



PRG Report



Newsletter of the Presidency Research Group

The American Political Science Association

Spring 1993

AMERICA'S FIRST HUNDRED DAYS

James Sterling Young
University of Virginia

Editor's note: The following essay is drawn from Jim's forthcoming study of the presidency. Except for the passage from the Virginia Stamp Act protest, all quotations are taken from The Journals of the Continental Congress.

The United States of America was, as we all know, born with a legislative body and no head. From 1776 to 1789 Americans chose to run their affairs of state in a purely legislative way. Policies of the union were made consensually— and contentiously— in a Continental Congress of equal representatives, without an "executive" either single or plural, and without a president save in name.

As we know also, government by legislature was indicted in
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Chief Clerk's Report

I want to thank Richard Pious for making his extensive bibliography of the presidency literature available to PRGers. So far, we have filled thirty-five requests. If you would like a copy, send me a note or e-mail PRG-REQUEST@weber.UCSD (for Bitnet users) and PRG-REQUEST@weber.UCSD.edu (for Internet users) with your address and the size and format of the floppy you prefer.

Michael Genovese has kindly agreed to organize the committee to select the best paper on the presidency award from the 1991 and 1992 APSA meetings. Serving on the committee will be Robert Spitzer (Chair), Nancy Kassop and David Adler. Those of you who chaired presidency panels during either of these years are encouraged to identify deserving papers. Also, authors may
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The Reagan-Bush Civil Rights Legacy

Steven A. Shull

University of New Orleans

Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Steven's new book, A Kinder, Gentler Racism? The Reagan-Bush Civil Rights Legacy scheduled to be in bookstores August, 1993.

This research posits that Ronald Reagan returned civil rights to a place of prominence on the national agenda. He was the initiator of many statements and actions that had long lasting policy results. Did George Bush simply maintain that legacy or did he pursue the "kinder and gentler" policies of most predecessors? Empirical evidence suggests the former. Despite early high support from minorities, Bush continued — perhaps expanded — the Reagan retrenchment from previous federal protections. Leadership from these two ideological conservatives led to substantial changes in civil rights. Reagan and Bush can be compared to their contemporaries, and my primary thesis is that presidential influence leads to public policy change.

The larger research (Shull, 1993) is organized according to a stimulus-response model not unlike the process of making public policy itself. This study covers the full range of statements and actions (stimuli), and results (responses). Presidents make statements through public communications that may be symbolic or substantive in setting the agenda. They take actions legislatively, administratively, and seek other avenues to formulate their policy preferences in the civil rights realm. How do others react to these presidential statements and actions through the modification, adoption, and implementation of policy? Finally, what are the results or consequences? My ultimate aim is to assess the impact of policy statements, actions, and results.

The outcomes of civil rights policymaking are

largely a function of actor relations and the nature of issues. These conditions are highly variable and greatly determine the leadership potential of the president. Presidents operate within an environment but with some chance to alter all these "givens." Presidents take on or inherit a set of continuing policies that serve as a starting point for their administrations. Although presidents may be able to set the stage (advocate an agenda and formulate proposals), whether these proposals become law (let alone are implemented) is largely under the discretion of other actors. Those inside and outside of government also respond to and evaluate such policies. Presidents often are followers, but they can also be leaders in civil rights policy making. Although constraints occur on presidential statements, actions, and results, they are also subject to manipulation.

The 1980's under Ronald Reagan returned to the "benign neglect" of the early 1970's. Like Richard Nixon, he sought to end or ignore many government civil rights programs (Amaker, 1988; Detlefsen, 1991; Orfield and Ashkinaze, 1991). In the 1980 election, Reagan received the lowest percent black vote of any Republican presidential candidate in history. Near the end of Reagan's first term, the "fairness" issue began to have some effect. Frequently he felt compelled to defend his civil rights record. Reagan called the 1988 Civil Rights Restoration Act a "federal power grab" and vetoed it. His remarks require us to scrutinize traditional notions about presidential leadership in civil rights. Foremost is the assumption that a "civil rights activist" in the White House means a president who tries to advance and extend civil rights. Reagan was active, but to reduce government's role, at least as

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THE PRESIDENCY: LIVE FROM WASHINGTON, D.C.

Larry Berman

University of California, Davis

Undergraduate education in American universities today calls out for enhancement and innovation. For too many years too little attention was paid, too little priority was given, and too little creativity was dedicated to the nature and quality of the courses offered to undergraduates.

As universities today refocus on the problems of undergraduate education, we do so while confronted with difficult fiscal constraints and amidst the compounding effects of a world changing more rapidly and profoundly than at any time in recent memory. Innovation is thus more difficult, yet all the more essential, for us to fulfill our mission to provide the best possible education for America's students.

One of the more promising modes of innovation with which universities have begun to work is satellite interactive telecommunications (SIT). A study by the Office of Technology Assessment, for example, found that nearly every state offers some form of teaching through telecommunications, an approach to education that has come to be known as "distance learning." The rationale for the use of such technology is, as *The Chronicle of Higher Education* recently noted, that it "promises to help institutions cope with such factors as the public's demand for better undergraduate teaching, the reduction in state support for public universities, the pressure to hold down private-college tuition, and the increase in the numbers of non-traditional students."

The use of SIT for undergraduate instruction can and has been used to target a number of problem areas identified above. Perhaps the most important of these concerns the lack of active participation in the learning process on the part of students. Educators have found that the use of interactive telecommunications technology can help promote participation by students in both the classroom and the learning experience as a whole. Not only are students motivated by the opportunity to work with such technology, but the access it provides them to nationally known experts and scholars or real-life case studies puts what they are learning into a context that often seems more relevant to them than that of the classroom alone.

The UC Davis Washington Center was created to provide enhanced opportunities for UC Davis students to take advantage of the unique

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Hundred Days (from page 1)

the constitutional proceedings of 1787-89. The charges ranged from tyrannical tendencies to impotence, from reckless speed to dangerous procrastination, and from disregard of minority rights to frustration of majority will. The argument made then, like the argument made ever since then against congressional government, was that no legislative body is capable of supplying what the survival and well being of the United States requires—energy, expedition, efficiency, consistency, secrecy, and responsibility in the affairs of state. Only an independent executive, the argument went, possesses the capacity to meet these requirements.

That this was a winning argument in 1787-89 is common knowledge, too. Not well known, however, are the facts that did not support it. Advocates of an independent executive made much of the failures of legislative government, especially during the decline of the Confederation, 1783-1787. Ignored were the successes of the preceding eight years under the severest performance test possible— an unprecedented war of liberation by a hastily assembled league of colony/states against the world's most powerful nation. Repeatedly during the war years, Congress showed

precisely those "executive" attributes that were said to be inherently lacking in a legislative body, or even in a plural executive. And in the first 100 days of those years, this diverse body of 65 members did so as dramatically as the presidency did in the celebrated first 100 days of Abraham Lincoln and of Franklin Roosevelt.

Consider these events. In the spring of 1775 Britain, having failed to end American disobedience by civil coercion, adopted an undeclared policy of military pacification, including the employment of native American tribesmen as terrorists. The sending of troops to destroy an American arms cache at Concord was the first action under the new policy, resulting in 49 Massachusetts militiamen killed on April 19. On May 10 delegates from all the colonies assembled at Philadelphia. In short order they organized themselves as a body, adopted rules of secrecy, digested reports of the battle and of British military activities elsewhere, and adjourned into a "committee of the whole on the state of America" to hammer out a policy. Decidedly different views were aired, competing priorities were argued, and contending proposals were debated. Consensus was

reached on a four-part plan of action.

First: a final petition to the king for redress, heralded by a day of prayer throughout America that "the Great Governor of the World" would move George III to grant it. This part of the policy showed respect for the crown, notified him of the intolerable wrongs committed by his ministers, signaled Americans' preference for peaceful solutions, and served to satisfy the doves in Congress.

Second: armed resistance to British use of military force and collective responsibility to aid any afflicted localities. This part of the policy anticipated the petition's failure, showed American mettle, signaled a nonnegotiable demand to end military coercion, and served to satisfy the hawks in Congress.

The policy was pursued with Hamiltonian energy, secrecy, and dispatch. Committees were immediately formed to help get America "in a state of a defence." One, chaired by delegate Washington, was to come up with a scheme for "supplying these colonies with Ammunition and military stores." This soon led to the creation of "the secret committee" for purchasing arms in Europe through a dummy corporation, Rodrigue Hortalez et Cie. Another,

chaired by delegate Franklin, was to devise a system "for conveying letters and intelligence through this continent." This led to the creation of not only the Post Office but also "the committee of secret correspondence," which ran an overseas intelligence network of agents paid to provide "such advice and assistance as . . . justice to an oppressed people demands." In the month of June Congress created a volunteer "Army for the Defence of American Liberty"; enacted rules and regulations to govern it; set up committees to screen, appoint, equip, and pay its officers and men; elected Washington to serve as "General and Commander in chief" under instructions "punctually to observe and follow such orders and directions . . . as you shall receive from this or any future Congress"; and sent him to take charge of the militiamen besieging British troops at Bunker Hill. In July, after the battle, Congress declared Britain an "aggressor" and issued a call to American arms "in defence of the freedom that is our birth-right."

Third: peaceful coexistence with native Americans and prevention of British-sponsored terrorism. An Indian Department was created in July. The commissioners were instructed to use their appropriations for peace-making, to keep British

Indian agents under surveillance, and to seize anyone "stirring up or inciting" enmity toward Americans. Congress voted also to kindle a council fire at Albany and to give a talk as "one great council" of "we, the white people" to the great council of the Six Nations: "Brothers and Friends, Open a Kind Ear!" "This is a family quarrel between us and old England. We desire you not to join on either side, but keep the hatchet buried deep." "Brothers, Listen! We wish peace. . . ."

Fourth: public diplomacy and a press campaign to gain credibility and support for the American cause "in the opinions of mankind." Congress made nine major public addresses during the first 100 days. Each message was drafted by a different special committee appointed for the purpose. Each was debated and voted on by paragraphs in the whole body. All were ordered to be "put to press and communicated as universally as possible." Included were messages to Canadians, to Jamaicans, to the people of Ireland, to "the Inhabitants of Great Britain," and to the "citizens" of London in addition to those addressed to the American Indians, the American people, and the king. Space precludes even a brief summary of the messages

here. They are notable specimens of speechcraft and statecraft, expressing a unity of purpose in a variety of idioms and prefiguring in their content the Declaration of July '76. In short, the rhetorical performance of Congress, like its policy performance, was of a "presidential" character.

Indeed, if a president had said and done what Congress said and did in America's first 100 days, "he" would surely be ranked high on the short list of great presidents.

Congressional government may not be as flawed as presidentialists are wont to think. And the legislative way may not be as lacking in the capacity to do what is necessary for the survival and well being of the United States as advocates of the executive way are wont to claim. True, the summer of 1775 was no ordinary moment in American political history. Neither was the summer of 1787 — America's second 100 days — when another representative body, again at Philadelphia, again acting consensually and contentiously in the legislative way, came up with a constitution to save the union that had been forged there in 1775.

Yet what the delegates at Philadelphia accomplished in

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Hundred Days (from page 5)

the legislative way cannot be discounted as an accident of history or as a stroke of pure luck. For this was the way of governing that Americans had been learning and practicing for more than 150 years, ever since they constructed their first representative assembly in 1619. By independence time, elected delegates of local communities, assembled in a body, had managed in every colony to replace de jure government by the British executive with de facto government by legislature "in all matters respecting our internal polity," as the Virginia burgesses put it in their Stamp Act protest. Those who assembled at Philadelphia to construct, govern, and preserve a new American polity were not the first but the eighth generation of Americans schooled in the art and science of governing in the legislative way.

These facts may help explain why, for all the

failings of legislative government brought to light in the 1780s, Americans still made a constitutional choice to have the most powerful legislature and the most constrained executive of any nation in the 18th century world. And this choice may help in turn to explain why, despite our perennial habit of indicting Congress, Americans have far less often in history let our presidents govern in the proverbial executive way than we have made them govern in the legislative way—consensually and contentiously in a polity premised on the belief that many heads are usually better than one when it comes to deciding the policies of the nation. It may even be that, far from lacking the capacity to do what the survival and well being of the nation requires, the legislative way helps explain why the United States has become the oldest and most powerful constitutional democracy in the world today.

Chief Clerk's (from page 1)

nominate their own good efforts. A copy of the paper should accompany nominations and be sent to each committee member: Robert Spitzer, Political Science, SUNY—Cortland, Box 2000, Cortland, NY 13045; Nancy Kassop, Political Science, SUNY—New Paltz, New Paltz, NY 12561; David Adler, Political Science, Idaho State University, Pocatello, ID 83209. The deadline for nominations is May 15, 1993. The winner will be announced at our business meeting.

Larry Berman, who will soon be assuming chief clerkship duties, has asked me to help recruit a new editor of *PRG Report*. From the accolades heaped on me by fellow PRGers, I can promise that the work will be amply repaid in glory. Let me know if you would like to consider editorship or some other involvement with the newsletter.

Respectfully submitted,

Sam Kernell
skernell@UCSD

Civil Rights (from page 2)

expressed in his public statements and actions. He was the "chief apostle of conservatism on race" (Carmines and Stimson, 1989: 54).

The racial divisiveness in the 1988 campaign over the Willie Horton Republican television commercial seemed an inauspicious beginning for the Bush administration. Still, Bush had called for a "kinder and gentler America," which some saw as a more supportive view on civil rights. The administration's four years in office did not settle the question of Bush's level of commitment. Civil rights advocates criticized several of his appointments, but during 1989 the administration backed, and a Senate committee approved, the Americans with Disabilities Act. Much greater controversy arose over a 1990 bill to tighten the remedies against job discrimination. Political events in 1991 forced Bush to support legislation similar to that he had vetoed the previous year. After this controversy, attention to civil rights waned. Bush's foreign policy interests and emerging events moved the administration more quickly into the international realm than had been the case with previous presidents.

Presidents have exercised varied but sometimes considerable influence in civil

rights. Although generally a low priority for presidents (Kessel, 1974; LeLoup and Shull, 1979), their leadership is critical in determining the direction and magnitude for civil rights policy. The president often is not the driving force behind civil rights policy, but the power of the presidency usually is essential to change policy. It may range from strong legislative leadership, such as Johnson exerted with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to a decision not to veto, as Ford decided with the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, to a movement *away* from government (or at least legislative) involvement as under Reagan and Bush. These latter two presidents forced a reconsideration of the notion that an activist president pursues expansionist civil rights policies. They were also among the most active while Gerald Ford and Dwight Eisenhower were the least active modern presidents.

Although Ronald Reagan took few legislative actions, his executive actions were unparalleled. He and Bush also used strong rhetoric to rekindle and recast civil rights policy. More than most presidents, they showed the importance of public statements in shaping the governmental agenda on civil rights. They also shrewdly used other tools of the

presidency such as the budget. Both paid a price for their opposition to civil rights, however, because it seems that at least rhetorical support is now a requisite that constrains the actions of the president. Although the president influences civil rights, conversely civil rights influences the president. The expansion of civil rights to large numbers of people makes it mandatory for the president to make overtures and gestures to them; the civil rights constituency has grown. Reagan's and Bush's statements and actions did not go unnoticed by civil rights advocates.

The Reagan and Bush administrations returned civil rights to the forefront of the domestic policy agenda. If this policy represented an attack on civil rights, it was done in the guise of a broader ideological purpose. Although the evidence is limited, their administrations had significant effects on enforcement. A newspaper column showed that the top legal official in the Bush EEOC repeatedly overruled staff recommendations and ordered action favorable to employers. This is consistent with the charges others have leveled (Newsweek, March 7, 1988: 4; Amaker, 1988; Stewart, 1993; Yarbrough, 1985: *passim*).

Did these presidents succeed? Did the Reagan and

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Bush administrations usher in a new era of presidential policy making in civil rights? Did they make the late 1980's and early 1990's the "presidential decade" in civil rights?

However, their preferences were policy contraction rather than expansion, reversing the direction that civil rights policy had taken during the past generation. Although their success varied, those decisions compared to those of Lyndon Johnson provide the parameters within which future presidents must act in the realm of civil rights.

Why do some presidents succeed with their civil rights policy preferences while others, apparently, fail? Attentiveness, ideological commitment, and consistency in statements and actions appear to pay off. All these characteristics require follow-through on the part of the president to obtain the desired responses from the public policy arena. Presidents like Johnson and Reagan exhibited these characteristics, while others like Eisenhower, Ford, and Bush did not. All these presidents were ideologically distinct (if sometimes in opposite directions), but by being both assertive and consistent (e.g., rational follow-through from statements and actions), such presidents obtain their way more often. Thus, presidents can influence the process, if less so the nature of issues and

the political environment of civil rights policy.

The late 1980's and early 1990's offered the potential if not always the actuality of presidential leadership in civil rights. The policy area provides the opportunities for presidential discretion and policy potential. For example, the after-tax income of the poorest 10% of the population decreased by over 10% from 1980 to 1990 while that of the richest 1% grew by over 87% (Edsall and Edsall, 1991:220). Because income and race are related, the Reagan administration produced substantial policy change. Reagan and Bush took advantage of a renewed agenda and created a substantial civil rights legacy. That legacy seems likely to be furthered by the courts but will also be muted by a resurgent Congress and bureaucracy.

George Bush issued strong statements and actions in civil rights. The fact that they were more conservative than those of Ronald Reagan surprised most observers. During his four years in office, Bush certainly tried to maintain the Reagan civil rights legacy. In some ways he even expanded on it. Bush blamed the 1992 Los Angeles riot in part on social programs of the 1960's and 1970's. His more modest proposals reveal diminished support for civil rights in the political environment. By playing on

that fear and frustration from the white middle class, both Presidents Reagan and Bush left a substantial civil rights legacy, but it was not a kinder, gentler one. Democrat Bill Clinton's landslide victory in the 1992 election portended kinder, gentler civil rights policies than had occurred under his two Republican predecessors.

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educational resources of the nation's capital. This primarily had meant "bringing Davis to Washington": e.g., an academic-internship program for undergraduates. Last year with generous support from the UC Office of the President and a UCD Undergraduate Instructional Improvement Fund Grant, the Washington Center and Political Science Department developed a pilot project to help "bring Washington to Davis": specifically, a live interactive "telecourse" for undergraduates.

The pilot offered a set of five (5) instructional units to use in my Political Science 106, The American Presidency, during Spring Quarter 1992. "The Presidency: Live from Washington, D.C." telecourse last spring was enormously successful. Interviews were conducted on the following themes.

- "Contemporary Presidents and the Institution of the Presidency," with Hedrick Smith (author, *The Power Game*; former Washington Bureau Chief, *The New York Times*), April 21;
- "Staffing the White House: Domestic Policy," with Dr. Roger Porter (Special Assistant to President Bush for Domestic Policy and veteran of the Ford and Reagan administrations), April 30;
- "Views from Congress," with Congressman Christopher Cox (R-CA) and Congressman Calvin Dooley (D-CA), May 14;
- "Making Foreign Policy," with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski (National Security Advisor to President Carter), May 28;
- "Presidential Campaigns and Political Advertising," with Roger Ailes (Principal Media Advisor to the 1988 Bush Presidential Campaign), June 9.

Our objective was to communicate to students an awareness of politics and the presidency, with the added ability to do so through a more active learning process. The telecourse provided exposure and insight: exposure to prominent Washington-based

speakers, drawn from both the government and more generally from the Washington community, and the opportunity to learn from the insights and perspectives they can uniquely provide. The value of doing this via live interactive transmission is that it allows for both lecture and discussion, and provides a "real time" element which can be quite meaningful for students.

Each instructional unit consisted of four parts:

(a) Live Interactive Telecommunications Session — 45-50 minutes. Each session featured a speaker from Washington, D.C., for 15-20 minutes of interview and 30-35 minutes of question-and-answer, moderated by Professors Bruce Jentleson (Director, UC Davis Washington Center) and Larry Berman (Davis);

(b) Unit Outline — Any classroom use of guest speakers has the inherent risk of ensuring that however impressive the individual's credentials, he/she does focus on themes and ideas the instructor considers central. While not trying to over-structure, we developed an outline for each session which was sent to the speakers in advance, in order to facilitate a focusing of his/her remarks;

(c) Readings — Appropriate readings were identified and developed to prepare students for the discussion;

(d) Biographical Materials — Background on the speakers was developed and distributed to students.

The pilot project was intended to advance several long term goals, and we envision three types of telecommunications activities for undergraduate education as possible in the future.

First is the continued development of multi-show series such as for Political Science 106, The American Presidency; second is for the development of appropriate modules of one or two live interactive sessions as enhancements to a wide range of existing courses on our campus; and third is simultaneous transmission to all campuses.

Presidency Panels for the 1993 APSA Meetings

Stephen Wayne, Program Organizer

Panel 1

Presidential Influence on Domestic Policy

Chair: Steven Shull (University of New Orleans)

Papers:

Daniel E. Ponder (Vanderbilt University)

"Presidential Advice and Policy Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence From the Carter Administration"

Kathy Smith (Wake Forest)

"Presidential Campaigns: Why Follow Our Leader? "

Mark Stern (University of Central Florida)

"Civil Rights Policy and Presidential Policy Making: From Carter to Clinton"

Shirley Anne Warshaw (Gettysburg College)

"White House Control of the Domestic Policy Process During the Reagan Administration"

Discussants:

Marcia Lynn Whicker (Rutgers University-Newark)

Panel 2

The Clinton Transition and the New Administration: A Preliminary Assessment

Chair: James Pfiffner (George Mason University)

Papers: Harold F. Bass, Jr. (Ouachita Baptist University)

"Bill Clinton's Presidential Party Leadership: A Preliminary Assessment"

James D. King (University of Wyoming) and James W. Riddlesperger Jr. (Texas Christian University)

"Staffing the American Presidency: An Early Assessment of the Clinton Administration"

Bob Maranto (Bryn Mawr College)

"Exploring the Clinton

Transition: Views From the Career Civil Service"

Discussants:

Michael Nelson (Rhodes College)

Panel 3

Roundtable: The Lure of Presidential Power

Chair: Michael A. Genovese (Loyola Marymount University)

Participants:

Thomas E. Cronin (Colorado College)

Terry Eastland (Ethics and Public Policy Center)

Harold Hongju Koh (Yale Law School)

Jeremy A. Rabkin (Cornell University)

Panel 4

The Contemporary Presidency and Presidential Influence

Chair: Michael L. Mezey (DePaul University)

Papers:

G. Calvin Mackenzie (Colby College)

"Radical Makeover: The Post-War Transformation of the American Presidency"

Russell D. Renka (Southeast Missouri State University)

"What Difference Does the Calendar Make? Changes in Presidential Capital and Success Over Time"

Fengyan Shi (Georgetown University)
"Agenda Setting: What Influence Do
Presidents Actually Have?"

Discussants:

Paul Light (University of Minnesota)
Robert Spitzer (State University of New
York-Cortland)

Panel 5

The Presidency and Economic Policy Making

Chair: M. Stephen Weatherford (University of
California- Santa Barbara)

Papers:

Brian Berry, Edward J. Harpham, and
Euel Elliott (University of Texas-
Dallas)

"Riding the Long Wave:
Macroeconomics and the Presidency"
Wesley Joe (Georgetown University)

"U.S. Presidential Elections and
Personal Consumption Spending
Patterns: A Case for the Political
Business Cycle Theory"

Constantine J. Spiliotes (University of
Chicago)

"Presidential Choice in Economic
Policymaking."

Discussants:

John W. Sloan (University of Houston)

Panel 6

**Roundtable: Is The Presidency
Still Organized To Fight the Cold War?**

Chair: Ryan J. Barilleaux (Miami University)

Talking Paper:

Ryan J. Barilleaux, "The Cold War
Presidency in a Changing World"

Participants:

David Barrett (Villanova University)
Daniel Paul Franklin (Georgia State
University)

Phillip J. Henderson (Catholic
University)

Robert J. Thompsom (East Carolina)

John Kenneth White (Catholic
University)

Panel 7

**Exercising Political Leadership:
The Public Presidency**

Chair: Samuel Kernell (University of
California- San Diego)

Papers:

George C. Edwards III (Texas A & M)
"The Irrelevance of Charisma"

Lawrence R. Jacobs (University of
Minnesota) and Robert Y.
Shapiro (Columbia University)

"The Public Presidency, Private Polls,
and Policymaking"

William W. Lammers (University of
Southern California)

"Presidential Leadership Styles in the
First Hundred Days: Going Public from
Roosevelt to Clinton"

Gregory L. Hager and Terry Sullivan
(both of University of North
Carolina)

"President Centered and Presidency
Centered Explanations of Presidential
Public Activity"

Discussants:

Bruce Miroff (State University of New
York- Albany)

Panel 8

**The Crisis of Neutral Competence:
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives**

Chair: Graham K. Wilson (University of
Wisconsin)

Papers:

Joel Aberbach (University of California-
Los Angeles)
and Bert Rockman (University of
Pittsburgh and the Brookings
Institution)
"Civil Servants and Policy
Makers: Neutral or Responsive
Competence?"
Guy Peters (University of Pittsburgh)
"The Decline of Neutral Competence
and Public Accountability; Alternative
Visions of the State,"
Colin Campbell (Georgetown
University)
"The Presidency and the Decline of
Neutral Competence in Comparative
Perspective,"
Graham Wilson (University of
Wisconsin)
"The Challenge to (Neutral)
Competence"

**Panel 9
Presidential Rhetoric**

Chair: Jeff Tulis (University of Texas- Austin)
Papers:

Meenkshi Bose (Princeton University)
"Words as Signals: A Comparison of
Eisenhower and Kennedy's Initial
Statements About the Cold War"
Karen Hult and Charles E. Walcott
(both of Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University)
"Policy- Makers and Wordsmiths:
Writing for the President under
Johnson and Nixon."
Martha Joynt Kumar (Towson State
University)
" WhiteHouse Communications
Operations: The Partisan Dimension"

Discussants:

Thomas Langeton (Tulane University)
Russell Riley (University of Virginia)

**Panel 10
The Political Presidency**

Chair: Joe Pika (University of Delaware)

Papers:

Kent E. Portney and Jeffrey M. Berry
(both of Tufts University)
"Centralizing Regulatory Control and
Interest Group Access: The Quayle
Council on Competitiveness"
Roger G. Brown and Carolyn R.
Thompson (both of University of North
Carolina- Charlotte)
"Transformations of Political Functions
from the Presidential Party to White
House Management."
Frank M. Sorrentino (St. Francis
College)
"The President and the Bureaucracy:
Strategies for Influence."

Discussants:

Joan Lucco (Ellicott City, MD)
Ron Moe (Congressional Research
Service)

**Panel 11
Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Affairs**

Chair: Alan Shank (SUNY-Geneseo)

Papers:

Edward Drachman (State University of
New York- Geneseo)
"Evaluating Controversial Presidential
Foreign Policy Decisions."
Michael W. Link and Charles W. Kegley,
Jr. (both of University of South
Carolina)
"Is Access Influence? Measuring
Adviser-Presidential Interactions in the
Light of the Iranian Hostage Crisis"
Kevin V. Mulcahy (Louisiana State
University)
"Rethinking Groupthink: Walt W.

Rostow and the National Security
Advisory Process in the Johnson
Administration"

Discussants:

Robert Lieber (Georgetown University)

Panel 12

**Elections and Governance:
The Presidential Connection**

Chair: Bruce Buchanan (University of Texas)

Papers:

Bruce Buchanan (University of Texas)

"Citizen Learning in the 1992
Presidential Campaign"

Katie Dunn Tenpas (Leiden
University)

"Presidents, Politics, and the Pursuit
of Reelection,"

Henry C. Kenski, Michael Nitz, and
Barbara Walkosz (University of Arizona)

"The Origin of Presidential Expectations:
Media Coverage of the Presidency,
Congress, and the 1992 Elections"

Discussants:

Lawrence Longley (Lawrence
University)

Samuel B. Hoff (Delaware State
University)

Announcement...

The PRG Bulletin Board is now
functioning properly. To access the
bulletin board, send your messages to
PRG@UCSD for Bitnet users and
PRG@UCSD.edu for Internet users.
Your message will then be transmitted to
all PRG members on the electronic
mailing list.

Panel 13

**The Psychology of the Presidency:
Clinton's Character and Personality**

Co-sponsored with Political Psychology
Research Group

Discussants:

Stanley Renshon (City University of New
York)

Jerrold Post (George Washington
University)

Fred Greenstein (Princeton University)

James David Barber (Duke University)

Announcement...

**CALL FOR PAPERS AND PANELS
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
CONFERENCE: 50 YEARS LATER**

Louisiana State University in
Shreveport will hold its second conference
in a series on great American presidents.
FDR AFTER 50 YEARS, a three-day
program, is scheduled for Thursday-
Saturday, 14-16 September 1995. All
topics considered. Though the deadline
for submitting proposals is October 1,
1994, early submission is strongly
recommended. The Selection Committee
makes decisions on a rolling basis.

For those interested in presenting
papers, chairing panels, or observing the
conference, please contact: William D.
Pederson, History and Social Science
Department, LSU-S, Bronson Hall 451,
One University Place, Shreveport, LA
71115-2301.

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Include full mailing address and e-mail address, if available, after institutional affiliation. Send subscriptions, address changes and submissions to : Samuel Kernell, APIP (0521), UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521.

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