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The Administrative Presidency: Retrospect and Prospect

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While the use of the administrative presidency during the Nixon and Reagan presidencies attracted much media attention, its salience to reporters has largely waned ever since. This has happened despite President Bush and President Clinton continuing to apply its logic and tenets in persistent, albeit less confrontational, fashion whenever they saw an administrative strategy advancing their agendas. Like their predecessors, both presidents understood that executive branch departments and agencies engaged in rulemaking and adjudication were making policies daily that reflected upon their presidencies.

As such, Bush and Clinton also understood that affecting the exercise of bureaucratic discretion could significantly

advance parts of their own policy agendas, especially if departments and agencies were not likely to embrace their goals. What is more, like Nixon and Reagan, they saw an administrative strategy as a means for trying to sidestep congressional resistance to specific statutory initiatives. Put most aptly by Richard Nathan (1975), each president saw the administrative presidency as a "low visibility, low political cost" strategy for reorienting policy.

In the end, however, both the Bush and Clinton administrations learned the same lessons that their predecessors did about the administrative presidency. It is neither as politically potent a force in the American political system as its proponents suggest or its critics fear, nor as Lilliputian in potency under all conditions as its detractors allege. At the same time, however,

plying administrative strategies with virtuosity in the future may become more problematic for presidents should the ascendancy of a "downsizing, defunding, and devolution" agenda for the administrative state continue in Washington.

The Morphology of an Administrative Strategy

The tools of the administrative presidency are multifaceted and divisible into two primary approaches to bureaucratic agenda setting. The first is a decidedly *deus ex machina* approach to policy reorientation. Presidents use their budgetary, personnel, reorganization, and appointment powers to create decision-making contexts in departments and agencies that they think will favor their aims. The second approach is a decidedly more substantive, directive, and binding one in which presidents express their preferences to agencies in executive orders, presidential proclamations, presidential signing statements, and national security directives.

The Contextual Approach

In wielding the contextual tools of the administrative presidency, the logic of presidents is straightforward. First, they try to reconfigure agency budgets and personnel patterns (e.g., the number, skill mix, and promotion patterns) to support their agendas. At bottom, presidents try to switch the policy emphases of agencies by either enhancing or inhibiting their administrative

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capacities to carry out statutory responsibilities. The Bush administration, for example, reversed the Reagan administration's lax approach to "Glass Ceiling" workforce issues by shifting significant resources administratively toward increasing anti-discrimination enforcement efforts in the Department of Labor's (DoL) Office of Federal Contract Compliance. Similarly, the Clinton administration shifted DoL's resources toward waging administratively a low-visibility campaign against sweatshops, fraudulent health insurance, and work site hazards, as well as toward collecting tens of millions of dollars in back pay for persons victimized by job discrimination.

Second, presidents appoint persons with kindred philosophical and policy predispositions to key posts, aiming to direct and control their operations and the discretion that the career bureaucracy exercises. During the Bush administration, for example, the president's appointments sometimes reflected his middle-of-the-road approach to environmental and natural resource issues: he appointed a noted environmentalist as administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (William Reilly) and a congressman with abysmally low approval ratings by environmentalists as secretary of the Interior Department (Manual Lujan). Similarly, President Clinton appointed an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) director, James King, who, unconventionally for a Democrat, was willing to slash OPM personnel by two-thirds, cut its merit system regulations, privatize many OPM functions, delegate hiring responsibilities to agencies, and abandon his predecessor's training efforts.

Third, these presidential appointees then oversee the amending, rescinding, or

relaxing of agency decision rules and regulations to suit the president's agenda. For instance, President Clinton's appointees at the Interior Department tried to link administratively the issuing and renewal of ranchers' grazing permits to good environmental stewardship of public lands in the West. Similarly, in altering the fast-paced quota system for disability claims by the Department of Veterans Affairs, President Bush sought to stop slipshod (and falsified) reviews of veterans' claims. In contrast, the Clinton administration accelerated the processing of applicants for naturalization into the United States by altering decision rules at the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

Fourth, presidents seek to create a bias for action within the bureaucracy that is consonant with their policy preferences by exercising their reorganization authority. Focusing on major *intradepartmental* reorganizations that Congress does not have to approve, presidential appointees try to symbolize and institutionalize the purposes of their presidents. For instance, by creating or raising the stature of offices of environmental security in the Defense and State departments, Clinton appointees tried to symbolize and affect the emphasis the president sought on the environment as a national security issue in the post-Cold War era. Similarly, the Clinton administration sought to symbolize the president's commitment to addressing public health issues like AIDS, as well as to strengthen the influence of health advocates in internal deliberations in the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). It did so by allowing the eight Public Health Service (PHS) agencies to make their case directly to the secretary of DHHS, rather than indirectly to her through the assistant

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secretary for health. Likewise, President Bush's appointee as administrator of the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA), sought to implement the president's emphasis on efficiency and accountability in the face of burgeoning Medicaid costs by creating a separate Medicaid Bureau within HCFA. This reversed the Carter and Reagan administrations' structural emphasis on consolidating Medicare, Medicaid, and other reimbursement operations in a single HCFA office.

Finally, presidents try to create a policy bias in favor of their agendas by enhancing the role of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) in agency policy development. For instance, President Bush strengthened the role of the National Security Assistant in foreign policy decisions by designating Brent Scowcroft to chair the main deliberative committee of the National Security Council (NSC). He also appointed the deputy national security assistant to chair the Deputies Committee. Meanwhile, on the regulatory policy front, both the Bush and Clinton administrations further enhanced the role of the White House in harnessing the regulatory proclivities of agencies. Bush, for example, created the controversial Competitiveness Council headed by Vice President Dan Quayle, a fervid deregulator. Meanwhile, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866 ("Regulatory Planning and Review") and promoted deregulation in Vice President Gore's series of National Performance Review (NPR) initiatives. Designed partly to buttress President Clinton's "New Democrat" image and partly to establish his deregulatory *bona fides* among skeptics, both the NPR and E.O. 12866 also further enhanced the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) role in

interagency coordination of rulemaking.

The "Directive" Approach

Supplementing these contextual approaches is a set of legally binding administrative tools that are more substantive and directive, yet do not require congressional approval.¹

Executive Orders. As noted, issuing executive orders (E.O.s) is a significant weapon in the arsenal of presidents trying to reorient policy administratively. Recent presidents have understood how important it is for their own policy agendas to review the approximately 13,000 E.O.s already in existence when they take office. E.O.s, after all, instruct actors within the executive branch either to act on, or to cease ongoing activities prompted by, their predecessors' orders. Thus, unless presidents amend, rescind, or drop existing E.O.s altogether, agencies will remain legally bound by them. Concomitantly, presidents perceive E.O.s as policy-reorienting weapons that are extremely easy to wield unilaterally. Indeed, as long as they can demonstrate that they have the statutory or constitutional authority to support their actions, any E.O.s they issue carry the force of law. What is more, since the late 1970s, presidents increasingly have relied less on statutory authority and more on their inherent constitutional powers when justifying the executive orders that they issue.

Under these circumstances, issuing a spate of E.O.s in the early days of a presidency has now become standard fare. So, too, is it routine to sprinkle them liberally throughout the years of a presidential term. For example, the White House reports that President Clinton has issued 248 E.O.s during his six years in office (www.whitehouse.gov, 10/11/98). His first, issued 12 days after assuming the presidency, reversed two Bush administration E.O.s opposed by labor

unions. Overturned were requirements that federal contractors stop issuing project agreements with unions (E.O. 12818) and that they post notices that workers on these projects do not have to join labor unions (E.O. 12800).

During the first year of his presidency, Clinton issued 26 additional E.O.s, dealing with such significant and controversial topics as sustainable development, entitlement cuts, human radiation experiments, and most-favored-nation status for China. In contrast, the president issued 102 E.O.s during the first ten months of 1998 alone, perhaps reflecting the lack of legislative activity in the Republican-controlled Congress in an election year (as well as his own personal problems). These included orders to agencies regarding equal employment opportunity, creating the Internal Revenue Service Management Board, and developing an interdepartmental strategy for food safety. In the interim years, the president averaged 32 E.O.s annually, with peak activity across his presidency coming in election years.

Regardless of when they are issued, E.O.s can have substantial policy implications. Consider, for example, how President Nixon used this device to implement wage-and-price controls. Likewise, both Bush and Clinton used E.O.s to order the Coast Guard to return Haitian refugees found at sea to Haiti, without an asylum evaluation in a neutral location. Executive orders also implemented President Reagan's controversial agendas on family and federalism issues (Cooper, 1997). And, of course, President Johnson used an executive order to initiate affirmative action policies in the federal government, an initiative later endorsed in President Nixon's order instituting the Philadelphia Plan (E.O. 11246).

Presidential Proclamations. To be sure, an overwhelming number of the 6,000 president

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presidential proclamations issued by presidents since 1789 have been ceremonial (e.g., proclaiming 1992 the "Year of the Indian"). Yet many of these have also had significant impacts on policy making and on the operations of the executive branch. This is especially true in the international trade and foreign policy arenas.

Treaties or statutes can authorize presidents to use proclamations as the bases for actions taken whenever certain events occur (e.g., when President Nixon used Proclamation 4047 to impose wage and price controls pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970). As such, the Supreme Court has held that proclamations have the same legal status as executive orders. Legal status aside, however, it is noteworthy that presidents tend to target these tools toward distinctly different audiences. As noted, E.O.s are directives to agency actors within the executive branch. In contrast, proclamations are directed toward the general public. For instance, in 1980, President Carter used a proclamation (Proclamation 4771) to require draft registration.

Still, presidents have combined proclamations and executive orders to pursue their ends. For instance, Proclamation 4483 combined with E.O. 11967 to grant pardons to Vietnam draft evaders and to instruct the Justice Department on how to set up a process for deciding eligibility requirements. Nevertheless, it is also important to understand that presidents have less latitude in issuing proclamations than they do when issuing executive orders. Unlike the latter, presidents can only use proclamations as instruments for redirecting policy when they are authorized by statute to do so. The courts have rebuffed broad claims of presidential authority to issue proclamations under the U.S. Constitution.

Presidential Signing Statements. Presidential bill signing ceremonies are easy to overlook as tools of the administrative presidency. Yet these afford presidents more than photo

opportunities. Reflecting their long-standing concerns about not having a line-item veto, presidents now use these statements to communicate to the bureaucracy and to the courts what they do not like about the bills they are signing. For example, President Bush issued over 150 of these declarations during his four years in office.

To be sure, the legal standing of these typically brief statements of presidential preference is as yet unresolved by legal scholars. But their significance is at once subtler and more direct than their immediate legal standing. In essence, presidents tell officials in the executive branch—both their own appointees and careerists—how they want them to implement a new statute. Moreover, as Cooper (1997) indicates, this interpretation sometimes goes beyond mere nuance. Presidents Reagan and Bush, for example, used signing statements to signal their outright refusals to implement sections of statutes. President Reagan used signing statements to afford less stringent enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1986 than called for by Congress and to make it more difficult to file discrimination suits under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Popkin, 1991). Likewise, President Bush's signing statement accompanying the Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1992 claimed that ambiguity in the statute might cause the secretary of Energy to violate the U.S. Constitution. The secretary would do so, the president argued, if (as the law stipulated) he allocated ten percent of all funding for the Superconducting Super Collider to minority institutions.

Obviously, when signing statements are wielded in a confrontational manner, bureaucratic resistance (prompted by legislative oversight committee pressures) and judicial challenges are likely to arise. As such, Justice Department lawyers now work routinely with White House legal counsels to

craft signing statements that can withstand rigorous judicial scrutiny. But even when they are not so blatantly confrontational, signing statements are developed with the courts in mind.

As scholars widely recognize, judges turn to the legislative histories of statutes to determine congressional intent when agency-promulgated rules and regulations are appealed to the courts (Shapiro, 1988). Since the Reagan administration, West Publishing Company has published signing agreements expressing presidents' sentiments and interpretations of statutes along with legislative histories. Consequently, courts seeking statutory intent now routinely consider presidents' views part of the legislative history of the law (Cooper, 1997).

National Security Directives. Presidents also use national security directives (NSDs) to advance their policy agendas administratively. Along with executive orders, some of the earliest actions new presidents take involve issuing NSDs that reverse or modify existing directives that are inconsistent with their policy aims. Likewise, they continue to issue NSDs throughout their terms. The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimates that presidents issued approximately 1,042 NSDs between 1961 and 1988, with President Bush subsequently issuing 51 NSDs in the first year of his administration alone (Conahan Statement, 1988).

What is stunningly different between EOs and NSDs, however, is the secrecy surrounding the latter. For instance, both the Reagan and Bush administrations refused to supply a complete list of the topics or titles of these directives to either the GAO or to congressional committees. Certainly, those NSDs that have come to light demonstrate the significance of what these directives entail. For example, the Bush administration's policy towards Iraq before the Persian Gulf War was contained in NSD 26, a directive that the White House originally refused to share with

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Congress.

Nor do NSDs have only foreign affairs implications. A 1988 GAO study, for example, revealed that while 63 percent of all substantive directives that had become public dealt with foreign policy, nearly 22 percent had domestic policy implications. Thus, some scholars worry that presidents can use NSDs to conceal controversial domestic initiatives under a cloak of national security secrecy (Cooper, 1997). The GAO, for example, found that nearly half of President Reagan's publicly available NSDs had domestic policy impacts (Conahan Statement, 1988).

Finally, and aside from the obvious advantage that secrecy provides presidential initiatives, NSDs also hold significant implications for presidential control of the bureaucracy and, in turn, for bureaucracy's role in a democracy. NSDs can attenuate any bureaucratic proclivities toward leaking information to Congress, the media, and the public. Leaking classified information brings severe legal penalties to employees engaging in it.

Caveat Emptor

Although presidents applying these tools of the administrative presidency to advance their policy agendas have met successes, they have also experienced considerable setbacks. As such, incumbents will be disappointed if they think that the administrative presidency is a "silver bullet" that advantages them inordinately as they try to disrupt the continuing agendas of Congress or executive branch agencies (Skowronek, 1993). Indeed, research on the administrative presidency suggests that presidents are well advised to start with the following rebuttable presumptions when approaching policy reorientation in this fashion.²

- The less that they fail to devise strategies for countering congress members' own budgetary, appointment,

and personnel system powers, the less successful they will be in our system of separated powers, competing legitimacies, diffused responsibilities, and continuing agendas (Jones, 1994);

- The more that the courts can construe presidents' rulemaking efforts as arbitrary and capricious, unable to pass a reasonableness test, or inconsistent with statutory intent, the more likely that the courts will remand these rules to the agencies for reconsideration;
- The more that they try to change decision rules in agencies unilaterally, the more likely that members of Congress will respond with riders and appropriation bills that will try to thwart these efforts;
- The more that they pursue their policy goals through the bureaucracy without simultaneously revamping the balkanized and rigid budgetary, personnel, and accounting systems that constrain agency responsiveness to their policies, the less successful they will be;
- The greater the extent of behavioral change required by E.O.s, proclamations, and signing statements to implement their initiatives, and the less that presidents offer accompanying incentives for change (e.g., additional or fewer resources, personnel, and technology), the more likely that agencies will continue doing what they are already doing;
- The more their appointees are ideological and/or amateurish, the more likely that the courts will remand their actions back to agencies for further consideration;
- The more necessity they feel to unite their parties by choosing appointees less on policy competence than on the basis of past party service, advancing geographical diversity, or aggressive interest maintenance (Skowronek, 1993), the more likely they will dilute the philosophical or policy consistency

of their administrations;

- The greater the number of political appointees they try to place in agencies, and the deeper they try to place them into the bureaucracy, the more likely that philosophical or policy loyalty to presidential causes will be compromised;
- The greater the number of political appointees they try to place in agencies, and the deeper they try to place them into the bureaucracy, the more likely that their appointees will lack experience and thus become more dependent on career bureaucrats;
- The greater the number of political appointees they try to place in agencies, and the deeper they try to place them in the bureaucracy, the greater the layers of hierarchy they will create and the more tenuous their influence will be over them;
- The more that they try to rotate appointees rapidly through agencies, the more dependent their appointees will become on careerists, and the less responsive they will be to presidential initiatives;
- The more that they rely on executive orders rather than statutes to advance controversial policies, the less likely that their agendas will have staying power in the hands of their successors;
- The more that they rely on proclamations and signing statements to advance controversial policies that Congress has not approved, the more likely they will find their efforts challenged in courts;
- The more that they use executive orders, proclamations, and signing statements to advance their goals, the greater will be the amount of cross-pressures on agencies to respond to different masters, and the less effective those agencies will be in advancing anyone's goals in the short-term;

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- The more that they rely on NSD security strictures to advance their agendas in secrecy, the more vulnerable they will become to rogue operations carried out in their name and to the opprobrium that these will generate should they prove unwise and become public (e.g., the Iran/Contra affair);
- The more that they try to stop controversial things from happening, rather than make them happen, the less difficulty they are likely to experience.

Presidents should also not expect that the potency of the administrative presidency will increase with today's downsizing, defunding, and devolution agenda ascendant in Washington. To be sure, the downsizing and agency restructuring pursued by the Clinton administration's NPR initiatives have been targeted on mid-level managers, not political appointees. As such, program-level resistance to presidential initiatives has probably been weakened in certain policy areas and opportunities for more control by political appointees over street-level bureaucrats should be possible.

But a recent Merit Systems Protection Board (1998) survey of 9,710 federal employees suggests that this effort has been uneven across departments and agencies. More precisely, only 37 percent of all respondents felt that NPR goals were important priorities in their agencies; only 21 percent felt that they had more flexibility in managing human resources (a high priority of NPR); and only 20 percent felt that NPR efforts had brought positive change to the government. Moreover, nearly 49 percent believed that too many layers of hierarchy still remained in their organizations, while two-thirds of the 50 percent who said that their jobs had changed as a result of NPR thought the change was for the worse.

Nor does the downsizing, defunding, and

devolution agenda necessarily advantage presidents when they seek to *accomplish* their ends, rather than prevent agencies from acting. For instance, the GAO has found in recent studies that where reorganization, budget cuts, and downsizing were pursued simultaneously, they were done without adequately considering the ongoing statutory responsibilities of agencies (Radin, 1995). Cut as well were the capacity of agencies to perform whatever responsibilities they still retained and to monitor the growing number of state and local government actors and contractors carrying out "devolved" responsibilities formally performed by them. Consequently, presidents trying to affect the performance of these actors may have even less leverage than they had in the past when career civil servants were implementing these responsibilities.

What is more, the present penchant for having federal agencies enter into "partnering networks" with third-sector actors (i.e., for-profit and nonprofit agencies, as well as states and localities) rather than build in-house capacity may render the impact of the administrative presidency even more marginal. Not only are federal agencies woefully staffed to monitor the activities of these actors (Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 1992), but accountability for actions becomes even more difficult to ascertain in these opaque and complex networks (Durant, 1998).

In sum, presidents must understand the *realpolitik* of the administrative presidency before trying to wield its tools. Otherwise, they may come to reside figuratively, if not literally, in the discomfiting lands of either Oz or Uz.³ The first is a fantasy world in which they underestimate the power of Congress and the courts to complicate the administrative presidency's success in our Madisonian system. The second is the land

of Job in the Old Testament. Like Job, presidents may find themselves faithfully doing God's work, but persistently excoriated for assiduously trying to combat momentous forces with administrative tools that are Lilliputian in proportion to the tasks at hand (e.g., tinkering with the structures of HCFA without reexamining the premises of a heavily networked health care "partnering" system in America). Neither land is an attractive place to visit, let alone live out one's presidency.

NOTES

¹ Portions of this section rely heavily on Cooper (1986 and 1997).

² These presumptions are culled or deduced from the following sources: Waterman, 1989; Durant, 1993; Holt, 1998; Maranto, 1993; Pffifner, 1996; Ingraham; Michaels, 1997; Wood and Waterman, 1994.

³ The analogy to the lands of Oz and Uz is adapted from Gawthrop (1998).

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Choosing Supreme Court Nominees: Notes to a Theory¹

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Perhaps no subject in American politics has given rise to more unsubstantiated myths and rumors than the process by which presidents select their Supreme Court nominees. Many scholars have casually assumed that Earl Warren's nomination to be chief justice was the culmination of a deal he negotiated with then-candidate Dwight Eisenhower at the 1952 Republican convention; or that William Brennan was Eisenhower's last-minute backup choice for a Supreme Court seat in 1956. In fact, both nominations emerged out of complex sets of circumstances: in the former case, the promise of a Supreme Court seat to Warren did not occur until December of 1952; it represented Eisenhower's earnest attempt to stay in the California governor's good graces once it was decided that Warren would not receive an important position in the new administration. In the latter instance, Brennan may have been the *only* candidate in the country able to fulfill Eisenhower's litany of requirements for that particular vacancy: the president had expressed interest in choosing a nominee who was Catholic, a Democrat, a state judge, and under 62 years old.

Recent appointments have produced a whole new set of unwarranted assumptions and rumors about the recruitment practices of more contemporary presidents. As an example, many scholars assume that Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy stunned and disappointed Reagan administration officials when they joined David Souter in 1992 to save *Roe v. Wade*. In fact, the role that each justice would later play in frustrating conservative opponents of *Roe* came as a shock to no one in the administration itself, as presidential papers from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library clearly show. Before coming to the Court, Anthony Kennedy had authored opinions as a federal appeals judge that pro-

vided clear evidence of his deference to privacy rights, and several high-level officials in the Reagan administration took direct notice of this fact. O'Connor's position on abortion rights also posed substantial concerns to conservatives within the administration: Prior to her nomination to the Court in 1981, the administration's 35-year old counselor to the Attorney General, Kenneth Starr, wrote a confidential memorandum to Attorney General William French Smith in which he detailed O'Connor's record as an Arizona legislator dealing with the issue of abortion. According to Starr, during the 1970's O'Connor had co-sponsored a bill permitting state agencies to participate in "family planning activities"; she also had opposed an Arizona senate resolution urging enactment of a human life amendment at the federal level.

Why do social scientists so often fall prey to flawed assumptions about the practical politics of nominee selection? Certainly it not due to apathy or a lack of interest in the appointment of Supreme Court justices. Among public law scholars, the recruitment of judges — especially Supreme Court Justices — has garnered as much (if not more) attention than any other topic of judicial research. Unfortunately, most of this scholarly attention has focused on vagaries and developments in the more public confirmation process, where data is accessible and information more readily available. Recent controversies surrounding the nominations of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas to the United States Supreme Court have only heightened this already keen interest in how presidents, interest groups and other political entities attempt to influence the outcome of the Senate confirmation process. In truth, a seamless web links both phases of the appointment process. Just as a quick, successful confirmation process may be at-

tributed to careful and strategic selection decisions, so may a contentious confirmation battle arise from missteps in the selection process that preceded it.

Ironically, scholars of the presidency have also shied away from comprehensive treatments and analysis of White House judicial recruitment practices, perhaps because they view the subject as lying more squarely in the field of public law. For these and other reasons, critical aspects of the nomination process have fallen through the cracks of political scientists' research and analysis. As a consequence, the role that the Senate plays in influencing nominations may have been unduly exaggerated. During the 20th century, 86 percent of all nominees to the Supreme Court were confirmed, usually by wide (if not unanimous) margins. And even in recent decades, when the Senate has theoretically presented a more ominous threat in the process, 12 of the past 14 nominees have been confirmed.

Although the confirmation process for Supreme Court nominees has undergone significant and well-documented changes during the past half-century, the initial nominee selection has been marked by equally dramatic developments. In particular, we have witnessed a steady increase in the open and public politicization of the nominee selection process itself. Up until recently, this initial screening process occurred almost entirely behind closed doors. By contrast, the media now cover the nominee selection process with extra intensity, reporting on the results of meetings among top officials concerning an upcoming vacancy and heavily scrutinizing the backgrounds of prospective candidates even before one has been formally designated for a seat on the high court. Interest groups (in addition to the traditionally active American Bar Association) have staked their own claims within the White House selection pro-

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cess, providing lists of suggested candidates to the president and offering detailed analysis of potential candidates. Prior to President Bush's formal designation of Clarence Thomas for the Supreme Court, Counselor to the President C. Boyden Gray sought assurances from Benjamin Hooks that he would steer the NAACP away from opposing Thomas's nomination. Going one step further, Bill Clinton encouraged a "politics by trial balloon," floating prospective candidates to the media as a precursor to formal designation.

Several additional developments in nominee selection are also noteworthy. The politics of the nominee selection process (at least since Nixon) has been characterized by an excessive emphasis on "judicial credentialism" — by this I mean that presidents and their administrations have disproportionately focused on candidates who possess judging credentials (especially from one of various United States Circuit Courts of Appeals) during the earliest stages of the vetting process. Certainly the final outcomes of the nomination process bear out this development in part: Between 1945 and 1968, only a third of the 15 individuals nominated were federal circuit court judges. More often than not, justices during this period arrived directly from positions in the U.S. Senate, statehouses, or positions in the current administration.

Dwight Eisenhower was the first chief executive to openly express the desire to nominate only experienced judges to the United States Supreme Court. Despite these proclamations Eisenhower filled the vacancy of chief justice in 1953 with Earl Warren, who had never before served in any judicial capacity. To fill a vacancy of associate justice a year later, Eisenhower turned to John Marshall Harlan, who boasted less than a year's service as judge on the United States Court of

Appeals. The more lasting shift to nominees with judicial credentials occurred during the early part of the Nixon Administration. Of President Nixon's six proposed nominees to the bench, each of the first four were at the time active judges on a federal appeals court. Half of those considered by Gerald Ford for William Douglas' old seat in 1975 were federal district and circuit court judges. This emphasis on judicial credentials soon reached unprecedented heights during the Reagan administration. A full 75 percent of those candidates Reagan considered for a Supreme Court seat in 1981 were judges, including the eventual nominee, Arizona appellate judge Sandra Day O'Connor. Then in 1986 and 1987 the lists that administration officials drew from to fill two more associate justice vacancies were comprised entirely of federal circuit judges. George Bush considered federal circuit judges almost exclusively in filling his own two high Court vacancies; indeed, Clarence Thomas was eliminated from contention in 1990 not because of his relative youth, but because administration officials believed he might benefit from additional service on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. And despite all the predictions from President Clinton that he would name an "ex-pol" with a big heart to the Supreme Court, ultimately he turned to Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, two federal appeals court judges with long and distinguished records of judicial service.

Why have recent presidents turned so frequently to members of the judiciary — especially the federal judiciary — in their search for Supreme Court nominees? Certainly increased conflict in the confirmation process has played some role in their thinking. As opposed to candidates with more political backgrounds, federal judges are more likely to garner ABA approval, diffus-

ing opposing Senators' cries that a nominee is not qualified. The backgrounds of federal circuit judges have already been vetted and screened (albeit to a lesser extent) by the United States Senate. Obviously, all federal circuit judges have already been confirmed at least once by the Senate to a judicial post. Moreover, federal circuit judges—charged in theory with the responsibility for carrying out the will of the Supreme Court on legal issues—generally chart a course of moderation in their opinions, giving opponents little fodder for attack during the confirmation process. By contrast, law professors, senators and candidates with greater political followings often achieve success precisely because of their willingness to confront society's most heated controversies head-on. Even Robert Bork exercised so much restraint as a judge on the D.C. Circuit that the ABA — an unqualified opponent of Bork's nomination — was forced to concede that his opinions as a federal judge had been "balanced" and "fair". (Ultimately the ABA emphasized Bork's extreme positions in his academic writings to create momentum against his candidacy).

Finally, in a political environment where Supreme Court nominees are expected to conduct courtesy calls with members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, circuit judges benefit from political associations with the one or two senators responsible for their previous nomination to a federal judgeship; that same senator (or senators) may now play a critical role aiding the candidate's cause by shepherding him or her around Capitol Hill, and providing enthusiastic support in the event of a floor fight. Senator John Danforth's assurances to the Bush administration that he would assist Clarence Thomas's nomination were an important consideration to White House officials; given the narrowness of Thomas' 52-48 victory in the Senate, Danforth's influence may well have made the

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difference in the final outcome.

From a president's perspective, the promotion of judges - especially federal circuit judges - also carries with it a number of strategic advantages that are unrelated to concerns over the confirmation process. Judicial opinions are among the most reliable indicators of future positions on the Supreme Court. Federal circuit judges in particular have issued a variety of opinions interpreting constitutional and federal law, and thus provide an excellent (if imperfect) gauge for predicting how that judge is likely to rule in the future. By contrast, governors and senators may have never before addressed many critically important legal issues.

The decision to draw from a pool of jurists for the Supreme Court may also help a president score points with the public by in effect demonstrating that he is above "packing the Court" with fellow politicians. With some notable exceptions, the public is generally less likely to view a federal appeals court judge as a political ideologue, even though he or she may in reality sit further along the political spectrum than a comparable political official.

Finally, whereas the president's selection for his cabinet and other high-level executive branch positions used to be confirmed by the Senate with relative ease, political conflict now surfaces during Senate scrutiny of these other nominations as well. Accordingly, if a president wants to draw a Supreme Court nominee from within his own administration, he may be opening up another Pandora's box of political conflict: specifically, his administration may now face new political obstacles in finding a politically acceptable replacement for this sudden new vacancy in the executive branch. Compare the experience of President Truman - who drew on members of his own administration to fill two of four vacancies - with that of President Clinton.

Without any difficulty, Truman quickly lined up candidates to replace Secretary of the Treasury Fred Vinson and Attorney General Tom Clark once he had decided to promote those two men, respectively, to the United States Supreme Court. By contrast, the mere suggestion that President Clinton might tap Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt for a seat on the United States Supreme Court set off a wave of political activity around Washington, especially among interest groups interested in seeing Babbitt stay at his current post, or in staking a claim on who would replace Babbitt at Interior. Both the Senate Majority Leader, Robert Dole, and the Senate Judiciary Committee's Ranking Member, Joseph Biden, picked up on this groundswell of activity, and each proclaimed publicly that Babbitt's success at the Interior Department might provide at least one good reason for keeping him there.

A second development in Supreme Court recruitment is also worth noting. Specifically, presidents in recent decades have engaged in a "politics of overreaction": in the course of formulating and crafting his own administration's approach to recruiting and selecting Supreme Court nominees, each president has felt compelled to respond to critics of his predecessor's selection practices. Often presidents have overcompensated in the opposite direction, hindering the achievement of their own objectives. Perhaps the previous president was forced to compromise his ideological priorities prematurely in an effort to preempt Senate opposition; the current president may now react by persisting more firmly — indeed, too firmly — in his goal of finding a like-minded Supreme Court justice. At the opposite extreme, a past president may have rushed to send a highly controversial nominee to the Senate, only to see his nomination go down to

ignominious defeat; in the process, that president may have weakened his own standing in the public and within Congress. The new president may now strive to avoid that fate by handling the appointment process in a meek and overly safe manner.

Although unfortunate, some amount of overreaction is perhaps understandable in the context of Supreme Court appointments. The new president may have been one of his predecessor's greatest critics with regard to past recruitment practices. During his 1968 election campaign, Republican candidate Richard Nixon emphasized his distaste for President Johnson's practice of promoting "cronies" to the United States Supreme Court. Under such circumstances, Nixon's efforts to avoid hypocrisy on the matter during his first year in office was perhaps to be expected. Still, it is worth noting the difficulties a president may cause for himself and his administration when he unnecessarily and prematurely restricts his own options for Supreme Court candidates. Nearly two decades earlier, Dwight Eisenhower had expressed his own frustrations with President Truman's habit of appointing cronies to all levels of government, including the United States Supreme Court. As a consequence, Eisenhower insisted that all high Court nominees (at least after Earl Warren) possess some judicial experience — he presumed that such a rigid filter would emphasize the legal "merit" of candidates over political connections. In fact, Eisenhower's rigidly imposed filter also eliminated from contention a number of well-qualified candidates for the Court including well-respected attorney Kenneth Royall and Attorney General Herbert Brownell. And Nixon, in an obvious effort to distance his selection practices from those of Lyndon Johnson, emphasized that candidates from the Court be drawn from a pool of those who did not already know him personally. Report-

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edly, Nixon even told his third nominee to the Court, G. Harrold Carswell: "I'll never talk to you except socially."

By contrast, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson may have gone too far to the other extreme, openly substituting Eisenhower's "stilted" method of nominee selection with a far-ranging search that was literally bound by no rules whatsoever. In Johnson's case, the choice of Abe Fortas for Chief Justice was in part a product of his decision to throw too much caution to the wind. Ford then distanced himself from Nixon in a procedural way by openly embracing the ABA as a filter for prospective nominees *prior* to their names being formally submitted to the Senate. Ironically, in the final analysis the Ford recruitment process may have become too heavily dependent on the ABA's recommendations.

President Reagan's ardently conservative aides had watched as past Republican president's nominees turned unexpectedly moderate during their time on the high Court: The liberal decisions of Warren, Brennan, Blackmun and even Powell figured prominently among these conservative's frustrations. Consequently, the Reagan formula for choosing Supreme Court nominees was marked by an insistence that the administration only consider federal judges with proven track records as conservatives. This tactic limited the pool of available candidates substantially, and perhaps unnecessarily.

In short, these calculated attempts by presidents to distance their administration's practices from the problems of past administrations often created new problems for themselves – in particular, short lists for the court heavily tend to emphasize one narrow type of candidate and exclude many other qualified individuals who might well have served the administration's interests better in the long run.

One final characteristic of modern recruit-

ment practices has been their often heavy reliance – even dependence – on White House and executive branch bureaucracies for assistance in decisionmaking. To facilitate the selection of Supreme Court nominees, presidents have often adopted an elaborate multiple advisor scheme, in which they charge up to three advisors (usually the attorney general, the White House Chief of Staff and the White House Counsel) with research and winnowing responsibilities. Such an organizational scheme contrasts sharply with the strict single-advisor framework employed by Presidents Eisenhower and Ford, each of whom placed sole authority for nominee selection in the hands of his respective attorney general. Unfortunately, the use of multiple officials may cause unexpected problems for the president. Because each official brings to the decisionmaking table different information about the same subject (as well as different modes of perceiving reality), respectful disagreements may suddenly escalate into broader conflicts. Indeed, heads of departments may begin to behave more like advocates for their own agendas than like well-meaning and deferential protectors of the president's interests.

Of course no amount of primary research and analysis can answer more ambitious questions such as whether a president was in fact "satisfied" by his own Supreme Court appointments. Occasionally we stumble upon persuasive evidence of a president's satisfaction or frustration with a Supreme Court justice he nominated: Unfortunately, such data is usually anecdotal, and so it confounds more systematic analysis. By contrast, more quantitative attempts to test presidential satisfaction across time usually rely on a number of assumptions; for example, sometimes they derive an appointing president's intentions strictly from party affiliation or his commitment to a particular

viewpoint. Without questioning the validity of any of these assumptions about a president's goals, primary source research – whether it is in the form of presidential papers or interviews with actual participants in the selection process – is a necessary prerequisite to crafting the most valid assumptions possible. Clearly, a president's choice of a nominee may be based on a variety of factors, only one of which may be that nominee's perceived position on a host of legal issues. In the end, qualitative research can assist more systematic, quantitative research by at a minimum ensuring that it maintains as firm a foothold as possible in political reality.

¹ Drawn from David Yalof, "Choosing Supreme Court Nominees: Selection Politics from Truman to Reagan," (Ph.D. Diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1997); Revised for publication in *Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees* (forthcoming, the University of Chicago Press, 1999).

The Study of Political Leadership: Bill Clinton as a Test Case

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Students of political leadership would like to be able to compare politicians in order to generalize about the differences that the creativity or failings of leaders might make in politics and policymaking. We do this, with a fair degree of success, in our characterizations of the collective folkways of sets of politicians, for example, in Congress. Such generalizations are anchored in institutional structures which politicians both sustain and modify through their actions.

We are much less comfortable with the comparisons of individuals, even in the same office, and in fact shy away from the effort. Some of our number argue strongly that analysis of individual careers is a blind alley that can never yield good generalizations. The N is too small and the comparisons are *ad hoc* and *ad hominem*. Much the better, they argue, to describe the recurring patterns of institutional relationships. Of course the American presidency is the constant negative example.

Some few of us attempt to spin out conceptual categories that will permit comparisons and generalizations about handfuls of politicians, but the categories necessarily capture only one aspect of leadership. I devised a model for the study of political leadership with a particular eye to American presidents, in my book *The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature* (University Press of Kansas, 1998). The model encompasses particular aspects of leadership that I wish to capture because of normative concerns that I bring to the study of the presidency. By deliberately limiting what one wishes to analyze and explain, one is freed from the spurious obligation of speaking to all aspects of leadership through one context; that is impossible. Therefore it is important to be explicit about what one wishes to know from a model.

The model contains both empirical and

normative elements. The empirical elements deal with the relative effectiveness of leadership that, for example, joins a high level of personal skill to a favorable context. The normative elements uncover the importance of commitment to persuasion, rather than control, or teaching rather than manipulation. I argue that it is better to tell the truth, to appeal to cultural ideals, to have a character that inspires confidence, in that one is a more effective leader. But, by the same token, these are not solely utilitarian insights to guide a prudent leader. A moral commitment to truth telling is required before it becomes a reality in political life, for example.

Strategy and Skill in Context

Discernment
Character
Psychological health
Moral commitment
Integrity

Cultural Leadership

Purpose
Prudence
Discernment

Teaching Reality (or Illusion)

Teaching
Preaching
Demagogy
Cultural Traps
Short run or long run politics and policy

Persuasion/Control

Bargaining
Heresthetics
Rhetoric

A historical presidential inquiry freezes the presidency and generalizations about it at one point in time. One needs a construct that will compare presidents across time, and such a construct must join the leadership of presidents to the changing historical/political contexts in which they worked. Both leadership and context are dynamic. The idea of skill in context assumes that a presi-

dent's skill in reading the political environment will be the best possible guide to the use of particular personal skills such as bargaining or rhetoric. Personal character is then invoked in an unfamiliar way as a potential skill. Character, in at least these three guises, may give a politician resources he would not otherwise have, or deny him such opportunities if apparent deficits of character are obvious.

Cultural leadership relies greatly on the political leader's discernment of the possible policy achievements in a given time. There is no certain guide; different people read the environment differently. But to fail to attempt to do so is fatal, and to do it accurately is a godsend. The assessment of this ability turns not only upon the cognitive skills of the politician but also on his or her reading of a nation's cultural politics. If one believes, as I do, that Louis Hartz has given us the most accurate of the possible range of successful political actions in American politics, then one assess shrewdness in the politician accordingly. Failure to read the environment accurately is a deficit for leadership. The model may work with different interpretations of cultural politics and still be useful as a model.

Teaching reality is a difficult concept. I use it to cover three aspects of leadership: 1. An open style of rhetoric which does not claim to be absolutely correct and accepts contingencies. 2. Invocation of cultural values as bases of support for political action. 3. Teaching about the nature of the public problems the nation faces as education of the public. The politician who would teach reality must be willing to ask publics to accept unpleasant truths and explain that the failure to do so will carry a future price.

Cultural traps are those blind spots in the political culture which politicians cannot change, at least in the short run. The Ameri-

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can disapproval of "welfare" is the classic example. Social policies must be based on the ethic of self-help. The tension between short run political advantage and concern for the long run benefits of policy is great in our system of frequent and staggered elections. Political artistry is required to cover the gap and there are no institutional devices to aid the task.

Bill Clinton as a Case Study

What are Clinton's political skills and how has he matched them to the political environments of his presidency? I use environments in the plural because they have changed across six years, just as he has changed. This analysis looks only at domestic policy and politics but the same patterns may be found in foreign policymaking. Clinton's greatest skill seems to be rhetoric, not as a deliverer of formal addresses, but as a conversational speaker who hears his audience as he speaks and does his best to register their thoughts as he adds his own. His rhetorical style is transactional in that he leads as he follows and never seeks to overpower the audience.

I see no particular skill at constructing coalitions, for example in Congress, through bargains or maneuver. In fact he lacks a strong strategic sense in how to join means to ends. In various case studies he often cries out to his advisers, many of whom may be in the room, give me a "strategy." He started out very badly with the gays in the military fiasco. This mistake could have happened to any new president. But his failure to surround himself with politically experienced White House staff revealed a high regard for his own talents, which were, in fact, not up to the job as it began.

Clinton oscillated awkwardly between "new" Democrat and "old" Democrat in his first two years in large part because of deep splits within the congressional Democratic

party. He also accepted the advice of his legislative leaders to ignore the Republicans in his legislative initiatives; they would provide the votes. They barely did so on his first budget. He relied on Republicans for the passage of NAFTA, and could deliver nothing on health care reform. But the president bears some responsibility because he gave no clear signals about his purposes as president and provided no coherent political strategy.

Questions about Clinton's character were numerous in the 1992 campaign, not so much in his misdeeds, as in his way of talking about them. The public discussion of his draft record was so labyrinthine because that was the character of his explanations. Some people began to wonder if this represented a way of dealing with the truth - at the margins. This pattern of integrity was apparent in his dealings with Congress in his first two years. He zigged and zagged so many times that many felt uncomfortable in standing by the president's legislative plans because he was sure to change them. His purposes and promises were suspect. However, he appeared to be in the bloom of psychological health and this was certainly an asset as he presented himself to the general public.

Clinton practiced cultural leadership after the debacle of Mondale's loss in 1984. Along with other moderate, mostly southern, Democrats he organized the Democratic Leadership Conference as a staging group for moderate "new" Democratic policies. Clinton thus became Jimmy Carter's ideological legate, but presumably with greater political ability. However, Clinton had campaigned like an "old" Democrat in 1992 and attacked Paul Tsongas's articulation of "new" Democrat ideas, especially in Florida, with demagoguery about what Tsongas would do to social security and other programs for the

preparation of his first budget but lamented preparation of his first budget but lamented that he did not understand why he was talking like Eisenhower. He showed courage in his fight for NAFTA and prevailed, albeit with Republican help.

There will be many post mortems of the Clinton health care failure. It appears to me that he attempted to find a middle ground between the status quo and a single payer plan along Canadian lines, which was politically wise, but he also permitted what appeared to be an administrative monster to be put up for Republicans to attack, which they did. This failure contributed to the 1994 Republican election victory more than any other factor. Clinton had forfeited the opportunity to tell the public who he was and what he wanted to do. The Republicans did it for him.

Clinton's rhetorical style is very winning in the way that he opens up questions for debate and avoids dogma or high emotion. His conversational style, up close and at a distance, makes the best use of his good mind and personal charm. One feels that he knows what he is talking about, and that he has a special understanding of his audience. How do we assess Clinton's capacity to "teach reality"? What is "reality"? One aspect of teaching is to fire the imagination of people by the invocation of values. One thinks of Lincoln's two inaugural addresses, FDR's fire-side chats, Lyndon Johnson's speech to Congress about the Voting Rights bill in which he invoked the slogan of the civil rights movement that "we shall overcome," and even Reagan's "city on a hill." I find nothing of this timber in Clinton's rhetoric. His weak sense of strategy for effective political actions is matched by his attachment to concrete tactical rhetoric rather than the language of moral vision.

Teaching reality also means to reduce

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public confusion about emerging problems and suggest plausible actions to cope with such problems. Clinton does this well on individual issues, such as free trade, the education and health of children, and many other social issues. But his leadership has provided no overall theme with which adherents might be rallied. He tried the phrase "The New Covenant" more than once but it did not take. This is another example of how he has fumbled the opportunity to create and sustain a policy agenda, both for himself and the Democratic coalition.

Clinton has struggled with the American "cultural trap" of skepticism about government, both as a "New Democrat" and as a centrist who campaigned like a Republican in 1996. He won in large part because Newt Gingrich and his minions made the mistake of trying to run the government by themselves and fell in public esteem through their extremism. The president stole their ideological clothes. Now he must find clothes of his own. His own weak strategic sense and the political impasse of divided government thus reinforce each other. In this kind of situation only short term politics can work.

1998 has been taken up almost exclusively with the Monica Lewinsky affair, and it was the unwillingness of the president to be honest early that can be blamed. Clinton's protest that an affair is a matter of private life is absurd. The president has no private life, and White House interns may have private lives but in the White House they work for the public. Character has shown its true face. The president is a seducer in both private and public life. He must win over his audience even if it is only one person.

He does not so much wish to please as to earn credit for his special character as he sees himself. This is one reason that he finds it difficult to apologize. His egotism is such that he feels like a special and protected

young woman in the White House simply reveals that he feels invulnerable. This buoyancy and resiliency is a political virtue that has served him well as the "come back kid." One need not inquire into private life to see these patterns. His leadership as president is sufficient.

Clinton is a good transactional politician who can win popular support and make compromises. If the affair with Lewinsky had been kept secret, his presidency would have taken much the same course that it will now take in that policy achievements will be limited. After the Lewinsky story, it will be very difficult for him to engage in the bargains of transactional politics with both Republicans and Democrats in Congress. The former will be debating impeachment and the latter will keep their distance. His moral authority may be permanently eroded. The president may have lost the opportunity for one or two major achievements, like social security reform, by his tarnishment of the office. The fact is pathetic rather than tragic, because Clinton is not a tragic hero.

Conclusion

I find the model useful in the analysis of Clinton, because it uncovers the links between skill, character, and purpose. Clinton's political personality is a seamless web. There are no sealed off compartments, and character cannot be relegated to a lesser role because strong or weak moral character will reveal themselves in political leadership sooner or later. Skill without character and purpose permits transactional success but also limits what can be achieved in politics. Clinton would have dearly loved to be a great Democratic president of reform. The uncertainties of the times would not permit it. It may be that, as a reformer with a strong political movement behind him, Clinton

deficits of character might have been forgiven at the onset and overshadowed by his achievements. But one can never be sure with Clinton. His biographer David Maraniss writes that Clinton has the capacity to pull victory out of defeat and defeat out of victory. The actions of politicians can only be explained in part by assumptions that they act "rationally" as they devise strategies to win. The idea of rational choice does not reach into the psychological, moral, and even spiritual dimensions of politics and life.

The test of my model will be its utility for comparing politicians and drawing generalizations out of the comparisons. Skill and context are mutually supportive. Discernment is the most valuable skill as it guides strategies and tactics. Moral character is a positive skill. The primary task of the president is to teach reality drawing on both empirical and normative appeals. The strongest single political resource that presidents may invoke is to be found in American values, to the "better angels of our nature." One must be prudent before one can bold. These propositions have utility for effective leadership but one must have a strong moral commitment to this way of leading in order to rely on the maxims. Realism and conviction go hand in hand.

One final thought. We have had three presidents in the last twenty-eight years who were ambitious to a fault. They achieved much but the polity was also damaged. A comparison with British or Canadian prime ministers for the same period does not reveal this kind of hungry politician. Perhaps our processes for selecting nominees for the presidency are flawed in that they reward highly ambitious, even driven candidates who, in the absence of peer review, may carry their excesses into office. I have no alternative suggestion but it is something to think about.

Soon They Will Walk Among Us: A Beginner's Guide To Understanding Formal Theory

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During a recent college vacation, my son, an English major, expressed an interest in viewing some class films that had not been part of his educational experience. His mother, an English major 25 years ago, happily accompanied him to the video store. After watching *Casablanca*, my wife dabbed the tears from her eyes and asked, "Weren't the love scenes beautiful?" Our son gave her a puzzled look: "What love scenes?" he inquired.¹

The presidency subfield has arrived at a crossroads, an opportunity every subfield in political science has bungled in the last twenty years. Formal theory stands on the periphery, preparing to come into the analysis of presidential politics. Such entrances have become a discipline-wide phenomenon. I suggest doing something that no one else has ever tried – we welcome this analysis into the tent, recognizing that diversity builds strength and that the presidency subfield has some strengths to offer theorists. Making that transition successfully depends, of course, on our vision of the enterprise. I see a romance, some see an action thriller. It just depends on what we make of it.

In hopes of better understanding what formal theorists do, I have devised this guide. It describes some basics about the formal theory (sometimes called the "rational choice") approach to analyzing American institutions. I do not intend to convert anyone nor teach anyone the technical details of any formal modeling. I hope to familiarize others with what I believe are a few of the useful aspects of this approach.

For those of you who do not know me, I trained under the first generation of rat choicers who came to political science from backgrounds in economics and mathematics. I worked as a graduate student on books about Viet Nam with titles like "the Rational Peasant." And in my early professional career, I rode with the vanguard as our tanks blasted their way into congressional studies, with titles like "Voter's Paradox and Logrolling" or "Risk and Regret for the Expected Utility Maximizer," and "Reelection Incentives and the Choice of Policy Intervention." Since those heady days, I have labored in the vineyard of presidential persuasion.

Formal theories do offer a promising analysis for presidency studies and especially to the study of presidential power. As Professor Charles Cameron recently noted at our Columbia conference on the topic, formal models focus on the meat and potatoes of *Presidential Power*: persuasion, signaling, bluffing, reputation, information, vantage, and choice. Formal models fall into four general categories depending on the modeling approach they use: social choice theory, expected utility maximization, spatial theory, or game theory.

Social Choice Theory. Modelers began with "social choice theory," a tradition in mathematics and philosophy dating to the dark ages. "Condorcet's theorem," the "paradox of voting" or "Arrow's theorem" or "cycling majorities," and "Sen's liberal paradox," all represent achievements in this area of formal theory. Arrow's work won him the Nobel prize in economics. Condorcet's got him beheaded during the French Revolution. C. L. Dodgson's work didn't, so he went back to writing under his pseudonym Lewis Carroll. So we have a tradition as old as many in political science,

older than many. Social choice theory investigates "constitutional" characteristics – what does separation of power get you? How many jurors does it take to reduce the likelihood of a false guilty verdict? What does a presidential veto afford the presidency? If you have an agenda setter (like a committee chair), does controlling the agenda give the chair ultimate power to shape the final outcome? Does a hierarchy pass information along better than a collegial system?

To investigate these questions about structure, social choice theory uses three intellectual items. First, it uses the mathematical notion of a "function," a device which takes one kind of input and gives you another kind of output. The formula for a line used in standard univariate regression analysis, $y = a + bx$, describes the linear function that transforms information about x into information about y . We can understand governing institutions as functions which take information of some sort (like votes and candidates) and transform them into other things (like "winning" candidates). The advantage of using a functional form comes from the fact that you can set conditions on the function. For example, you can define some of the normal characteristics of "democratic" rule – like a democracy should give no special favor to any alternative that might get proposed, it should lend no special weight to anyone's vote more than someone else's, it should break ties with the least amount of new information, etc..

When you take the function and set it to accomplishing these goals (or working under these constraints) you discover characteristics about these rules. Sometimes, you can prove worthwhile things, sometimes you validate old presumptions, and sometimes you run amok. One famous exercise in this genre comes from K.O. May, who demonstrated

¹Morris Fiorina, 1995, "Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise," *Critical Review*, 9 (Winter-Spring): 89.

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that the simple majority rule represents the only procedure which satisfies the above three criteria (in conjunction with a couple of other similar conditions). This may not seem like much, but it establishes the difference in *normative* terms between institutions that use a simple majority and those that use two-thirds, or unanimity, *etc.* And you can even characterize the resulting choices based on other normative criteria.² You see such an institution or such an outcome, and you will know something basic about its normative character.

Arrow's theorem constitutes the most famous of these social choice exercises. He uses the second intellectual item in social choice – the “impossibility theorem:” discerning whether a set of these defining normative conditions turn out mutually contradictory.³ *Suspecting* that a choice institution has normative foundations of sand and *proving* it constitute two different things, of course and *proving* it usually turns out to be the more difficult. Arrow claims he had developed a general impossibility theorem about the normative foundations of democratic rule. He found inconsistent five otherwise appealing normative criteria: legislative consistency, tie-

breaking, equal treatment of alternatives, Pareto's principle of fairness, and no dictators. The widely noted phenomenon called “cycling majorities” (e.g., x beats y beats z beats x) constitutes just one manifestation of Arrow's paradox. The interpretation of his impossibility result and its manifestations, beyond a purely normative understanding, becomes the work of formal theorists with substantive designs – like congress scholars studying the internal workings of committees or public administration types worrying about advisory systems.⁴

Analyzing institutions in social choice theory often utilizes simple logic and set theory (an arcane but central mathematical subfield). Establishing the “right” specification of an institutional setting constitutes one of the central intellectual activities. For an excellent and readable treatment of the subject in political science terms, without avoiding the theorems and proofs, see Thomas Schwartz, *The Logic of Collective Choice*, New York: Columbia Press.

Expected Utility Theory (EU). This approach to formal modeling relies most heavily on standard notions of “rationality.” Analysts attempt to walk through the decision process identifying all the forces that might affect a decision and trying to specify exactly how they would play a role in decision-making. This approach begins with some problem statement described usually as an algebraic statement (i.e., a *functional* statement). The statement captures formally the

motivation of and constraints placed on the decision-maker. The analyst can then manipulate this algebraic statement to investigate the various relationships inherent in the formal statement of motive and constraint. In this area, the most widely known examples revolve around mass behavior – the logic of collective action and the Downs's model of turnout effects (i.e., how the cost of voting and the difference between candidates might affect turnout).

The analysis relies on three major concepts. First, *ceteris paribus*, which constitutes one of the most complicated problems in appreciating formal models as positive theory. When one builds a formal model of decision-making, say of presidential decisions about speech making, as a function of some influences, say the weight of electoral college endowments, one inevitably leaves out significant influences. Empirical models have the same underspecification – always. In a sense, then, the formal theory as specified says that it holds constant all of the other influences that it ignores in the specification and concentrates on those it does specify. Assessing presidential speech making, then, cannot make “point” predictions about presidential behavior, only predictions about behavior holding constant all of the other forces. Sometimes this kind of analysis, where you hold constant other forces and observe the impact of changing one influence, generates “comparative statics.”

A second major element of this genre appears in the name – “expectations.” Here the notion of expectations applies to assessing the possibility of an eventuality coming to pass. You might want a particular outcome to result from a choice, but a small likelihood of such an event occurring reduces the gleam of it in your eyes. We all would want Dick Neustadt to leave Harvard and join our department - we rarely make an effort because we expect it to fall on hard times. Typically, the notion of expectations in this area comes from

² While analysts have devised many standards, the “Pareto principal” represents the most significant and minimum of these criteria about the “fairness” of a choice institution. It says, “Look-it, as unlikely as it seems, if we did have an outcome (call it ‘A’) that everybody in the decision-making body (nation, committee, board, whatever) likes better than some other alternative outcome (‘B’), then it would seem perverse if the ultimate choice between these two made by the institution turned out as B.”

³ The third item (just plain theorem proving techniques) I will skip as too long a topic to consider.

⁴See Terry Sullivan, “Voter's Paradox and Logrolling: An Initial Framework for Committee Behavior on Appropriations and Ways and Means,” *Public Choice* 25(1976):31-44. See Thomas Hammond and Paul A. Thomas. 1989. “The Impossibility of a Neutral Hierarchy,” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations*, 5:155-183.

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either the general pattern of mass behavior – given the likely turnout, what chance do you have of affecting the election of your favorite candidate? – or from the stochastic appearance of “states of nature” where processes entirely beyond the control of decision-makers play a role in shaping outcomes given decisions.

Third, the expectation of professionalism plays an important role in the positive implications of EU analysis. The analyst expects that the prize of decision-making is of sufficient value as to warrant taking on the analysis necessary to reach approximations of the results achieved by a full-blown analysis. Obviously, in institutions manned by less than professional personnel or where they face choices that have little impact the analyst cannot expect adherence to the mode of decision analysis anticipated in more professional settings where the stakes run high. The presidency, presumably, constitutes an institution of the latter sort.

Analysis in this area follows pretty much along the lines of algebraic manipulation of the functional system specified.

Spatial Theory. The most recent modeling genre, spatial models employ a geometric analogy to understanding decision-making. They rely on the notion of “closeness” as a metaphor for decision-maker’s preferences about alternatives. And in most cases, they rely on the notion of a policy “ideal” as a metaphor for the decision-maker. The most well known result in this area of formal modeling goes by the name of the “median voter” effect, sometimes attributed to Downs, sometimes attributed to Duncan Black.⁵ Median voter effects exist in many choice institutions

⁵ Anthony Downs, 1957, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper. Duncan Black, 1958, *The Theory of Committees and Elections*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Black originally published his work in 1954.

including elections and committees.

Like social choice theory, the spatial model focuses more on institutional relationships, like the nature of campaigns or the relative power of separated institutions. Take the situation of analyzing the strategic impact of the presidential veto. We might analyze that institutional characteristic by using a spatial model. If we assume that we can array all possible policies on a single dimension, we can identify decision-makers with their policy ideals and we can graph them all in the space (see Figure 1).

In this example, the legislature has 19 members. We could use any number, of course. With 19, member 10 constitutes the median voter. Let’s say that “q” indicates the current policy status quo.⁶ Now, in this simple model we could expect the legislature to settle on the alternative M. If members vote for the alternative closest to their ideal⁷ then a sizable majority (11-8) support M over q. Of course, what actually would happen in a legislature would depend upon the rules which allowed amendments, structured the sequence of choices, broke ties, etc.⁸ Barring some unfair treatment of M, barring some rule about non-orthodoxy, the M alternative would win and become policy.

Now let’s introduce a “liberal” president into this mix. Locate the president’s ideal at P (see Figure 2). In this example, the President’s veto plays an important role. The

⁶ We might imagine that an electoral shift has moved the median voter away from the previous policy status quo.

⁷ Holding aside the possibility that members at the extremes (say 18 and 19) would refuse to vote at all because they don’t see much difference between the choices.

⁸ See Terry Sullivan, 1984, *Procedural Structure: Success and Influence in Congress*, New York: Praeger.

median voter coalition supporting M over q must come to grips with two facts. First, because the President prefers q to M, a veto seems imminent. The veto, if sustained, would result in q as the policy outcome. As it currently stands, two-thirds of the members would not support M over q. Member 7, the critical member would vote for q, sustaining the veto.

Second, the median voter coalition could accept a change in overall policy incrementally, suffer a veto, and then override it if they would support a policy change closer to member 7’s ideal outcome. The ruling majority could propose an alternative “?” closer to 7’s ideal and closer to M than the status quo. Member 7 would vote against sustaining a presidential veto of ?. Thus, this spatial analysis suggests a weak position for the president in this situation. Yet, that seems like a misleading impression. The fact of a presidential veto, a constitutional constraint on the choice institution, meant that the policy expected out of the legislature changed from M to ?, a substantial improvement over M, *from the president’s perspective*. Evaluating the president’s power in this institutional setting depends on your point of view (“...what love scenes?”).

Based on this kind of analysis, several analysts, typically congressional scholars, have pursued theory about the general conflict between presidents and Congresses.⁹ They typically conclude that the veto provision affords the president few advantages in the constitutional system, *ceteris paribus*.¹⁰ Obviously, these formal results have their limitations, which some (Morris and Munger, for

⁹ See, for example, Irwin Morris and Michael Munger, 1996, “First Branch, or roof? the Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve,” *Public Choice*, 39(May):1-18 or Thomas Hammond and Gary A. Miller, 1987, “The Core of the Constitution,” *American Political Science Review*, 81:1155-75.

Figure 1





Figure 2



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example) willingly admit and introduce into their basic analysis. Others have begun to incorporate these formal theories into their own research on presidential veto use with some very interesting results.¹¹

Analysis of spatial models, of course, rests upon the geometric realities. Beyond one dimension and into two, for example, one must use the notion of closeness measured in Cartesian form as a common line of analysis. See Hammond and Miller in the *APSR* for a very good example of this kind of analysis.¹²

Game theory. While the spatial model introduces something of a notion of "strategic interplay" through its assessment of expected outcomes, the real formal modeling of strategic interdependence comes in game theoretic research. An invention of the 1920s, game theory takes as its subject those "arrangements" formal and informal that define how decision-makers (whether individuals or institutions) interact. Game theory constitutes a formal model of strategic *interdependence* very similar to what Neustadt described in his analysis of the presidency/congressional relationship.¹³ On the one hand, the president's ability to obtain support of some congressional majority limits presidential fortunes; on the other, the president's influence

tempers the power of every congressional majority.

In describing such strategic interplay, a game theoretic analysis uses one of three representations. The most detailed representation charts every decision-maker's choice, specifies every option at every decision, and describes the outcomes that result from the full sequence of all decisions made at every decision point.¹⁴ This form of a game, called the "extensive" form, most often resembles a tree turned on its side. The extensive form focuses on the interdependency of actors. Figure 1 (see page 18 for figure) illustrates an extensive form summary of bargaining between a president and a single member of Congress. An extensive form attempts to describe all of the interaction between decision-makers, including: the relationship between actors and when they can make choices, the options they face, the process of decision-making represented by the left to right movement across the chart, and the relationship between choices made and outcomes. In this representation and for simplicity of presentation, the member and the president have a limited number of options. The member can vote either *for* or *against* the administration in the last stage of the game. In the first stage of the game, the member can either respond to an administration proposal with support (commitment), opposition (oppose), or lack of support (hesitation). In response, the president can take one of two

courses of action, conceding a favor or persevering without offering any concessions.

Game theory incorporates institutional constraints on interdependence (so it can model constitutions) and it considers how decision-makers can interact with one another (so it models information conditions and signaling). In game theory, analysts have some basic tools for structuring their research; four stand out as central. First, the extensive form itself in conjunction with the assumption of rationality allows the analyst to make an argument for excluding certain "paths" in a game as not reasonable to pursue. For example, it would seem reasonable to expect that if members in the first decision of this bargaining process gave the administration a commitment of support, then the administration will not likely and gratuitously offer some kind of valuable concession, even though logically it could. So, the tree limb from "commit" to "concede" and onto the voting decision seems decidedly withered.¹⁵ In some instances, eliminating paths constitutes an important advance.

Second, game theory analyses search for "equilibrium." Where mutual dependence constitutes the interplay of decision-making, then situations in which no one can make themselves better off on their own constitute interesting situations. In such situations, individual decision-makers have exhausted their independence and the analyst has an assessment of the defining limits of the mutual dependence that constrains the decision-making.

Finding equilibrium has become an important job in game theory. Some games have

¹⁰ See, alternatively, D. Rodrick Kiewit and Mathew McCubbins, 1988, "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions," *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(August):713-36 or Daniel E. Ingberman and Dennis A. Yao. 1991. "Presidential Commitments and the Veto," *American Journal of Political Science*, 35(May):357-89.

¹¹ Charles Cameron, 1996, *Sequential Vetoes, Bargaining, and Presidential Power*, Paper presented to a conference entitled, *Presidential Power: Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-first Century*, in New York at Columbia University.


¹² Hammond and Miller, *op. cit.*

¹³ Richard Neustadt, 1960, *Presidential Power*, New York: John Wiley and Sons: p. 356.

¹⁴ In addition to form described here, the second form ("normal") emphasizes the strategic options of decision-makers. It takes strategies as the principal element of study. The third form ("characteristic function") uses a functional description of the game's outcomes as the central element of analysis.

¹⁵ Similarly, to oppose the administration makes a secure commitment to opposition beyond the capacity of the administration to "buy" support with some concession. We assume, thus, that no amount of concession will obtain civil rights support from Jesse Helms.

Figure 3. An Extensive Form Representation of Presidential Bargaining



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none, some have a well defined range (or set) of equilibrium, and some have a plethora of equilibrium.¹⁶

Bargaining games tend to have many equilibrium. A very common approach to sorting through outcomes and strategic choices leading to identifying equilibrium, called "backwards induction," traces out decisions from the final outcomes asking at each node "what seems best here?" For example, at the member's last decision node after committing and seeing the President choosing to persevere in the administration's position (the bottom node on the graph), the member faces two choices with two resultant outcomes: vote *for* or *against*. At that point one might ask which seems best for that member at that point. We can assess the other options too, assuming that the President concedes after a commitment from the member (although we have already noted the irrationality of that possibility). In both situations, we might conclude that the member would vote *for* in both situations. Commitments mean something, after all. Working backwards, then, we can assess the President's response at the previous stage, observing a commitment. Since conceding after a commitment gets the president a vote *for* along with a concession (δ), persevering seems best at that point. Thus, through backwards induction we can assess a reasonable scenario if the member chose to commit – Commit, Persevere, *for*. Likewise, going down the other "hesitant" bran-

ch, we might observe a conundrum for the President. If the member genuinely hesitates, then a concession will result in a vote *for* while if the President persevered, the member would want to vote *against*. In the end, the member can count on presidential concessions when necessary (expressed by a hesitation) and perseverance whenever the member commits.

"Why don't members always hesitate, then?" one might inquire after seeing this backwards induction. Indeed. The fourth critical element in modern game theoretic analysis focuses entirely on such "information" driven considerations. If Presidents and members know each other well, just like really good friends playing poker, then hesitation and commitment take on special roles. They signal to the *well informed* decision-maker the strategic condition. So, where Presidents and members enjoy the condition of "perfect information," an equilibrium develops around the President's responsiveness to the desires of the member. Administrations never concede favors unless members hesitate and the concession always buys a vote *for*. Members never hesitate unless a favor would help. Otherwise they oppose or commit, which signals a straightforward response from the President.

In situations of "incomplete" information, where politicians resemble strangers in significant ways, backwards induction seems to yield interesting consequences. Bluffing becomes a possibility. Even a good friend becomes a fiend under some circumstances. One might find it advantageous to feign hesitancy, for example, in order to obtain a concession even though the resultant vote would remain the same, i.e., *for*. Obviously, administrations have to sort through when members bluff and when they genuinely need help. Unfortunately, too, backwards induction suggests that even the "good" might yield to temptation, when they represent others.

In the end, game theoretic analysis of such interactions brings to the fore just the kinds of issues presidential scholars value – reputation, power, strategy, keeping counsel, taking advantage. But it adds a new twist for consideration. And it puts a handle on many of these complex problems.

To my way of thinking, having a handle, however crude it may seem, on something (presidential bargaining) we have had a concern about for more than thirty years seems like a good deal. Wherever these new theories can help us, we should bring them in. Most of these formal models, though, critics might suspect have generic genealogies. The author originally cared about the models more than applications. Such a characterization, however, might seem appropriate for social choice theories like Arrow's but not expected value models like Olsen's logic of collection action or Down's model of elections. Recently, a number of researchers have become embroiled in a dispute over whether or not formal theories and theorists have an "empirical agenda." In my impression, positive theory and testing have always stood at the center of formal theory, where it applied to institutions, maybe not to policy. Some policy types, like Niskanen, have given formal models a bad reputation by proffering models with decidedly weak models of institutions but with decidedly appealing political messages. Many modelers, especially in congressional studies (e.g., Michael Munger, Morris Fiorina, Keith Poole, R. D. R. Hbeil, Mathew McCubbins, Gary C. Sorkin, Howard Rosenthal, Keith Poole) care a good deal about empirical testing. Charles Cameron's new book on presidential vetoes, highlighted in part at the Columbia conference, represents one of the new formal model driven empirical analyses of the presidential institution. And my own work on bargains and headcounts falls into the same genre.

¹⁶Game theory has developed a number of concepts associated with types of equilibrium, a jargon which typically gets reserved for general equilibriums. If we consider the separate limbs in the tree as "sub-game" portions of the larger interaction, then we might identify "sub-game equilibrium." General equilibrium also have to be subgame equilibrium. See James Morrow, 1994, *Game Theory for Political Scientists*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Announcements

A Tribute to Norman C. Thomas by Steven A. Schull, University of New Orleans

About two years ago, I was asked to develop a volume of essays on the presidency in honor of the pending retirement of Norman C. Thomas, Charles Phelps Taft Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati. Norm has long been a mentor to me and many other students of the presidency because of his insightful analysis and incorporation of a public policy perspective to studying the office. Norm and I collaborated with George Edwards in 1985 to produce a volume of original essays using policy approaches in examining the presidency, and it seemed like a good time to update what we know about this vital institution in American politics. The resulting effort is entitled *Presidential Policymaking: An End of Century Assessment* and will be published late this year by M. E. Sharpe Inc. with a 1999 copyright date.

Norman Thomas received his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1959 and taught at Michigan and Duke before settling in Cincinnati. He mentored many students and gained numerous admirers along the way. Norm has a long and distinguished career as a political scientist, and I am not the only one to whom he has given time and ideas. He critiques the work of and writes letters of recommendations for many scholars in the discipline. He has also influenced the contributors to the above volume. The 16 chapters focus on the contemporary presidency in a comparative and policy context, an approach that Norm successfully incorporated in studying American national institutions, and all of the selections reveal his influence.

Norm argues that a public policy approach provides a more analytical understanding of the most crucial institution in American politics. In his writings, he reminds us of the necessary interactions among institutions, processes, and policies. He stresses interactions between presidents and actors inside and outside government. Such an approach invites comparison, generalization, and concern for relevance, themes that appear throughout the selections in the volume. A policy approach may seem all encompassing, which contributes to complexity, but it also forces scholars to consider the structure and environment within which presidents must operate. It is an approach that virtually all of the fine scholars in *Presidential Policymaking* have found useful regardless of their particular emphases in presidential studies.

After Thomas' forward, chapters by myself and James P. Pfiffner introduce the nature of presidential policymaking. Then, presidential relations with actors outside government are discussed by Jeffrey E. Cohen and Ken Collier (public opinion), Joseph A. Pika (interest groups), Sidney M. Milkis (political parties), and Lyn Ragsdale and Jerrold Rusk (elections). Following these exogenous influences, the following authors cover presidential relations with actors inside government: George C. Edwards III (Congress), Shirley A. Warsaw (staff), Richard W. Waterman (bureaucracy), and Jeffrey A. Segal and Robert M. Howard (courts). The focus then shifts to comparing policy areas important to the presidency: Paul J. Quirk and Bruce Nesmith (domestic policy), Lance T. LeLoup (budgeting), James E. Anderson (economic), and Louis Fisher (foreign and defense policy).

The final two chapters form the conclusion to *Presidential Policymaking* and focus more directly on Norm's research. Mary E. Stuckey examines presidential power and accountability, while Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman compare presidential policy leadership, concepts Norm considered important in studying the presidency. Norm also argued that if there is one constant in presidential policymaking, it is change, what he refers to as the "protean presidency." All of these components of policymaking help move research from discrete case study analysis toward more cumulative knowledge, which Norm views as vitally important for arriving at a fuller understanding of the American presidency.

Announcements

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Edwards Named Editor of *Presidential Studies Quarterly*

George C. Edwards III has been named editor of *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. The first issue for which I have responsibility will be the Summer 1999 issue. The *Quarterly* will continue to welcome articles from authors in the fields of political science, history, and communications, as well as other fields. It also welcomes authors employing a wide range of methods and perspectives. The concern is with theoretical significance and analytical rigor. All submissions will undergo efficient blind peer reviews by multiple reviewers.

Contributors should send manuscripts to George C. Edwards III, Editor, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Center for Presidential Studies, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4349. Send 4 copies of each manuscript, three of which have all references removed that could identify the author, and an approximately 100-word abstract. Manuscripts will not be returned. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* does not consider manuscripts submitted simultaneously to other journals or those exceeding 50 standard pages (250 words per page). The text should be double-spaced, using reference-in-text format. References and footnotes should appear on separate pages, double-spaced at the end of the text. Tables and figures should also appear on separate pages at the end of the manuscript.

The editor's goal is to establish a reputation for excellence and attract outstanding work by both well-established and emerging scholars. He wishes to make the *Quarterly* the focus of presidency research and also provide accessible materials on the contemporary presidency. He welcomes your input.

The Alice Paul Award

The Women's Caucus for Political Science of the American Political Science Association announces the annual competition for its Alice Paul Award. This \$500 award is given in recognition of the best dissertation proposal submitted by a woman graduate student in political science in the current academic year. Applicants from all the subfields of political science are welcomed; self-nominations are encouraged.

Proposals should be five (single-spaced) to eight (double-spaced) typewritten pages in length, specifying the research topic and design. Contributions to the field and to the literature should be clearly delineated. The nominee's name, institutional affiliation, and address (mailing address, telephone, and e-mail for the academic year and the summer) should be provided on a detachable title page. The nominee's name should not appear in the text of the dissertation proposal. The Award Committee will read and evaluate the proposals "blind."

Six (6) copies of the proposal, with detachable title page, must be submitted to:

MaryAnne Borrelli, Associate Professor of Government
Chair, Alice Paul Award Committee
Connecticut College, College Box 5418
270 Mohegan Avenue
New London, Connecticut 06320

Under no circumstances can submissions be made electronically.

The deadline for the 1998-1999 competition is April 1, 1999.

The award will be announced at the business meeting of the Women's Caucus for Political Science at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. It is hoped - but not required - that the recipient will be able to receive the award in person.

Announcements

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Best Dissertation on the Presidency Prize

The Center for Presidential Studies in The George Bush School of Government and Public Service announces the third annual national competition for the best doctoral dissertation on the American presidency. The competition is open to scholars in any field, and dissertations may focus on any aspect of the presidency. Nominations may be made by chairs of dissertation committees or other faculty members.

The winners will receive a \$1,000 award and expenses to present their work at Texas A&M University. The prize also carries with it the opportunity for publication in the Presidency and Leadership Series of Texas A&M University Press.

Nominations for the prize should include three copies of the dissertation and a cover letter. They should be sent to George C. Edward III, Director, The Center for Presidential Studies, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843. Dissertations accepted for degree completion in 1997 are eligible. The deadline for nominations is February 15, 1999. For additional information see our website at www-bush-school.tamu.edu/prez.html.

Awards

Jeffrey Cohen Wins Neustadt Award

The Richard Neustadt Award winner for the best book published on the American presidency in 1997 goes to Jeffrey E. Cohen of Fordham University. Jeff's book, *Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policy-Making: The Public and the Policies That President's Choose*, from the University of Michigan Press, improves our understanding of the way presidents respond to public opinion in the shaping of presidential policy making agenda. It will be widely read and cited - and should be, for it demonstrates why presidents struggle so hard to control the policy-making processes.

Cohen's examination of four policy-making activities - problem identification, substantive rhetoric, policy formation, and policy legitimization - shows that presidents are quite responsive to public opinion in selection of policy issues, but considerably less responsive thereafter. Once issues are selected, presidents then respond to public opinion chiefly by symbolic gesture rather than substantive change. Presidents count on making good policy to ultimately vindicate this lack of heed to public opinion.

Jeffrey Cohen's book will be a mainstay for all serious students of the American presidency for years to come.

Russell D. Renka, Chairperson
Richard E. Neustadt Awards Committee

Founder's Award Goes to Bruce Buchanan

The Founder's Award for the best paper on the presidency given at the 1997 APSA Meeting goes to Bruce Buchanan of the University of Texas. Professor Buchanan's paper on "Presidential Campaign Quality" was selected from a strong slate of nominees. It addresses an important topic of concern to all who are interested in the presidency, and does so in a theoretically interesting and methodologically sophisticated way. The paper presents operational indicators of campaign quality (policy signals and regime support) and analyzes them in the context of the 1988, 1992, and 1996 elections. It identifies the situational factors that produce higher quality campaigns and ties its findings to a discussion of campaign reform. The paper adds significantly to our understanding and will stimulate additional important work by others.

Joel D. Aberbach, Chair
Founders' Award Committee

Awards (continued from page 24)

David Yalof Receives Prize for Best Dissertation on the Presidency

Professor Jim Pfiffner, chair of the Center for Presidential Studies' committee to determine the best dissertation on the presidency wrote the following on behalf of his committee (including John Maltese, and Richard Gregg) in awarding the prize for 1997 dissertations to Professor David Yalof of the University of Connecticut:

After carefully examining all of the dissertations submitted, the committee unanimously recommends that the prize for the best dissertation on the presidency be awarded to David A. Yalof, a graduate of Johns Hopkins University, for his dissertation, "Choosing Supreme Court Nominees: Selection Politics from Truman to Reagan." In a field of other fine dissertations, the committee believes that Yalof has chosen an important aspect of presidential power and has contributed significantly to our understanding of presidential nominations.

Presidents have the opportunity to shape public policy through Supreme Court appointments. Since Supreme Court Justices have life tenure, they can influence policy long after the presidents who nominate them leave office. As a result, nominees are carefully scrutinized and often opposed by a variety of organized interests during the confirmation process. Although the confirmation stage has been much studied, little scholarship has focused on the initial, internal stage of the process when presidents choose nominees.

The initial selection of a nominee is extremely important. An ill-considered nomination could either lead to an embarrassing defeat at the confirmation stage (undermining a president's short-term political capital) or result in the confirmation of a Justice whose voting behavior on the Court is inconsistent with the president's wishes (undermining a president's long-term ability to influence judicial policy). The initial selection process has also become more complicated as presidential staff resources have grown. Multiplication of staff resources in the White House and Justice Department has led to overlapping jurisdiction and internal power struggles over who should be nominated and why.

Despite the importance of the initial selection process of Supreme Court nominees, very little scholarship has focused on it. Part of this dearth of scholarship is due to the lack of public records and difficulties with access to primary sources. Public confirmation battles are simply easier to study. Thus one of Yalof's contributions was to mine thoroughly the presidential archives for documents internal to the presidency and Justice Department in order to illuminate the initial selection process. In addition, Yalof uses skillfully his own interviews with participants in the process to add to our understanding.

Yalof's analysis leads us to a much more sophisticated understanding of how the internal process of selection worked in the Truman through Reagan years. His analysis highlights the necessity of building consensus and resolving conflicts among competing interests at the initial stages, even before nominations are announced. He discerns interesting differences among different administrations with respect to the delegation or personal decision making involved, and he points out the benefits and liabilities of each strategy.

In summary, Dr. Yalof has chosen an interesting and important question; he has mined heavily primary sources in his research; and he has added significantly to our understanding of presidential selection of Supreme Court Nominees. In our judgement, he deserves the award for the best dissertation on the presidency.

Upcoming Conferences

Reinventing the Presidency Conference

The Program in American Politics in The Center for Presidential Studies at Texas A&M University will host a conference on *Reinventing the Presidency*, October 1-2, 1999 at The Bush School of Government and Public Service in College Station. The conference addresses two questions of public and academic concern. Is the presidency optimally designed for effective governance in the 21st century? If the current presidency has limitations and restrictions, how should the institution be redesigned? The focus of the conference will be on institutional factors, that is, rules and structures rather than behavioral factors.

The presidency performs four key functions in the U.S. polity: agenda setting, decision making, coalition building, and policy implementation. Agenda setting includes setting national and international priorities and determining the issues to which the president devotes scarce political capital. Decision making involves designing policy, selecting and motivating personnel, obtaining appropriate advice, and managing crises. Coalition building includes building alliances in foreign policy, coalescing support in Congress, and marshaling public opinion. Implementation is the process of taking care that the laws are faithfully executed and deals primarily, but not exclusively, with bureaucratic oversight.

While performing each function, the presidency faces major changes in technology, complexity, interdependence, political alignments, and issues. The *Reinventing the Presidency* conference has commissioned essays by Charles O. Jones, Karen Hult, George Edwards, David Lowery, Paul Light, and Burt Rockman to address how the presidency might be restructured. Commentary on the essays by scholars of the presidency and political institutions will be made by Lee Sigelman, B. Dan Wood, Fred Greenstein, Kim Quaile Hill, Stephen Skowronek, Jon Bond, Laurence J. O'Toole, Robert Durant, George Krause, Pat Hurley, Louis Fisher, and Charles Hermann. There will also be a policymaker roundtable coordinated by James Pfiffner. The conference will conclude with a discussion/debate on Article II of the Constitution.

The conference is open to scholars, policymakers, and journalists interested in the presidency. Conference registration is free and meals are provided for a nominal fee. A limited number of travel grants of up to \$300.00 are available. Individuals interested in additional information should contact Kenneth J. Meier, Conference Coordinator, Center for Presidential Studies, Texas A&M University, College Station TX 77843.

Congress and the President in a Partisan Era

The power to make national policy in the United States, as Richard Neustadt aptly observed, is shared between Congress and the president. Historically, the U.S. Congress has been characterized by weak partisanship. Consequently, much of what we know about presidential-congressional relations is based on observations of interactions in a weak partisan environment. Beginning in the 1980s, politics in Congress and the White House became more partisan. We know much less about presidential-congressional relations in a partisan environment.

The Program in American Politics at Texas A&M University is sponsoring a conference to address this issue. The conference, to be held at Texas A&M University on February 5th and 6th, 1999, brings together a group of leading scholars of American Politics to present original research examining how elevated partisanship has affected various aspects of inter-branch interactions in the formation of public policy.

The program participants and tentative paper titles are as follows:

John H. Aldrich, Duke University, and **David W. Rohde**, Michigan State University

"The Consequences of Party Organizations in the House: Theory and Evidence on Conditional Party Government"

Sam Kernell and **Tim Groeling**, University of California, San Diego

"When Presidents and Their Congressional Party Disagree: Public Competition to Define the Party Label."

Barbara Sinclair, University of California, Los Angeles

"Hostile Partners: The President, Congress and Lawmaking in the Partisan 1990s"

George C. Edwards III, and **Andrew Barrett**, Texas A&M University

"Presidential Agenda Setting in Congress"

Richard Fleisher, Fordham University, and **Jon R. Bond**, Texas A&M University

"Partisanship and the President's Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress"

Anyone interested in attending the conference should contact: Professor Jon R. Bond, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4348. Phone: (409) 845-4246. E-Mail: jonbond@polisci.tamu.edu

Doing Research Online at the Presidential Libraries

Robert Bohanan

Jimmy Carter Library

In the Spring 1998 *PRG Report*, Sherrie Fletcher of the Ronald Reagan Library mentioned how the Reagan Library is working with the Electronic Access Project (EAP) at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to provide greater access to the Library's holdings. In fact, all of the Presidential libraries have joined this effort. The work to date has produced a good start at a virtual Presidential library system.

The EAP has developed a web-based National Archives Information Locator (NAIL) which contains descriptions of holdings throughout NARA, these include approximately 175,000 textual records (at varying levels of the archival hierarchy,) almost 100,000 films and videos, 40,000 sound recordings, and 50,000 still pictures. In addition, select sample records have been digitized and made available through NAIL, these include over 50,000 still pictures, about 360 maps and charts, 75 sound recordings, and more than 5,000 textual documents.

The Presidential libraries' contributions to NAIL are substantial. In the late 1980s the Ford and Carter Libraries implemented an in-house database to access their holdings at the folder-title level. The current contents of the Carter database (approximately 37,000 folder titles) are now available in NAIL. To search the open holdings of the Jimmy Carter Library via the World Wide Web, point your browser to: www.nara.gov/nara/nail/searchnail.html. A search form will come up which asks you for the terms you wish to search. The more specific you are, the narrower your search will be, and the more focused on your topic the responses will be. There is a "Help" button on this screen if you need more assistance. Leave the "Media" box unchanged. In the "NARA Units" box select "Jimmy Carter Library (Atlanta, GA)", and click on "Submit" to retrieve the information about holdings in the Library related to your topic. Your resulting search will describe collections, series, and file folders in the open collections of the Jimmy Carter Library on a screen titled "NAIL Brief Results." You may (if you choose) retrieve the "Full Results" as well. The information elements which the Library requires to access the specific file folders are the Collection Title, File Folder Title, and Box Number. Plans are underway to convert the Ford Library database to NAIL's successor, an even more functional database which has yet to be named. In the meantime, the Ford Library has contributed 285 photographs and some documents to the digitizing project.

The Lyndon B. Johnson Library has approximately 5,000 records in NAIL describing two series of great interest. They are the JFK Assassination Related Recordings and Transcripts (1963-67), and the White House Telephone Recordings and Transcripts (1963-69). Other libraries have contributed heavily to the digitizing project. The Hoover Library has digitized over 30 documents. The Roosevelt Library has over 2,000 photographs, 250 speeches, and almost 500 documents imaged on the web and accessible through NAIL. The Truman Library has put up 2,000 photographs and 73 documents. The Eisenhower Library contributed about 100 documents. The Kennedy Library contributed 100 photographs. In addition to the descriptions of their sound recordings, the Johnson Library has put up on the web 140 photographs, and over 500 documents.

There are 432 photographs from the Nixon Project, 100 photos and 278 documents from the Reagan Library, and 100 photographs from the Bush Library available through NAIL. In addition to the database of its open holdings, the Carter Library has digitized 865 photographs and over 800 pages of manuscripts which will be added to the NARA website in November 1998. These materials may be searched in NAIL using the instructions above. Simply substitute the name of the Library you are interested in searching in the "NARA Units" box of the search screen.

While the libraries contributed their materials and descriptions, the real work in digitizing and putting our materials up on the web was done by the Electronic Access Project. All of the libraries are particularly grateful to Debra Wall and Dan Jansen for both their efforts and their patience.

Each individual Presidential library has its own homepage with even more material available for research. For more information on NAIL, the EAP and Presidential libraries homepages, check the NARA homepage at www.nara.gov.

Books and Articles on the Presidency

Mary Anne Borrelli

Connecticut College

Books on the Presidency

A note to the reader: The following book list includes texts and collections, in addition to scholarly works, is the belief that such information is useful in planning courses and designing syllabi. Whenever possible, entries include price and ISBN information.

Berman, William C. 1998. *America's Right Turn, From Nixon to Clinton*, 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University. 240 pp. \$38.95, cloth, ISBN 0-8018-5871-2. \$14.95, paper, ISBN 0-8018-5872-0.

Bose, Meena. 1998. *Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy, The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy*. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press. 224 pp. \$29.95, ISBN 0-89096-833-0.

Christopher, Warren. 1998. *In the Stream of History, Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 586 pp. \$60.00, cloth, ISBN 3225-6. \$22.95, paper, ISBN 3468-2.

Denton, Robert E., ed. 1998. *The 1996 Presidential Campaign, A Communication Perspective*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. 299 pp. \$65.00, cloth, ISBN 0-295-95681-4. \$24.95, paper, ISBN 0-275-96152-4.

Ferrell, Robert H. 1998. *The Dying President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-1945*. 208 pp. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press. 208 pp. \$24.95, ISBN 0-8262-1171-2.

Garrison, Jean A. 1998. *Games Advisors Play, Foreign Policy in the Nixon and Carter Administrations*. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press. 256 pp. \$34.95, ISBN 0-89096-862-4.

George, Alexander L. and Juliette L. George. 1998. *Presidential Personality and Per-*

formance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 304 pp. \$65.00, cloth, ISBN 0-8133-2590-0. \$25.00, paper, ISBN 0-8133-2591-9.

Hogan, Michael J. 1998. *A Cross of Iron, Harry S Truman and the Origins of the National Security State*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 480 pp. \$34.95, ISBN 64044-X.

Jones, Charles O. 1998. *Passages to the Presidency, From Campaigning to Governing*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 232 pp. \$39.95, cloth, ISBN 0-8157-4714-4. \$16.95, paper, ISBN 0-8157-4713-6.

Kurtz, Howard. 1998. *Spin Cycle, How the White House and the Media Manipulate the News*. New York: Simon and Schuster. 346 pp. \$14.00, ISBN 0-684-85715-4.

Liebovich, Louis W. 1998. *The Press and the Modern Presidency, Myths and Mindsets from Kennedy to Clinton*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. 256 pp. \$59.95, ISBN 0-275-95926-0.

Maney, Patrick J. 1998. *The Roosevelt Presence, The Life and Legacy of FDR*. Berkley: University of California Press. 270 pp. \$17.95, ISBN 21637-7.

Marolda, Edward J. 1998. *FDR and the US Navy*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 176 pp. \$49.95, ISBN 0-312-21157-0.

Matusow, Allen J. 1998. *Nixon's Economy; Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 304 pp. \$35.00, ISBN 0700608885.

Mitchell, Franklin D. 1998. *Harry S Truman and the News Media; Contentious Relations, Belated Respect*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press. 288 pp. \$34.95, ISBN 0-8262-1180-1.

Montgomery, Gayle B. and James W. Johnson. 1998. *One Step from the White House, The Rise and Fall of Senator William F. Knowland*. Berkley: University of California Press. 400 pp. \$29.95, ISBN 21194-4.

Nelson, Michael. 1998. *The Evolving Presidency; Addresses, Cases, Essays, Letters, Reports, Resolutions, Transcripts, and Other Landmark Documents*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 250 pp. \$14.95, ISBN 1-56802-369-3.

Pierpaoli, Paul G., Jr. 1998. *Truman and Korea, The Political Culture of the Early Cold War*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press. 288 pp. \$32.50, ISBN 0-8262-1206-9.

Ragsdale, Lyn. 1998. *Vital Statistics on the Presidency: Washington to Clinton*, rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 500 pp. \$50.95, cloth, ISBN 1-56802-393-6. \$35.95, paper, ISBN 1-56802-427-4.

Richardson, Don, ed. 1998. *Conversations with Carter*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 340 pp. \$39.95, ISBN 1-55587-801-6.

Shull, Steven A., ed. 1998. *Presidential Policymaking, An End-of-Century Assessment*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 320 pp. \$66.95, cloth, ISBN 0-7656-0259-8. \$24.95, paper, ISBN 0-7656-0260-1.

Tenpas, Kathryn Dunn. 1998. *Presidents as Candidates, Inside the White House for the Presidential Campaign*. New York: Garland. 230 pp. \$54.00, ISBN 0-8153-2506-1.

Tomkin, Shelley Lynne. 1998. *Inside OMB: Politics and Process in the President's Budget Office*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 352 pp. \$50.95, ISBN 1-56324-454-3.

Articles on the Presidency

A note to the reader: Because every article in the *Presidential Studies Quarterly* relates to this column, and because limited space argues against replicating its tables of contents, only the themes which define each issue of the journal are listed.

Books and Articles on the Presidency

(continued from page 28)

- Bose, Meena. 1998. "Words as Signals: Drafting Cold War Rhetoric in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations." *Congress and the Presidency* 25: 23-41. Examines the speech writing processes of Eisenhower and Kennedy and argues that George's multiply advocacy recommendation for presidential foreign policy decision making is also applicable to presidential speech writing.
- Chaney, Carole Kennedy, R. Michael Alvarez, and Jonathan Nagler. 1988. "Explaining the Gender Gap in the U.S. Presidential Elections, 1980-1992," *Political Research Quarterly* 51.2:311-339. Uses a multivariate model to explore sex differences in voting, finding that men and women place different emphases on different issues and that women have the consistently more negative assessments of the economy. The role of partisan identification in explaining the gender gap is therefore at once clarified and questioned.
- Cohen, Jeffrey E. "State-Level Public Opinion Polls as Predictors of Presidential Election Results," *American Politics Quarterly* 26.2: 139-159. Develops a model to test whether these mostly commercial polls can be employed in future modeling and forecasting efforts.
- Fisher, Louis and David Gray Adler. 1998. "The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye," *Political Science Quarterly* 113.1: 1-20. Argues that the War Powers Resolution grants the president undue discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs and warmaking power, stating that immediate repeal is necessary to reduce inappropriate military engagements and legislative powerlessness.
- Gleiber, Dennis W., Steven A. Shull, and Colleen A. Waligora. 1998. "Measuring the President's Professional Reputation," *American Politics Quarterly* 26.3: 366-385. Develops a model to operationalize Neustadt's conception of the president's professional reputation, utilizing nearly 3600 editorials in the New York Times from 1961 to 1992.
- Harknett, Richard J. and Norman C. Thomas. 1998. "The Precedence of Power: Determining Who Should Authorize Force," *Congress and the Presidency* 25: 1-22. Re-examines the debate over the War Powers Resolution and suggest that changing the question from one of exclusive prerogative to one of conditional precedence creates the possibility for effective resolution.
- Hult, Karen M. and Charles E. Walcott. 1998. "Policymakers and Wordsmiths: Writing for the President under Johnson and Nixon," *Polity* 30.3: 465-487. Locates the beginning of the current disjunction between presidential speechwriting and the clear expression of administration goals to the Johnson presidency, comparing the organizational responses of Johnson and Nixon to this phenomenon.
- Koch, Jeffrey. 1998. "The Perot Candidacy and Attitudes toward Government and Politics," *Political Research Quarterly* 51.1: 141-153. Uses American National Election Study data to examine the effects of the 1992 Perot campaign – and third parties more generally – on voter turnout and alienation.
- Lockerbie, Brad, Stephen Borrelli, and Scott Hedger. 1998. "An Integrative Approach to Modeling Presidential Success in Congress," *Political Research Quarterly* 51.1: 155-172. Proposes and tests an integrative multivariate model predicting aggregate annual presidential success on House and Senate roll calls from 1953 to 1994.
- Meinhold, Stephen S. and Steven A. Shull. 1998. "Policy Congruence Between the President and the Solicitor General," *Political Research Quarterly* 51.2: 527-537. Examines presidential rhetoric in four policy areas, finding that these statements are an important predictor of the filing of discretionary amicus curiae briefs by the solicitor general.
- Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 1998. 28.1, Wheeling and Dealing in the White House.
- Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 1998. 28.2, The Buck Stops Here: Decision Making in the Oval Office.
- Rosenblatt, Alan J. 1998. "Aggressive Foreign Policy Marketing: Public Response to Reagan's 1983 Address on Lebanon and Grenada," *Political Behavior* 20: 225-240. Investigates how presidential speeches on the use of military force effect people's opinions. Uses a quasi-experiment to show that these speeches are often followed by increased public support for the use of military force.
- Sharbel, Kelly M., Lynne F. Moffitt, Paul F. Leimer, Ruth A. Shane, and Charles T. Goodsell. 1998. "Cornerstones of Presidential Power: The First Executive Office Buildings," *Administration and Society* 30: 194-208. Presents an historical account of the development of executive office buildings.
- Wittkopf, Eugene R. and James M. McCormick. 1998. "Congress, the President, and the End of the Cold War: Has Anything Changed?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42.4: 440-466. Argues that increased conflict between the Congress and the president in the post-cold war period is the result of members' role responsibilities and ideological preferences.
- Yates, Jeff and Andrew Whitford. 1998. "Research Note: Presidential Power and the United States Supreme Court," *Political Research Quarterly* 51.2: 539-550. Provides a model of Supreme Court voting on presidential power cases, arguing that support for the president is conditioned upon the president's approval rating and the justice's ideological position, with the subject matter of the case also influential.
- Yawn, Mike, Kevin Ellsworth, Bob Beatty, and Kim Fridkin Kahn. 1998. "How Presidential Primary Debate Changed Attitudes of Audience Members," *Political Behavior* 20: 155-181. Examines the effect of presidential primary debates on voters' attitudes towards presidential candidates using a quasi-experimental research design. Presidential candidates in the 1996 Arizona Republican primary debate were able to change people's assessments of candidates and public policy stances.

Secretary-Treasurer's Report

Robert J. Spitzer

SUNY-Cortland

As of August 3, 1998, the Presidency Section (#9) had 398 individual memberships, according to the APSA. This compares with 385 from 1997, 416 from 1996, and 421 from 1995. Given that all these numbers hover around 400, we can assume a generally stable membership base.

The organization continues on a solid financial footing. For the fiscal year 7/1/97-6/30/98, the PRG began with a checking account balance of \$3160.62. It acquired revenues of \$2489.15, and spent \$2178.92, for a net surplus of \$310.23. Our largest expenditures were expenses stemming from the APSA meeting, and duplicating costs associated with production of the *PRG Report*. I note one item of particular interest. While the Presidency section's membership level stands at about the middle when compared to that of the other 32 APSA organized sections, the PRG generated more rebate dollars from the purchase of section mailing lists (\$292.66) than any of the other 32 sections. This clearly reflects the particular interest of outside organizations (or whoever purchases mailing lists from the APSA) in reaching scholars of the presidency.

Minutes of the Annual Meeting

The annual business meeting of the PRG was called to order by President Terry Sullivan at 12:30 PM on September 5, 1998 at the Sheraton Boston Hotel, Boston. Approximately 50 members attended. After adopting the report of the Secretary-Treasurer, Sullivan expressed thanks to outgoing board members Michael Genovese and Ryan Barilleaux. The new slate of board members, David Gray Adler, Victoria Farrer-Myers, James Pfiffner, Mark Rozell, and Shirley Anne Warshaw, was approved by the membership. They will serve a three-year term.

Reporting on the Thursday section heads meeting, Sullivan said that some of the APSA sections objected to the \$3 fee the APSA

extracts from section member dues. The year 2003 is the 100th anniversary of the APSA, and plans are moving ahead to establish Presidency Research Fellowships.

The section head for the 1999 APSA, Cary Covington of the University of Iowa, reminded the assembled group about the new submission guidelines for presenters and others, noting in particular that proposals now are sent to the APSA rather than to section heads. The 1999 conference theme on the real world impact of political science is one especially suited to the Presidency section, he noted. Our group has been allotted 13 panels; panel attendance and submissions are important in determining future allocations. Panels split between more than one section are especially sought, and the deadline for proposals is November 15. Short courses do not count against our panel totals.

The Neustadt Award for best book written on the presidency published in 1997 was given out by selection committee chair Russell Renka. The award went to Jeffrey Cohen for his book, *Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policymaking* (University of Michigan Press). Joel Aberbach presented the Founder's Award for Best Paper presented at the 1997 convention, named after the late Dom Bonafede, to Bruce Buchanan of the University of Texas at Austin for his paper, "Presidential Campaign Quality."

Martha Joynt Kumar spoke about the White House Interview Program (WHIP), which has been funded by the Pew Charitable Trust to the tune of \$250,000 for three years. Interviews of White House staff will be conducted spanning six White House offices, including Chief of Staff, Staff Secretary, Press Administration, Legal Counsel, Office of Administration, and Transition Office. Aside from its research uses, the information will be used for helping the transi-

tion process to occur at the end of the year 2000. Other information will also be accumulated. Confidential and public web sites will be set up so that this information can be accessed. Those interested can contact Kumar at: mkumar@ibm.net

Kumar also reported that PRG Fellowships are also being established. A funded presidency prize will be created for presidency scholars to work out of an office at the APSA. The goal is to raise \$50,000 in three years to provide \$2500 for ten weeks of research time. Of this fund total, \$18,000 has already been raised. A fellowship named after the late Ann Devroy will be established for young scholars.

George Edwards reported that he has been named editor of the *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. The journal will operate via peer review, a new editorial board will be named, the journal will be redesigned, and the first new issue under his leadership will be Summer 1999. Edwards invites suggestions for issues and topics.

A motion was made to thank Janet Martin for her three years of work on the state of the discipline and fundraising issues. The meeting was adjourned at 1:20 PM.

**American Political Science Association
Organized Section Expense Report
for the Period July 1, 1997 Through June 30, 1998**

Funds at Beginning of Period (7/1/97) 3,160.62

Revenue for Period 1,895.00

APSA Section Dues

Publication Sales

Interest Income

Other Revenue (Labels) 594.15

Total Revenue 2,489.15

Expenditures for Period

Copying and Printing 652.50

Postage 153.57

Telephone

Travel 145.00

Staff

Bank Service Fees 10.00

Business Meeting & Receptions 846.87

Other (Awards) 370.98

Total Expenditures 2,178.92

Net Activity for the Period 310.23

Funds at End of Period (6/30/98)

Location & Balances of Accounts at End of Period

Checking Accounts:

NationsBank

0000 0440 9728

CD's & Other Accounts:

Institution Name: _____

Other:

Institution Name: _____

Section Name and Number: Presidency Research, #9

Report Prepared By: Robert Spitzer

Title: Secretary-Treasurer

Date: 8/11/98

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