within a few months of that date, the Library received so many FOIA requests that a backlog accumulated. It became necessary to institute a queue system so requests are logged, processed, and responded to on a first in, first out basis. By the beginning of 1997, the processing time had lengthened to 12 to 18 months for FOIA requests involving unclassified records. Because of the volume of requests, the archival staff is processing and reviewing presidential records only in response to FOIA requests, virtually eliminating the processing and review of collections or series in their entirety.

In Spring of 1997, the archival staff was constituted into a team. The first task the team undertook was streamlining FOIA processing in order to reduce the FOIA request backlog and cut processing time, without impacting customer service. With a restructured queue system and other procedural changes initiated by the archival team, processing time was cut to 8 to 10 months for unclassified record requests and 12 to 18 months for classified record requests. The team is committed to reducing the backlog further by the end of the year.

The archival team has also processed and reviewed preliminary file folder lists and inventories for unprocessed White House and National Security Council staff and office file collections. This will assist FOIA requestors in focusing their requests and identifying relevant presidential records. For those who cannot visit the research room, the Library will lend copies of up to six inventories to researchers for two weeks.

Depending on the volume, type, and complexity of responsive records, the archival team places the FOIA request in one of two FOIA processing queues, an unclassified record queue or a classified record queue. Requests involving only a few pages are processed immediately, without being placed in a queue. When the request comes up in the queue, an archivist processes the records according to provisions of the PRA and the FOIA. When processing is finished, a 30-day notice is sent to representatives of the incumbent and former president, as required by the PRA and E.O. 12667. When this process is completed, the staff notifies the requestor of the availability of the records. Since the summer of 1996, as part of FOIA processing, classified presidential records, in which no other PRA restriction applies, are identified so they can be sent to the appropriate agencies for

current classification review.

The team continues to examine and evaluate all work processes, including customer service. The archival team is currently developing and evaluating ways to automate finding aids to provide greater access to the Library holdings and records processed in response to FOIA requests. Team members are involved in discussions relating to the National Archives Information Locator (NAIL). NAIL was developed by NARA to assist the general public and researchers interested in accessing information about the holdings of the NARA through the Internet. The team is also refining and updating the Library's own web site. In addition, the Library has submitted documents and photographs to NARA for inclusion in the Electronic Access Project (EAP), developed to place significant historical documents on the NARA home page.

Researchers are encouraged to contact the library prior to planning a trip to the Reagan library, or before filing an FOIA request. The archival team can provide researchers with a list of records currently available for research and a preliminary list of holdings. In addition, they can assist the FOIA requestor by providing information on the quality and composition of relevant unprocessed Presidential records. The archives team will be happy to answer any questions you might have concerning the library's holdings, conducting research at the library, or hotel accommodations. Researchers are also encouraged to visit our web site at [www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/reagan/](http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/reagan/) or through the NARA home page [www.nara.gov](http://www.nara.gov). Requests for information can be directed to the reference archivist,

# Books and Articles on the Presidency

MaryAnne Borrelli

Connecticut College

## Books on the Presidency

### A Note to the Reader:

The following list includes texts and collections, in addition to scholarly works, in the belief that such information is useful in planning courses and designing syllabi. Whenever possible, entries include price and ISBN information.

- Bowie, Robert and Richard H. Immerman. 1997. *Waging Peace, Eisenhower's Strategy for National Security*. New York: Oxford University Press. 352 pages. \$49.95, ISBN 506264-7.
- Brands, H.W. 1997. *T.R., A Life*. New York: BasicBooks. 816 pages. \$35.00 cloth, ISBN 0-465-06958-4.
- Cho, Yong Hyo and H. George Fredrickson, ed. 1997. *The White House and the Blue House Government Reform in the United States and Korea*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 360 pages. \$62.00 cloth, ISBN 0-7618-0908-2. \$39.50 paper, ISBN 0-7618-0909-0.
- Engstrom, David W. 1997. *Presidential Decision Making Adrift, The Carter Administration and the Mariel Boatlift*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 256 pages. \$62.50 cloth, ISBN 0-8476-8413-X. \$23.95 paper, ISBN 0-8476-8414-8.
- McMaster, H.R. 1997. *Dereliction of Duty; Lyndon Johnson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*. New York: Harper-Collins. 352 pages. \$27.50 cloth, ISBN 0-06-018795-6. \$46.00 cloth, ISBN 0-7618-0880-9. \$26.50 paper, ISBN 0-7618-0881-7.
- Thompson, Kenneth W. 1997. *The Bush Presidency, Ten Intimate Perspectives of George Bush*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 220 pages. \$46.50 cloth, ISBN 0-7618-0670-9. \$26.50 paper, ISBN 0-7618-0671-7.
- Thompson, Kenneth W., ed. 1997. *The Budget Deficit and the National Debt - Volume I*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 192 pages. \$48.50 cloth, ISBN 0-7618-0709-8. \$26.50 paper, ISBN 0-7618-0710-1.
- Thompson, Kenneth W., ed. 1997. *Governance VIII, The Presidency and Foreign Policy*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 196 pages. \$46.00 cloth, ISBN 0-7618-0880-9. \$26.50 paper, ISBN 0-7618-0881-7.
- Thompson, Kenneth W., ed. 1997. *Papers on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-fifth Amendment, Volume IV*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 144 pages. \$46.50 cloth, ISBN 0-7618-0724-1. \$26.50 paper, ISBN 0-7618-0725-X.
- Thompson, Kenneth W., ed. 1997. *The Reagan Presidency, Ten Intimate Perspectives of Ronald Reagan*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 184 pages. \$44.50 cloth, ISBN 0-7618-0722-5. \$24.50 paper, ISBN 0-7618-0723-3.
- Thompson, Kenneth W., ed. 1997. *Statesmen Who Were Never President, Volume III*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 188 pages. \$49.00 cloth, ISBN 0-7618-0894-9. \$22.50 paper, ISBN 0-7618-0895-7.
- Thompson, Kenneth W., ed. 1997. *The Virginia Papers on the Presidency, Volume 30; The Miller Center Forums, 1991-1996*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. 208 pages. \$44.50 cloth, ISBN 0-7618-0902-3. \$22.50 paper, ISBN 0-7618-0903-1.
- Volkan, Vamik D., Norman Itzkowitz, and Andrew W. Dod. 1997. *Richard Nixon: A Psychobiography*. New York: Columbia University Press. 208 pages. \$27.50 cloth, ISBN 0-231-10854-0.

## Managing FOIA for Presidential Records - New Strategies at the Reagan Library

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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 40 Presidential Drive, Simi Valley, CA 93065

Phone: (1-800-410-8534).

Fax: 805-522-9621.

E-mail: [library@reagan.nara.com](mailto:library@reagan.nara.com)

# Books and Articles on the Presidency

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## Articles on the Presidency

### A Note to the Reader:

Because every article in the *Presidential Studies Quarterly* relates to this column, and because limited space argues against replicating its tables of contents, only the themes which define each issue of the journal are listed.

Atkeson, Lonna Rae. 1998. "Divisive Primaries and General Election Outcomes: Another Look at Presidential Campaigns." *American Journal of Political Science* 42.1: 256-271. A regression analysis of the effect of divisive presidential nomination campaigns on general election outcomes. Divisiveness is found to have "a much more modest effect" that was previously hypothesized.

Beck, Paul Allen, Russell J. Dalton, Audrey A. Haynes, and Robert Huckfeldt. 1997. "Presidential Campaigning at the Grass Roots." *Journal of Politics* 59.4: 1264-1275. An examination of the differences in Democratic and Republican party grass-roots activism. Local parties' relative organizational capacities and local-national party integration are found to be significant explanatory variables.

Cooper, Phillip J. 1997. "Power Tools for an Effective and Responsible Presidency." *Administration & Society* 29.5: 529-556. Examines use of the basic tools of presidential direct administration, such as executive orders and presidential proclamations.

Dalton, Russell J., Paul A. Beck, and Robert Huckfeldt. 1998. "Partisan Cues and the Media: Information flows in the 1992 Presidential Election." *American Political Science Review* 92.1: 111-126. Local newspapers are found to be significant cue-givers, affecting citizens' candidate preferences. Also considered are the varied messages presented by the press and the factors which shape readers' perceptions of this information.

Edwards, George C. III. 1997. "Aligning Tests with Theory: Presidential Approval as a Source of Influence in Congress." *Congress & the Presidency* 24.2: 113-130. Reexamines the impact of presidential approval on presidential support in Congress.

Fischer, Beth A. 1997. "Toeing the Hardline? The Reagan Administration and the Ending of the Cold War." *Political Science Quarterly* 112.3:477-496. Rejecting convention wisdom, it is argued that the Reagan administration became more conciliatory even before Moscow began to reform. Thus, rather than being passive or reactive to changes in the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration assumed the initiative in defusing hostilities.

Franklin, Mark N. and Wolfgang P. Hirczy de Miño, 1998. "Separated Powers, Divided Government, and Turnout in U.S. Presidential Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 42.1: 316-326. Divided government is shown to have an effect on voter turnout, with time series analysis demonstrating that the effects are cumulative and negative.

Holtzman, Abraham. 1997. "Members of Congress as Presidential Diplomats in the United Nations." *Congress & the Presidency* 24.2: 149-166. Explores the impact of the use of members of

Congress as executive branch representatives in the United Nations on the executive-legislative relationship.

Lenart, Silvo. 1997. "Naming Names in a Midwestern Town: The Salience of Democratic Presidential Hopes in Early 1992." *Political Behavior* 19.4: 365-382. Using a panel survey, the author examines the comparative influence of media exposure and interpersonal discussion during the presidential nomination process.

McCormick, James M., Eugene R. Witkopf, and David M. Danna. 1997. "Research Note: Politics and Bipartisanship at the Water's Edge: A Note on Bush and Clinton." *Polity* 30.1: 133-149. An extension of an earlier study of bipartisan perspectives on legislative-executive relations in foreign policy. Ideological divisions were more pronounced under Bush, partisan divisions under Clinton, a circumstance that is considered in light of divided and unified government.

Morley, Morris and Chris McGillion. 1997. "'Disobedient' Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti." *Political Science Quarterly* 112.3: 363-384. A consideration of the implementation of United States foreign policy regarding regime changes in Latin America, focusing upon the Clinton administration's response to Haiti.



## Articles on the Presidency

(continued from page 24)

*Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 1997. 27.3, The Presidency in the World.

*Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 1997. 27.4, Rules of the Game: How to Play the Presidency.

"Redefining American Leadership." *Foreign Policy*. 1997. No. 109: 34-69. This series of nine articles, prepared by *Foreign Policy's* contributing editors, examines Clinton's reputation from a variety of region perspectives, namely, Europe, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Russia.

Sigelman, Lee and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 1997. "The 'Veepstakes': Strategic Choice in Presidential Running Mate Selection." *American Political Science Review* 91.4: 855-864. A discrete choice model is utilized to investigate the selection of vice presidential nominees from 1940 to 1996. The presidential nominee's choice is primarily explained by the size of the prospective VP's state, by whether she/he was a rival for the nomination, and by the balance in age for the ticket.

Sloan, John W. 1997. "The Reagan Presidency, Growing Inequality, and the

American Dream." *Policy Studies Journal* 25.3: 371-386. A discussion of how the political skills of the Reagan administration rendered the president "relatively immune" to liberal attacks regarding growing inequalities along various indices.

### *Dissertation on the Presidency Prize*

The Center for Presidential Studies in the George Bush School of Government and Public Service announces the third annual national competition for the best doctoral dissertation on the American presidency. The competition is open to scholars in any field, and dissertations may focus on any aspect of the presidency. Nominations may be made by chairs of dissertation committees or any other faculty members.

The winners will receive a \$1,000 award and expenses to present their work at Texas A&M University. The prize also carries with it the opportunity for publication in the Presidency and Leadership series of Texas A&M University Press.

Nominations for the prize should include three copies of the dissertation and a cover letter. They should be sent to George Edwards III, Director, The Center for Presidential Studies, George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 77843-4349. Dissertations accepted for degree completion in 1998 are eligible. For additional information, see our website at <http://www-bushschool.tamu.edu>. **Deadline February 15, 1999.**

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Please send your book or paper directly to each relevant committee member.

# In Memorium: Dom Bonafede

Stephen Wayne  
Georgetown University

The Presidency Research Group sadly mourns the passing of its valued member and contributor Dom Bonafede, who died of complications from cancer on January 13, 1998. Dom was a journalist and presidential analyst par excellence. He began his career in the 1950s, first working as a reporter for the *Havana Herald* in Cuba and later for two Miami newspapers, *The Miami News* and *The Miami Herald*. He then moved to Washington in 1963, becoming a political correspondent for *The New York Herald Tribune* and later for *Newsweek*. In 1969, Dom became assistant foreign editor for *The Washington Post*. After a year at the *Post*, he joined the then fledgling *National Journal* as its White House correspondent.

It was through Dom's insightful reporting for the *National Journal* that many of us got our first behind-the-scenes look at the Nixon White House. In his stories, Dom gave us the access which was difficult for most of us to obtain on our own. Dom continued to cover the White House for the *National Journal* for next 10 years, providing a rich and detailed portrait of the changing tapestry of the contemporary presidency.

Dom loved presidential politics, but he was as interested in political institutions and policy processes as he was in the partisan political activity. He understood the interaction of organization, procedure, and politics and strived to help his readers appreciate the operational complexities of the White House and the Executive Office. Presidency watchers naturally gravitated to his in-depth descriptions and analyses, which were consistently insightful from an institutional perspective.

Dom kept his eye on the presidency even after he left the White House beat to become the *Journal's* chief political correspondent. He contributed numerous book chapters and articles to the presidency literature. He also followed many of us into academia, becoming a professor of journalism at American University. Dom loved teaching and did so until his untimely death. He also took his faculty responsibilities seriously, so seriously in fact that he actually injured himself running to a faculty meeting. How is that for devotion and dedication?

A prolific, savvy, and articulate journalist, Dom was always accessible to those of us in the political science community who studied the presidency. He was our friend, and we were his. More than anyone else, it was Dom Bonafede

who first turned to political scientists as analytic sources for his articles. He even quoted us in his stories on the presidency well before other journalists did so. Although he had limited patience with the more esoteric and methodologically challenging parts of our research, he always valued our frameworks, our arguments, and our findings, gently, ever so gently, critiquing our conclusions from his real-world experience. Moreover, he came to our meetings, participated in our panels, and contributed to our dialogue.

We shall miss his friendship, his wisdom, and his good humor. But our research will continue to benefit from his insight and his understanding of the institutionalized presidency.

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