

PRG REPORT



Newsletter of the Presidency Research Group of the American Political Science Association

Volume XXIII, Number 1

Fall 2000

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(GO TO PAGE 4
FOR AWARD CITATION)

Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness.

by Lawrence R. Jacobs &
Robert Y. Shapiro

As we see it, the conventional wisdom that politicians habitually respond to public opinion when making major policy decisions is wrong. There has been a declining trend in the American government's responsiveness to the public's policy preferences. For example this was visibly the case in the way congressional Republicans treated the impeachment and Senate trial of President Bill Clinton. The Republicans' handling of impeachment fits into a larger pattern in contemporary American politics. Moreover, the actions and political rhetoric of politicians and the connections of politi-

(Continued on page 25)

Joseph Campbell and the Heroic Construction of the Presidency

by Mary Beth Melchior & Nicol Rae

The lens of mythology suggests an alternative perspective from which to study those in positions of power. Drawing on the seminal work of Joseph Campbell, we explore the ways the contemporary American Presidency is both illuminated and shaped by Campbell's concept of the archetypal hero: the lone individual subject to undergoing public trials, responsible for self-transformation, and typified by heroic speech and actions in service of the public good.¹ We argue that that the framework of mythology applies to institutions as well as individual public servants and that how citizens see their rulers is shaped, at least in part, by the mythologies that are attached to specific offices. Finally, we believe that consideration of these questions highlights cultic tendencies in presidential action in the early 21st century.

Campbell published "The Hero with a Thousand Faces" in 1949

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
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The "Heat" of the Archetypal Hero

A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man. (Campbell 1949, 30)

If we look closely at Campbell's description of the creation of the hero, one sees several characteristics that are particularly relevant to considering the contemporary President as the archetypal "hot" hero. "A hero

(Continued on page 31)



Report from the President

by Karen M. Hult

It's always gratifying when long-term projects are completed. The PRG reached at least one such milestone in the past year and is positioned to attain several more.

In November 1996, the PRG helped design and sponsor a conference at Columbia University entitled

"Presidential Power: Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century." Designed both as a celebration of the 35th anniversary of the publication of Richard Neustadt's landmark *Presidential Power* and as a forum to explore the present state of research on the U.S. presidency, the conference brought together promising junior and distinguished senior scholars. This fall, a presidential term later, Columbia University Press released the book that draws together much of the work and many of the ideas spawned by "the Neustadt conference": *Presidential Power: Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Robert Y. Shapiro, Martha Joynt Kumar, and Lawrence R. Jacobs.

White House 2001

Meanwhile, two other tasks approach completion. One is the White House 2001 Project, funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts. Currently, the Project (a.k.a. WHIP, the White House Interview Program) involves numerous PRG members. Among the products thus far has been a piece for journalists covering the 2000 election on the elements of a successful presidential transition. This "backgrounder" was written by

George Edwards, Martha Kumar, Jim Pfiffner, and Terry Sullivan. Other products will include material -- available to both presidential campaigns electronically and in hard copy -- on the organization and operation of several key units in the Executive Office of the President (the offices of chief of staff, press, communications, White House counsel, staff secretary, and administration). At the heart of the Project are close to 80 interviews that Martha Kumar has done with senior staffers who have worked in these offices in administrations from Richard Nixon's through Bill Clinton's. These interviews will be available to incoming presidential staffers and they are the main "data" that groups of scholars are using as the basis for writing overview memos on the organization and operation of each of the selected staff units. In addition, sometime next spring, the interviews and selected other materials will be made available to all of us through the presidential library system.

Of course, whether the campaigns' transition planners or members of the new administration will seriously use such transition assistance remains an open question. Even if it is not, however, students of the presidency will have access to the interviews, organization charts, and other information. That is a contribution in which the PRG can take considerable pride.

Presidency Research Fellowships

The second project that is nearing fruition is the PRG

Fellowship program, for which money is being raised as part of the APSA's Centennial Campaign. After two years of fundraising, we are within \$10,000 of achieving our initial (five year) goal of \$50,000. Moreover, three PRG members have anonymously pledged \$5000 if other members contribute an additional \$5000 by the end of 2000. The APSA has recognized PRG's continuing success in several ways. For example, at the annual meeting in Washington, I was asked to discuss the PRG's fundraising strategies and progress at the breakfast meeting of the Organized Section representatives. More importantly, the APSA not only invited us to hold our annual reception at APSA headquarters, but Rob Hauck also gave those in attendance a tour of the planned Centennial Center facilities. Seeing physically where one might be able to have a desk and computer during a fellowship period in Washington made the results of donating to the fund more concrete.

As we move to meet our \$50,000 goal, I again want to stress trying to expand the number of contributors and the range of contributions and pledges (including more \$10 and \$25 donations, not just additional \$1,000 ones).

(Continued on Page 3)

Karen M. Hult is the president of the Presidency Research Group and Professor of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

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*American Political Science Association Online: www.apsanet.org
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Report from the President (Cont'd)

Clearly, as the endowment grows (with continued help from the magic of compound interest), so too can the number and the size of PRG Fellowships. Yet at least as important, in my view, the more PRG members who contribute -- no matter how small the sum -- the more we demonstrate to each other and to colleagues in other subfields our commitment to serious presidency scholarship.

Next Steps

Even as these projects conclude over the next several months, other tasks continue. Three awards committees (the Neustadt for best book and the Founders' awards for best APSA paper and best graduate student paper) are gearing up. As always, the pool of nominations is critical. Please nominate deserving books and papers, including your own. (The members of the commit-

tees for 2000-2001 are listed in this newsletter and in the December *PS*, and they have been sent out on PRG's listserv, "PRGNews.")

Meanwhile, now under a new editor, the *Report* promises to continue to provide us with an opportunity to share our varying perspectives on the substance, theoretical approaches, and methodologies of presidency research. We also will have the chance to exchange ideas (and perhaps frustrations, concerns, and enthusiasms) about teaching about the U.S. presidency.

Finally, the Board members, officers, and I all welcome suggestions for PRG activities, feedback on the organization and its operations, and questions. I remain concerned about the relatively limited number of members who are on the listserv, PRGNews: only about half of the 450 or so PRG members are subscribed. It's an easy

way to connect to the subfield worldwide. (For those concerned about e-mail overload, PRGNews has not been generating mountains of messages.) To sign up, send an e-mail from your own account to PRGNet@unc.edu.

And, while you're connected, please remember to submit paper and other proposals for APSA 2001 by the **November 15th** deadline. Once again this year, *all* proposals must be submitted electronically and must be submitted directly to the APSA (see <http://www.apsanet.org/>).

Now, back to the Bush/Gore/Nader/Buchanan campaigns...(or their aftermath—adds the editor).

Presidency Research Group Awards 2000

Founder's Award, Honoring David Naveh, for the Best Graduate Student Paper

The greatest legacy of the seminal books in presidency studies (indeed, in any sub-discipline of political science), is not the work itself, but the literature it spawns. Conceptual development and refinement, tests of critical hypotheses, and eventually theoretical advance are the hallmarks of these "classics." This is almost certainly true of Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power*, and is increasingly the case with Stephen Skowronek's *The Politics Presidents Make*. The winner of this year's Founder's Award for the Best Graduate Student Paper (Honoring David Naveh), fits squarely into this category. Kevin Price's paper, "The Partisan Legacies of Preemptive Leadership: Assessing the Eisenhower Cohorts in the U.S. House," packs sophisticated analysis with a creative research design to inform our understanding of a somewhat

neglected but extremely interesting aspect of Skowronek's work, that of "preemptive leadership."

FOUNDER'S AWARD HONORING DAVID NAVEH FOR THE BEST CONVENTION PAPER ON THE PRESIDENCY BY A GRADUATE STUDENT DELIVERED IN 1999- 2000: KEVIN S. PRICE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

In the paper, Price sets out to discern the effects of Ike's New Republican party project on party contingents in the U.S. House. Ideological patterns, electoral dynamics, and roll-call behavior are analyzed on four Eisenhower cohorts elected between 1952 to 1958. The upshot of the paper is that Eisenhower's movement toward the center-left of the ideological spectrum left his partisans to face a resurgent

Democratic party in the aftermath of his presidency. Price's provocative conclusion is that the preemptive leadership project tends toward the Pyrrhic. The victories of the preemptor are offset by larger losses.

Though tested on only one president, Price's work suggests a set of hypotheses that could be extended to other administrations. Price's work is rich, informed, theoretically relevant, and easily accessible. We can look forward to further work, which can only increase our fundamental understanding of presidential leadership projects, their constraints and opportunities, and their implication in party dynamics.

Award Committee:

Dennis M. Simon, (Chair)
Southern Methodist University
Lori Cox Han
Austin College
Daniel E. Ponder
*University of Colorado at
Colorado Springs*

PRG Awards 2000

The Richard Neustadt Award for Best Book on the Presidency

The Senate has confirmed nine out of every ten of the president's nominees to the Supreme Court during this century. Most scholars of the nominating process have sought to distinguish the nine who were confirmed from the one who was rejected, by

delving into the congressional confirmation process. David Yalof shifts the focus of inquiry to the selection of the nominees, thereby enlarging the "sample" to include candidates for nomination who were weeded out at the crucial, but private, pre-nomination phase. In thus shifting the focus of his empirical inquiry, Yalof helps to assert the critical importance, in theory as well as practice, of the presi-

dency in the staffing of the Court.

Yalof shapes his study through careful case studies of selection politics in seven administrations from 1945 to 1987, with an epilogue on the Bush and Clinton years. Through documentary analysis and interviews, he identifies three principal types of decision frameworks utilized by presidents, and considers how presidents fared when uti-

Presidency Research Group Awards 2000 (cont'd)

lizing each of these approaches.

An open selection framework posits that the work of selecting a nominee does not begin until a vacancy occurs. At that point, the president maintains his flexibility by placing himself in the center of a web of persons attempting to influence his decision. The single-candidate, or closed selection process was used with considerably greater frequency than the closed. By settling on a single candidate even before a vacancy occurs, the White House can restrict the influence of interest groups and other outsiders, and hit the ground running when a vacancy is announced. The major liability of such an approach is that political circumstances at the time of an announcement may be radically different from at the time of candidate selection. Yalof argues, in this context, that Robert Bork's nomination might have survived Senate scrutiny in 1986, but by 1987, with Democrats back in the majority in the Senate, prospects were diminished. Three presidents avoided the extremes of either a free-wheeling open or a rigid closed system, opting instead for a "criteria-driven" framework.

Reflecting the bureaucratization of the executive branch and the growth of extra-governmental agents eager and able to analyze and publicize data on potential nominees, the criteria-driven process has become the norm in the most recent administrations. This process allows the president to

delegate authority to subordinates to research potential nominees, while preserving control over the naming of the final candidate. Ironically,

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT
AWARD FOR THE BEST
BOOK ON THE U.S.
PRESIDENCY
PUBLISHED IN 1999:
DAVID ALISTAIR
YALOF, UNIVERSITY
OF CONNECTICUT
*Pursuit of Justices:
Presidential Politics and
the Selection of Supreme
Court Nominees*

(University of Chicago Press, 1999)

however, the multiple advisors and overlapping staff structures that characterize the criteria-driven search can create problems for a president, as in the case of the Bork nomination. As Yalof writes, the "competition among advisors may have exaggerated Meese's perceived costs of losing; after all, Bork's replacement might now be some other official's first choice, rather than Meese's own second choice."

Ultimately, Yalof concludes that the president must guard his power stakes in whichever selection process he chooses. But a modern president can no longer do that by trying to channel all relevant information to himself. When it comes to selecting Supreme Court nominees, in particular, the problem is not that presidents are told too little, but that they are asked to digest too much information. The

alternative, Yalof believes, may be that "one eminently qualified presidential advisor (either the attorney general or the White House counsel) must be entrusted with the bulk of recruitment responsibilities." Moreover, to minimize the problems generated by the growing pressures of intra-executive branch conflicts, presidents should be wary of an overly formulaic criteria-driven process, which repeatedly has led to an either an excess or an abandonment of caution.

Professor Yalof's book is an exemplary exploration of a problem central to the constitutional authority of the president, and should encourage other presidency scholars to join in drawing out the executive branch dimensions of judicial politics.

On a more general note, The Neustadt Committee this year was struck by the quality of the books submitted to it, and by their variety. In addition to Yaloff's volume, three others stood out as indicative of the vitality and breadth of contemporary presidency studies:

Douglas C. Foyle's **Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) uses survey analysis and detailed case studies to advance the argument that "the reaction of presidents to public opinion will largely be determined by variations in their beliefs." Presidents, Foyle finds, in fact rarely respond to public opinion after the fact in making

PRG Awards 2000

Founder's Award honoring Martha Joynt Kumar for the Best Paper on the Presidency delivered at the 1999 APSA

"Institutional Development in a System of Separation of Powers," Keith Whittington, Department of Politics, Princeton University and Daniel Carpenter, Department of Health Management and Policy, University of Michigan.

The Whittington and Carpenter paper combines strong theorizing, informed comparative case studies, and historical analytic techniques. Whittington and Carpenter take on the principal agent model of American politics in which the executive is sometimes characterized as a clerk in service to the legislature. Rather, as part of a recent movement that reinterprets the meaning of the separation of powers, Whittington and Carpenter persuasively argue that

competition and conflict between the branches creates a dynamic that leads to institutional development and policy change.

Further, they elaborate on the powers of both presidents and bureaucrats to take the initia-

FOUNDER'S
AWARD HONORING
MARTHA JOYNT
KUMAR FOR THE
BEST PAPER ON
THE PRESIDENCY
DELIVERED AT THE
1999 APSA:
KEITH
WHITTINGTON,
PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY &
DANIEL
CARPENTER,
UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN

tive from Congress, their ostensible "principal."

Whittington and Carpenter illustrate their argument by reinterpreting three oft-told tales, the functioning of the Department of Agricul-

ture in the early part of the 20th century, the creation of the national security state at mid-century, and the issue of presidential impoundments, especially in the 1970s. Whittington's and Carpenter's paper requires that we not only rethink past analyses of these events and processes, but also how we conceptualize the presidency, presidential-congressional relations, and the structural dynamics of our constitutional system. Furthermore, they do this with elegant and clear prose that all readers will appreciate. Kudos to this fine scholarship.

Award Committee:

Jeffrey E. Cohen, (Chair)
Fordham University
Kenneth R. Mayer
University of Wisconsin
Charles E. Walcott
Virginia Tech

PRG Awards 2000: Neustadt (cont'd)

(Continued from page 5)

foreign policy, though many react to anticipated opinion.

David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran apply transaction cost analysis from economics to the issue of executive-congressional policy making. Congress is careful, they seek to demonstrate, not to delegate excessively to an executive antagonistic to the congressional majority's policy goals. Their book, **Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers**, was published

by Cambridge University Press.

Finally, a keen historical sensibility informs Russell L. Riley's **The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality: Nation Keeping From 1831 to 1965**, published by Columbia University Press. Riley's book is an exploration of when and why presidents took the lead in advancing racial equality. Because of the presidency's unique constitutional role, which Riley interprets as "nation keeping," presidents have only rarely been "change

oriented."

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The PRG Report serves the scholarly community in presidential and executive politics. The editor of the Report welcomes your submissions and ideas.

PRG Report

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Diane Heith	2000	2003
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Kathryn Dunn Tenpas	2000	2003
Shirley Warshaw	1998	2001
Andrew Barrett, <i>graduate student</i>	1999	2002

Richard E. Neustadt Award for the Best Book on the U.S. Presidency Published in 2000 (i.e., with a 2000 copyright.) To be nominated for this award, please make sure your publisher (or you) sends copies to each of the members of the Neustadt Committee by the submission deadline of February 15, 2000.)

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PRG Awards Committees, 2000 - 2001

Founder's Award honoring Bert Rockman for the Best Convention Paper on the Presidency delivered at the 2000 APSA. Copies of the 2000 APSA papers to be considered for this award should be sent to the members of the committee by the February 2001 Deadline.

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Founder's Award honoring Francis Rourke for the Best Convention Paper on the Presidency by a Graduate Student Delivered in 2000-2001 Papers given at the APSA or any of the regional meetings in the 2000-2001 academic year are eligible. The deadline for submission is May 15, 2001. Nominations by panel chairs, discussants, and even proud advisors are strongly encouraged!

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Minutes of the PRG Business Meeting

APSA Annual Conference, Washington, D.C.

Saturday, September 2, 2000

Submitted by Michael A. Genovese, Secretary/Treasurer, PRG

President Karen Hult called the meeting to order at 12:40

Karen Hult announced the publication of **PRESIDENTIAL POWER: FORGING THE PRESIDENCY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**, a publication of papers and commentary from a PRG-cosponsored event, the Neustadt Conference held at Columbia University. The volume is edited by PRG members, Robert Shapiro, Larry Jacobs, and Martha Joynt Kumar, and has just been released by Columbia University Press.

Secretary/Treasurer Michael Genovese reported the PRG's surplus of \$4,245.28, and announced that membership is at 424 members. The PRG ranks 15th out of 31 organized sections in membership. We are down from 440 last year, but up from 1997 (385) and 1998 (398).

Karen Hult thanked George Edwards for his excellent service as editor of the PRG Newsletter, and introduced new editor, Tom Langston, who discussed his plans for the Newsletter. Langston will include articles on Teaching the Presidency, as well as themed issues of the Newsletter. He can be reached at langston@tulane.edu.

Karen Hult thanked Bruce Miroff for the outstanding panels at this year's conference, and we were reminded of the panel honoring the career of James M. Burns to be held immediately after the business meeting. It was announced that Jeffrey Cohen (Fordham University) would chair next year's Presidency Section for the APSA conference to be held in San Francisco.

Mary Stuckey (Georgia State University), book review editor of **RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS**, invited PRG members to send their books to her for review in the journal.

The **FOUNDER'S AWARD**, honoring David Naveh, for the best convention paper on the Presidency by a graduate student, was presented by Daniel Ponder to KEVIN S. PRICE, of the University of Wisconsin for "The Partisan Legacies of Preemptive Leadership: Assessing the Eisenhower Cohorts in the U.S. House." The Award Committee consisted of Dennis M. Simon (chair), Lori Cox Han, and Daniel Ponder.

The **FOUNDER'S AWARD**, honoring Martha Joynt Kumar, for the best paper on the Presidency delivered at the 1999 APSA conference was presented by Charles E. Walcott to Keith Whittington, Princeton University, and Daniel Carpenter, University of Michigan, for their paper, "Institutional Development in a System of Separation of Powers". The Award Committee consisted of Jeffrey Cohen (chair), Kenneth R. Mayer, and Charles E. Walcott.

The **NEUSTADT AWARD**, for the best book on the Presidency published in 1999, was presented by Tom Langston to David Alistair Yalof, of the University of Connecticut for his book, **PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES** (University of Chicago Press). The award committee consisted of Thomas Langston (chair), Patricia Conley, Byron W. Daynes, John Hart, and Donald Robinson.

Victoria Farrar-Myers (University of Texas, Arlington) announced that she would welcome participation of PRG members in the March 15-17, 2001 Western Political Science Association meeting, and invited proposals.

Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan discussed the PRG Fellowship Program that is part of the APSA's Centennial Campaign. The PRG is the leading fundraiser among organized sections in the APSA. Our goal is to raise \$50,000. We collected \$33,000 in the first year, and with interest, we are up to \$40,000. Three of our colleagues will match the PRG with a \$5,000 contribution if we can raise the rest by the end of the year.

(Continued on page 10)

Minutes of the PRG Business Meeting (cont'd)

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This fund is designed to assist colleagues who are doing research in Washington, D.C. by making available to them office space and other forms of assistance. All PRG members are encouraged to donate to this campaign.

Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan also reported on the status of the WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT. This project, designed to assist the incoming administration as it assumes office in January 2001, has been very successful. Seventy-eight interviews have been conducted with current and former EOP officials, most of them for over two hours each. The interviews, organizational charts, books and manuscripts, nomination forms on-line, and a Rolodex of important phone numbers, plus essays gleaned from the extensive interviews, will be given to members of the incoming administration. This project is funded by the Pew Foundation, and in the Spring of 2001, the materials will be made public and given to the National Archives. They will be available for scholars to examine and use in their research.

Karen Hult announced that the terms of five PRG Board members would end, and thanked Mary Anne Borelli, Nancy Kassop, Janet Martin, Robert Shapiro, and Katie Dunn Tenpas for their service. At that morning's Executive Board meeting, the Board approved the following nominations for the PRG Executive Board: Janet Martin, Katie Dunn Tenpas, and Mary Anne Borelli (each for a second term) and Diane Heith and John Hart as new members. Karen Hult asked if there were other nominations. There being none, these nominations were moved and seconded, and were unanimously approved by the membership.

Karen Hult again thanked Martha and Terry for their work on the WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT, and thanked George Edwards for his work as editor of the PRG NEWSLETTER. There being no new business, President Hult closed the meeting at 1:29.

Announcements • Announcements • Announcements •

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA LOOKING FOR AMERICAN PRESIDENCY RESEARCHER

University of Virginia, Miller Center of Public Affairs. Assistant professor or lecturer, research faculty, to participate in research projects on the American presidency. Priority projects involve in-depth presidential oral history interviewing and tracking presidential organizational and policy making arrangements. Advanced degree and demonstrated knowledge of U.S. governmental institutions and processes with a focus on the modern presidency are required. Published scholars with experience in elite interviewing and directing student research are preferred. Appointment term is up to three years with possibilities for renewal and promotion.

Send curriculum vitae, writing sample, transcript of post-baccalaureate education, and two letters of reference to: Professor James S. Young, Chair, Presidency Scholar Search Committee, Miller Center for Public Affairs, P.O. Box 400406, Charlottesville, Virginia 22904-4406. The University of Virginia is an equal opportunity/affirmative action employer.

ERRATUM FROM FALL 2000 PRG REPORT

Stanley A. Renshon, author of "Still Relevant After All this Time?: Character Issues in the 2000 Campaign" was incorrectly identified in the Spring 2000 issue of the PRG Report. In addition to being at the City University of New York, Professor Renshon was a Fellow at the Joan Shorenstein Center in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Teaching the Presidency: Presidential Advising Simulation

by Charles E. Walcott,

Many instructors elect to use role-playing simulations in their classrooms for a variety of reasons. They stimulate student-to-student interaction, provide a sense of the complexity of politics, are more fun than taking notes, and can even positively affect the students' evaluations of a class.¹ While designing role-playing simulations for presidency courses is perhaps a little more challenging than doing so for courses on courts or legislatures, it can be done, especially if one focuses on the presidency, not just the president.

Here I will report on one such simulation that I have designed and used twice – successfully, I think. I will try to provide enough detail so that anyone interested in adopting or adapting it could easily do so, along with a summary of some evaluative information that has persuaded me that the exercise is worthwhile.

Purposes

This simulation is designed for an upper-level, undergraduate course on the U.S. Presidency, but could be adapted to other course contexts. In simulating the presidential advising process, I have sought to achieve two broad objectives. The first is to familiarize students

with elements of the process, with emphasis upon the different roles that advisors assume, and the consequences of role for the nature of advice. In other words, the simulation introduces students to the notion that “where you stand depends on where you sit.”

Moreover, by placing students in a group decision-making situation, the simulation permits examination of decision processes more generally (e.g., in terms of “rationality,” conflict resolution, or whatever theoretical emphasis the instructor might prefer).

The second objective is to immerse students in a substantive area of public policy, preferably one that is on the president's decision agenda at the time of the simulation. If the issue confronted by the students is simultaneously one that the media are covering, students are able to use news sources -- including Internet resources -- in an instrumental way. They are also confronted with a research project that (a) cannot be purchased ready-made from term paper “factories,” and (b) resembles the “research” that informed citizens do in real life.

Procedures

Role assignment

The basic unit of the sim-

ulation is the advisory group, or “task force.” Thus the first job is to define advisory roles for the students to play. These may vary according to the issue under discussion. If one tries to pick an issue “in the news,” one has to

wait until a few days before the exercise begins to decide upon the issue. I have done this, with the result that my two classes had to deliver advice about (a)

the legal and public relations aspects of impeachment, in the period before the House vote, and (b) campaign finance reform legislation. In each case, I defined seven advisory roles, which together comprised a White House “task force” to advise President Clinton on the issue. Six roles were used both times:

1. Chief of Staff to the President. Presides at task force meetings, and is the closest thing to a surrogate president. Main concern is to protect the President at any cost. Delivers final report of task force.

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Teaching the Presidency: Presidential Advising Simulation (cont'd)

(Continued from page 11)

2. Director of Communications. Concerned with how any presidential action or position will "play" with the media and the public. Familiar with relevant public opinion polls and tactics for dealing with both the public and the media. Is the specialist in "image" politics.

3. Head of Congressional Liaison. The expert on Congress, aware of the latest legislative developments, the positions of various members, the partisan breakdown on the issue, and tactics for influencing Congress. Advises the president from the perspective of attaining the best possible legislative result, not only on bills, but with regard to investigative hearings as well.

4. Counsel to the President. Concerned with legal issues, particularly the constitutionality of any proposed reform or action. Also the expert on the activities of the Attorney General and the Office of the Independent Counsel.

5. Chair of the DNC. Invited to represent the party's interest, this person is primarily concerned with the ability of the party to function in campaigns. Takes a longer view than the others, protecting the party's interests beyond the time frame of the current administration, though

nonetheless focused on the nearest elections.

6. Chief of Staff to the Vice President. Invited to sit in to protect the Vice President's interests, and thus strongly focused on the "successor" election year -- 2000. In the Clinton role playing exercises. Greatly concerned with the VP's nomination and election chances.

Note that not all represent strictly White House offices. The DNC chair and the VP's chief of staff were included to provide perspectives beyond just the president's. For the campaign finance version of the simulation, I added:

7. Head of the Domestic Policy Council. The President's chief "issues" person. Responsible for evaluating the desirability of campaign reform legislation in terms of its likely effect upon campaign practices. This involves both policy analysis and partisan calculations, since the effects of any change in campaign laws are likely to include some alteration of the balance of partisan advantage.

For the impeachment version, attempting to include an element of response to "world opinion," I added:

7. National Security Advisor to the President. The President's top foreign policy aide. Responsible for advising on long-term military and diplo-

matic strategy as well as on responses to crises and other short-term events. Especially concerned with maintaining the position of the U.S. in the world during a time when the government might be preoccupied with domestic distractions.

Obviously, these roles would vary according to the topic, as well as the number of students. The point is simply to incorporate relevant and divergent perspectives, laying the basis for differing recommendations. Ideally, the number of roles will be divisible into the number of students in the class, creating a set of complete task forces. In both my classes, for instance, seven roles were appropriate because each class had 49 students, thus seven complete task forces.

First Paper and Meeting

Role assignments were made immediately after the first exam in the course was returned (allowing for those who would decide to drop the course to do so), and about a week before the first simulation meeting. Prior to that meeting, students were required to write a paper of 7-10 pages summarizing the issues confronting the task force and tentatively laying out advice for the president from the perspective of each student's role.

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Teaching the Presidency: Presidential Advising Simulation (cont'd)

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During this period also, the class studied the organization of the White House, so the various roles took on additional meaning, as did the general political environment within the White House. For their substantive research, students heavily utilized web-based sources, including newspapers and magazines. It was important to discuss both the formal ways of citing web material and issues related to judging the credibility of any given web site.

The papers were turned in to the instructor before the first group meeting. Students were urged to keep a copy for themselves. They were graded and returned at the first class period after the meetings.

The first meeting was not a task force meeting, but rather was a meeting of role-groups. In other words, all the Chiefs of Staff met with each other, all the Directors of Communication, etc. Their task was to share with each other not only the information and sources they found, but, more importantly, their interpretation of the kind of advice they should be presenting to the task force. There was no requirement that any consensus be reached. The purpose of this was mainly to socialize each person into her or his role, and to more fully "arm" him or her with resources and possible arguments.

These meetings lasted 50 minutes - one class period. The students were given class time for the exercise in order to avoid having "no shows." They were also warned that participation was mandatory if they wished to get a passing grade on the associated paper assignment. (There were few absences at the first meetings, and all the meetings used at least 45 minutes of their allotted time.)

Second Paper

The students were given a week after the first meeting to revise their papers, based on what they had learned at the meeting, as well as from the instructor's comments. From these revisions it is clear that the meetings worked, at least to the extent of correcting some misconceptions about roles, and a few misconceptions about how much effort should go into the paper. Students turned the revised papers in on the class period prior to the actual task force meetings -- again, they were urged to keep a copy. The papers were regraded (most went up, none went down) and the grade achieved at this point replaced the original grade.

Task Force Meetings

The task force meetings, the "heart" of the simulation, also took 50 minutes of class time. The task forces were urged, but not

required, to reach a consensus, and they did so about half the time. The Chief of Staff, in addition to presiding, took notes and made a brief oral presentation at the next full class meeting. All task force members were permitted to supplement or take issue with the Chief's report. (Again, there were few absences, most of which were excused. All task forces used the full 50 minutes.)

Third paper

The first time I used the simulation, the students were given the option of one more revision of their paper. This revision was to take into account any additional perspectives they gained from the task force meetings, as well as the instructor's comments on the second paper. Those who did not choose to revise again (including those who had received an A on the second paper) were allowed to keep their second paper grade. However, they were required to submit a 1-2-page discussion of the decision process within the task force. This was not graded, and was primarily for the instructor's edification. For those who did revise their papers, the grade they received on this version was their grade for the assignment, which constituted 20% of their course grade. (Another 10% of the grade was for "participation," which included, but was

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Teaching the Presidency: Presidential Advising Simulation (cont'd)

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not limited to, the simulation.)

I was not particularly happy with the level of effort or improvement on this final rewrite, and dropped it the second time I used the simulation. It was replaced by a paper asking the students to analyze the decision-making dynamics of their Task Force groups, in terms of such things as leadership, participation, and evidence of the various pathologies associated with "groupthink." Appropriate readings and lectures preceded this assignment. This paper was graded, and constituted 25% of the total paper grade.

Evaluation

After the campaign finance simulation had concluded, I devoted 15 minutes of a class session to an evaluation. 41 of the 49 students responded. I will not report these evaluations in great detail, since it is not clear how applicable they would be to other scenarios, institutional settings, or sets of student characteristics. But the responses were useful to me, and should at least be suggestive to others.

1. Getting into the role. 39 of the students reported that the first paper and meeting prepared them to "hold their own" in their role, and 38 felt

well prepared for the Task Force meeting. However, only 31 said they fully "got into" their role, and five of these questioned how well others did in that respect. Nevertheless, 27 felt they did "very well" or "well" in the task force, and 12 more felt they did "fairly well." Only two felt they did poorly.

2. Quality of the task force meeting. 25 students reported that the task force meeting went "very well" or "well," while 14 thought it went "fairly well." Two thought it was poor. In explaining their responses, the students clearly showed that they experienced different reactions to the conflict built into the situation. Some felt that meetings went well if good arguments broke out, while others would bemoan the lack of consensus in the same meeting.

3. The papers. The students reported spending an average of 9.5 hours on the first paper, with estimates varying from three to twenty. By contrast, they reported putting only 2.8 hours into the first revision (before the task force), and just over two hours on the third paper, which for some was simply an informal discussion of how the task force functioned. One must, of course, take student reports of their efforts with a grain of salt, but it at least seems clear that

most students took the assignment seriously. Asked to compare the value of these papers to "regular term papers or essays," 35 liked them better, and only one liked them less. The most common reasons for approval were the "realism" or "current affairs" aspect, and the link to participation and consequent feedback from both students and the instructor.

4. Overall worth. 34 students felt that both simulation meetings were valuable for learning, while 10 were positive about at least one of them, and only one felt that neither was valuable. Of the 40 who responded to a question on whether I should use the simulation exercise again, the students were unanimous that I should, and had surprisingly few suggestions for change. The most common of these was a request for greater guidance in the definition of each role.

In evaluating this or any other teaching innovation, one must acknowledge that some part of the outcome represents a "Hawthorne" effect, i.e. a consequence of novelty per se rather than of the content of a particular innovation. Since practically none of these students had been in a political simulation before, it is likely that this effect was fairly strong. But that mainly cautions against assuming

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Using the Web in Teaching the Presidency

www.americanpresidency.org

By John T. Woolley

How can the internet help in teaching the Presidency? Is it just another bit of flash or is it an opportunity to do something serious?

My answer to this, and not a terribly original one, I'll admit, is "it depends."

My saga begins with a query I posted in February 2000 on the PRG listserv asking members if they knew about "excellent presidency-related websites" and how they used them in their courses. Shortly thereafter, our intrepid editor, Thomas Langston, asked if I

would venture an essay on the topic.

The first thing you should know is that my query elicited *two* replies. I suppose that my request for "excellent" websites may have deterred scholars reluctant to toot their own horns. But still I expected to get more than *two*. I have concluded that, in fact, this pretty much reflects the current state of affairs. The internet is not very much integrated into instruction on the presidency.

One of the responses I did get, from Russell Renka, includes

the most astonishingly complete set of internet links on the presidency that I have encountered. (Renka's URL and the URL's for all sites mentioned in this essay are listed in a table below.) The second response, from Dana Ward, thoughtfully mentioned a set of very useful links. Both of these messages ultimately were forwarded to all PRG members.

My underlying interest has been in trying to figure out how I can use the internet to make my teaching better. Are there things I can do using in-

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Teaching the Presidency: Presidential Advising Simulation (cont'd)

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that if one simulation is good, ten will be better. For the limited purposes (and limited investment of my time) of this simulation, there is no question that it worked extremely well. Less formal evaluations from the "impeachment" version of the simulation were entirely consistent with the above.

Conclusion

Simulation is not a panacea, but it can be a good and interesting supplement to a course. In relatively large classes, in particular, it provides an unusual opportunity for sustained student participation. The exercise described here is only one of a variety of possible formats. Just as research on the presidency need not be thwarted by the "small N" problem, so also can classroom simulations benefit from a perspective on the institutions and processes of the White House and beyond.

Notes

¹ This is the central finding, for instance, of Virginia Gray and Charles Walcott, "Simulation, Learning, and Student Attitudes," *Teaching Political Science* 4 (1977), 295-306. This and other studies fail to demonstrate that simulation enhances learning, but it does not seem to detract from it, either.

Using the Web in Teaching the Presidency (cont'd)

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ternet resources that are better than traditional alternatives? Are there kinds of assignments we can pose for students with the internet that involve more interesting analytic challenges?

In the ensuing months, I have spent hours poking around the web looking at a number of instructional websites, looking at available general-purpose presidency sites, and trying to design my own web site.

In searching the web for material relevant to the presidency, one will find vastly different levels of sophistication in presentation and in content. In terms of presentation, the range is extraordinary. At the low end of the spectrum is the product you get when you use early version of Microsoft Word to save a document in html format. The result is ugly. As an example, I offer one of my early web sites which, for

all its defects, is not as bad as some you can find. At the high end are slick presentations using plugins like macromedia shockwave. Some of the best academic work I have encountered has been done by my anthropology colleagues here at UCSB.

In terms of content, the continuum runs from extremely basic and very specific course material (e.g., an online syllabus), to generic reference work, to data that has been organized and displayed

specifically for the purpose of course instruction and research. These are obviously fairly crude distinctions, but still useful. For example, a "reference" resource on the electoral college would let you know what the rules are and surely would include a table showing the distribution of electoral college votes by states. For instructional purposes, however, we want to know how the institution has worked over time to produce good or bad results. We might be particularly interested in visualizing electoral college results in relationship to popular vote results. As good as the NARA electoral college site (<http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/elctcoll/index.html#top>) is in technical terms and as a reference source, it is not a direct aid to instruction. The "electoral college calculator" site (<http://www.jump.net/%7Ejnhnx/ec/ec.html>), with which you may be familiar, allows users interactively to allocate states to candidates and total the electoral votes involved.

It is pretty simple to direct students to reference resources on the web. In fact you can be pretty confident that your students are actively using those resources to prepare papers for you. What is not so easy is to construct your own instructional web site.

1. "Good Looking" is not easy.

If it were easy to make a good-looking web site, then there would not be so many ugly ones around. It takes patience, technical know-how and a certain artistic flair. De-

sign tools like Dreamweaver and Adobe Photoshop can produce wonderful products in the hands of someone with enough skills and know how, but they are dauntingly complex for the beginner.

2. It requires ongoing attention--

It is a trivial but extremely crucial point: Web Links Die. When you find a web site that is a bit old, with many links in it, you will find links that don't work. The links take you to some other computer system that has been changed. One of my favorite "fun" sites for the Presidency is the "Nixon meets Elvis" collection at NARA. Shortly after creating the link on my "old" web site, NARA restructured their site and my link was useless. And, of course, when the course changes (which is to say, every time you teach it), the content and links of the web site have to change as well.

3. High end instructional applications require serious funding.

There are many ways we can exploit the web, but the most interesting applications are not simple and are not free. An example that I would like to have on my site, but have not been able to implement would be a "server side application" that accepts and aggregates data entered separately by students. Imagine a class assignment that involves each student collecting a few pieces of data (perhaps coding presidential speeches and associated media coverage). Students working on their own cannot

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Using the Web in Teaching the Presidency (cont'd)

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produce enough data for a really interesting analysis. However, if they can easily enter their separate bits of data online, your application can aggregate the data quickly for their analyses.

The table below lists some examples of presidency (except for the anthropology links) web sites at various levels of substantive and technical development. After briefly pointing out some of the special features of some of these sites, I will mention a few features of my own site--and some more ambitious goals.

The "reference" sites:

The reference sites can be very valuable in instruction and in research. These include sites like the Interlink Café's site, the Internet Public Library's POTUS site, and the PRESIDENT website. This group also includes president-specific sites such as the various presidential libraries. The more a course emphasizes a "president centered" approach, the more useful these sites will be. In almost every case I have encountered, if a "reference" site includes "original" content, the content tends to be president-specific. The links tend to be organized in terms of particular presidents. Renka's list is particularly valuable precisely because of the broad-ranging topical content that cuts analytically, rather than just president-by-president.

The "Instruction-Related" Sites.

The sites I have listed all enhance or extend our conventional instructional approaches in ways that exploit the advantages of the internet. All instructional sites include a syllabus and some kinds of additional valuable links. But these go beyond the basics in interesting and ambitious ways.

Sam Kernell's site, for example, includes a set of message boards so that class members can post comments or queries. I have encountered a few faculty using this kind of feature who have required students to post a certain number of comments. This is an obvious extension of the "class discussion" and as long as civility is demanded (and preventing anonymity probably helps), it accommodates students' varied schedules while including everyone who bothers to check in.

Calvin MacKenzie has posted copies of his class overheads for students to access at their leisure. Among these are original data displays and commentary. Feedback from my students shows that they particularly value the ability to retrieve this kind of information in exactly the form it was originally presented, particularly if the material is at all complex. Undoubtedly, some students use it as a crutch or feel they can ditch class knowing the material will be online. In my view, those costs are outweighed by the benefits of having the best information readily accessible to students.

Bryan Jones's course site is not much on bells and whistles, but Jones is trying to inte-

grate the web directly in his course assignments. For example, in a public opinion assignment, students are expected to retrieve data and do basic analyses using Excel. At another point he directs students to Poole and Rosenthal data (<http://vote-view.gsia.cmu.edu/>) and asks for analysis and interpretation. This, in my opinion, is the direction we need to be moving. We need to find ways to deliver "data" to students in ways that help them move beyond visualizing (or, in some cases, hearing) the presidency more realistically. We need to engage them directly in analyzing data. In this way, they don't just learn political science, they "do" it.

I have been fortunate to have among my students a talented web-designer, Gerhard Peters (check out <http://home.netpipeline.net/gldfinger/design/>). With Gerhard's assistance, we assembled the resources that you can browse through at www.americanpresidency.org. The basic principle is to emphasize change over time between and within presidencies. We're not satisfied with the project as it stands now, and plan many changes. However, already the features have proved to be useful or entertaining.

1. ALL the SOTUs and Inaugural Addresses and a search engine.

I don't think these are ALL available anywhere else. We have graphs of word counts that are worth studying. And, by the way, Woodrow Wilson

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Using the Web in Teaching the Presidency (cont'd)

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did break the tradition of transmitting the "Annual Message" in writing, but his reversal *was not* permanent. Our current search engine is very weak in terms of boolean searching, which is a real impediment to research. As near as I can tell, top end search engines are expensive.

2. Streaming video and audio

of many speeches.

Some of these are served in QuickTime format from a UCSB server. Most of them redirect you to resources in the outstanding collection at C-SPAN. The advantage of our layout is its simplicity and visual appeal. Pedagogically, if you are interested in Presidential rhetoric, and you have access to the net from your

classroom, this can be a very useful resource. It is quite wonderful to be able to play some of FDR's first inaugural address and then jump immediately to Carter's "malaise" speech. A defect: with streaming video, you cannot easily start and stop at particular points as you can with hands-on video.

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Presentation Quality

Nature of Content ↓	Low End	Moderately Slick	Very High End
Course Specific, usually with some links	Woolley's "old" Web Site http://www.sscf.ucsb.edu/depts/polsci/faculty/woolley/courses/157/	Richard Pious's course websites at Barnard College http://www.econ.barnard.columbia.edu/~polisci/courses/4321rp98.html	Nobody would waste time doing this.
Reference	Fujisan's Lists of American Presidents http://www.fujisan.demon.co.uk/USPresidents/preslist.htm Russell Renka's mind-boggling compilation of links: http://cstl-cla.semo.edu/renka/PresidencyLinks.htm	Interlink Café presidency Site: http://www.interlink-cafe.com/uspresidents/ Internet Public Library's POTUS: http://www.ipl.org/ref/POTUS/ The President Website http://www.ibiblio.org/lia/president/	Sites maintained by news organizations are often in this category, but not specific to the presidency. They change content very frequently: New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/pages/politics/ Washington Post: http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/
Instruction-Related	Byran Jones's Website http://depts.washington.edu/~thechief/	Sam Kernell's Course Web Site: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~skernell/Ps100a.htm Calvin MacKenzie's Web Site http://www.colby.edu/govt/gcm/gov211/index.html Russell Renka's Course Site: http://online.semo.edu/ui320/index.htm Woolley's Second Generation Site: http://www.americanpresidency.org	UCSB Anthropology Department Web The General Site: http://www.anth.ucsb.edu/ 3-D Fossil Images http://www.anth.ucsb.edu/projects/human/

Using the Web in Teaching the Presidency (cont'd)

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3. A "Data Archive" with Graphs.

A lot of standard data are online in tabular form and can also be displayed in a graph. The technology here is very rudimentary and the data are not always ideally organized--but making changes is not simple (or free!). With more advanced applications it should be possible for students to select variables to display simultaneously--either on the same chronological graph or in a bivariate scatter. A substantial minority of my students really are drawn to the data, and they very much want to be able to play around and test hypotheses.

4. Timeline.

We have created one of many possible timelines that would be useful or interesting to stu-

dents. Our timeline focuses on development in transportation and communications technology. We were surprised to find that students found the timeline much more valuable than the streaming audio and video.

Developing assignments that truly depend on or effectively exploit the web resources

ture. Needless to say, I would be very interested in any comments or suggestions you may have on this site. I am especially interested in learning about your experiences in developing instructional applications that take advantage of the web for delivery.

***Visit Woolley's Second
Generation Web Site:
www.americanpresidency.org***

turns out to be difficult. However, students seem to enjoy the use of web-based material and reported that they felt it made the course more interesting than other political science courses they had recently experienced.

With any luck, we will be able to maintain the site in the fu-

PRG Report

***Interested in contributing a piece for the
Spring 2001 PRG Report on TEACHING
THE PRESIDENCY?***

Please consult the editor!

langston@tulane.edu 504.862.8311

Hayes Wins:

A Revisionist Account of the Presidential Vote in 1876

by Ronald F. King

There is a common interpretation of the presidential election of 1876 which asserts that the wrong person was allowed to become president. Allegedly, "Rutherfraud" B. Hayes was given the electoral vote in the states that Samuel Tilden actually won. The conventional account goes on to assert that partly in exchange for seating Hayes, white rule was restored throughout the south. The white southern leadership may have been racist, it is allowed, but they deserved under democratic precepts to exercise local self-government within the Constitution. The data analyzed in this paper, consistent with the revisionist perspective on Reconstruction, challenge this conventional view. The right person was elected president and the wrong persons were conceded power in the south, at substantial cost to these states and to a major segment of their population for the next ninety years.

The common interpretation of the 1876 election has had remarkable endurance, even among those aware of the ideological biases of its initial proponents. One purpose of this paper is to help, then, dispel one of the abiding myths of American politics. The main contested states in 1876 -- Louisiana, South Carolina and Florida -- had black majorities, and the blacks who turned out on election day voted Republican in sufficient proportions to achieve a Republican victory had extraordinary intimidation and fraud not occurred. Yet there is

another, more positive purpose as well. Revisionist historians correctly assert that the Republican Party should have been declared the winner in 1876, blaming any outcome to the contrary upon the para-military campaign by whites in the south and a weakness of will from Washington. This assertion, however, has never been subjected to systematic testing. Thus I examine the racial pattern to the vote in the three main contested states and the variations within that pattern most likely caused by electoral irregularities. This study of the 1876 election shows the complexities inherent to the system of presidential selection through the Electoral College. Moreover, it reminds us as presidency scholars of the fertile fields for investigation at the intersection of social science and history.

BACKGROUND AND METHOD

After examining the available returns late on election night, diehards at the national Republican headquarters sent telegrams to party officials in the states still outstanding. "Hold your state sure for Hayes," one telegram urged, "he is elected. Hold your state." Another, issued the following morning, read, "Hayes is elected if we have carried South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana. Can you hold your State? Answer immediately" [Polakoff 1973, Woodward 1966]. Tilden definitely had carried sixteen states with 184 electoral votes. Hayes

had carried nineteen states with 165 electoral votes. With the votes of the three undecided southern states, Hayes would win by a single electoral vote. Republican-controlled Returning Boards in the three critical states had the obligation of compiling the votes, certifying the election, and announcing the winner. In all three, the Returning Boards nullified a number of votes actually cast, thereby insuring Republican victories. The board in Louisiana excluded approximately 12,000 votes in 22 parishes, more than 10,000 for Democratic electors. The board in South Carolina invalidated the entire return from Edgefield and Laurens counties. The board in Florida negated more than 1,800 votes. As a consequence, in all three states, opposing sets of electors cast ballots in early December 1876, each representing a different political party and claiming full legitimacy, with the presidency at stake.

To help resolve matters, Congress appointed a special Electoral Commission comprised of ten respected legislators, five from each party, and five Supreme Court justices. The Commission, by partisan division, chose not to investigate the "official" returns promulgated by the Republican-dominated state Returning Boards and therefore decided for Hayes. Further turmoil occurred in Congress, which had ultimate responsibility to accept

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President Rutherford B. Hayes (1877-1881)

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or reject the outcome. In a famous compromise, a sufficient number of Democrats agreed not to deadlock the process and, as part of the deal, Hayes made a public commitment to remove federal troops from the south. Without the possibility of military support, Republican claimants to state office conceded power to their Democratic rivals and the era of Reconstruction came to an end.

This study attempts what the Electoral Commission appointed by Congress refused to do, to go behind the electoral result in Louisiana, South Carolina and Florida to determine the real winner. The perspective adopted is that of an independent political consultant "hired" by the commission to identify the extent of electoral irregularity and to correct for it. The fundamental

problem is the estimation of candidate preferences by race. Partisan Republicans at the time claimed that blacks would not voluntarily vote Democratic. Partisan Democrats argued that black voters increasingly were disaffected from Republican state leaders believed to be corrupt and incompetent. Unfortunately, there are no survey data to permit aggregate findings from the sum of individual observations. In their absence, I rely upon "cross-level inference" based on parish/county returns.

The method is 1) to estimate the overall partisan division of

the vote by race within each state using ecological regression; 2) to identify implausible parish/county results by the identification of extreme outliers, assuming that extraordinary deviation from the normal vote pattern is an indication of probable intimidation or fraud; 3) to simulate a more plausible outcome to substitute for the published result in those counties identified as extreme outliers. [Regarding the application of ecological inference to Reconstruction elections, see Kousser 1973. Regarding the use of outliers as an indicator of probable fraud or intimidation in Reconstruction elections, see Powell 1989.] It should be noted that this method differs from that adopted by the state Returning Boards as it is based on statistical re-estimation of the vote in suspect areas rather than on outright rejection of ballots actually cast. This is a far more defensible method of adjustment, generating simulated outcomes that are plausible and precise. In this brief report, I focus entirely on the estimates for Louisiana. There is every reason to believe that those for South Carolina and Florida turn out similarly.

LOUISIANA ESTIMATES

There are three separate counts of the Louisiana electoral returns for 1876. The first is the list presented by the Democratic-Conservative party, affirmed under oath by a designated subcommittee instructed to witness the canvassing and compiling of votes. This list has the Democratic gubernatorial candidate winning by 8,000 votes and

the smallest margin of victory for a Democratic elector at 6,300 votes. The second is the list compiled by the Republican-appointed Board of Supervisors as presented to the Returning Board. This count shows a somewhat smaller margin yet still a decisive Democratic victory for governor and all presidential electors. Finally, there is the outcome officially promulgated by the Returning Board for the state. The Board made small adjustments in the count based upon legal technicalities and errors in compilation, and it rejected outright returns from 69 polling places. The result was a Republican victory for all statewide offices, by at least 3,400 votes [House Report 44-156; House Misc Doc 44-34 and 45-31; Senate Report 44-701; Louisiana Proceedings 1876].

The dependent variable in this study is the election count produced by the Democratic-Conservative forces. If the Republicans were correct regarding the presence of widespread intimidation and fraud by their opponents, sufficient to justify the actions of the Returning Board, it should appear visible relative to the count most favorable to Tilden. The estimations presented here are based on parish-level data. The one exception is Orleans Parish, which contained approximately one-quarter of Louisiana voters in the mid-1870s. Reliable vote data exist disaggregated by the 17 wards within Orleans, but only from the Board of Supervisors tabulation. The small distortion in candidate vote totals resulting from the combination of data

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sets is far outweighed by the gain from more precise statistical estimation. Thus the analysis is based on 73 separate observations ($n=73$): 56 parishes plus 17 wards for Orleans. The independent variable is the black proportion of 1876 registrants per parish. Overall, 55.5% of Louisiana registrants were black. This is virtually identical to the black share of eligible voters – males, 21 years or older – according to the 1875 state census. Ecological inference is then used to assess the percentage of black and of white registrants who voted for the various Louisiana electoral college candidates. It is hypothesized that there will be a distinct racial pattern to the vote by party, but that there will also be a small number of extreme outlier observations for which the pattern will differ systematically. Their existence will justify a division of the sample and the calculation of a counterfactual alternative, showing the probable outcome had the extreme outlier subset looked normal (i.e., had the suspected fraud and intimidation not occurred).

The ecological estimates for the full state sample contain significant results for all the main coefficients. About 21% of white registrants did not vote for presidential elector. Of those whites who did cast ballots, approximately all voted for Democrats. It appears that presidential elector non-voting among black registrants was slightly greater than among white registrants. Of those blacks who did cast ballots, approximately seven-eighths voted Republican. The partisan differentiation by race

is striking.

Outlier analysis is used to identify those parishes (and wards within Orleans) with implausible returns, as determined by their extreme variance from full sample patterns. There is no accepted convention for the identification of outliers. I have used both absolute and relative calculations. The former is based on the absolute difference between actual and fitted values. An extraordinary outlier is defined by a given candidate receiving a share of the vote varying from the expected by at least 1.5 standard deviations ($\pm 1.5Z$). The latter is based on the difference between actual and fitted values, divided by the fitted value. An extraordinary outlier is defined by a given candidate receiving half or half-more ($\pm 50\%$) than is statistically expected. Despite the different modes of calculation, the search consistently identified many of the same parishes. Yet, in the attempt to be comprehensive, I have selected fifteen parishes that are extraordinary for at least a few among one party's set of candidates by at least one mode of calculation. Of the fifteen, two are biased in a pro-Republican direction and thirteen are biased in a pro-Democratic direction.

Democratic expert witnesses have an objection. The analysis of outliers is based on vote registration in 1876, that was based to a great degree on the 1875 state census, that itself might have been inaccurate. Allegedly, the 1875 count was supervised by a Republican functionary named Jewett who

later served the party by gathering affidavits of Democratic abuses [Lonn 1967]. From a detailed examination of 1870, 1875, and 1880 census data by race, there are only two parishes that can be considered suspect, Nachitoches and Plaquemines. For these parishes, I applied the 1880 proportions by race to the total population recorded for 1875. The simulated census counts were then reduced for purposes of estimating registration, by 23.7% for whites and by 23.5% for blacks, which were the state averages in 1876. The consequence, therefore, is a census-based subset of outlier parishes ($n=2$), a vote-based subset of outlier parishes ($n=15$), and a basic subset of parishes ($n=56$) for which there is no evidence of extraordinary bias in the vote.

Statistically, there is very low probability that the outlier and non-outlier sets of parishes could simply be two samples randomly drawn from the same population. This justifies a division of the data. The non-outlier subset ($n=56$) again has significant coefficients for the key estimates. Among white registrants, more than 79% voted for Democratic electors and approximately none for Republican electors. The remainder were non-voters. The total outlier subset ($n=17$) showed roughly similar results for white registrants. This is not true for black registrants. On average, for the non-outlier subset, blacks voted 72% for Republican electors and only 5% for Democratic electors. On average, for the outlier

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subset, blacks voted 40% for Republican electors and 28% for Democratic electors. Black non-voting was also higher in the outlier subset. The differences imply a net Democratic advantage occurring in the suspect parishes identified by their outlier status. The question is whether it was large enough to change the electoral outcome.

Thus, in the third stage of the analysis, I applied the coefficients from the non-outlier subset to the racial distribution of registered voters for those parishes in the outlier subset. The findings are clear and consistent. The Democratic electors on average lose 4279 votes. The Republican electors on average gain 5772 votes. As a result, a 7800-vote Democratic majority becomes under counterfactual conditions a 2200-vote Republican majority. The vote outcome is reversed for all eight electoral seats contested. The net adjustment is small and in a pro-Democratic direction for the two census-outlier parishes. The net adjustment is large and in a pro-Republican direction for the 15 vote-outlier parishes. According to the uncorrected count of votes actually cast, Democratic electors won by an average of 52.5% to 47.5%. After the Returning Board finished negating votes, Republican electors had won by an average of 51.4% to 48.6%. According to the simulated count, Republican electors should have won by an average of 50.7% to 49.3%. The Returning Board was somewhat exaggerated in its degree of correction, but it got the winning side exactly right.

Some remarkable shifts appear when the data are viewed disaggregated by parish. In 14 of the 17 outlier parishes, Republican electors gain more by the simulation than Democratic electors. In 10 of these (Claiborne, East Feliciana, West Feliciana, Franklin, Jackson, Morehouse, Ouachita, Richland, Sabine, and Union), the average Republican increase is more than 15% of votes cast. The smallest pure Republican gain occurs in Vernon Parish, where 2 votes for the Republican electors grow to 50. In no parish is the Democratic increase under simulation as large as 15% of votes cast.

The 1876 Democratic presidential-electoral candidates in Louisiana appeared to triumph according to votes actually counted, exclusively because of the advantage garnered from the set of counties identified in this analysis as extraordinary outliers. The parishes with results by race that are generally consistent with the overall pattern show a moderate majority for the Republican electors. This majority is reduced only slightly by that part of the simulation that assumes the census-outlier subset should look more like the non-outlier subset. The finding, therefore, is that Democrats could assert victory only on the basis of unusual and implausible returns in a small number of parishes. The Republican presidential electors would have won had the election been more honest. The Electoral Commission authorized by Congress declined to look in detail at the Louisiana vote in 1876 and instead merely accepted the

state Returning Board's certification of the Republican electors pledged to Hayes. Had it decided to look in detail at the vote, as done in this study, its conclusion would have been the same.

CONCLUSION

The results reported here represent part of a much larger research project. No estimates are presented for South Carolina or Florida, nor for the other statewide contests in Louisiana. The focus has been on the direction and degree of estimated electoral irregularity, and thus it makes no attempt to explain where in the state it occurred and why these particular locations. It does not differentiate among various types of possible intimidation and fraud. The calculations were performed independent of any examination of the anecdotal record, of the charges and counter-charges elaborated before the congressional investigation teams that descended on the three critical southern states in the aftermath of the election. It would be helpful to explore these qualitative narratives, assessing the extent to which they accord with the quantitative estimates. No single research paper can ever be comprehensive. Nevertheless, I suspect that further research will sustain the general conclusion. The impression that Tilden won and that the South, with the end of Reconstruction, was restored to its legitimate white rulers is based on a mistaken interpretation of the electoral data.

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**Table 1 — Louisiana
Electoral Outcome — Actual and Simulated
Based on 1876 Registered Voters**

	Actual Non-Outl Parishes	Actual Vote-Outl Parishes	Simulated Vote-Outl Parishes	Actual Cen-Outl Parishes	Simulated Cen-Outl Parishes	Actual All Parishes	Simulated All Parishes
<u>Democratic Electors</u>							
McEnery	63,741	17,425	12,937	2,473	2,615	83,639	79,293
Wickliffe	63,875	17,466	12,968	2,473	2,620	83,814	79,463
St. Martin	63,787	17,472	12,956	2,300	2,615	83,559	79,356
Poche	63,616	17,530	12,918	2,300	2,605	83,446	79,139
DeBlanc	63,764	17,476	12,951	2,300	2,614	83,540	79,329
Seay	63,785	17,469	12,956	2,473	2,614	83,727	79,355
Cobb	63,671	17,467	12,922	2,300	2,614	83,438	79,205
Cross	63,738	17,474	12,950	2,300	2,612	83,512	79,300
<u>Republican Electors</u>							
Kellogg	68,058	5,250	10,696	3,853	3,475	77,161	82,229
Burch	68,062	5,234	10,699	3,853	3,482	77,149	82,243
Joseph	67,092	4,531	10,637	3,312	3,405	74,935	81,134
Sheldon	67,093	4,507	10,640	3,312	3,407	74,912	81,140
Marks	67,413	4,533	10,682	3,312	3,423	75,258	81,518
Levissee	67,090	4,535	10,638	3,846	3,405	75,471	81,133
Brewster	67,683	4,535	10,662	3,304	3,451	75,522	81,796
Joffrion	67,083	5,246	10,638	3,412	3,405	75,741	81,126

Comparison of Outcomes, Average Vote for Electors

	Democrats	Republicans	Total
Actual Votes Counted	83,584 (52.5%)	75,768 (47.5%)	159,352
Returning Board Result	70,494 (48.6%)	74,435 (51.4%)	144,929
Simulation Result	79,305 (49.3%)	81,540 (50.7%)	160,845

Politicians Don't Pander (cont'd)

IN THIS ESSAY WE PROVIDE A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF POLITICIANS DON'T PANDER: POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE LOSS OF DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 2000).

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 cians to public opinion have important effects on the mass media and the public itself.

The cases of Clinton's health care reform campaign and Newt Gingrich's first Congress as House Speaker lead to three observations of central importance to contemporary American politics that are echoed in the impeachment episode.

First, Republicans disregarded public opinion on impeachment, because their political goal

of attracting a majority of voters was offset by their policy goal of enacting legislation that they and their supporters favored. The ideological polarization of congressional Republicans and Democrats since the mid-1970s, the greater institutional independence of individual lawmakers, and other factors have raised the benefits of pursuing policy goals that they and their party's activists desire. Responding to public opinion at the expense of policy goals would have compromised their convictions and alienated ideologically extreme party activists and other supporters who volunteer and contribute money to their primary and general election campaigns. Only the heat of an imminent presidential election and the elevated attention that average voters devote

to it motivate politicians to respond to public opinion and absorb the costs of compromising their policy goals.

Second, politicians pursue a strategy of crafted talk to change public opinion in order to offset the potential political costs of not following the preferences of average voters. Politicians track public opinion not to make policy but rather to determine how to craft their public presentations and win public support for the policies they and their supporters favor. Politicians want the best of both worlds -- to enact their preferred policies and to be reelected.

While politicians devote their resources to changing public opinion

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Politicians Don't Pander (cont'd)

ion, their actual influence is a more complex story. Politicians themselves attempt to change public opinion not by directly persuading the public on the merits of their policy choices but by "priming" public opinion: they "stay on message" to highlight standards or considerations for the public to use in evaluating

policy proposals. Republicans, for example, emphasize "big government" to prompt the public to think about its uneasiness about government. Politicians' efforts to sway the public are most likely to influence the perceptions, understandings, and evaluations of specific policy proposals such as Republican proposals in 1995 to reduce Medicare spending to fund a tax cut. But even here, politicians' messages promoting their policy proposals often provoke new or competing messages from reporters and political opponents that complicate or stymie

their efforts to move public opinion. In addition, efforts to influence the public's evaluations of specific proposals is unlikely to affect people's values and fundamental preferences (such as those underlying support for Medicare, Social Security, and other well-established programs). We distinguish, then, between political leaders' attempts to alter the public's perceptions, evaluations, and

choices concerning very specific proposals (which are susceptible but not certain to change), and Americans' values and longterm preferences (which tend to be stable and particularly resistant to short-term manipulation).

Politicians respond to public opinion, then, but in two quite different ways. In one, politicians assemble information on public opinion to design government policy. This is usually equated with "pandering," and this is most evident during the relatively short period when presidential elections are imminent. The use of public opinion research here, however, raises a troubling question: why has the derogatory term, "pander," been pinned on politicians who respond to public opinion? The answer is revealing: the term "pandering" was deliberately deployed by politicians, pundits and other elites to belittle government responsiveness to public opinion and reflects a longstanding fear, uneasiness and hostility among elites toward popular influence over the affairs of government. It is surely odd in a democracy to consider responsiveness to public opinion as unrespectable. We challenge the stigmatizing use of the term "pandering" and promote the more positive connotation of political responsiveness.

Politicians respond to public opinion in a second manner -- they use research on public opinion to increase apparent support for their desired policies by pinpointing alluring words, symbols, and arguments. Public opinion research is used by politicians to manipulate public opinion -- to move the public to adopt opin-

ions that they would not have if they were aware of the best available information. Their objective is to simulate responsiveness -- their words and presentations are crafted to change public opinion and create the appearance of responsiveness as they pursue their desired policy goals. The motivation of elected officials is to lower the potential electoral costs of subordinating their political goals to their policy goals. Politicians use polls and focus groups not to move their positions closer to the public's but just the opposite -- to find the most effective means to move public opinion closer to their own desired policies.

Political consultants as diverse as Republican pollster Frank Luntz and Clinton pollster Dick Morris readily confess that legislators and the White House "don't use a poll to reshape a program, but to reshape your argumentation for the program so that the public supports it." Indeed, Republicans' dogged pursuit of impeachment was premised on the assumption that poll-honed presentations would ultimately win public support for their actions. We suggest that this kind of overconfidence in the power of crafted talk to move public opinion explains the political overreaching and failure that was vividly displayed by Clinton's health reform effort during the 1993-94 period and the Republicans' campaign for their objectives beginning with the "Contract with America" during 1995-96.

Specifically, White House memoranda, interviews, and other evidence suggest that the exten-

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sive public opinion research conducted by Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg for the Clinton Administration, in the case of health care reform, and by the Gingrich Republicans, in the case of the push for their agenda, was geared toward identifying the words, arguments, and symbols to change (and not follow) public opinion. Capturing consistent themes during major policy initiatives during the 1990s, Clinton aides explained that polls and focus groups were an aid to determining "how best to sell a health care reform plan that is constructed by the policy people" (Memo to First Lady from Boorstin and Dreyer [copies to McLarty, Rasco, and Magaziner], 1/25/93).

Our argument about crafted talk flips the widespread image of politicians as "pandering" to public opinion on its head. The influence of public opinion on policy decisions is declining. Instead, politicians' own policy goals are increasingly driving major policy decisions and public opinion research, which is used to identify the language, symbols, and arguments to "win" public support for their policy objectives. Responsiveness to public opinion and manipulation of public opinion are not mutually exclusive; politicians manipulate public opinion by tracking public thinking to select the actions and words that resonate with the public.

Third, politicians' muted responsiveness to public opinion and crafting of their words and actions has spillover effects on

the mass media and on public opinion itself. In contrast to others who emphasize the autonomy and power of the mass media, we argue that press coverage of national politics has been driven in critical ways by the polarization of politicians and their reliance on crafting their words and deeds. The press focuses on political conflict and strategy because these are visible and genuine features of contemporary American politics.

We find this impressively in a quantitative content analysis of the news media's coverage of health care issues from 1977 to 1994. The emphasis of the media's reporting on political conflict and the strategies of each side occurred when real conflict was actually occurring and increasing. Our content analysis reveals, further, that the media did not greatly distort President Clinton's public statements and efforts toward health care reform, but rather magnified the visible political conflict that it produced. This combination of politicians' staged displays and the media's scrutiny of the motives behind them have led to public distrust and fear of major government reform efforts.

We do not claim that polls, focus groups, and other indicators of public opinion play no direct and important role in the policy making process. Information about public opinion does play a role in the making of symbolic decisions (such as the location of presidential vacations), minor policy decisions (Clinton's proposal before the 1996 election

for school uniforms), and some important policy decisions (e.g. raising the minimum wage in the summer of 1996). Our main point is that the influence of public opinion on government policy is less than it has been in the past and certainly less than commonly assumed by political pundits and some scholars. In addition, public opinion research in American politics does play a critical role in how politicians and other elites craft their actions and statements to elicit public support. Finally, politicians are not shy about brandishing polls that support their positions in order to justify and promote further their position.

Conclusion

Our research and analysis is motivated by the central promise of representative democracy -- popular sovereignty and the notion of government responsiveness in which the public's policy preferences point government officials in specific directions. The promise of popular control has inspired a long and, at times, violent struggle for the right to vote by all Americans, the full and equal right to freedom of speech and assembly, and other essential rights.

We revisit the fundamental

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How Do Bush and Gore Stack Up Against Their Predecessors?

by Fred I. Greenstein

By the time the public had rendered its verdict on George W. Bush and Al Gore the personal qualities of the two men had come into sharp focus. But one thing that was missing from public debate was a clear conception of what qualities serve well and poorly in the Oval Office. Such a conception can help voters de-

cide, and scholars analyze. If one thinks only of the most recent two-term presidents, the complexity of presidential performance becomes strikingly evident. Ronald Reagan, who was not famous for his intellectual preoccupations, was centrally responsible for a major redirection the nation's domestic priorities and the termination of the extended, potentially lethal nu-

clear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Rhodes Scholar Bill Clinton, by contrast, has been a conspicuous presidential underachiever.

There can be no definitive job specification for the presidency, but much can be learned by examining the eleven White House occupants over the two-thirds of a century since the powers and re-

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premise of representative democracy (popular sovereignty and government responsiveness) and ask: does the American government respond to the broad public or to the interests and values of narrowly constituted groups committed to advancing their private policy agendas? On one side lies democratic accountability; on the other a closed and insular government that is ill-suited to address the wishes or wants of most citizens. When politicians persistently disregard the public's policy preferences, popular sovereignty and representative democracy are threatened.

Our analysis should not be confused, however, with naive populism. We recognize that the sheer complexity and scope of government decisions require elite initiative, at times without public guidance. And, on occasion, elites may need to defy ill-informed and unreasoned public opinion in defense of larger considerations and, instead, rely

upon the public's post-hoc evaluations of their actions and their arguments justifying their actions. Franklin Roosevelt's arming of merchant marines prior to U.S. entry into the Second World War and Richard Nixon's opening to China represent such cases.

What we see today in contemporary American politics, however, far exceeds responsible trusteeship in a representative democracy. What concerns us are indications of declining responsiveness to public opinion and the growing list of policies on which politicians of both major political parties ignore public opinion and supply no explicit justification for it. The practice of American government is drifting from the norms of democratic responsiveness.

We suggest that the decline in responsiveness and the rise of opinion manipulation and fierce partisan conflict have reduced the effectiveness of the governing process and the public's confidence in it.

Rather than accepting the false choice between responsiveness and independent leadership, we propose that each has an important place in a process in which politicians generally respond to strong, sustained public preferences. We think that changes are needed to raise the costs of discounting public opinion and making sustained responsiveness more politically attractive.

How Do Bush and Gore Stack Up Against Their Predecessors?

sponsibilities of the chief executive underwent a quantum leap under Franklin D. Roosevelt. In *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton* (The Free Press, May, 2000), I point to six broad qualities that provide useful benchmarks for assessing presidents and aspirants to the presidency.

1. Ability as a public Communicator

For a role that places a huge premium on public teaching and preaching, the modern presidency has been surprisingly lacking in talented public communicators. Few of the occupants of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue from FDR to Bill Clinton have addressed the public with a high level of professionalism. The great exceptions were FDR, Kennedy, and Reagan. (As in much else, Clinton's performance is uneven, alternating between rhetorical home runs and verbal excess).

2. Organizational capacity

The modern president with the greatest organizational sophistication was the architect of the D-Day invasion and the Allied campaign in Europe -- Dwight D. Eisenhower. "I know of only one way in which you can be sure you have done your best to make a wise decision," Ike once remarked: "That is to get all of the [responsible policymakers] with their different viewpoints in front of you, and listen to them debate. I do not believe in bringing them in one at a time, and therefore being more impressed by the most recent one you hear than the earlier ones. You must get courageous men of strong views, and let them debate with each other."

3. Political Skill

If there ever were reason to doubt that presidents need to be skilled political operators, it was eliminated by Jimmy Carter. The man from Plains displayed great adroitness in catapulting himself to the White House and brokering a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt at Camp David in 1978, but in most other respects Carter's presidency provides a catalogue of avoidable errors, the bulk of which involved failing to build productive relationships with key figures in Washington and abroad. The consequences for Carter's policy aims were predictably negative.

Lyndon Johnson, at the opposite pole, was one of the most gifted practitioners of the art of the possible in American political history. Within hours after Kennedy's assassination, LBJ had begun to muster support for major domestic policy departures. He exhibited will and skill, cultivating his political reputation by keeping Congress in session until Christmas 1963 in order to prevail in one of his administration's first legislative contests. His actions won him strong public support, making it apparent to his opposite numbers on Capitol Hill that it would be politically costly to ignore his policy proposals. Yet Johnson's political virtuosity did not prevent him from expanding the military involvement in Southeast Asia that was to doom his presidency and damage the body politic in ways that continue to the present. This brings us to the matter of harnessing political skill and vision to an identifiable sense of direction and realistic policy goals.

4. Policy vision

Three of the eleven post-Herbert Hoover presidents stand out for clarity and explicitness of their policies: Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan. Presidents with consistent and clear policy vision serve as anchors for the rest of the political community, setting the terms of political debate. In his lack of "the vision thing" George Bush fell in a class of presidential pragmatists that includes the great bulk of the modern chief executives. The costs of substance-free leadership include drift, programs that cancel one another out, and self-destructing policies.

5. Cognitive qualities

Jimmy Carter evinced an engineer's proclivity to reduce issues to their component parts, a style served him well in the 1978 Camp David negotiations but failed to provide his administration with an overall sense of direction. Carter's impulse to "morselize" issues contrasts with the strategic intelligence of a chief executive who will never grace Mount Rushmore -- Richard Nixon. Two years before entering the White House, Nixon laid down the goals of moving the United States beyond its military involvement in Southeast Asia, establishing a balance of power with the Soviet Union, and an accommodation with China. By the final year of his first term, Nixon had accomplished these purposes, but he also had authorized a program of

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How Do Bush and Gore Stack Up Against Their Predecessors?

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political espionage and dirty tricks directed at his perceived enemies, as well as the installation of the voice-activated tapes that were to be his undoing.

6. Emotional intelligence

This now popular notion proves a useful way to refer to a president's capacity to manage his (and someday her) emotions constructively, rather than allowing them to undermine his job performance. The leadership of four of the presidents since FDR was marred by their emotional obtuseness. The volcano-tempered Lyndon Johnson was subject to mood swings of clinical proportions, and his domineering personality was a barrier to open debate in his administration's councils. Richard Nixon's emotionally driven excesses destroyed his presidency. Jimmy Carter's rigidities impeded his White House performance. Bill Clinton's lack of self-discipline led him into a sexual relationship that was bound to become public and that led not only to his impeachment, but also to the paralysis of national policy making in 1998 and a diminution of the zone of privacy that has traditionally surrounded the president.

How does the new president stack up in comparison with their modern predecessors? How do this year's victor and the also ran compare with their modern predecessors?


Fortunately for the nation, neither is marked by the florid emotional extremes of a John-

son or Nixon. It seems likely that both would be responsible custodians of the nuclear football. They have had nearly antithetical life trajectories. Gore was the dutiful son of a politically prominent father, even enlisting in the army during a war he opposed in order not to damage his father politically. Bush was the rebellious son of another politically prominent father, who drifted from job to job during what he refers to as his "nomadic" years and abused alcohol until early middle age.

The present-day Al Gore has often seemed excessively eager to comply with the demands of his political environment, but has revealed a capacity for boldness in his choice of Joseph Lieberman as a running mate. There are possible warning signals in Gore's tendency to keep his own counsel, a propensity that can lead to inadequately considered actions. The George W. Bush of today has acquired impressive self-discipline. Rather than being a solitary decision maker, Bush takes advice readily and is an impressive team builder.

In the other realms noted above the two men have counterbalancing strengths and weaknesses. Gore far exceeds Bush in his willingness to use his mind and openness to the play of ideas. When it comes to the bully pulpit, neither is in the sphere of such presidential great communicators as Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan. In the organizational realm, Bush has the advantage of having been a big state governor. Gore's strength in the Senate was more in enunciated issues than building policy making coalitions, whereas Bush has been a coalition-builder par excellence in Texas, working readily and effectively across party lines. When it comes to what the senior George Bush referred to dismissively as "the vision thing," Gore far exceeds Bush in the number and depth of his policy commitments. Bush has been adept at drawing on his advisors to establish and advance a policy agenda, but presidential advisors are sometimes sharply divided so

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Joseph Campbell and the Heroic Construction of the Presidency (cont'd)

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ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder": something uncommon has been bestowed upon our hero that has taken him out of the realm of his previous routine existence. In traditional mythologies, this may be the chance to discover new lands, new people, and new tools; in the context of the presidential hero, it is the victorious election which then takes the prospective hero to the "new land" of Washington and its governmental institutions and their traditions, not to mention the encounters with "tribes" of bureaucrats, lobbyists and "power brokers." "Inside the Beltway" is its own country, where "how will it play in Peoria?" is a relevant question signifying the distance between the capital and everyday life for most Americans.

But is it "a region of supernatural wonder"? This is clearly a more difficult case to make; Washington is hardly Middle

Earth or Outer Space. Alternatively, one could argue that virtually any new culture to which one is introduced has an air of wonder about it; the differences between the routine and the new, and the excitement (and fear) that novelty can generate certainly help to define the experience of wonder. For purposes of this analysis, we must use the concept of "supernatural wonder" in this looser construction – as a point of consideration that helps to illuminate the challenges that attend one's introduction into a new environment. For newly elected presidents, that new and wondrous environment is Washington in general, and specifically, the institution to which they have been elected.

"Fabulous forces are there encountered." In the world of traditional mythologies, the hero does battle with dragons, disease, severe weather, gods and demons, and/or otherwise unidentifiable creatures that exist only in the new land.

How can this translate to the presidential hero, who lives in a world of limousines, air conditioning, private elevators and State Dinners? The forces that elected officials must contend with do have their own "fabulous" quality, though -- particularly when considered from the perspective of the everyday lives of most Americans: the media scrutiny (and its attendant lack of privacy), the overwhelming workload and seemingly endless workdays, the complexity of the problems that must be faced, the control over weapons of mass destruction. An elected official who wishes to become a hero must face these "fabulous forces" head on – and succeed in somehow "conquering" them.

"A decisive victory is won."
Traditional mythology de-
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How Do Bush and Gore Stack Up Against Their Predecessors? (cont'd)

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it is important that their boss be more than an empty suit.

As the campaign intensified, analysts were ready for lurking character flaws to come to the fore. In one famous instance, the 1962 California gubernatorial campaign elicited Richard Nixon's diatribe against the press for giving him "the shaft" and his premature decla-

ration that he had just held his last press conference. No such drama influenced the decision of this electorate.

These remarks, which come to you just as the election news is in, were written by Professor Greenstein as the campaign was coming to an end. Greenstein is the author, most recently, of *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton* (The Free Press, 2000).

Joseph Campbell and the Heroic Construction of the Presidency (cont'd)

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mands that the dragon be slayed, the plague be lifted, the locusts be vanquished. Contemporary accounts require the vaccine that will cure the epidemic be discovered, the war be won, or that the "aliens" be defeated. The hero is the victor: he has worked hard, become heated (both physically and emotionally) when necessary, and seen his quest through to its righteous conclusion.

Of course, the presidential hero must also be able to claim victory: shepherding the passage of legislation that will save lives, dealing with national emergencies, prevailing over enemies both foreign (Hussein, Milosevic, Bin Laden etc.) and domestic (Perot, Gingrich, "Big Tobacco," etc.). This is often a victory over the will of opponents, generally claimed through persuasion at home, but often enough through physical means abroad. In either case, it is still

understood as the attainment of a specific goal: "The leader does not just vaguely affect others. He or she takes others toward the object of their joint quest" (Wills 1994, 19). Even in the guise of President, the "hot" hero must overcome adversity to emerge triumphant. "The hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man." Society benefits from the presence of this man. It recognizes what the hero is able to provide: peace,

prosperity, land, the chance to start a new life. This construction of heroism does not result in a "lonely" hero, for the transformed man is the transcendent man, resurrected and beloved: "The hero has died as a modern man; but as eternal man – perfected, unspecific, universal man – he has been reborn" (Campbell 1949, 21). His ability to claim (implicitly) universality allows him to aid his community, to help those around him move toward their own transcendence.

Mythic Political Institutions

When you initiate someone into a role in government ... the person must know that he's not acting as himself. He's acting as a functionary. When the judge walks into the courtroom people stand. Not because it's the guy, but because he represents a function. One is not standing out of respect to him; we're standing out of respect to his role. To act as though and live as though your role is what is significant about you in a social way is what a mythologically grounded life will enable you to do. (Campbell in Cousineau 1990, 202)

On its most superficial level, the creation of the hero would seem to be about breaking down institutional boundaries. As Max Weber pointed out in his discussion of the functioning of that inherently heroic trait, charisma: "charisma knows no formal and regulated appointment or dismissal, no career, advancement or salary, no supervisory or appeals body, no local or purely technical jurisdiction, and no permanent institutions in the manner of bureaucratic agencies..."

(Weber [1978], 1112). But, as Weber later went on to argue, this approach is too simple: of course charisma (and those who possess it) must exist within the boundaries of organizations. Indeed, political institutions may provide many incentives for the individuals that act within their boundaries to believe that the roles that they are playing are socially significant. Institutions may seek to create charismatic actors, even heroes.

This is no easy task; there is an inherent tension between institutional functioning and the mythic journey. The confines of daily political life do not welcome "supernatural wonder," "fabulous forces," or even periods of introversion. To the contrary, the functioning of bureaucratic institutions requires regularity, compromise, and the willingness to work with others. The great leaps that heroism requires are not easily accommodated by organizations that employ a substantial number of people, and whose task is to serve a nation's citizenry.

Yet, as Campbell judiciously points out, mythology -- or at least, the narrative of heroism -- does surround political institutions. It is understood as appropriate to stand when a judge enters the courtroom, and to address elected officials as "The Honorable" in one's correspondence. A show of respect for the journey that brought one to the institution is understood as appropriate, and effectively delineates between those that have undertaken the journey into public service, and those that rely on their wisdom. Similarly, there are also narratives within institutions that

(Continued on page 33)

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Joseph Campbell and the Heroic Construction of the Presidency (cont'd)

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shape behavior and approaches to service. These mythologies facilitate what Max Weber called the charisma of office, "the belief in the specific state of grace of a social institution" (Weber [1978], 1140). The shared belief in what constitutes this "state of grace" determines the nature of the mythology that adheres to the institution: the possible course of the heroic journey, the opportunities and limitations that define the challenges that allow one to become a hero within the context of public life.

The Presidency and the Challenges of "Hot" Heroism

Though the intent of the men who framed the Constitution was to avoid the development of another king, their decision to construct a branch of government embodied by a single individual allowed for the development of an office of heroic stature, even though that office is constrained by legalistic checks and balances. In fact the office was created specifically because the framers perceived that heroic actions such as defending the nation in case of attack or restraining a tyrannical legislature would be necessary from time to time in the nascent American Republic (McDonald 1994, Mansfield, 1989). So the late twentieth century Presidency, with its legacy of chopped down cherry trees, assassinations, and the buck stopping here, finds itself in an interesting position: seemingly a venue in which the archetypal hero can be constructed, though he remains a hero constrained by formal processes and other institutions. The myth of the "hot" hero does indeed find room to express itself here, though, as both Presidents and citizens recognize the office of the Presidency remains the primary vessel of archetypal

heroism in U.S. public life.

The importance of (at least) the impression of heroism in structuring the U.S. Presidency should not be underestimated. Military service – an obvious contemporary criterion for heroism – has been virtually a prerequisite to holding the office for most of the modern era. Similarly, the public is not uncomfortable with the President making what could best be understood as heroic statements, each representing various phases of the archetypal journey. "We have nothing to fear but fear itself;" "The buck stops here;" "Ask not what your country can do for you, ...;" and the description of the Soviet Union as "the Evil Empire." Such statements from individuals holding other public offices would likely be ignored; any attention they did receive would probably be derisory. As a heroic institution, the presidency accommodates (and may require) clear demonstrations of both physical and verbal courage that would be seen as little more than eccentric in other contexts.

Indeed, the U.S. presidency represents the fruition of what Weber called "the routinization of charisma" (Weber [1978], 1139). As if anticipating the development of contemporary focus groups and public opinion studies, Weber goes on to argue that "charismatic education" is possible; in effect, that heroes can be created if there is an office that requires at least the patina of heroism: "the real purpose of charismatic education is regeneration, hence the development of the charis-

matic quality, and the testing, confirmation and selection of the qualified person" (Weber [1978], 1143).³ It may be possible to educate the individual to heroism; it may be necessary simultaneously to educate the citizenry in such a way that it perceives particular individuals (particularly those who may occupy certain offices) as heroic. Indeed one can argue that the role of the presidency in contemporary American politics is specifically to provide injections of charismatic leadership to shake the remainder of the political system out of gridlock, bureaucracy, and stasis. Clinton Rossiter's "rampaging lion" is expected to be the recurrent dynamic element in the political system, necessary to guarantee the system's rejuvenation and survival though adaptation to changing circumstances (Rossiter 1956).

Studies of symbolism in presidential discourse and action highlight the importance of drawing on the characteristics of archetypal heroism if the President is to be successful in occupying his office. Consistently ranked among the most accomplished (and popular) presidents in American history, Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency demonstrated many of the characteristics of the "hot" hero's archetypal journey: the move away from everyday experiences (in the guise of both recovery from the Depression and the beginning of U.S. involvement in the Second World War); the decisive challenge (the attack on Pearl Harbor); the journey to a strange and exotic land

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Joseph Campbell and the Heroic Construction of the Presidency (cont'd)

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(his decision to engage in war in the South Pacific); the decisive victory; the ability to bestow boons on others (greater prosperity at home, the Marshall Plan in Europe). Richard Neustadt's description of Franklin D. Roosevelt defines the ideal of the president as archetypal hero:

No president has had a sharper sense of personal power, a sense of what it is and where it comes from; none has had more hunger for it, few have had more use for it, and only one or two could match his faith in his own competence to use it. Perception and desire and self-confidence, combined, produced their own reward. No modern President has been more nearly the master in the White House. (Neustadt 1980, 118-119).

When circumstance demands and individual abilities allow, the institution of the presidency thus accommodates the heat of the archetypal hero. Indeed, one might even wish to argue that given the demands of the media age, the characteristics of heroism are not only accommodated, but expected.

Conclusion

The framework of mythology is frequently alluded to in studies of the presidency but rarely examined in any depth. In our ongoing research we intend to pursue the avenues of academic study opened up in this article. By doing so we hope to use Campbell's concept of the hero and Weber's concept of the "charismatic leader" to help explain the complex relationship between

President, public and other elements of the political system, and also to enhance our understanding of why some presidents succeed or fail politically. It might be thought that in an apparently "unheroic" age the conception of the president as hero is either irrelevant or, at best, somewhat overblown (Langston, 1995). We contend, however, that the mythological hero is inherent to any human society, and it is merely the object of his heroism that changes with social and historical circumstance.

Notes

This article stems from a more extensive study of the application of Campbell's framework to contemporary American national political institutions. In the larger project we divide the characteristics of the archetypal hero to discuss what we term "hot" heroism (the typical construction of the heroism of grand gestures) and "cool" heroism, the heroism of composure under pressure, a concept that we argue may be helpfully applied to the legislative branch today, particularly the US Senate.

It is interesting to note that Weber goes on to delineate the elements of charismatic education, which bear a striking resemblance to the journey taken by the hero in Campbell's discussion of monomyth. This highlights the importance of the mythic journey to "heroism" if one is to be perceived as suitable for certain positions. See Weber [1978], 1143.

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BOOK SCAN — Books on the Presidency

by Meena Bose

The following list was compiled through a search of <http://www.amazon.com> for books on the American presidency published in 2000. Due to space constraints, the list focuses on books that may be useful for research and/or teaching. Whenever possible, entries include page count, price, and ISBN number.

Baumgartner, Jody C. *Modern Presidential Electioneering: An Organizational and Comparative Approach*. Praeger. 248 pp. \$65 cloth, ISBN 0275967603.

Bennett, G.H., and Harry Bennett. *The American Presidency 1945-2000*. Sutton Publishing. 256 pp. \$27.95 cloth, ISBN 075092277X.

Brands, H.W., ed. *The Use of Force After the Cold War*. Texas A&M University Press. 352 pp. \$44.95 cloth, ISBN 0890969280.

Brinkley, Alan, and Davis Dyer, eds. *The Reader's Companion to the American Presidency*. Houghton Mifflin. 566 pp. \$40 cloth, ISBN 0395788897.

Burke, John P. *Presidential Transitions: From Politics to Practice*. Lynne Rienner. \$65 cloth, ISBN 1555879160.

Burke, John P. *The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House From FDR to Clinton*. 2d ed. 296 pp. \$16.95 paper, ISBN 0801865018.

Califano, Joseph A., Jr. *The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years*. Reprint ed. Texas A&M University Press. 416 pp. \$17.95 paper, ISBN 0890969604.

Campbell, James E. *The American Campaign: U.S. Presidential Campaigns and the National Vote*. Texas A&M University Press. 320 pp. \$34.95 cloth, ISBN 0890969396. \$18.95 paper, ISBN 089096940X.

Canfield, Roger, and Richard A. Delgaudio. *China Doll: Clinton, Gore, and the Selling of the U.S. Presidency*. U.S. Intelligence Council. 128 pp. \$4.95 paper, ISBN 0970205309.

Chase, Philander D., Jack D.

Warren, and Mark A. Mastromarino, eds. *The Papers of George Washington: September 1791-February 1792*. Vol. 9. University Press of Virginia. 672 pp. \$62.50 cloth, ISBN 0813919223.

Clift, Eleanor, and Tom Brazaitis. *Madam President: Shattering the Last Glass Ceiling*. Scribner. 352 pp. \$26 cloth, ISBN 0684856190.

Cook, Rhodes. *United States Presidential Primary Elections 1968-1996: A Handbook of Election Statistics*. Congressional Quarterly Books. 1000 pp. \$271 cloth, ISBN 1568024517.

Cornog, Evan, and Richard Whelan. *Hats in the Ring: An Illustrated History of American Presidential Campaigns*. Random House. 336 pp. \$39.95 cloth, ISBN 0679457305.

Crew, Spencer R., Lonnie G. Bunch, and Mark G. Hirsch, eds. *The American Presidency: A Glorious Burden*. Smithsonian Institution Press. 208 pp. \$50 cloth, ISBN 1560989920. \$24.95 paper, ISBN 1560988355.

Cupitt, Richard T. *Reluctant Champions: U.S. Presidential Policy and Strategic Export Controls: Truman, Eisenhower, Bush, and Clinton*. Routledge. 304 pp. \$80 cloth, ISBN 0415924391. \$25.99 paper, ISBN 0415924405.

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*Book Scan (cont'd)**(Continued from page 35)*

Curtis, Richard. *Hubris and the Presidency: The Abuse of Power By Johnson and Nixon*. Rutledge Books. 760 pp. \$25.95 paper, ISBN 1582440867.

Davis, James W., and Robert E. DiClerico. *Choosing Our Choices: Debating the Presidential Nominating Process*. Rowman & Littlefield. 208 pp. \$55 cloth, ISBN 084769447X. \$15.95 paper, ISBN 0857694488.

Daynes, Byron W., and Glen Sussman. *The American Presidency and the Social Agenda*. Prentice Hall. 256 pp. Paper, ISBN 0130826324.

Divine, Robert A. *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*. Texas A&M University Press. 128 pp. \$29.95 cloth, ISBN 0890969531. \$14.95 paper, ISBN 1585441058.

Felzenberg, Alvin S., ed. *The Keys to a Successful Presidency*. Heritage Foundation. 168 pp. \$12.95 paper, ISBN 0891950931.

Ferrell, Robert H. *Choosing Truman: The Democratic Convention of 1944*. Reprint ed. University of Missouri Press. 160 pp. \$14.95 paper, ISBN 0826213081.

Fisher, Louis. *Congressional Abdication on War and Spending*. Texas A&M University Press. 240 pp. \$34.95 cloth, ISBN 0890969507. \$17.95 paper, ISBN 0890969515.

Gardner, Lloyd C., and Ted Gittinger, eds. *International Perspectives on Vietnam*. 304 pp. Texas A&M University Press. \$39.95 cloth, ISBN 0890968985.

Genovese, Michael A. *The Power of the American Presidency, 1789-2000*. Oxford University Press. 240 pp. \$49.95 cloth, ISBN 0195125444. \$19.95 paper, ISBN 0195125452.

Gilbert, Robert E., ed. *Managing Crisis: Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment*. Fordham University Press. 388 pp. \$19.95 paper, ISBN 0823220877.

Greene, John Robert. *The Presidency of George Bush*. University Press of Kansas. 248 pp. \$35 cloth, ISBN 0700609938.

Greenstein, Fred I. *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style From FDR to Clinton*. Free Press. 256 pp. \$25 cloth, ISBN 0684827336.

Henderson, Phillip G., ed. *The Presidency Then and Now*. Rowman & Littlefield. 352 pp. \$70 cloth, ISBN 084769738X. \$24.95 paper, ISBN 0847697398.

Herken, Gregg. *Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI*. Rev. ed. Stanford University Press. 384 pp. \$55 cloth, ISBN 0804739668. \$22.95 paper, ISBN 0804737703.

Jackson, John S., and William J. Crotty. *The Politics of Presidential Selection*. 2d ed. Longman Publishing Group. 256 pp. \$31 paper, ISBN 0321081099.

Jones, Charles O. *Separate But Equal Branches: Congress and the Presidency*. 2d ed. Chatham House. 276 pp. \$22.95 paper, ISBN 1889119156.

Karabell, Zachary. *The Last Campaign: How Harry Truman Won the 1948 Election*. Knopf. 320 pp. \$27.50 cloth, 0375400869.

Kendall, Kathleen E. *Communication in the Presidential Primaries: Candidates and the Media, 1912-2000*. Praeger. 272 pp. \$69.50 cloth, ISBN 0275940705. \$24.95 paper, ISBN 0275968979.

Kenney, Charles. *John F. Kennedy: The Presidential Portfolio: History As Told Through the John F. Kennedy Library and Museum*. Public Affairs. 256 pp. \$35 cloth, ISBN 1891620363.

Kincade, Vance R., Jr. *Heirs Apparent: Solving the Vice Presidential Dilemma*. Greenwood Publishing Group. 176 pp. \$55 cloth, ISBN 0275968669.

Koplinski, Brad. *Hats In the Ring: Conversations With Presidential Candidates*. Presidential Publishing. 672 pp. \$19.95 paper, ISBN 0967870232.

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*Book Scan (cont'd)**(Continued from page 36)*

Lamb, Brian, and C-SPAN Staff. *Who's Buried In Grant's Tomb? A Tour of Presidential Gravesites*. Johns Hopkins University Press. 305 pp. \$24.95 cloth, ISBN 1881846083. \$14.95 paper, ISBN 1881846075.

Lammers, William W., and Michael A. Genovese. *The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership Styles, FDR to Clinton*. Congressional Quarterly Books. 330 pp. \$47.25 cloth, ISBN 1568021259. \$34.25 paper, ISBN 1568021240.

Landy, Marc, and Sidney M. Milkis. *Presidential Greatness*. University Press of Kansas. 288 pp. \$34.95 cloth, ISBN 0700610057.

Lichtman, Allan J. *Prejudice and the Old Politics: The Presidential Election of 1928*. Lexington Books. 400 pp. \$26.95 paper, ISBN 0739101269.

McCarthy, Eugene J. *1968: War & Democracy*. Lone Oak Press. 246 pp. \$24.95 paper, ISBN 1883477379.

McJimsey, George. *The Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt*. University Press of Kansas. 355 pp. \$34.95 cloth, ISBN 070061012X.

McWilliams, Wilson Carey. *Beyond the Politics of Disappointment? American Elections, 1980-1998*. 2d ed. Seven Bridges Press. 184 pp. \$24.95 paper, ISBN 1889119180.

Medhurst, Martin J., and H.W. Brands, eds. *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*. Texas A&M University Press. 304 pp. \$39.95 cloth, ISBN 0890969434.

Morman, Robert R. *Clinton's 1996 Presidential Re-Election: Dissection and Disaffection*. 1stBooks Library. 447 pp. \$24.91 paper, ISBN 1585003441.

Morton, Rebecca B., and Kenneth C. Williams. *Learning By Voting: Sequential Choices in Presidential Primaries and Other Elections*. University of Michigan Press. 180 pp. \$44.50 cloth, ISBN 0472111299.

Nelson, Michael, ed. *The Presidency and the Political System*. Congressional Quarterly Books. 6th ed. \$54.25 cloth, ISBN 1568024975. \$42.50 paper, ISBN 1568024967.

O'Rourke, William. *Campaign America '96: The View From the Couch*. 2d ed. University of Notre Dame Press. 528 pp. \$20 paper, ISBN 0268022518.

Pickett, William B. *Eisenhower Decides to Run: Presidential Politics and Cold War Strategy*. Ivan R. Dee. 288 pp. \$27.50 cloth, ISBN 1566633257.

Plissner, Martin. *The Control Room: How Television Calls the Shots in Presidential Elections*. Reprint ed. Touchstone Books. 256 pp. \$13 paper, ISBN 0684867729.

Polsby, Nelson W., and Aaron Wildavsky. *Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics*. 10th ed. Seven Bridges Press. 416 pp. \$24.95 paper, ISBN 1889119261.

Ponder, Daniel E. *Good Advice: Information and Policy Making in the White House*. Texas A&M University Press. 288 pp. \$39.95 cloth, ISBN 0890969132.

Ponder, Stephen. *Managing the Press: Origins of the Media Presidency, 1897-1933*. Reprint ed. Palgrave. \$18.95 paper, ISBN 0312235070.

Riccards, Michael P. *The Presidency and the Middle Kingdom: China, the United States, and Executive Leadership*. Lexington Books. 256 pp. \$60 cloth, ISBN 0739101293.

Rozell, Mark J., William D. Pederson, and Frank J. Williams, eds. *George Washington and the Origins of the American Presidency*. Praeger. 232 pp. \$65 cloth, ISBN 0275968677.

Schier, Steven E., ed. *The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton's Legacy in U.S. Politics*. University of Pittsburgh Press. 296 pp. \$45 cloth, ISBN 082294135X. \$19.95 paper, ISBN 0822957426.

Schroeder, Alan. *Presidential Debates*. Columbia University Press. 280 pp. \$24.95 cloth, ISBN 0231114001.

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by Meena Bose

Journal Scan — Articles on the Presidency

The following list of articles on the presidency was compiled through an electronic review of the spring, summer, and fall 2000 issues of the following scholarly journals: *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *American Political Science Review*, and *Political Science Quarterly*. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* and *Congress and the Presidency* are not included because every article will be of interest to the PRG audience. Whenever

possible, entries include page numbers. (Not all journal websites contain page numbers of articles.)

Abramson, Paul, John Aldrich, Philip Paolino, and David Rohde. "Challenges to the American Two-Party System: Evidence from the 1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996 Presidential Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 53 (September 2000).
Cohen, Jeffrey E., and George A. Krause. "Opportunity, Con-

straints, and the Development of the Institutional Presidency: The Issuance of Executive Orders, 1939-1996." *Journal of Politics* 62 (February 2000).

Diermeier, Daniel, and Randolph T. Stevenson. "Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events." *American Political Science Review* 94 (September 2000): 627-40.

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Book Scan (cont'd)

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Shapiro, Robert Y., Martha Joynt Kumar, and Lawrence R. Jacobs, eds. *Presidential Power: Power, Conflict, and Democracy: American Politics Into the 21st Century*. Columbia University Press. 544 pp. \$49.50 cloth, ISBN 0231109326. \$26.50 paper, ISBN 0231109334.

Shenkman, Richard. *Presidential Ambition: Gaining Power At Any Cost*. Reprint ed. Harperperennial Library. 400 pp. \$14 paper, ISBN 0060930543.

Shull, Steven A. *American Civil Rights Policy From Truman to Clinton: The Role of Presidential Leadership*. Reprint ed. M.E. Sharpe. \$24.95 paper, ISBN 0765603942.

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The Spring 2001 edition of the Report will feature "Memos to the New Administration," highlighting the practical wisdom of political science as applied to the everyday problems of the chief executive.

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In addition, we plan to include an interview with Richard Neustadt on the topic of advising presidents.

Contributors for Spring will include: Matthew Dickinson, George C. Edwards, Douglas Foyle, Charles O. Jones, Richard Pious, Robert S. Robins, John Sloan, Shirley Anne Warshaw, and Douglas Yalof.

Journal Scan (cont'd)

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