CONTENTS

I. NEWS AND NOTES  2

II. ARTICLES
   Two Cheers for the 22nd Amendment, by Thomas E. Cronin  6
   Thirteen Year Paper Chase: The Nixon Archives,
   by James P. Pfiffner  15
   Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Monarchs,
   by David F. Prindle  21
   Propositions on the Structure of Bargaining and Command:
   A Memorandum for Research, by Matthew Holden, Jr.  32

III. RECENT PUBLICATIONS ON THE PRESIDENCY
    Books  50
    Articles  52
NEWS AND NOTES

The following panels have been scheduled for the upcoming American Political Science Association convention:

Panel 1: "Predicting the Reagan Presidency: The Contribution of Political Science?"
Chair: George Edwards, U.S. Military Academy
Disc.: John Kessel, Ohio State University
Chuck Jones, University of Virginia
Jack Walker, University of Michigan
Fred Greenstein, Princeton University

Panel 2: "The President and Economic Policy-Making"
Chair: Stephen Weatherford, University of California, Santa Barbara
"The Factor of Cohesion!: Presidential Fiscal Policy and the Dynamic of Class Conflation." Ronald F. King, Cornell University
"Policy Moves: Presidential Politics and Changes in U.S. Monetary and Fiscal Policy." John T. Woolley, University of California, Santa Barbara
Disc.: Stephen Weatherford, University of California, Santa Barbara
James E. Alt, Harvard University

Panel 3: "The American Executive: Views From Abroad"
Chair: Pat Sykes, University of Massachusetts
Papers: "France." Nicholas Wahl, New York University
"Britain." Landis Jones, University of Louisville
Disc.: James Ceaser, University of Virginia
David Smailes, University of Massachusetts

Panel 4: "Executive-Legislative Relations"
Chair: Don Racheter, Central College
Papers: "Presidential Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Middle East." Mitchell Bard, University of California, Irvine
"Congressional Leaders and Presidential Success." Richard Fleisher, Fordham University, Jon R. Bond, Texas A & M University
"Presidential Influence Over the Term in Office." Terry Sullivan, University of Texas at Austin
Disc.: Jeff Fishel, The American University
Paul Light, National Academy of Public Administration
Panel 5: "The President's Veto Power: Constitutional and Political Dimensions"

Chair: Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service

Papers:
- "Presidential Strategies and the Veto Power: A Reappraisal." David McKay, University of Essex
- "The Transformation of a Kingly Power: The Presidential Veto, Past and Present." Robert Spitzer, SUNY College at Cortland
- "The Reasons Presidents Veto Legislation." Richard Watson, University of Missouri - Columbia

Disc.: Stephen J. Wayne, George Washington University

Panel 6: "Organizing the White House: Are There Any Options?"

Chair: Bruce Buchanan, University of Texas at Austin

Papers:
- "Constrained Diversity: The Organization Theory of the Presidency." Bruce Buchanan, University of Texas at Austin
- "Institutionalizing the Presidency: The Structural Development of the White House Staff." Charles Walcott, University of Minnesota, Karen M. Hult, Pomona College

Disc.: Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., The Brookings Institution
      Thomas E. Cronin, Colorado College
      Joseph Pika, University of Delaware

Panel 7: "Studies in Presidential Prerogative"

Chair: Richard Pious, Barnard College

Papers:
- "Presidential Prerogative and Rhetoric." Nancy Kassop, SUNY-New Paltz
- "Presidential Prerogative and the Legislative Veto." Daniel Franklin, Colgate University
- "Presidential Prerogative and the Iranian Crisis." Robert Pearson, National Security Council

Disc.: Ryan J. Barilleaux, Miami University, Ohio
      Jeffrey Tulis, Harvard University

Panel 8: "Radical/Critical Critiques of the Presidency"

Chair: Michael A. Genovese, Loyola Marymount University

Papers:
- "A Radical/Critical Critique of the Presidency." Michael A. Genovese and Robert J. Welch, S.J., Loyola Marymount University
- "The Presidency and Critical Scholarship in Perspective." Norman Thomas, University of Cincinnati
- "Reagan's Imperial Presidency." John Orman, Fairfield University

Disc.: Bruce Miroff, SUNY - Albany
Panel 9: "Empirical Studies of the American Cabinet"

Chair: Jeffrey E. Cohen, University of New Orleans
Papers:
- "Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President." James D. King, Memphis State University, James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., Texas Christian University
- "The Recruitment of Women to the Cabinet." Janet Martin, Bowdoin College
Disc.: Jeffrey E. Cohen, University of New Orleans
Herbert Weisberg, Ohio State University

Panel 10: "Persuasion and the Presidency"

Chair: Martha Kumar and Michael Grossman, Towson State University
Papers:
- "The Limits of Persuasion." Martha Kumar and Michael Grossman, Towson State University
- "Straight Talk on Slanted News." Robert Entman, Duke University
Disc.: Leon Sigal, Wesleyan University
George Reedy, Marquette University

Panel 11: "Elements of Presidential Power"

Chair: Stephen J. Wayne, George Washington University
Papers:
- "The Myth of the 'Whig' Presidency." David Aladjem, Princeton University
- "Presidential Learning: Lyndon Johnson's Interactions." James J. Best, Kent State University
- "Marcia Lynn Whicker, Virginia Commonwealth University, Raymond A. Moore, University of South Carolina
Disc.: Kathy Smith, Wake Forest University
Michael G. Krukonis, Bellarmine College

Panel 12: "Constitutional Dilemmas of the Presidency"

Chair: Michael Nelson, Vanderbilt University
Papers:
- "The Presidency and the Deadlock of Democracy." Craig A. Rimmerman, Hobart and William Smith Colleges
- "Executive Non-Agreements, Arms Control, and the Constitution's 'Invitation to Struggle' in Foreign Affairs." Ryan J. Barilleaux, Miami University, Ohio
- "The President's Pardon Powers: A Question of Antinomy?" William W. Anthony, Texas A&M University
Disc.: Michael Nelson, Vanderbilt University
Larry Berman, University of California, Davis
Presidential Studies Quarterly, now in its 17th volume, is the first journal with its primary focus on the American presidency. It is published by the Center for the Study of the Presidency. Subscriptions to the Quarterly are $17.00 per year. Professional membership in the Center, which includes the subscription to the Quarterly as well as the volumes in the Proceedings series, are $25.00 per year. For either a subscription or the membership, make your check payable to:
Center for the Study of the Presidency
208 E. 75th Street
New York, NY 10021

The editors of the Quarterly also welcome the submission of manuscripts. These should not exceed 6,000 words in length and should include a brief biographic paragraph and an abstract not to exceed 200 words. The manuscript, in duplicate, should be sent to the editors at the above address.

The following articles will be included in the Spring 1987 issue of Congress and the Presidency:
Richard Allan Baker, "A Slap at the 'Hidden-Hand Presidency': The Senate and the Lewis Strauss Affair."
John W. Malsberger, "The Transformation of Republican Conservatism: The U.S. Senate, 1938-1952."
Lawrence C. Dodd, "Congressional Government and the Modern Congress: The 'Universal Principle' of Change."
Joel D. Aberbach, "The Congressional Committee Intelligence System: Information, Oversight, and Change."
Daniel Paul Franklin, "War Powers in the Modern Context."
TWO CHEERS FOR THE 22ND AMENDMENT

Thomas E. Cronin

McHugh Professor of American Institutions, The Colorado College

Until President Reagan's recent travails, ardent Reagan enthusiasts rushed around the country clamoring for repeal of the two term limitation for presidents. Ratified thirty six years ago, the 22nd Amendment states that "No person shall be elected to the office of President more than twice."

Only a few months ago Representative Guy Vander Jagt, Chairman of the House Republican Campaign Committee, declared Reagan was one of the "the greatest American Presidents of all time and I want to keep him on the job." "The Democrats had FDR for four terms," he said. "I think we deserve to have Ronald Reagan for at least three." Saying "the 22nd Amendment be damned," a Portland, Oregon gentleman launched a committee to repeal the Constitution's prohibition against third term presidents. And a New Hampshire Republican formed a national organization called Project 88 to mobilize public support for repeal of the 22nd Amendment.

Reagan came to the White House supporting the 22nd. Sometime early in his second term, however, he changed his mind. Reagan repeatedly says he now believes the 22nd Amendment violates the people's democratic rights. The people ought, he said, to have a right to decide who their leaders will be. "If they want to vote for someone, we shouldn't have a rule that tells them they can't."

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The President made clear he did not want a third term for himself, yet he vigorously favors repeal of the two term limit. He believes the two term tradition was wisely established by George Washington because at the time citizens of the New Republic conscientiously watched to make sure we did not become anything like a monarchy. Reagan thinks the FDR reelection to a third and fourth term proved a multi-term presidency could happen without impairing the Republic. Further, adds Reagan, "there are plenty of safeguards against the power of the presidency that would prevent him from becoming a lifetime monarch or the like."

Reagan isn't alone. At least a third of the general public, according to Gallup Poll (October, 1986), say they would like to see this amendment repealed so presidents could run for more than two terms. A spring 1986 Wall Street Journal poll found even stronger support for repeal. (Not surprisingly, twice as many Republicans as Democrats favored repeal). Reagan and the "reforming public" are joined by an impressive number of both conservative and liberal intellectuals. "It is a terribly destructive thing to make a man a lame duck the day he is sworn in for the second term," writes George F. Will, "because it eliminates much of his ability to instill fear, which is the basis of reasonable politics; the ability to reward and punish."

Historian Henry Steele Commager long ago agreed with the "born again" Reagan views. "Imposing a restriction on the freedom to repeatedly reelect a President is to violate the essential principle of democracy—that people have a right to exercise a free and untrammeled ballot, even if they exercise it badly." Commager and others make the point that the 22nd is a limit placed upon the electorate, the first since the adoption
of the Constitution that restricted the power of the voter rather than expanded it.

Liberal and conservative historians alike note the framers considered and debated the idea of term limitation and rejected it.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr. notes correctly that the 22nd Amendment was an exercise in retroactive partisan vengeance and that the Republicans, unable to defeat FDR in four election, were determined to get back at him once he was in the grave. Schlesinger contends the 22nd Amendment is antidemocratic and asserts too that it reduces the accountability of presidents to the people: "Nothing makes a president more attentive to popular needs and concerns than the desire for reelection." Historians and pundits on both the left and the right also claim the country may need an experienced veteran of public and world affairs in the White House in a time of crisis. Why preclude ourselves from the service of a gifted leader, perhaps an indispensable leader, in national or global emergencies? Why not permit an FDR, for example, to re-run in 1940? What if Abraham Lincoln was willing to run again in 1864 and that had been his eighth rather than fourth year in office? Americans "stand in no need of an irrevocable self denying ordinance" that would in effect "bind themselves never to take action which under conceivable circumstances it might be to their great interest to take," wrote Theodore Roosevelt in his autobiography. It would be an unwise policy in dire crises, said Theodore Roosevelt, to disqualify absolutely a person who, while holding the job of president, had demonstrated gifted presidential leadership.

Skepticism about the 22nd comes also from those who suggest the term limitation "remedy" promotes a false sense of security that may actually
hinder the development of safeguards that might protect us against the arrogance of the Watergate and Iran contra scam methods of overweening executive power grabs. Surely the existence of the two term prohibition has not prevented White House abuses of power and the public trust. Moreover, we already have the impeachment process and other checks and balances--some presently at work in this current mess--to hold incumbent presidents and their adventuresome aides to account.

Those who favor repeal raise some good points. I myself admit to being sensitive to the contention that the 22nd is an elitist and anti-democratic measure. It does diminish the choices of a voter and it is valid to say the voters in 2004 or 2008 will be in a better position than those who supported the 22nd amendment in the post-FDR period to decide who should be their president.

Much of the rest of the case for repeal, however, strikes me as exaggerated, misleading or wrong. I once favored repeal with the belief it diminished a voter's options. Second, I shared the notion that it often served to weaken the president, if not the presidency, in the waning "lame duck" years of a second term.

Although these reasons still have validity, I now favor retention of the two term limit. I would have, I believe, voted against it in the late 1940s when it was handily passed by more than a two to one margin in both chambers of the Congress. It was indeed a "Republican revenge against Roosevelt." It is one of our least important amendments, yet its repeal could cause more harm than good, and it could send the wrong signals. It would, for example, affirm positively the virtues of multi-term presidencies. It might weaken our national party system. It might
further strengthen the institution of the presidency in a century when this has already taken place in nearly every decade—usually at the expense of countervailing checks and balances. Until a more effective amendment can be devised to replace it, it is better to retain than repeal it.

Here are the chief reasons why two terms are enough.

(1) Eight years is long enough. Americans have never liked the idea of a permanent president or one who looked upon the job as a career. Presidents like Jefferson, Jackson and John F. Kennedy praised the notion of rotation in office as desirable and healthy. Jefferson warned that "history shows how easily [unlimited tenure] degenerates into an inheritance." And, William F. Buckley writes, "[A]gainst the proposition that a democratic people should have the right to continue whosoever is in power for whatever period they want is the republican tradition of the citizen leader, the Cincinnatus who lays down his plow to serve, and picks up his plow again, having served."

(2) The presidency is an awesome position for any person, however experienced and talented, to hold. And its powers and responsibilities have become enlarged enormously in the last fifty years and this shall doubtless continue in the next fifty. The rise of the mechanisms and resources of power available to presidents such as once-unimaginable nuclear weapons, covert operations, satellite intelligence systems, and a veritable "electronic throne," suggest new dangers even to those of us who want a strong presidency. The 22nd Amendment may not have been needed in 1947 but it will prove to be an invaluable additional check and balance in the future, without taking away from the effectiveness of the good
presidents. It is a check against the ultimate type of corruption—the arrogance that a president is indispensable, the very inclination that motivated Ferdinand Marcos, General Somoza, Fidel Castro, the Duvaliers in Haiti and countless other one-time friends of our country. The 22nd might, like impeachment, only be needed once a century, yet it would be there to protect against our would-be savior who could in fact be our enslaver.

(3) Eight years is ample time for a president and an administration to bring about major policy changes. And if these changes have been valued and effective, they will be continued and honored by the succeeding presidents of whatever party. Further, an able and honest president need not become lame—though most presidents understandably witness a diminution of power in their last years because of normal fatigue and the reality that they have already advocated and fought for their best ideas in their first term and a half. Ike's effectiveness was not impaired in his second term because of the 22nd. Nor was Reagan a lame duck in 1986 when he won immigration, tax and contra aid votes in Congress. (His lameness at present is mostly self-inflicted.) Note too that a "lame duck" set in on many a president before the adoption of the 22nd (Wilson, Hoover and HST, for example, saw their power and authority eroded in their last year or two). The two-term limitation is only one, and I believe a much exaggerated, cause of "lame duckness."

(4) The two-term limit is healthy for the two party system. It helps prevent political stagnation. The two parties benefit and are rejuvenated by the challenge at least every eight years of nurturing, recruiting and nominating a new team of national leaders. In this sense, the very
existence of the 22nd Amendment prevents the hardening of the political
arteries. Change every eight years adds a degree of "freshness" and new
energy—commodities our Madisonian system can always use.

(5) Most Americans reject the idea that any political leader is
indispensable. We are a nation of sixty-five times as many people as we
were in 1789. There are plenty of talented leaders in this abundantly
blessed nation. Moreover, if a president of the stature and ability of a
Washington, Lincoln or FDR were available and the nation faced exacting
emergencies, their services and leadership do not need to be thrown out
and ignored merely because a successor president comes to office at the
end of eight years. Common sense dictates these exceptional public
servants be retained as national counselors, roving ambassadors, or
cabinet members without portfolio—precisely to take advantage of their
experience and expertise.

(6) Although the 22nd does somewhat diminish the choice of the voter,
this restriction is only likely to occur once every fifty years, if then.
Most presidents never even get a second term. Most of those who serve a
second gladly retire because of deteriorating health or diminished
political support or a combination of the two. It might be noted also
that the voters don't appear to be all that upset by this diminution of
their voting privilege—at least 60 percent support retention of the two-
term limit. Moreover, the charge that the 22nd Amendment is undemocratic
is somewhat irrelevant. Ours is not a pure democracy. It is a republican
government under a federal system. A republican government purposely
limits the majority of voters in a number of ways and protects the
minority, however small. In a sense, the limits of the 22nd stand
together with judicial review, age and residency requirements to run for office, and the supermajorities needed for treaty ratification or amending the Constitution, as safeguards against undesirable or excessive majoritarianism.

(7) A look at many of the big city mayors who have stayed for a third or fourth four-year term provides additional skepticism about repealing the 22nd Amendment. Of course there are exceptions. Yet in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Newark, Kansas City, New York, and Washington D.C., to suggest just a few, multi-term mayors and their associates have often been less responsive, less accountable and more tempted to engage in arrogance, deception, or even outright corruption than was the case in their first or second terms.

(8) A president who stays for twelve or sixteen years would very likely be able to stack, if not pack, the Supreme Court, and fundamentally alter the partisan leanings of the entire federal judiciary. FDR appointed nine justices in twelve years. Nixon appointed four in just five years. Do we really want presidents these days who could dominate and thereby control two branches of government?

(9) The 1986 booklet to banish the 22nd from the Constitution was a transparently expedient partisan ploy to retain the White House for another four years and to reap the political advantages of patronage, judicial nominations and Reagan's once magical fund-raising abilities. Few people think Congressman Vander Jagt or his allies would have mounted their "Repeal the 22nd" drive if Cuomo, Hart or Biden were in the White House.
The Constitution should not be amended, or unamended, for short term partisan advantages. Fortunately the drive to repeal this amendment died with the revelation of the Iran Contra mess. (Similarly, the last boomlet to repeal the 22nd came to a screeching halt during Richard Nixon's spiral downward in 1973).

Although the 22nd Amendment has its drawbacks, its virtues, I believe, will be appreciated in future generations. We want an effective presidency, yet we fear the arbitrary abuse of power and the potential of a president who someday deludes himself into believing he is indispensable. The 22nd Amendment allows a citizen to serve eight years in one of the world's most powerful positions, while protecting the country from the potential excesses of power that could come with prolonged tenure. It is an acceptable, if imperfect compromise.
Before President Nixon resigned from the presidency in August of 1974, he made an agreement with Arthur Sampson, Director of the General Services Administration, which included the National Archives, about the disposition of his presidential papers. The agreement was part of the presidential pardon package and provided that Nixon would have the right of access to all of the files and the right to remove or destroy any material that he did not want made public. It also provided that the tapes made in the Oval Office would be destroyed by the National Archives after ten years or at the time of Nixon's death, whichever occurred first.

Congress was outraged by the deal and nullified the agreement by passing the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act in December 1974 (P.L. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695). The act gave custody of the materials to the National Archives and instructed the Archivist to prepare for public access the papers and recordings of the Nixon presidency, with special efforts "to provide the public with the full truth, at the earliest reasonable date, of the abuses of government power popularly identified under the generic term 'Watergate.'" The Archivist was to publish regulations to control public access to the materials and to return to Nixon and his aides purely personal papers, while protecting their legal rights to challenge in court the release of any materials. Nixon sued to challenge the constitutionality of the law, but the Supreme
Court on June 28, 1977 ruled that the law was not unconstitutional (Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425).

Over the next several years, GSA proposed three different sets of regulations that were rejected by Congress as being too restrictive of public access. Two more sets of regulations were proposed and attacked in court by Nixon and his former aides. In June of 1986 the sixth set of regulations, by the newly independent National Archives, become effective.

The sixth set of regulations, however, were returned from OMB to the Archives, accompanied by an OMB memorandum that said that the regulations had to be implemented according to a legal opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department. The opinion stated that if former President Nixon claimed executive privilege with regard to any of the materials, any incumbent president must respect the claim and that the Archivist must restrict public access to them. This opinion was attacked in court as extending executive privilege throughout Nixon's life, and in effect allowing him complete control over what materials would be opened to the public. In March of 1987 a U.S. District Court Judge ruled that the Archivist did not have to honor automatically any claim of Executive Privilege by Nixon, but should decide any claim according to its own regulations. Nixon still has the right to challenge any specific decision on executive privilege in court.

Former President Nixon's lawyers argue that he is being treated differently than other former presidents and that some materials from the Eisenhower, Truman, and Kennedy presidencies were kept from the public longer than his materials will be. Proponents of early release of the materials, however, argue that the Archives' regulations governing the
Nixon papers contain appropriate protection against improper release of materials, including restrictions on national security and purely personal materials, as well as provisions that Nixon and his former aides must be notified about openings of materials and have a chance to present their objections in court.

To better deal with such issues in the future, Congress passed the Presidential Records Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523), which will take effect before the disposition of the papers of the Reagan Presidency. The act provides that the government will retain complete ownership and control of presidential records and that the Archivist must make the materials public as soon as possible, with certain exceptions. The Archivist must honor claims of executive privilege of future former presidents for a twelve year period. After this period, executive privilege claims that disagree with the Archivist's determination can only be pursued in court.

The Nixon archives at issue include more than 40 million pages of documents, 4,000 hours of audio tapes, and 4,000 hours of video tapes, 950 White House tapes and 1 million feet of motion picture film, as well as 500,000 photographs and 30,000 gift items.

The White House Central files were created as an archival system during the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt and are divided into 61 subject categories in an alphanumeric filing system. Of the Nixon papers, 32 of the categories have been prepared for public access. The subject files are further divided into general divisions: Executive and General. The former are of more importance and include documents from Congress, foreign governments, and other important correspondence. Among the above
materials, 1.5 million pages have been available to the public since December 1, 1986. These include materials from 32 subject files and some staff office files (including the Ash council files).

In addition to the 12 and one half hours of White House tapes that have already been made public, there are 4,000 hours of tapes that are yet to be released. The National Archives has prepared a 25,000 page subject log of the tapes and has deleted information related to national security. Ten second gaps in the tapes indicate that material has been deleted, and the subject log gives the reason for the deletion. There have been no transcripts of the tapes prepared because of the huge volume of tapes, but also because the audio quality is so poor that there would inevitably be disputes over interpretation of them.

The materials currently under dispute are 1.5 million pages of the White House "Special Files" which were established by the Nixon administration in 1972 in order to provide more security for especially sensitive materials. They include office files of President Nixon and his staff, including H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Charles Colson, John Dean, and some others. These materials do not include national security sensitive information, but are primarily political materials that include Watergate matters.

The Special Files have been prepared for public access and will be opened to the public in May or June of 1987 unless delayed by further legal claims. Given the legal history of the Nixon papers, presidential scholars should not hold their collective breath waiting for the opening of the Special Files. There is plenty of motivation to keep the papers locked up. As Henry Kissinger told John Ehrlichman: "You know, the
public will not understand. They will be very critical of you and me when they listen to the tapes of our conversations with Richard Nixon. We will often appear to be agreeing with him at times when you and I know that we did not." (Parade Magazine, November 30, 1986, p. 9)

Eventually the Nixon archives will be housed on a beautiful site overlooking the Pacific Ocean in San Clemente. After several attempts to locate his presidential papers at major universities, Nixon evidently decided that the threat of embarrassment from liberal academics was too great, and so he opted for the independent site. Presidency scholars must admit that San Clemente, while probably more expensive, is a bit more attractive a location for research than Independence, Missouri or Abilene, Kansas. The distractions available, however, are also considerably greater.

Specific information on which categories of the Central Files are presently open is available from the National Archives: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 20408. (703/756-6498)

PRESIDENTS, PRIME MINISTERS, AND MONARCHS

David F. Prindle

University of Texas at Austin

We know that the American presidency is both a symbol of the nation (a Chief of State) and the single most important participant in the political process (a Chief of Government). We also know that other democracies tend not to place the burden of fulfilling both these executive functions on a single office, but to divide them among two different "chief executives." But we have not made rapid progress in discovering how different countries divide up the executive functions among the various types of executive, or why they do so. I have elsewhere attempted to give a theoretical underpinning to a cross-national study of executives (Prindle, 1986). In the present article I give a report on some of my beginning efforts to answer the questions raised there. My hope is that by viewing the American Presidency against a comparative background we can better understand which of its structures and activities are distinctive and which are merely illustrative of executive power everywhere.

In this paper I will address the following questions:

1. Which democracies have single presidents, which have a president and prime minister, and which have a monarch and prime minister?

2. Can we observe variations among countries that will suggest a strategy for explaining why a particular combination of chief executive(s) is found in a particular polity?
3. Are some types (or combinations) of executives likely to be more stable (longer-lasting) than others?

As Table One illustrates, I have chosen to study thirty-nine democratic regimes that existed in the quarter century from 1960 to 1984, excluding those with plural executives. Because some either ceased to be democratic or emerged from authoritarianism during the decade, not every country spans the entire era. In addition, two countries, Greece and Ceylon/Sri Lanka, supported two quite different democratic regimes during different parts of the period, and thus appear twice.

My theoretical framework is functionalist. As suggested in my first sentence above, modern chief executives appear to fulfill two major purposes in the body politic. The first of these is to embody the nation as a whole, that is, to be Chief of State. As a symbolic figure, the executive is "above" the partisan bickering of who-gets-what politics, and instead stands for the things that unite the citizens. Although the activities of the Chief of State are largely ceremonial, this does not mean that he or she is superfluous. As a focus of national love, this executive helps to legitimize and stabilize the regime, and keep the political battle within manageable bounds. Reflective of this role, Chiefs of State are expected to remain in office for a very long time, for to do otherwise would suggest that the polity itself was unstable.

The other major function of executives is to make policy, that is, to take sides in the partisan struggle, choosing among alternatives. The person who fills this role is Chief of Government. In Rousseau's terms, we might say that it is the Chief of Government's job to pursue the Will of All, and the Chief of State's task to nurture the General Will
(Rousseau, 195, p. 26). Another way of saying it is that the one executive preserves the idea of the harmonious community while the other gets things done. Since political coalitions normally change with relative frequency, and since Chiefs of Government are natural scapegoats when things go wrong, it is to be expected that they do not last as long in office, on the average, as do Chiefs of State.

If this is so, then it is not unreasonable to suggest that countries as collectives make functional choices when they adopt (or allow to evolve) certain patterns of executive power. By examining the way democracies have chosen to allocate executive functions, we might throw light on the way such functions are concentrated in the United States.

I make three assumptions. The first is that a monarch in the twentieth century is the pure type of a Chief of State. A monarch symbolizes the collective, and as such, reigns but does not rule. The second is that a prime minister (called "premier" in some polities) tends much more to be the ideal type of the Chief of Government. Although some prime ministers are esteemed for their personal qualities, they are not loved the way monarchs are, for they are too involved in the dirty details of governing. The third is that a president is a hybrid form of executive, both symbolizing the nation and participating in policy formation. What expectations follow from making these assumptions?

One expectation is that no country will have two monarchs, two presidents, or a monarch and a president. The reason is obvious: there is room for only one unifying symbol in each polity. In fact, this prediction is borne out by reality. There are no countries that combine executives this way, and so far as I know, never have been.
This may seem like a rudimentary and therefore trivial finding. As with many other fundamental truths, however, its very obviousness conceals its importance, for it tends to support the application of the functional assumptions in less obvious areas.

Application to stability, for example. Scholars in comparative politics have investigated in some detail the way that party systems are related to the stability of politics (Powell, 1982; Lijphart, 1984). They have tended to leave variations in executive structure out of their discussion. The purpose of the present investigation is not to criticize the "parties" approach but to augment it with an independent look at the way executives are related to stability.

There are four major patterns of chief executive government, as illustrated in Table Two. In some countries, monarchs exist with prime ministers. In such cases, the p.m. is always the Chief of Government and the monarch the Chief of State.

Elsewhere, prime ministers and presidents exist together. In these countries the president is always the Chief of State, but may have important Chief of Government functions also; in some countries he or she is politically dominant over the prime minister, while in some cases the reverse is true. In such countries it is necessary to make individual investigation in order to determine which partner is dominant.

Finally, a few countries support a president alone. Where that is so, the two major executive functions are combined in one person.

Given such patterns in various countries, and given the preceding discussion, we can hypothesize varying patterns of longevity in office for the four types of executive.
First, we expect that prime ministers coupled with either monarchs or dominant presidents will, as a group, enjoy relatively short tenures. Since national psychic stability is not threatened by a change in executive at this level, premiers can expect their jobs to be threatened by every shift in the political wind.

As Table Two illustrates, this prediction is supported by experience from the period under study. Prime ministers coexisting with more symbolic executives lasted, in both instances, for about forty-four months.

On the other hand, we would expect that dominant presidents, despite their immersion in the dangerous world of political choice, would last a relatively long time. This is because a popular clamor for a change in leadership can be appeased with the sacrifice of the prime minister, leaving the perhaps more culpable president still in office.

Although there are relatively few examples of this sort of functional distribution, Table Two shows that they strongly support the hypothesis. Dominant presidents survived a mean of almost exactly twice as long as prime ministers.

For countries with presidents alone, our predictions must be somewhat more complicated. Because of the stability inherent in such a symbolic office, we expect that the tenure of lone presidents will average longer than that of prime ministers. Table Two shows this to be true.

On the other hand, a single presidency is a rigid and therefore potentially vulnerable arrangement of executive function. Because solitary presidents have no "scapegoat" executive to act as a safety valve by being sacrificed to public disgruntlement, a truly serious disaffection
may result in a coup or revolution. We would therefore expect a tendency for lone presidents to be overthrown more often than executives in the other institutional arrangements.

Table Two shows this also to be true, but the data cannot be anything but suggestive, for two reasons. First, the number of cases is very small. Second, all of the four democracies suffering coups are in Latin America, which brings in the problem of highly (in fact, perfectly) intercorrelated independent variables.

What does all this suggest about the American Presidency?

As a single executive performing two separate and not entirely compatible functions, the Presidency exists under inherently stressful circumstances. As a Chief of State, the President is expected to be aloof from the divisive squabbles of politics; as Chief of Government he is expected not only to participate in those squabbles, but to prevail in them. As Buchanan (1978) has argued from different evidence, Presidents cannot escape a "role stress" that inevitably induces them to engage in various kinds of seemingly pathological behavior. Perhaps it would be too strong a statement to say that it is the single presidency, itself, that is inherently pathological. Nevertheless, this comparative evidence, while it is by no means conclusive, does offer that interpretation as an historical hypothesis.

If we accept as a basis for discussion that such a conclusion is plausible, then it leads us to wonder what implications we might draw for possible reforms. Observers who tire of the irrationalities of United States politics sometimes suggest that this country would be better off under a parliamentary system (Sundquist, 1986 p. 14). If the present
inquiry is tending in the right direction, however, such a change would only substitute one kind of unbalanced political system for another. An executive with too little symbolic weight would be substituted for one with too much.

It is well to remember that there are no long-term examples of a democracy with a lone prime minister. The only extant example of a country which has attempted such an arrangement is Canada. In 1982, that country officially withdrew as one of the polities pledging allegiance to the British crown, thus losing its official Chief of State. This is not a serious counter example, however, for the experiment is still quite recent, and it is legitimate to ask if the political separation has been accompanied by psychological independence. At any rate, the functionalist perspective would lead us to expect serious Canadian political dislocations as time progresses. A country without a national symbol is a country on the road to disunion.

Returning to the topic of reforms in the United States, perhaps a better suggestion would be to add an executive, in order to help the President with one of his major present functions. A prime minister, or the equivalent, whose responsibilities were to shepherd programs through Congress, would be one possibility. Another would be a "president emeritus" or some such, who could function as a national father figure. Such a complication in institutions might actually simplify the national political process.
REFERENCES


Table One: Democracies, 1960-1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1970 Population in Thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>12,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7,456</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Brazil (pre-1964)</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>21,568</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Ceylon</td>
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</tr>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Chile (pre-1973)</td>
<td>8,835</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Dominican Republic (post-1966)</td>
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<td>12.</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>German Federal Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Greece I (pre-1967)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>547,950</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>Irish Republic</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>Jamaica (post-1962)</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea (post-1975)</td>
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<td>29.</td>
<td>Philippines (pre-1972)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Portugal (post-1974)</td>
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<td>31.</td>
<td>Spain (post-1975)</td>
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<td>34.</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>35.</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago (1977-1984)</td>
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<td>37.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>203,212</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>10,722</td>
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### Table Two: Average Number of Months in Office
By Type of Executive
(Countries with plural executives excluded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister With Monarch</th>
<th>Mean # of Months</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>41.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (pre-1967)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica (post-1962)</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>32.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>49.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea (post-1975)</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (post-1976)</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>74.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>49.8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Number of countries: 15  
Mean number of months in office: 44.7  
Standard deviation: 15.29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Prime Minister With President</th>
<th>Mean # of Months</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (post-1974)</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>37.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>42.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>25.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal (post-1976)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
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<td>Trinidad and Tobago (post-1977)</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey (1961-1980)</td>
<td>38.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Number of countries: 11  
Mean number of months in office: 43.9  
Standard deviation: 12.59
Table Two, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant President With Prime Minister</th>
<th>Mean # of Months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (1963-68, post-1980)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (post-1978)</td>
<td>82</td>
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Number of countries: 4  
Mean number of months in office: 89.8  
Standard deviation: 36.36

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President Alone</th>
<th>Mean # of months</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (post-1966)</td>
<td>109.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil (pre-1964)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile (pre-1973)</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic (post-1967)</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (pre-1972)</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay (pre-1973)</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of countries: 9  
Mean number of months in office: 55.3  
Standard deviation: 34.97

Number of countries not overthrown: 5  
Mean number of months in office: 71.2  
Standard deviation: 26.48

For all countries

Number of countries: 39  
Mean number of months in office: 51.2  
Standard deviation: 23.5  
Measure of association (Eta): .5421  
Statistical significance: $p < .01$
INTRODUCTION

Charles E. Merriam, whom I regard as the most important political scientist thus far in the United States, once said "We do not teach all that we know, and are driven sometimes to teach what we are not quite so sure of." In that spirit, I have here distilled "propositions" (or summary declarations, if one prefers) from a longer working paper. The purpose is to identify research issues in public administration that, in my opinion, are worth the research attention of grown men and women. Accordingly, I have drawn upon systematic research in political science and history, but also upon current journalism, personal observations, and speculations that seem reasonable. Verification is yet to come.

It is important to say that the material that follows is not prescriptive. Some of the forms of action described or hypothesized may be rather grim. The point is merely to identify, as objectively as possible, what seems probable. The fact that some of these actions seem probable, under particular circumstances, does not mean that they are morally recommended. To say "probable" also means that one does not deal

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in absolutes. Rather, the assertion is that if, at any time, one could choose a hundred polities—and could actually acquire the data to compare them—the propositions would describe the dominant tendency in most of the cases. Similarly, if one could choose a hundred polities over any number of years into the past, the proposition would also describe the dominant tendency.

The predicate is that administration—the exercise of discretion about force, money, and information—is the central political process. Therefore, it is worthy of considerable examination by the professional students of politics (political scientists and others). In particular, I emphasize the conjunction of public administration as a form of activity, and executive decision-making as the most critical mode by which it occurs.

Proposition 1: There is a basic structure (pattern) that consists of a central executive ("President", "General Secretary", "Premier", "Prime Minister", "King") an executive entourage (sometimes called "staff," ) and the set of operating entities to perform the ultimate work ("department," "ministries," "boards," "commission," and so forth).

This requires one to consider how action is framed so that it emanates from the central executive to the Nth person who must comply. This is executive direction in the determination of policies, in the choice of alternate programs to implement policies, and in the choice and use of specific operational details to implement programs. This necessarily entails transactions between chief executives and their secretaries or ministers, between parallel secretaries or ministers, and between the members of the chief executive's entourage and the various agencies involved.

Political science contains two basic models that seek to predict and
explain how these structures work. The command model is central to much of "classical" public administration and also powerful in discussions of the Presidency. In principle the command model says that the chief executive does (or should) get automatic compliance by subordinates once his (or her) decisions are known. The bargaining model is the alternative. Chief executive action (sometimes called "executive leadership") involves policies, programs, and quite frequently involves operation details. Chief executives choose the objectives they think most important, but they must also have some concern for what their formal subordinates are willing to implement and what their formal subordinates have the ability to implement, no matter how willing they are. The mobilization of the wills and skills of formal subordinates may sometimes involve explicit bargaining, and even more assuredly involves tacit bargaining.5

Proposition 2: Reality is not bargaining or command, but a permanent tension between them. If we imagine the line 0 - 1 to represent a see-saw, with A as the fulcrum, there is a repeated tendency for effective decisional authority to slide from one end toward the other.

FIGURE 1
Concentration of Decision Power

Bargaining ........................................ Command

0

A

1

The problem therefore is to think about some of the major considerations that induce command or bargaining.

CHIEF EXECUTIVES

Proposition 3: Bargaining and command relationships are influenced by chief executives' disposition and by objective capacity.

Proposition 3a: Chief executives may be driven to attempt to
assert command, or to allow bargaining. There are unpredictable acts based upon the person who occupies the chief executive role at the time. The act of choosing is individual, based upon his or her definition of the situation.

Chief executives sometimes act as if the decision-making choices were free of electoral necessity, the desires of friends and allies, or inconvenient complexity. American presidents seem to aspire to free choice to "do what is right." Operationally, this can only mean what they think is right. If free choice always existed, command would be the natural form of decision-making. Some decisions, notably those involving real or perceived crises, appear to decision-makers as virtually dictating command. What chief executives see as crises tend to project them into minute details, both on matters involving very small numbers of people and those involving potential or actual war.7

Proposition 3b: Coercive capacity is inherent in the use, threat, or withholding (as may be applicable) of investigation, prosecution, reward by material payment, reward by prestige, punishment by withdrawal of material payment, and punishment by withdrawal of public esteem.

Good judgment, temperament, and moral commitment may inhibit a chief executive. But the ability "to make an offer you can't refuse" exists by itself.

Proposition 3c: Chief executives accept some bargaining and allow subordinates to do some of what subordinates want, contrary to their own preferences, because chief executives inherently have more to do than they can master personally.8

The inevitable division of labor leads directly to organizational demand, the aggregate of career, income, status, and doctrinal values of official subordinates. These are employees whose skills or tenure lead them to believe they have some unique abilities or natural judgments to make about what the results should be. To override them entirely is to
produce sullenness, demoralization, or rebellion in the civil service or armed forces.

Proposition 3d: Chief executives are also constrained by external demand that seeks, and sometimes achieves, consideration of matters that would otherwise be ignored.

External demand is sometimes expressed by direct presentation to the chief executive, by an exponent of the outside interest. Members of the entourage sometimes function, and are expected to function, as liaison with particular groups. If the chief executive is not yet committed, so that the aide is able to avoid overt conflict with the boss, external demand may be assimilated to tacit bargaining.

THE ENTOURAGE

Proposition 4: Central executives have two types of subordinates: members of the entourage, which public administration calls "staff," and operating agents (department heads, etc.).

The composition of the entourage is governed, first of all, by the reality that chief executives are human beings. They may be more highly motivated than the rest of us, but not physically stronger. As they operate under more than normal psychological pressure, they want people around them to make them feel comfortable. But chief executives seldom have aides who are knowledgeable about themselves and who are knowledgeable about the working details of the current problems of governance. The result is a tripartite entourage: peers and friends, ambitious younger people, and migratory technocrats.

The more the chief executive must put personal friendships and associations aside, the more he or she will value the few that remain. The friends and peers (critics will call them "cronies"), can easily become marginal. They have their own standing in life. They cannot long
absorb the ego punishment that being around the chief executive may require. Moreover, the high-level, full-time, senior staff—emergent from servants and technocrats—will resent them and seek to push them out of the process.

The young come equipped with enthusiasm, the zealous obedience born of ambition, and school-taught techniques. It was so in medieval Europe, when kings began to fashion bureaucracy from the clerks. And the tendency has been notable in American national government, at least since the time of Lincoln. Those who are closest to the President on an everyday basis are notably the President’s juniors, although the Reagan Administration is a partial exception. About three in ten of the identifiable chief aides have been thirty-five or under when they began their high responsibilities. Others in the immediate entourage tend to be even younger. They are the servants. They run errands as the dues they pay for admission to high places. If they are successful, they will rise rapidly, in the estimation of the world. Sometimes their only experience will have been with the person who is now the chief executive. Their professed loyalty to the chief is passionate. And their operating style will show toward all others a pre-emptory tone, so much so, that many others often wish to—but seldom will—reply to them in virtually scabrous language.

Finally, there are those migratory technocrats who render their skills to whatever chief executive occupies the office. They are similar to the political technocrats who migrated from court to court and country to country in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Proposition 5: As central executives cannot act directly upon everything, they enter a de facto or tacit bargain with the
entourage. In exchange for extending the chief executive's reach, members of the entourage are able to exert influence in the world by gaining a reputation for having access to the center.

Proposition 5a: The bargain between the chief executive and members of the entourage is inherently unstable. The instability derives from the fact that the chief executive and most members of the entourage do not, in reality, know each other.

The public information revealed at the time of Watergate made it clear that President Nixon saw very few people apart from his central staff, and one might infer that he did not have very good understanding of even the few that he saw. Secondly, as I have looked at the post-White House books written by former Presidents, I have checked carefully, though not yet systematically, to see whom they assert they saw and on what basis. After that, I have begun to think about the studies that John Kessel has conducted of the internal organization of the White House. All lead to the same conclusion. Most people in the executive entourage cannot, in fact, have that much to do with anything of consequence, and cannot be known to the chief executive.¹¹

The President of the United States, I should guess, truly knows only about twenty people in his executive government. By that I mean that the President knows them well enough to remember their faces, names and characters without being prompted.¹² If the president does not know them, then they do not know him. The consequence is that, much of the time, the chief executive cannot be assured that what is being said or done under his (her) authority is something he (she) would do if acting originally. What follows, equally, is that most members of the entourage, much of the time, are skating on the thin ice of presumptive authority.

Hence, most members, if they are to have any impact worth mentioning,
will be driven to maneuver with great energy to be in the immediate circle of the immediate circle of senior advisers who deal with the President.

Proposition 6: Entourage politics becomes a more intensively competitive process of personal power than nearly any other part of the governmental process. As a result, the senior advisers are driven strongly toward an effort aimed at the capturing of the President. 13

Political writers have repeatedly attributed to Clark Clifford a comment about a liberal-conservative "struggle" for Mr. Truman's mind. This is, if correctly attributed, a notable illustration of the attempt at capturing a President. If capturing were fully effective, no one outside the entourage would ever be able to appeal an entourage decision and win.

Proposition 7: Politics within the entourage may be deemed rather similar to that of the village or the university department. It must depend largely on face-to-face relations. Colleagues are also adversaries, and much action occurs in a small space.

People within the entourage must work together, literally. The members of the group must maintain the stance of a common interest and common fate. Yet there is inevitable conflict. In the White House Mess, for instance, adversaries come and go, all within a few minutes of each other, between order and salad, salad and entree, entree and dessert. The strain on judgment, psyche, and intestinal tract must be fierce. Life is framed by the potentiality of a fall from grace.

Proposition 8: Personal dependence imposes a demand for loyalty to the incumbent of the office at the moment. Doubt about "loyalty", however grounded, is both a severe impediment and in an instrument in the war of one adviser against another.

In all aspects of life, honor and station are vital. Thus, shame and humiliation, the opposites of honor and station, are among the most powerful social controls. If shame and insult may be used to make people
feel uncomfortable about themselves, because of what they have internalized, they are easily effective.

**Proposition 9:** If shame and humiliation will not cause the individual to desist, they may be used to deprive that person of credit before the rest of the world.

Among the repeated forms of stigma are allegations of incompetence, of moral dereliction, or of ethical failure which repeatedly is a cover term for financial misadventure.

"Competence" was the weapon used in the first Reagan Administration against the private advisers ("kitchen cabinet") who knew the President well enough to call him "Ronnie" without being pretentious. The fight could be framed in terms of competence to work within governmental procedures, something the elderly gentlemen from California neither possessed nor wanted. The servants and technocrats in the government could generate criticism of the private advisers, sufficient to make it necessary for the President to loosen his ties to them.

It is not necessary to prove anything, but merely to establish the idea that someone has violated the established public morality. Whether Gaveston, a boyhood friend of Edward II's was the king's homosexual lover was not strictly relevant.15 Nor is it strictly relevant whether Queen Mary of Scotland did have one David Rizzio as her lover. Rather, it is only relevant that these acts violated the established public morality, and spreading the word that they had been done was sufficient to cause damage to the asserted offender. No one could doubt that similar attacks are easily made in contemporary politics.16

Claims of ethical failings, especially of financial misadventure, have also been important tools in the fight and remain so. This was so
for the Earl of Strafford, a diligent and effective defender of Charles I's interests, in 1641. And it was true for Governor Sherman Adams in the Eisenhower Administration. Both were accused, fairly or otherwise, of financial self-regard. Three hundred years, and the disappearance of political executions, separate Strafford and Charles from Adams and Eisenhower. But the underlying relationship is not otherwise much different. The central executive was willing to sacrifice the aide wounded, though always protesting that it was unfair.

Control over status symbols is an important factor, much neglected in our thinking. The term "status symbol" is often used to mean something trivial. But a status symbol is a power fact. In government, meetings to which you are not invited are a critical status symbol. Imagine the economist, or the corporate executive, who has been recruited to Washington, and must go home to tell friends and associates, "I really have nothing important to do. I really don't know anything." But this was the position in which Walter Heller would have found himself, in the Kennedy Administration, until he secured the friendly interest of the Appointments Secretary. But there are apparently even "smaller" things of which one cannot credibly be deprived without loss of standing. If you have no car, when everyone else who attends has official transportation, it will be self-evident that you count for less in the system. You will be treated accordingly. If an agency head can command the space required, particularly when other people cannot, that is a visible demonstration of power. If you cannot secure the personnel to perform your operations, you will be immobilized. The person who cannot get a secretary when various people of even lesser rank can easily get secretaries, is an essential
outsider whose weakness cannot be disguised.

**Proposition 10:** Control over other people's access to the higher authorities is a well-established method of political combat within the entourage. The claiming of jurisdiction reduces the personal element substantially. Jurisdiction has to be stabilized. Thus, the claiming of jurisdiction works against friends and peers, and for the others.

**Proposition 11:** The conversion of personal servants into officials with defined functions is an endless process in government.

Thomas F. Tout has described, in exciting detail, the fourteenth century emergence of official entities of government, from the king's household.\(^{18}\) When Richard E. Neustadt describes the "so-called 'staff' facilities around the President [as...\] an odd assortment of personal and institutional staffs and of interagency committees,"\(^{19}\) he is describing a similar result. Two presently noteworthy offices--Counsel to the President and Press Secretary--show how institutional growth is a result of benefits the Presidents knew they wanted.\(^{20}\) (On the other hand, the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) are politically vulnerable because they do not attract or compel the steady attention of the chief executive.)

**Proposition 12:** There is, however, a degree of institutionalization in which chief executives and some members of their entourage are linked in effective power-sharing arrangements.

The chief executive cannot escape awareness of the importance of the office. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Chief of Staff both embody this process. OMB is a major focus of action, even though some observers think its power somewhat exaggerated in the lore of the governmental community. The Office of Management and Budget is essential to the budget that the President submits to Congress each year. It is
also the vehicle for the President to keep control of agency legislation, and--the "management" function--the vehicle for controlling regulatory action.

The Chief of Staff function is the most important illustration of a modern "household" (personal) function taking on a governmental (institutional) character of its own. Chiefs of staff do not yet assert different policies from Presidents, not do they directly contest political strength with Presidents. But they control much of program decision-making, and of operational detail decision-making. Presidents have had to share the executive role, to "allow" this key executive dominance, sooner or later, whether they prefer it or not.

The reason is bio-psychological overload. Presidents share power not to be rid of trivial details, but to be rid of major problems that literally give them headaches.*

CONCLUSION

Proposition 13: The entourage as a control mechanism brings its force to bear upon the whole executive system of departments and agencies, acutely in the interest of the chief executive. Between the entourage and the agencies, bargaining and command are ever regenerated.

My argument (see Proposition 5a, above) is that the bargain between chief executive and entourage is inherently unstable. This is very

* My purpose is not normative or reformist, though there is a serious literature with such a purpose. If I were to raise a reform issue for discussion, however, it would concern the problem of presidential decision-making under bio-psychological overload. Bio-psychological demand under conditions of modern weaponry is a matter to which people interested in constitutional reform should pay attention. It is far more important than most structural issues examined, such as length-of-term or mode of election. However, people interested in governmental reform have given it very little consideration. It is difficult to think of proposals that are realistic enough to achieve respect in public debate.
important, as people outside the executive circle are continually pressed
to do things by people who live within it. People acting in the chief executive's name, purporting to act so, or allowing themselves to be believed to act so, may go well beyond any claim of authority until challenged. It will, as a practical matter, be very unclear what the President meant, but action still may follow. It will even be unclear who sees the President. Ambiguity is inevitable. Many of the people who have to deal with these members of the entourage may suspect that the President does not know what is said in his name, but strong demands from the entourage are likely to produce some action. Suspecting and knowing are different, and the price of losing a gamble can be very high. It is too chancy for other people to risk simply ignoring the entourage. Which department head, with any sense, wants the aide through whom most departmental business will pass, to be in a permanently nasty frame of mind? If the aide has lied and created a problem, is it wise to inform the President, unless you can convince the President and displace the aide?

Conflict over the roles of the entourage is ever-recurrent. Indeed, there is an economy of supervision which says that the more it is necessary to control some aides, the more freedom some other aides(s) must be permitted. People are permitted, by the unstated necessities of the central executive, considerable latitude—for command authority that they would not be given formally, and for bargaining that they would not admit undertaking.

I should conclude this memorandum with three observations, quite apart from any repetition of its provisional quality. The more important
points are these:

(1) The quick summary above appears to refer mainly to the national government in the United States. I do not try now to frame the variations in culture or institutional structure that will further determine variations in the structure of bargaining and command. Moreover, as I start with the United States, my present expectation is that the process can be understood in similar ways for successively lower levels of government ("state" or "local"). If one were studying government at a unit so small that it could have no hierarchy, then the propositions would not apply. At that point, government would be better understood as small group decision-making.

(2) The second working paper, following upon that which is here summarized, will complete the discussion of the structures of bargaining and command by linking the top-level political figures responsible for operational agencies (Secretaries, ministers, undersecretaries, etc.), the senior career and professional figures ("permanent government" in some Washington jargon), and the submerged structures of authority and control within such agencies. What is revealed, as one pursues that inquiry, is the simultaneous problem of seeking to bargain upward and to command downward.

(3) Finally, the underlying structures are intellectually important to a political scientist, because of their ubiquity. Administration is one of the very few control processes found repeatedly in various cultures and circumstances, now and from data about the past ("history"). Potentially, therefore, we have some opportunity first for qualitative and then for quantitative analysis on a very large scale. The essential
enterprise is to draw upon such material as one can muster from historical sources and from sources about contemporary countries and cultures other than that in the United States, e.g., the Ashanti kingdom and ancient Israel, medieval England, twentieth century America, and Spain. In that sense, one seeks a merger of "history" and "social science."
NOTES


3. This involves a methodological argument that it is not convenient to state here in any detail. For a partial exposition on that subject, however, see Matthew Holden, Jr., "Judgment and 'the Right Question,'" American Politics Quarterly, 1:2 (April 1973), 189-214.


8. Human perception of this necessity is recorded in early Biblical texts, in the reformation of command structures as armies got too big for personal leadership highly visible to all the troops. Frederick Winslow Taylor's "scientific management" recognizes the division of labor's consequences, by the effort to centralize knowledge so as to overcome the power that the division of labor allows lower-level functionaries. See,

9. I borrow this idea expressly from Ralph Huit, whom I heard expound it in a talk to the Wisconsin Political Science Association, October 17, 1970.

10. At least three (John G. Nicolay at 28, Joseph Stanley Brown at 22, and Bill Moyers at 29) were under thirty; five more (Robert Johnson, Daniel Lamont, George B. Cortelyou, Theodore Sorenson, and Richard E. Cheney) were between 31 and 35. About seven out of ten (including those already noted) were at least ten years younger than the President whom they served. Michael Medved, The Shadow Presidents, New York: Times Books, 1979.

A compilation of the public information on the staff assistants in the offices of many governors and big city mayors' would yield substantial confirmation. This would be relatively simple, though laborious.

I should expect, from looking at John Colville's memoirs, The Fringes of Power, that something like this also may be true in national governments elsewhere.


12. I would not make any firm claim as to the number twenty. It is purely a guess, though one about which I have tried to think, resulting from a discussion with Lou Cannon, based on his recitation of his experience as a White House reporter. My expectation is that the number, in any event, is very small and that, if we ever discover a means to test, it will be verified as extremely small.

13. I adapt this language and idea substantially from my colleague Robert J. Morgan.


20. In this section, I have been greatly helped by the opportunity to read Gwen Williams, "The White House Press Secretary and the Executive Branch," research paper in Government and Foreign Affairs 823, "The Cabinet Departments in the Political Process," University of Virginia, Spring Term, 1985. Typescript.
RECENT PUBLICATIONS ON THE PRESIDENCY

BOOKS


Robert Frederick Burk. *The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights.* Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984. 266p. Topics include the military services, the federal government's employment practices, housing, school desegregation, and the 1957 Civil Rights Act.


As denoted by the title, this is an examination of Washington's military experiences during the French and Indian War and the American Revolution, in which the author outlines Washington's professional sensibilities and military legacy.

Surveying various international agreements from the Cold War period through détente, the emphasis is on how they were made, with whom, and the role of Congress vs. the executive.

This collection of essays includes such topics as "An Analysis of Presidential Television Commercials from 1952 to 1984" and "The Evolution of Political Advertising in America."

A collection of papers by scholars, reporters, and politicians concerning the president as public educator, molder of public opinion, and manager of the executive branch.

A compilation of summits, conferences and trips, arranged chronologically by presidents, and alphabetically by countries visited.

The author focuses on the creation and development of the Peace Corps in the Kennedy years.

These papers cover Grant at the height of his military career, directing all Union armies and bringing the Civil War to a close.

A collection of presidential addresses grouped according to issues and events, analyzed within the same theoretical framework.
The author examines the Nixon Administration's hostile relations with the press during the years prior to Watergate, using public television as a case study.

An "unvarnished" biography in which the emphasis is on the "human dimensions" of Lincoln.

Within the framework of presidential roles and determinants of presidential power, the author examines, through case studies, instances of presidential power and presidential weakness.


An account of Reagan and the past that shaped him.

A "concise and lucid analysis" of Van Buren's administration which includes information regarding Van Buren's rise to power and the political context of his presidency.

Viewing the rhetoric of the War on Poverty as a key to its fate, the author analyzes the project in terms of the struggles fought over its symbols.

**ARTICLES**

A brief analysis of the concept of failure in politics and how it has affected various politicians.

The author explores the evolution of PUPDs, analyzing arguments for and against their use and how they will affect the future of executive/congressional relations in American foreign policy.
Relying on data on voter attitudes and perceptions as well as on campaign events, the author offers insights into the dynamics of the individual-level and aggregate-level processes of candidate choice in the preconvention period.

The author examines Jefferson's handling of the war with Tripoli, finding that "Jefferson emerged in the Barbary issue as a dynamic leader of Congress..., [not] intimidated by constitutional separations of power."

This article provides an analysis of the effects of the Reagan Administration's policies on blacks during his first term.

The authors chart "the contours of the unanticipated improvement in the public's image of government" and then provide an explanation for this resurgence of trust that "addresses persistent controversies about the theoretical and empirical status of this concept."

An analysis of the debate in terms of how the Illinois electorate responded to it and how the electorate may have influenced the major topic—slavery.

An essay assessing the statesman as historian in which the author argues that TR's "attitudes, interests, and reflections" in the fields of history and public affairs "vitallly affected his conduct" in both.

The author reviews the treatment of both George III and George Washington in the literature and poetry of the revolutionary war years, and then outlines similarities between the two leaders, asking why "their historical reputations have been so different" given those similarities.
In an attempt to understand Lincoln's appeal to so many people, even a century after his death, the author examines the time period in which Lincoln lived, Lincoln's character, and some who have identified with him since his death.

In analyzing Reagan's political rhetoric in light of American democratic ethics, the author finds numerous violations of those ethics.

A recounting of the 43 vice-presidents involvements in books--as authors, as owners and collectors, etc.

An analysis of the consequences of the U-2 crisis on American-Soviet relations.

In assessing the criticism that direct primaries cannot consistently produce candidates with broad electoral support, the author finds that the problem is with the rules that govern primaries rather than with the direct primary itself.

Viewing the 1952 campaign as the beginning of the age of "telepolitics," the author discusses how Eisenhower seemed "at ease with the medium [of television] and used it as a campaign vehicle both in the fight for the Republican presidential nomination and in the battle with the Democrats with great effect."

The author's assessment of the "liberal-internationalism that Utah's Senator Elbert D. Thomas demonstrated" in 1939 while attempting to assist FDR in modifying, circumventing, or negating the effects of American neutrality laws.

Speech texts are analyzed in order to illustrate how public discourse can subvert the "conventions of deterrence" which have guided the rhetoric of war since the end of World War II.


In analyzing the rhetorical responses of Reagan and Mitterand to the terrorist bombing of peace-keeping forces in Beirut, the author argues that foreign policy rhetoric, both in form and function, is grounded in a nation's acceptable images of reality.


The author argues that Eisenhower's formal method of organization could have prevented problems in subsequent administrations which relied on a more ad hoc style.


Arguing that the "ideal case study for an analysis of the sources of presidential power" is the administration of John Adams, the author proceeds to examine Adams' primary reliance on his constitutional powers in order to "conduct...a successful administration."


A review and analysis of the Reagan Administration's policies and diplomacy in the Middle East.


The author argues that the Iran affair is evidence of the "progressive suffocation" of presidential authority in foreign affairs.


Using a statewide survey of trade unionists in Pennsylvania, the author repudiates several assumptions about the labor movement which arose due to Reagan's "receipt of a sizable union vote" in 1984.


The authors examine what effect divisive primaries have on the results of general elections, relying on a theoretical framework developed from small group research.
A discussion of the nature of Wilson's contribution to the founding of the academic field of public administration.

In a detailed rhetorical analysis, the author finds that Reagan displaced guilt and redefined the situation through the use of myths and victimage in his speech.

An examination of both the promise and the reality of Kennedy's "activist" diplomacy as it was applied in Eastern Europe.

Seeing in Nixon's activities since his resignation the aim of "personal vindication and political rehabilitation" in order "to assume the self-appointed role he so covets, that of an elder statesman", the author finds that Nixon is "singularly ill-suited for this role."


In seeking to add to our understanding of the wartime presidential election of 1864, the author analyzes the activities of Union party leaders in the state of Connecticut "under the intense pressure of wartime circumstances."

An analysis of the effect Truman's handling of the Polish Question had on the advent of the Cold War.

Arguing that the public's understanding of domestic and foreign policy impinges on accountability, the author finds that in foreign policy, "a system of accountability is a hollow matter."
The author seeks to identify and analyze patterns of foreign policy making since FDR as well as to propose reforms in the policy-making process.

An analysis of the six-year presidential term and the effects it would have on the types of presidents who might gain or lose from such a reform.

A discussion of how two chief executives developed a personal relationship which "produced significant results in the relations between the United States and Mexico during their respective administrations."

The author probes the dispute between Congress and TR over the use of publicity experts in various executive agencies in order to sway public opinion.

A report on a roundtable discussion held at the annual meeting and including Robert McFarlane, Stuart Eizenstat, Roger Porter, and Richard Wirthlin.

An evaluation of various theories which have been proposed concerning why Wilson sent U.S. troops to Siberia in 1918.

The author defines presidential accountability, looks at its political and moral sources, and answers the question, how accountable is the modern Presidency?

A textual analysis which argues that the speech represents "the effective victory of public discourse over the technical sphere."

A commentary on several recent biographical studies of LBJ, including those by Dugger, Caro, Bornet, and Matusow.
As evident in the title, this article reassesses Grant and his impact after a century of scholarship.

Relying on such historiometric predictors as years in office, years of war, scandal, assassination, and war hero, the author tests an attributional model of presidential greatness.

How Herbert Hoover and other progressive engineers in the 1920s used the Federated Association of Engineering Societies "as a vehicle for encouraging industrial reform."

A study of the voting patterns in the Senate in light of the election of Reagan.

A detailed exposition of an incident which occurred in the summer of 1850 in which Fillmore drafted and circulated a petition to prominent political leaders in the Cabinet and Congress, requesting funds to purchase the release of his coachman's family from a slave owner in New Orleans.

A micro-level analysis of change in presidential popularity which relies on data from a three-wave panel.

An organizational analysis of the White House staff which relies on a variant of organization theory—the governance approach—to generate some preliminary propositions concerning the White House staff as an organization.

Three interaction models of leader appeal and leader performance are evaluated with data about the motive profiles of American presidents and American society.
An examination of the prospective judgments of a particular group of voters--stock market investors--as they respond to "the stimuli of presidential elections."