

PRESIDENCY RESEARCH



EDITOR: Cary R. Covington
ASSISTANT EDITOR: Kerry Suttan

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I. NEWS AND NOTES

REPORT ON THE ANNUAL MEETING, BY MARTHA KUMAR:

Erwin Hargrove opened the meeting. The first item on the agenda was to announce an appeal from Sheila Mann for someone to write on research on the presidency for a piece in the teachers section of P.S. The next item was the question of the cost of the newsletter and the subsequent questions it raises about the need for an increase in membership dues. The APSA will no longer help support the newsletters produced by the sections. The cost of producing our newsletter is almost \$3.00 per member per year. The high costs of newsletters is no doubt what has driven the other sections to raise their dues to \$6.00 or \$7.00, depending on the section. The APSA will give us \$1.00 per member as a transition amount for the coming newsletter, but after that we are on our own. The members voted unanimously to raise the dues to \$7.00 for individuals and \$10.00 for institutional members.

The meeting moved to a proposal by Michael Genovese for the Presidency Research Group to award a prize for the best paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA. Many groups in the association award such prizes, including Public Administration and Policy Studies. It has the benefit of providing the possibility for recognition of young political scientists. With quite a few abstentions, a prize was voted, with seven votes in favor, two opposed. Erwin suggested that the new president appoint a three-person group to award a prize for the best paper. It would not be necessary to award a prize if the group did not feel one was called for. We could try it out for two years and then assess how it appeared to be working. It was unanimously agreed by the membership that: a three-person committee would be appointed to award a prize for the best paper at the 1989 APSA Annual Meeting; and that an award does not have to be given each year, and that we will try it out for two years.

Sam Kernell reported for the Neustadt Book Award Committee. Kernell chaired the group, whose membership included Dick Kirshten of National Journal and Kevin Mulcahy. After reading the submitted books, there was one clear winner that all three agreed upon as the best book published this past year on the presidency: Erwin Hargrove's Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press). Hargrove was given a plaque to mark the award.

Erwin Hargrove then gave his report as departing president of the PRG. He gave a discussion of the state of presidency research. He finds two basic approaches to the presidency at the end of the 1980s: the framework approach across time, and the thick descriptive approach. He argued that we need to play off the two different types.

The PRG then moved to the selection of its officers for the coming year. Betty Glad, as the incoming president, headed the selection committee that developed the slate of officers. The slate, unanimously approved by the members present, include: Vice President and President-Elect James Young, Secretary-Treasurer Michael Grossman, Newsletter Editor Cary Covington and Steering Committee members for the 1989-1992 term Colin Campbell, Gary King, James P. Pfiffner, Donald L. Robinson, and Margaret J. Wyszomirski. Betty Glad then appointed the Neustadt Best Book Award Committee for 1990: Louis Fisher, Ted Lowi, and Marcia Wicker. The Best Paper Award committee was also named: Margaret Wyszomirski, Richard Pious, and Mark Petracca.

The APSA Program has become a big issue, particularly in terms of who controls the selection of papers to be presented. In 1988, there was a shrinking number of papers. Fifty percent were delivered to APSA panels, 30% to panels of organized sections, and 20% to panels of unaffiliated sections. This year, selection was decentralized, as Nelson Polsby thought control over selection should be given to organized sections. Jane Mansbridge talked with the organized sections and found that they did not want to return to an earlier period. They were afraid that if the program chair is appointed by the APSA, there would not be a wide representation of research interests on the panels. The current system promotes democracy by making the sections fairly accessible. The division approved by Mansbridge is that 40% of the panels go to the APSA, 40% to organized sections, and 20% to affiliated groups. Since there are no unaffiliated groups on the presidency, 50% go to the APSA and 50% to the PRG. Sam Kernell reported that he and Colin Campbell got together to do the panels, a practice that is followed each year. [Editor's Note: For

more information on the division of panels for the 1990 meetings, see the following report by Peri Arnold.] The PRG has 5.5 panels this year - the 1/2 panel to encourage interdisciplinary panels. George Edwards pointed out that the purpose in setting up the PRG was to get panels at the convention and we have won that battle. Thus, there is no big issue for us here. Sandy Maisel, program chair for the APSA next year, spoke. He said that for 2/3's of the groups there is the same working relationship between the section and the association. Jeff Tulis and Peri Arnold will be the two coordinating for the PRG and the Association, respectively. Both the PRG and the APSA are inviting conceptual and methodological papers from other disciplines.

REPORT ON PANEL ALLOCATIONS AT THE 1990 APSA MEETINGS, BY PERI E. ARNOLD:

The allocation of panels to sections for the annual APSA meeting has become a controversial issue for some organized sections. As part of my responsibility as 1990 program chair for the Presidency Research Group, I reported to the PRG business meeting in Atlanta on the allocation method adopted for 1990 and asked for comments. In this report I shall describe the allocation system adopted for 1990 and briefly sketch the controversy that has arisen in some parts of the association.

In the recent past, the APSA program was divided between official sections and the organized sections, each receiving some proportion of the panels designated for that sub-part of the discipline. However in the 1989 meetings, where organized sections existed, all of the panels were allocated to that section. Professor Jane Mansbridge, APSA program chair for 1990, has chosen to return to the earlier pattern. However, she has decided that where organized sections exist, they would receive exactly half the panels allocated to a particular area of the discipline. Thus, the official section on the executive will receive five and one-half panels for 1990, and the organized section on presidency research will receive an equal number of panels. Professor Mansbridge's views on this subject are conveyed in an essay she published in the summer issue of PS.

Some members of organized sections are critical of Professor Mansbridge's solomonic solution. They would argue that the organized sections represent the current state of work in areas of the discipline better than could a scholar chosen arbitrarily by the association's overall program chair. The counter is that the association's overall program chair will likely choose significant researchers in their fields who are likely to be in touch with the best work therein. In any case, it appears that there is no such controversy within the Presidency Research Group. Discussion on this issue at the business meeting suggested a generally positive view of the division of panels on the presidency between an official section and our organized section. At the business meeting, Jeff Tulis, who is chairing the official section on executives, and I announced that we would coordinate our planning to guard against unwarranted overlap and to produce a group of varied and high quality panels.

It is my responsibility to convey to Professor Mansbridge the views of PRG members about panel allocations. I would be pleased to hear from members who have views on this subject.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

1989 NEUSTADT BOOK AWARD TO ERWIN HARGROVE: Sam Kernell reported for the Neustadt Book Award Committee. Kernell chaired the group, whose membership included Dick Kirshten of National Journal and Kevin Mulcahy. After reading the submitted books, there was one clear winner that all three agreed upon as the best book published this past year on the presidency: Erwin Hargrove's Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press). Hargrove was given a plaque to mark the award.

COMMITTEE NAMED FOR 1989 APSA ANNUAL MEETING "BEST PAPER" AWARD - CALL FOR NOMINATIONS: The Presidency Research Group is initiating an award for best paper on the presidency presented at each annual APSA Meeting. The award committee, consisting of Margaret Wyszomirski (chair), Richard Pious, and Mark Petracca, is currently soliciting nominations for this paper award. Nominations have been requested from each individual who chaired a PRG-sponsored panel at the 1989 APSA Meeting. In addition, the award committee is also open to nominations of papers on the presidency that may have been presented as part of other panels or sections. Nominated papers should deal with an important topic and reflect originality of thought. A variety of research methods will be considered worthy of nomination, provided the paper strives for analytical sophistication.

Please send nominations (and copies of the paper if possible) to:

Dr. Margaret J. Wyszomirski
Senior Faculty
Federal Executive Institute-D.C.
U.S. OPM
P.O. Box 164
Washington, D.C. 20044
(202) 6326192

Nominations should be received no later than March 15th, 1990.

COMMITTEE NAMED FOR 1990 NEUSTADT BOOK AWARD: The Neustadt Book Award Committee for 1990 will consist of Louis Fisher, Marcia Wicker, and Ted Lowi. Nominations should be forward to one of those individuals.

CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH ON THE PRESIDENCY: Bert A. Rockman has received support from the National Science Foundation for a Conference on Research on the American Presidency. The Conference will be held at the University of Pittsburgh on November 12-13, 1990. Sponsored participation will be by invitation only. Fred I. Greenstein and John H. Kessel are helping to organize the Conference.

GERALD R. FORD FOUNDATION AWARDS: The Gerald R. Ford Foundation awards grants of up to \$2000 to cover travel and other expenses for research in the Gerald R. Ford Library's Archival collections. For information, contact David Horrocks, Gerald R. Ford Library, 1000 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109; telephone (313) 668-2218. The next application deadline is March 15, 1990.

1990 MIDWEST POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETINGS
Palmer House, Chicago
April 5-7, 1990

Tentative Listing of Executives and Administrative Processes Panels
Paul J. Quirk, University of Illinois at Chicago, Section Head

Presidential Communication

Chair: Robert E. Denton, Jr., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Papers: "Presidential Communication as Conversation"
Mary E. Stuckey, University of Mississippi

"Going Public: The Bush Administration's First Term in Comparative Perspective"
Henry C. Kenski, University of Arizona

"Codes of Confrontation and Containment: Spin Doctoring the Soviet Union in the White House" Timothy W. Luke, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,

Discussant: Kathleen E. Kendall, SUNY--Albany

Meet Author: Stephen Skowronek

Chair: Martha Derthick, University of Virginia

Author: Stephen Skowronek, Yale University

Panelists: Theodore Lowi, Cornell University
J. David Greenstone, University of Chicago
Thomas Hammond, Michigan State University

Modeling Bureaucratic Behavior

Chair: Paul Sabatier, University of California-Davis

Papers: "Modeling Federal Policy Structures with Dynamic Structural Equations"
B. Dan Wood, Texas A&M University

"The General Theory of Categories and Hierarchies, with Applications to Classification Schedules for Library Books, Personnel Classification Systems, Departmental Budgets, Wildlife Management, Bureaucratic Structure, Gerrymandering, and Formal Systems of Voting and Representation"
Thomas H. Hammond, Michigan State University

"Professional Norms, External Constituencies, and Hierarchical Controls: An Analysis of Forest Service Planning"
Paul Sabatier, John Loomis, and Catherine McCarthy, University of California--Davis

Discussant: Kenneth Meier, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

President and Congress

Chair: Steven A. Shull, University of New Orleans

Papers: "The Role of Organizational Efficiency In Effecting Presidential Legislative Success"
Mathew R. Kerbel, Villanova University

"Developing the President's Program: The President and Congress in a Strategic Game"
Mark A. Peterson, Harvard University

"Over Their Heads: Testing the Kernell 'Going Public' Thesis"
Greg Hager and Terry Sullivan, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Discussant: Jonathan Bond, Texas A&M University

Executive Power and Performance

Chair: Norman Thomas, University of Cincinnati

Papers: "Predicting Presidential Performance: The Character of George Bush"
Anne Freedman, Roosevelt University

"Perennial Mayor: Henry Maier's Milwaukee Record"
Martin Gruberg, University of Wisconsin--Oshkosh

"The Presidency, Hegemony, and the Media"
Robert M. Entman, Northwestern University

Discussant: Bruce Buchanan, University of Texas--Austin

Roundtable on the Bush Presidency

Chair: Bert Rockman, University of Pittsburgh

Panelists: John Kessel, Ohio State University
Michael Nelson, Vanderbilt University
Charles O. Jones, University of Wisconsin
George Edwards, Texas A&M University
Paul J. Quirk, University of Illinois at Chicago

Executives and Public Opinion

Chair: Benjamin Page, Northwestern University

Papers: "The Impact of Television on Carter and Reagan"
Darrell M. West, Brown University

"The Presidential Role in Agenda Setting: A Facilitator or Director?"
Lydia Maria Andrade, Texas A&M University
Garry Young, Rice University

"The Recoil Effect: Government Manipulation and Tracking of Public Opinion in the U.S. and Britain"

Lawrence R. Jacobs, University of Minnesota--Twin Cities

Presidents and Policy Formation

Chair: Peri Arnold, Notre Dame University

Papers: "Presidential Influence and the Allocation of Federal Grants"
John A. Hamman, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

"Managing Macroeconomic Policy: The Carter Experience"
James E. Anderson, Texas A&M University

"Department of Education's TRIO Program Monitoring and Evaluation: The Effect of Separate Support and Program Funding"
Anthony J. Eksterowicz and James D. Gartner, James Madison University,

Discussant: Ryan J. Barilleaux, Miami University

The Institutional Presidency

Chair: Charles Walcott, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Papers: "The Influence of People of Ideas in Three Presidencies of Achievement: A Developmental Perspective"
Thomas S. Langston, Tulane University

"Taming the Welfare State: Nixon, Reagan, and the Social Service Bureaucracy"
Thomas Weko, University of Toledo

"Cabinet Government in the Reagan Administration"
Shirley Warshaw, Gettysburg College

Discussant: Karen Hults, Pomona College

Regulatory Bureaucracy

Chair: John Gardiner, University of Illinois at Chicago

Papers: "Regulating State Air Quality: Politics and Results"
Evan J. Ringquist, University of Wisconsin--Milwaukee

"Decision-making in the NLRB: The Impact of Partisanship, Public Opinion, and Unemployment"
Diane E. Schmidt, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

"As Time Goes By: The Relationship Between Job Tenure and Enforcement in OSHA"
Jim Twombly, SUNY--Stony Brook

Discussant: Robert V. Bartlett, Purdue University

Public Organizations Under Stress

Chair: Allan Lerner, University of Illinois at Chicago

Papers: "Privatization: Implications for the Public Workforce"
Donald F. Kettl, Vanderbilt University

"Thatcherism and Organizational Power"
James B. Christoph, Indiana University,

"The Terminated Agency: The Organizational Termination of the Civil Aeronautics Board"
Jonathan Katz, University of Maryland--Baltimore County

Discussant: David Beam, Illinois Institute of Technology

Bureaucracies, Constituencies, and Political Controls

Chair: Carol Mock, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Papers: "NASA's Strategies for Winning Political Support"
Mark Byrnes, Vanderbilt University

"Policy Typologies and U.S. Asylum Policy: Joining Statist and Group Theories"
Andrew S. McFarland, University of Illinois at Chicago
Barbara M. Yarnold, Saginaw Valley State University

"Imposing Procedural Constraints on State Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Examination of the Legislative Manipulation Hypothesis"
William F. West and James C. Clingermayer, Texas A&M University

Discussant: Robert Backoff, Ohio State University

II. ARTICLES

WHAT DO WE KNOW AND HOW DO WE KNOW IT? RESEARCH ON THE PRESIDENCY

Paul J. Quirk
University of Illinois at Chicago, and
Institute of Government and Public Affairs

Two tough questions occasionally asked about a president are: What did he know? And when did he know it? The issue is always whether he knew more about some disreputable activity than he admits. One can also ask tough questions about research on the presidency: What do we know? And how do we know it? As many others have pointed out (King 1975, Hecllo 1977b, Pika 1981-82, Thomas 1983, Rockman 1986), we know less, through less substantial investigations, than one would expect in view of the importance of the subject. In recent years, however, there has been an outpouring of new research on the presidency, and the field has made noteworthy strides. In this essay I offer a fresh appraisal of its achievements.

To make the task less formidable, I have adopted certain expedients. I discuss only a handful of research issues -- which I argue, however, represent the core topics of the presidency field. For each of these issues, I consider only a few recent works that in my view are noteworthy or representative. The result is neither a comprehensive review of the current literature nor an account of how the field has developed. It is a commentary on the current state of the literature and prospects for further progress in what I think are the central areas of presidency research.

In each area, I try to assess whether and by what means important understanding has been gained. How far, for example, have the theories or methods of academic political science produced knowledge that is more precise, penetrating, or reliable than that of sophisticated lay observers of the presidency? I also try to identify the mistakes, omissions, or unfavorable circumstances that have retarded progress and to suggest promising avenues for further research.

While discussing the several areas of research, I make few pronouncements about the field as a whole. The state of the literature varies radically across areas. Indeed I suggest that the presidency isn't a single, coherent field, even potentially, and point out some consequences of its fragmentation. Nevertheless, I also suggest that the field should have a more definite agenda, which should focus mainly on the president's role in policy formation.

THE PRESIDENCY AND PUBLIC POLICY

The presidency is a massively complex institution -- with a differentiated internal structure, relationships with a multitude of other actors and institutions, and involvement in nearly every area of public policy. It offers an almost unlimited array of potential topics for research, and political scientists have addressed a large number of them. As a result, unfortunately, the literature is diffuse -- touching upon numerous topics but containing a sustained investigation of very few. That is one reason the field lacks the refinement of some other areas of political research. There is no escaping this condition. The difficulty can be mitigated, however, if the field identifies a manageable list of core topics and, without abandoning other inquiries, devotes a preponderance of effort to investigating them.

The most attractive way to identify such core topics, I would argue, is to select those issues of presidential behavior and influence that are central to the president's role in the formation of public policy. There are other conceivable ways to orient presidential research, but none has comparable potential to elicit a coherent effort. Purely from the standpoint of scientific procedure, for example, the preferred approach would be to choose research questions with a view toward

developing a theory of the presidency. But there is currently no such theory to occupy this role, and for reasons I will discuss below, virtually no likelihood of one emerging (Rockman 1986; Edwards 1983b). Another possible approach is to organize research to address the presidency's effects on procedural or foundational aspects of the political system: the stability and legitimacy of the regime; popular participation; or the integrity of constitutional principles. Such effects are obviously worthy of investigation; but in a stable, relatively democratic political system like the U.S., researchers inevitably are more interested in immediate issues of public policy. The most plausible way for the literature to become more coherent is therefore to devote concerted attention to the president's role in policymaking.

If the principal focus is policymaking, a handful of topics constitute the core of the field. The central issue is obviously how presidents make policy decisions. This question has two largely distinct aspects -- how presidents use information, and what goals or interests they respond to. A second major issue is how presidents get their decisions put into effect. More specifically, how do they lead Congress and control the bureaucracy? Because the president's influence depends on his public support, two further key issues are how presidents obtain public approval and how they lead public opinion. Finally, there are additional issues that have important bearing on all of the others: how presidents' attributes as individuals affect their performance, and how the presidency changes. (I leave out the question of how presidents are recruited, which also has such general bearing, only because the literature on recruitment is so large that it constitutes a field in itself.) Not surprisingly, much of the literature treats these issues,

Decisionmaking: Information

For analytic purposes, we can distinguish two dimensions of presidential decisionmaking: information and objectives. The dimension of information, broadly defined, concerns how intelligently presidents and their staffs design policies and how accurately they anticipate the consequences. Research on this dimension therefore seeks to learn how presidents obtain and use information, with what consequences for the outcomes. The work in this area hasn't made notable advances beyond the casual theorizing of sophisticated participants. Nevertheless, some of it has made a modest contribution to presidential capabilities.

Most of the work by political scientists on presidential use of information has concerned the organization and management of advisory processes. A number of researchers have examined the organization of the White House staff or the machinery for making economic policy, domestic policy, or especially foreign and national security policy.¹ Indeed, these issues are the principal focus of literature on the presidency in foreign policy.

On the whole, the research has relied on much the same methods of observing and interpreting events as those employed by participants. Researchers have performed detailed studies of decisionmaking in particular cases (Destler 1980; Porter 1980); or they have relied on judgments by participants and lay observers to reach conclusions about performance (Hess 1976; Campbell 1986). Their analytic frameworks have consisted largely of conventional administrative doctrine modified by a few apparent lessons of recent presidencies. Lacking any distinctive theoretical or methodological tools, students of advisory processes have debated the same organizational issues and used the same arguments as practitioners -- disagreeing about the proper roles of the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser, for example, just as those officials have disagreed themselves (Rockman 1981).

The main obstacle to progress has been the one Herbert Simon (1949) described in his critique of traditional public administration theory. Organizational design is a matter of striking the right balance between conflicting objectives -- for example, reducing the burden of coordination versus increasing the flow of information. In the absence of genuine experimentation, the

influences on organizational performance are too complex for analysts to determine the consequences of alternative structural arrangements with any precision.

Despite the resulting limitations, the research in this area has been useful. Salamon (1982) has laid out the major organizational options facing a president and their strengths and weaknesses. George (1972, 1980) has articulated the advantages of an organizational technique, multiple advocacy, with enough persuasiveness to inspire its adoption by at least one president (see Porter 1980). With the advantage of an international perspective, Campbell (1986) has pointed out the exceptional weakness of the mechanisms for policy coordination in the executive branch of the U.S.

The main contribution of political scientists with respect to advisory processes, however, has been to substitute for the institutional memory lacking in the White House by preserving accounts of what was tried and with what result. Knowledge has accumulated as successive presidents have adopted new organizational strategies and succeeded or failed in novel ways. On some points, a degree of consensus has emerged. Recent discussion has favored a White House organization with some combination of the hierarchical and spokes-in-a-wheel models (Campbell 1986, Weatherford 1987). For economic policymaking, it has called for a collegial system centered on the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and the Cabinet and for treating economic policy as a distinct function with its own structure (Weatherford 1987, Campbell 1986). Even if mainly as repositories of the collective memory, political scientists have played a role in designing the advisory processes of several presidents.

Conceivably, research on presidential advisory processes could become decisively superior to lay opinion through the development of better methods. That would require, above all, a method of gathering useable data about the quality of presidential information and judgment in a large number of decisions at feasible cost. Despite the risk of a certain amount of inaccuracy, the most promising approach is probably to do limited interviewing and other data gathering on each decision and rely on the respondents to make relatively complex, interpretive judgments about performance.

Unfortunately, the research has largely neglected factors other than the organization of advisory processes. In a penetrating essay, George (1980) noted that obstacles to effective use of information arise at three levels: the beliefs and personality of the president, the small-group interactions of the president and his principal advisers; and the organizational functioning of the executive branch. Students of the presidency have given almost all their attention to the organizational level, neglecting the individual and small-group levels. Among the few exceptions, Janis (1972) has discussed the dynamics of small decisionmaking groups. Buchanan (1987) has explored the implications for presidential decisionmaking of basic findings on heuristics and biases in human judgment. Two studies of decisionmaking on the Vietnam war (Gelb and Betts 1979, Berman 1982) have traced the rigidity of the American response to a pattern of basing foreign-policy decisions on overly generalized strategic doctrines. Researchers have overlooked the effects of the circumstances of decision or the issues at stake. There are a few studies of the effects of crisis -- pointing out that information gathering and analysis deteriorate when decisions must be made quickly (Herman 1969). In a study of the Social Security program, Derthick (1979) shows that the design of a program may hinder recognition of its effects. A comprehensive inquiry into presidential use of information will have to go beyond organizational issues and explore a wide range of other factors.

Decisionmaking: Objectives

The objectives pertinent to presidential decision are both the personal goals that presidents pursue (such as reelection or a place in history) and the societal interests to which they respond (such as group benefits or economic efficiency). The two kinds of objectives play

different roles in explaining decisions and present different tasks for research.² Although many studies of particular presidencies, policy changes, or areas of policy contain some discussion of presidential objectives (Reichley 1981, Hargrove 1988), few have addressed such objectives in general. In contrast, the corresponding issues about Congress, administrative agencies, and the judiciary are treated in substantial literatures.

There seem to have been two contradictory reasons for the omission. On the one hand, presidency researchers have considered presidential objectives unproblematic. In the 1960s many analysts took for granted that because of the importance of large industrial states in presidential elections, presidents were inherently inclined toward liberal social policies (Burns, 1963). That notion was discredited by the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan presidencies. Less restrictively, many now assume that presidents are primarily responsive to broadly based national interests and are largely responsible for government's capacity to serve such interests (Fiorina 1984). In an extreme formulation of this view in the context of foreign policy, Krasner (1979) virtually defined national interests as those that presidents pursue. To identify presidential policy in any simple way with broad interests, however, is unfounded. Indeed, as the beginnings of airline deregulation in a highly publicized congressional investigation demonstrates, it is sometimes Congress or a congressional committee that takes the initiative on behalf of such interests (Derthick and Quirk 1985).

At the same time, researchers may have doubted that efforts to explore presidential policy objectives would produce significant findings. They may have suspected that presidential policy goals would turn out to be relentlessly idiosyncratic. They also may have feared that research on presidential policy choice would recapitulate the work on Congress. With some modifications, most of the incentives and constraints that affect members of Congress undoubtedly also affect presidents.

Whatever the reasons, research that explicitly addresses presidential objectives in policymaking is scattered and uneven. The most substantial work is on the politics of macroeconomic policy -- an area of research that, although not conventionally identified with the presidency field, is largely about the behavior of presidents.³ One branch of this literature, concerned with the hypothesis of a political business cycle, proceeds from an explicit motivational assumption --namely, that presidents use economic policy to pursue electoral success for themselves or their parties. Indeed they are willing to sacrifice economic stability for electoral gain. From well established assumptions about the electorate, it follows that presidents will try to manipulate the economy to ensure prosperity in election years. Despite the fanfare that greeted this analysis in the mid-1970s, however, the political business cycle hypothesis has largely failed in empirical tests (Weatherford, 1988). According to the weight of the evidence, neither the performance of the economy nor even fiscal or monetary policy track the electoral cycle.

Nevertheless more attention should be given to the influence of electoral incentives and the electoral cycle on presidential decisions. Even if they don't go so far as to manipulate macroeconomic performance, presidents probably respond to electoral considerations in less dramatic ways. Kessel (1974) has shown that presidents emphasize different policy areas in State of the Union addresses at different stages of their terms.

Another branch of the macroeconomic policy literature explores the effect of political party -- in particular, the differences between Democratic and Republican presidents in their response to inflation and unemployment.⁴ Because such differences may reflect either ideological or electoral interests, this work has no definite bearing on presidential motivation. Rather, it confirms and elaborates conventional views of the effects of party. Nevertheless, it is the most substantial body of research that assesses presidential response to interests with some degree of generality.

Apart from the macroeconomic policy literature, a handful of other studies have focused broadly on presidential policy choice. Light's (1982) study of the president's agenda, probably the most frequently cited work on presidential policy choice, is most useful in explaining how the stages of a president's term affect his decisions and effectiveness. His analysis of presidential objectives and criteria of choice, however, is rudimentary. Light argues that presidents select issues for attention so as to maximize political benefits; that they choose policies for serious consideration so as to minimize political costs; and finally, that they adopt measures as presidential proposals on the basis of political feasibility. Such segregation of benefits, costs, and feasibility into different phases is implausible; to avoid serious irrationality, a president must consider all the criteria throughout the process. More important, neither Light nor anyone else has investigated how presidents judge benefits, costs, and feasibility.

Two studies (Ostrum and Simon 1985a, Kernell 1986) have analyzed presidential policy choice as a trade-off between policy achievement and popularity. The studies assume that presidents are interested in both achievement and popularity, and that proposing controversial policies is generally costly in public support. Presidents therefore alternate between promoting significant policy change, at cost to their popularity, and stressing noncontroversial campaign-like appeals and public relations techniques to restore popularity to acceptable levels. This analysis, though interesting, has difficulties. For one, policy achievements aren't a luxury for presidents, but an important source of their popularity. In addition, there is presumably a point of diminishing returns to campaigning for popularity, and presidents (or the astute ones) may always operate at that point. Neither simple trade-offs nor opportunities for variation over time may exist. In any case, these studies at least begin to investigate presidents' policy choices in light of explicit analysis of their objectives.

Doing the same thing in another way, Weatherford (1987) looks at the interplay of electoral and policy objectives to account in some detail for the weak findings on political business cycles. Contrasting economic policy in the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations, he argues that electoral objectives compete with the president's economic ideology and the influence of his economic advisers. Reelection is the dominant goal only when that ideology is absent and those advisers are weak. Eisenhower was committed to budget balancing and limited government and had defined a strong role for his economic advisers. Accordingly, he refrained from attempting to manipulate the economy for electoral ends. In contrast, Nixon, concerned mostly with foreign policy, had little interest in economic policy and a disorganized system for economic advice. His successful effort to boost the economy before the 1972 election is the prime example of electorally inspired manipulation.

In future work, there may be several ways to get some purchase on presidential objectives. As we have seen, one way is to analyze presidential decisions in light of the conflict between electoral success or popularity and other objectives like ideology or policy achievement. Another is to analyze presidents' electoral strategies in more detail, for example, by considering the conflict between serving party constituencies and appealing to independent voters or marginal groups.

A third approach is to explore more systematically differences between presidents' policy tendencies and those of other officials or institutions. For example, we should assess systematically how presidential action or refusal to act in conflicts between general and special interests compares to that of the whole Congress, congressional committees, and entrepreneurial members of Congress. We also should analyze the substantive and political basis of presidential conflict with the bureaucracy.

Finally, it would be useful to explore the content of the president's policy agenda as a whole. This could tell us whether presidents balance out the distributive effects of their entire agenda, whether they limit their efforts on behalf of general interests to relatively visible issues, and whether they select most of their initiatives to fit their central rhetorical themes.

Influence: Legislative Leadership

With certain limited exceptions, a president's policy decisions are consequential only if he can induce other decision makers to endorse or execute them. The most difficult task usually is to gain congressional consent. For a long time political scientists have traced the fluctuating relationships between the president and Congress (Sundquist 1983), debated the adequacy of the structural conditions for presidential leadership (Burns 1963), and described the organization of presidential lobbying activities (Wayne 1978). More recently a substantial body of research, much of it quantitative, has directly addressed presidential influence in Congress.⁵

Unfortunately, that influence is hard to measure with any precision. To produce conceptually sound, reliable findings about presidential influence in Congress, research should identify and weigh legislative outcomes that occur only because the president acts to bring them about (see, however, Bond and Fleisher, forthcoming). To do so, it should take into account: the relative importance of different bills, the correspondence between the president's substantive goals and legislative outcomes, and the prior disposition of Congress to pursue the same objectives. The analysis should include cases where Congress rejects a proposal without voting on it. As an indication of the strength of the president's preferences, it should take note of his effort to shape the outcomes.

The quantitative research has made impressive advances, but it still falls short of these requirements. The early work (Edwards 1980) used CQ's Presidential Support Scores to measure congressional support and made no effort to consider the importance of votes or the degree of presidential effort. Recent work has used CQ's Key Votes (Edwards 1989) or votes identified as important in White House records (Covington 1986, Sullivan 1988). But neither set of roll calls is selected, inappropriately, for controversy,⁶ and there has been no attempt to weight votes by their substantive importance or to measure presidential effort. Considering that each administration has a mere handful of proposals of highest priority (Light 1982), this is a major limitation. A few studies have tried to control for Congress's prior dispositions by estimating baseline models of congressional voting (Sullivan 1988, Mouw and MacKuen 1989), but they have succeeded only partially in isolating presidential effects. Apart from taking into account the numerical strength of the parties, the research has failed to control for non-presidential influences on Congress, such as economic conditions or public opinion on specific issues. In a useful analysis that extends and refines the approach of CQ's Presidential Box Scores, Peterson (1985) has brought the attributes of individual issues into the analysis. But there has been no systematic attempt to consider bills that the president blocks without a floor vote or, on the other hand, that he tries to bring up without success. Researchers understandably have avoided attempting to measure the correspondence between legislative outcomes and presidential goals.

The findings of this literature generally have been plausible and interesting. The principal finding is that the president's influence is above all a function of his party's numerical strength in Congress. Most of that relationship, however, undoubtedly represents ideological harmony more than presidential influence. There has been an illuminating, even though inconclusive, discussion of how the president's public approval affects his influence (compare Edwards 1989, Rivers and Rose 1986, and Bond, Fleisher, and Northrup 1988). The research has deflated the "two presidencies" thesis: Special congressional deference to the president in foreign policy has been limited to Democratic support for internationalist Republican presidents (Edwards 1989).

Yet because of the limitations of the research, such findings must be regarded as highly uncertain. Some of the potential for error is suggested by Covington's (1986) comparisons between roll calls identified as important by internal documents of the Kennedy-Johnson White House (about fifty per year) and CQ's Key Votes, one of the standard data sets, during the period. Support for the president was substantially more partisan on the White House's set of votes than it

was on CQ's. It seems likely that votes more important to the White House would also show a greater effect of presidential approval. And there may be even larger discrepancies between findings on the standard support scores and those on, say, the ten roll calls per year most central to the president's agenda.

The most provocative findings of the quantitative research, concerning presidential legislative skill, are particularly subject to challenge. From comparisons of the support scores of presidents with varying reputations for legislative skill, Edwards (1980) concluded that such skills "are not a prominent source of influence" -- a view he has only slightly modified in later work (Edwards 1989). These methods have limited bearing on this issue, however. They can test only for one possible form of presidential skill -- the ability to change votes in large enough numbers to affect support scores. Yet it is doubtful that presidents even try, except casually, to change that many votes; they apparently reserve their major lobbying efforts (in which they phone congressmen, make national television appeals, and so on) for a handful of crucial votes. In any case, a president's main skills probably have less to do with changing votes than with getting the right issues to the floor (Shull 1989).

Legislative skill has been treated more convincingly in case study literature. In a perceptive study of one major initiative by each of six presidents, Kellerman (1984) links success to energetic and intelligent persuasive effort by the president and his staff. In a study of the White House Office of Congressional Relations, Bowles (1987) portrays the complexity of the lobbying function and demonstrates wide variation in the precision and coordination of that function. Robyn's (1987) account of the Carter administration's effort to deregulate the trucking industry analyzes skill in four aspects of policy promotion: the strategic use of policy analysis, the organization of a lobbying coalition, the design of measures to reduce opposition, and negotiation with opposing forces. Although such studies can't directly demonstrate the effect of skill, they provide strong indirect evidence of its significance. The evidence includes, among other things, the sheer complexity of the lobbying task as presidents and their staffs conceive it.

Ironically, nearly all the research has neglected what is probably the single most important skill. A president's legislative success often will depend on the ability to design proposals that serve his objectives and yet provide the basis for winning coalitions in Congress. In view of the typical indeterminacy of majority preferences, there presumably is often a wide scope for shaping the outcome through the appropriate design of a proposal (see Riker 1986). By contrast, as the quantitative research rather convincingly indicates, there is usually limited scope for changing votes on a given measure. To be able to use the design of proposals as an effective tool, a president and his staff must have flexibility and a capacity for intelligent strategic judgment. One insightful study of this capacity is Nelson's (1988) analysis of President Roosevelt's 1937 court-packing plan.

Neither the quantitative nor case-study literatures have looked carefully at the effect of changes in the structure of Congress. It is often claimed that the decentralization of Congress in the mid-1970s increased the obstacles to such leadership (see, for example, Jones 1983). But there has been little research to show this and it is by no means self-evident. Decentralization requires the president to deal directly with numerous individual members of Congress. Yet because he can deploy White House and agency staff in large numbers for that purpose, the additional work may not pose a great difficulty. Moreover, the loss of a few people with the power to say yes is also the removal of a few people with the power to say no, and it leaves the president by far the most powerful actor in the legislative process. To reach well-founded conclusions about the effects of congressional structure for presidential leadership will require close study of the president's strategic opportunities under different conditions.

The literature on presidential influence on Congress has steadily improved. To continue to achieve greater depth and realism, however, it eventually will be necessary to go beyond analyzing

roll call votes and look directly at the president's impact on public policy -- weighing that impact in light of his objectives and the other forces acting on Congress.

Influence: Control of Administration

Compared with his legislative influence, political scientists have hardly noticed the president's influence in the administrative process as a subject for research. The literature consists of scattered studies on several aspects of the topic. Among the more significant works, Randall (1972) studied welfare administration under Nixon to assess the president's ability to control a specific program. Moe (1982) analyzed enforcement actions of the National Labor Relations Board to test the effect of presidential administrations on agency performance. More broadly, Aberbach and Rockman (1976) and Cole and Caputo (1979) measured the president's ideological support among agency officials. Rose (1976) evaluated Nixon's attempt to introduce management-by-objectives, and Greenstein (1982) and Redford and McCulley (1986) described the administrative strategies of two presidents.

An important point sometimes overlooked in the research is that presidents, although often depicted as struggling vainly to get the bureaucracy under control, in fact have been relatively uninterested in administration. They have used management initiatives like program budgeting and management-by-objectives mainly "to create an image of leadership, without making a sustained effort to expand their discretion and control" (Randall 1982). As Derthick (1989) shows for the Social Security program, they also have ignored the administrative consequences of policy decisions.

Despite the fragmentation of the literature, there has been an interesting debate about the utility of the management approach, used especially by Nixon and Reagan, of politicizing the bureaucracy and centralizing control in the White House. In a sympathetic account of the Nixon administration, Nathan (1976) described and largely endorsed the "administrative strategy" that Nixon adopted for his second term. In contrast, Heclo (1975) criticized Nixon's politicization of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), arguing that it undermined the agency's capacity to provide competent, politically neutral service, and Hess (1976) denied that the president should even attempt to be the general manager of the executive branch. The debate was renewed in response to the Reagan presidency, with its unprecedented degree of White House intervention and emphasis on ideological conformity and political loyalty in selecting political appointees. Most of the commentary on Reagan's approach was critical (see, for example, West and Cooper 1985). But Nathan (1983) found Reagan's methods appropriate and effective, and in a influential essay, Moe (1985) argued that politicized administration is probably desirable and, in any case, virtually inevitable.

The merits of the debate are, at this point, undecidable. It arises from the conflict between the president's interest in controlling administrative policy and his interest (shared with future presidents and the citizenry) in maintaining competent performance in the bureaucracy. Moe's argument boils down to a few points: To be successful, electorally and otherwise, presidents must manage to secure both responsive and competent performance from the bureaucracy. As the pronounced trend toward greater centralization and politicization of the bureaucracy under recent presidents demonstrates, however, they find the need for responsiveness the more compelling. Inasmuch as presidents have incentives to make a careful decision, that judgment is presumably warranted, at least from their standpoint. The extreme point to which Reagan took the pursuit of responsiveness is thus no aberration, but rather the culmination of an underlying process of institutional development.

Moe's argument, though certainly plausible, isn't compelling (for a useful critique, see Aberbach and Rockman 1988). For one thing, it requires a strong assumption that presidents are accurate, unbiased judges of their own interests in regard to management strategy. In fact, there

are reasons to suspect they will overvalue central control. There is a fundamental cognitive bias toward overconfidence (Kahneman and Tversky 1982) that may lead the White House to undervalue independent advice. For whatever reason, overcentralization is apparent among business corporations, which sometimes accumulate large headquarters staffs only to end up cutting them with good results. The argument for politicization also assumes that presidents are unable to control the bureaucracy by less drastic means. That, however, is doubtful too. Heclo (1977a) found that political appointees who start out suspicious of civil servants usually come to regret it. "What is truly surprising about asserting the near impossibility of managing the bureaucracy," Randall (1982) argues, "is that recent presidents haven't attempted it in a sustained manner." Finally, Moe doesn't address the consequences of politicized administration for future presidents or the political system.⁷

As Moe points out, the debate needs to be adjudicated through empirical research on the consequences of presidential management strategies for administrative performance. Such research must look at the actual outcomes, both substantive and political, in particular agencies. To my knowledge, the only such study is a casual investigation of the performance of six Reagan-appointed bureau chiefs by Lynn (1985). Lynn found that with one exception, Reagan's loyalist appointees performed adequately and advanced the president's political objectives.

For the literature on presidential control of the bureaucracy to become substantially more informative and reliable, there will have to be several improvements in the research. First, it should use more comprehensive criteria to evaluate control. It is inadequate to ask only whether an agency complies with the president's demands or implements his announced policies. Presidents don't want merely to impose certain policy changes, regardless of the consequences. They also want the changes they introduce to be widely accepted, at least after the fact, and to actually produce certain benefits. An adequate evaluation of presidential control therefore must also ask whether an agency translates the president's objectives into politically viable and workable policies. Second, the research should examine large enough numbers of programs, agencies, or decisions to estimate the frequency of different outcomes. A management strategy that fails in, say, one program out of twenty is highly effective; a strategy that fails in one out of four is not. To be of much use, research on presidential management must be able to detect such differences. Just as for research on presidential use of information, the key to attaining this capacity is the development of methods to reach complex judgments at a low cost for each case.

Finally, research shouldn't seek mainly to resolve practical debates like the one about politicization; it should aim primarily to develop a general analysis of presidential control of administration. In a rare such effort, Garand and Gross (1982) have outlined a theory of bureaucratic compliance with presidential demands. Despite their narrow definition of the relevant performance, as compliance, they provide a valuable starting point for such an analysis.

Public Support

A president's ability to influence public policy depends on his ability to elicit support from the general public. It seems likely, despite the empirical ambiguities, that his influence in Congress is in some degree a function of his public approval or "popularity." His influence in the administrative process probably is too. Even more clearly, however, the president's influence depends on his ability to produce public agreement with his policies. Both aspects of public support are important, but because of the availability of superior data, research on approval is more advanced.

Consistent data on presidential approval is available, for longitudinal analysis, in a time series with over 500 data points spanning about forty years and, for cross-sectional analysis, in most of the recent CPS National Election Studies. Exploiting this advantage with increasing sophistication, research has made rapid progress and clarified some central issues.⁸ It has

demonstrated that approval isn't somehow a mechanical function of the president's length of time in office, but rather responds to conditions and events. Thus it is important whether the news is dominated by stories favorable or unfavorable to the president (Brody and Page 1975, Mackuen 1983). Contrary to common expectations, public approval doesn't reflect individuals' reactions to their personal experience, but mainly their broader judgments about governmental or presidential performance, especially the management of the economy (Kinder and Kiewet 1981, Kiewet, 1983, Edwards 1983a).⁹ The findings in some areas are highly refined. There is evidence that Americans employ consistent criteria to evaluate presidents' personalities (Kinder and Fiske 1986); on the other hand, the public's response to events varies with the salience of the issues to which they pertain (Ostrum and Simon 1985b). Prospective judgments about economic performance are more important than retrospective ones (Mackuen, Erickson, and Stimson 1988).

Although impressive progress has been made, the literature on presidential approval still has important limitations. It has difficulty sorting out the effects of slowly changing variables -- such as the president's style or the nature of the leading issues in a period. There is disagreement, for example, about whether Eisenhower's sustained popularity resulted from his strategy of avoiding controversy (Greenstein 1982) or from the prominence of consensual foreign policy issues during his administration (Ostrum and Simon 1985b). The research also has difficulty clarifying some important interactions -- such as those, likely to be important, between the president's public relations efforts and other circumstances that affect his popularity. Thus several authors have described presidents' use of direct appeals to the public and considered the typical effects of those appeals on public approval (Lowi 1985, Kernell 1986, Ragsdale 1984). But none have carefully examined whether such appeals lose effectiveness with frequent use or whether they require certain conditions to be productive.

The president's ability to elicit public agreement with his policies is more elusive because it turns on changes over a short period in opinions that aren't measured regularly. In one-shot surveys, individuals express more support of a policy if they are told it is a presidential proposal (Edwards 1983a). (Toward the end of his administration, Jimmy Carter was an exception [Sigelman and Sigelman 1981].) This would suggest a substantial presidential capacity for leadership of public opinion. However, in studies that compare opinion on an issue before and after a presidential effort to change it -- providing a more demanding and realistic test -- presidents appear much less persuasive. Using a carefully assembled body of such before-and-after data, Page and Shapiro (1985) found no general disposition to follow the president. Rather, presidents were able to change opinion only if they had high approval ratings, and then only by a few percentage points. Unfortunately, usable before-and-after data is in short supply (presidents don't give advance notice of attempts to change public opinion) so findings in this area are crude and tentative.

In the future, research on presidential approval undoubtedly will become increasingly sophisticated and informative. By comparison, in the absence of a large scale project to generate appropriate data, the literature on opinion leadership is likely to remain sparse and primitive.

Presidents as Individuals

Two further areas of investigation -- presidents as individuals, and change in the presidency -- have bearing on all of the preceding issues. There has been important recent work in both areas. The literature in each, however, is disorganized -- with little agreement about the central questions, let alone the most promising avenues of inquiry.

Research on the psychology of the presidency probably was set back by the appearance of Barber's The Presidential Character (1972) -- which, while highly influential, was widely and severely criticized. Other researchers seem to have kept their distance from the subject as if to

avoid guilt by association. Nevertheless, the presidency clearly offers exceptional opportunity for the play of individual attributes. The only question is how to investigate them.

There is little justification for studying presidents to construct general theories of personality development or psychodynamics (Rockman 1986). Almost anyone else is a more accessible and equally pertinent subject for research on that topic. Rather, psychological research on presidents should aim to understand how personality and related attributes of presidents affect their performance, and how the career ladders and election processes leading to the presidency select for those traits.

Issues of abnormal psychology, even if suspiciously dramatic, are pertinent (cf. Tulis 1981). Considering the prolonged period of extraordinary effort and risk-taking required of a politician seeking the presidency, it wouldn't be surprising if presidents often were driven by needs associated with fragile or unstable personalities. Nevertheless, most individual differences among presidents will involve dispositions well within the bounds of normality. Kellerman (1984) suggests, for example, that a president's political skill depends on a particular combination of outer-directed and inner-directed traits -- extroversion and a tendency to be guided by strong convictions. Underlying personality aside, several studies have shown the importance of skills, beliefs, and dispositions that a president has acquired from prior experience in his professional career. Jimmy Carter may have had a strong need for achievement all his life. But it was mainly while he was governor of Georgia that he came to define himself as a moral leader who served the public by insisting on principled solutions to difficult problems (Hargrove 1988).

For the most part, research on presidential psychology has been improving with respect to both theory and methodology. Much of the improvement is due to the contributions of psychologists. In contrast to Barber, who himself invented a good deal of his psychological framework, they have employed theories and typologies with validation in mainstream psychology.¹⁰ They have distinguished among presidents with respect to their needs for achievement, power, and affiliation (Simonton 1987); explained president's foreign policy behavior on the basis of interpersonal generalization theory (Etheridge 1978); and linked presidents' adaptability and success to their explanatory style (Zullow et.al. 1988).

Perhaps because psychologists become accustomed to the convenience of experimenting with student subjects, however, they sometimes have fallen short of the methodological requirements for credible research in natural settings. Some of the best work has used painstaking, objective measures to assess presidents' personalities; in an especially elaborate effort, for example, Simonton (1987) had professional historians review presidents' biographies to score the items of standard personality instruments. But other work has used dubious evidence of presidential personality, such as content analysis of inaugural addresses. Most of the psychological research has ignored problems that arise from the multiple sources of presidential performance. The typical approach has been to compute simple correlations between measures of personality and, say, the occurrence of wars or historians' rankings of presidential greatness.

Ideally, research on presidents as individuals should combine the strengths of psychology and political science. It should employ concepts and theories from general psychology; combine substantial behavioral data with well validated instruments to assess personality; and test the effects of personality on performance by methods that control for other influences. For some purposes, it is less productive to study actual presidents, who are too few in number for reliable findings, than past or current aspiring ones, who undoubtedly resemble actual presidents and yet are available in quantity.

Change in the Presidency

The changes in the presidency that most warrant attention, by our criteria, are those that affect the president's impact on public policy. There have been relatively durable changes with such effects in presidential roles, activities, and practices; in the size and structure of the presidential bureaucracy; and in the president's relations with other actors and institutions. There is a good deal of literature about such change. Because of the several features subject to change and the difficulty of tracing the causes of long-term developments, however, the conclusions are generally quite speculative.

Most of the analysis has focused on several kinds of linear or cyclical change. To explain the expansion of the presidency's role and resources, researchers have pointed to the increasing size and complexity of the federal government, growing American involvement in international affairs, and presidential dominance of the media (Greenstein 1988, Rose 1988). To explain presidents' increasing use of public speeches and other mass appeals to promote their policies, they have pointed to the same dominance of the media along with the decline of political party organization (Kernell 1986, Lowi 1985). The more cyclical factors producing change are public moods, party realignments, and the rise and decline of party coalitions. Nelson and Hargrove (1984) suggest that such changes produce a cycle of presidencies of preparation, achievement, and consolidation; and that each kind of president requires distinctive strategies and skills. Combining linear and cycle factors in a provocative analysis, Skowronek argues that presidents who take office upon the demise of a preceding governing coalition have exceptional discretion to alter basic commitments and coalitions, but that such discretion narrows with the gradually increasing complexity and rigidity of the political system. This view contrasts with Sundquist's (1983) account of cycles of party politics overlaying a long-term increase in congressional deference associated with the growth of government.

Such studies, though certainly useful as far as they go, face the difficulties of drawing inferences from a rather short series of presidencies -- fewer than ten if one views the so-called "modern" presidents as the relevant universe (cf. Skowronek 1986) -- and a single historical sequence of events. They can't easily develop reliable, discriminating causal findings. For the most part they report gross relationships (such as that between party realignment and the president's ability to produce dramatic policy change), suggest associations between whole sets of underlying developments and resulting features of the presidency, or go out on a limb with more specific speculation. We have little precise knowledge, for example, about the relative importance of governmental growth and media attentiveness in the expansion of the president's role; or about whether the rise of the strategy of "going public" reflects an increase or a decrease in presidential power. For better or worse, moreover, studies of the development of the presidency rarely have been grounded in explicit theories of institutional change.

To improve this state of affairs won't be easy. But researchers should at least aspire to greater precision and generality. Instead of consorting with sweeping conceptions of the presidency, they should focus on explaining specific features such as the organization of the White House (Walcott and Hult 1987), the functions of the Cabinet (Cohen 1988), or presidential methods of policy promotion (Kernell 1986). They should look closely at the timing and processes of change to tease out the separate effects of various underlying conditions. Finally, they should explore the potential for grounding explanation in general theories of institutional change (Moe 1985) or accounts of American political development.

THE PRESIDENCY AND NEGLECTED DIMENSIONS OF POLICYMAKING

Beyond the strengths and weaknesses in specific areas, I want to point out a limitation of perspective in the presidency field as a whole. Without taking the space for a full discussion, I will

suggest that the literature reflects a largely unrecognized preoccupation of the entire discipline with the zero-sum aspects of political conflict (Quirk 1989).

Like most research on political institutions and policymaking, research on the presidency has sought fundamentally to explain who wins and who loses in policy conflict. At least implicitly, the central question has been the distribution of power among competing actors, interests, or institutions. That orientation, though obviously pertinent for political analysis, tends to overlook two further dimensions of policymaking that I will call deliberation and conflict resolution. Students of the presidency accordingly have failed to explore the president's performance with respect to these dimensions.

The dimension of deliberation concerns whether policy decisions are reached intelligently, on the basis of adequate understanding. Thus it involves the character and adequacy of information gathering, analysis, and consideration of alternatives (Bessette 1981). A highly diffuse process in our open and fragmented political system, deliberation ranges from formal debate on the Senate floor to private reflection by ordinary citizens. Notwithstanding the cultivated cynicism of journalists and political scientists, policymaking arguably consists largely of deliberation about how to advance goals, or comply with norms, that have widespread support. The effectiveness of that deliberation, however, is far from unproblematic. To the contrary, it is a crucial variable in the performance of government.

Unlike students of Congress, who have ignored deliberation almost entirely, students of the presidency have addressed it quite extensively, as we have seen, in relation to advisory processes for White House decision making. Besides deliberating over their own decisions, however, presidents participate in broader processes of deliberation that include Congress, other elites, and the general public. An important aspect of the president's performance, barely touched on by political scientists, is the degree to which he enhances or undermines those processes.

The principal study of how presidents affect public and congressional deliberation, Jeffrey Tulis's The Rhetorical Presidency (1987), takes a dim view of their performance. Tulis shows that in a profound change beginning with Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, presidential policy rhetoric has become not only more public (directed to mass audiences) but also more intellectually impoverished (relying on simplistic arguments and symbolism).¹¹ Indeed, Page and Shapiro (1989) have shown that presidential rhetoric is often essentially deceptive, reflecting several identifiable forms of bias. It is hard to determine the effects of simplistic or misleading presidential rhetoric on public and congressional deliberation or on policy outcomes. Tulis has explored such effects in brief case studies of some major policy choices, including the Johnson administration's War on Poverty, but further efforts along these lines are needed.

The dimension of conflict resolution concerns whether policy conflicts are decided cooperatively, on the basis of agreement and joint gain. The processes central to this dimension are bargaining and, in some cases, mediation. In many important policy conflicts, the opposing groups or factions have both complementary and conflicting interests. They thus have opportunity, in principle, to achieve joint gain by reaching agreement and bringing about cooperative policy change (Quirk 1989). However, as the inability to act constructively in relation to budget deficits, welfare reform, environmental regulation, and many other conflicts demonstrates, they often fail to exploit such opportunities.

In a recent paper (Quirk 1989), I outline a theoretical framework for research on the cooperative resolution of policy conflict, and suggest issues and hypotheses about the effects of several features of the policy process: issue content, the structure of conflict, party politics, institutions, and leadership. With respect to leadership and thus the presidency, the principal task from this perspective is to understand leaders' contribution to the prospects for cooperative outcomes. In other words, research should assess presidents' performance from the standpoint of

the requirements for integrative bargaining and effective mediation. Under what conditions, for example, do presidents adopt mediating roles? What methods of presidential policy formation and advocacy best preserve the potential for reaching agreement with opposing factions? To my knowledge, there is no substantial study of the presidency that seeks to answer such questions.¹²

THREE PRESCRIPTIONS AND A PROGNOSIS

Apart from these brief remarks about the neglect of deliberation and conflict resolution, I have mainly offered observations about several discrete literatures concerned with different aspects of the presidency. I will conclude with a few comments about the field as a whole. Secure in the knowledge that I have no significant exposure to malpractice liability, I will offer three prescriptions and a prognosis.

The first prescription is that students of the presidency should learn to live with the fundamental diversity of the field. Some reviews of the presidency literature have speculated about whether the field will someday achieve coherence through the development of a general theory of the presidency. That won't happen. Indeed, considering the range of issues addressed in the field, it is hard to understand what it would mean. One of the few works advocating discussion of general models of the presidency, an essay by Seligman (1980), demonstrates the limited prospects for such models. It actually outlines several obviously limited conceptions of the office (majoritarian leader, administrative leader, and the like), and presumes that most of them will remain prominent.

Indeed, as the research develops, it becomes increasingly dubious to think about the presidency as a distinct and independent focus of specialization. The development of the field almost surely will be better served if researchers consider themselves primarily students of leadership, decisionmaking, public opinion, administrative behavior, the legislative process, or political development -- that is, of the broader fields that provide relevant theories or methods -- and only secondarily students of the presidency. A researcher whose primary field is the presidency will be, in regard to theory and methods, a dilettante.

A second prescription is that theory, whatever its subject, should seek a general comprehension of the behavior it seeks to explain. Some areas of presidency research have been overly confined to practical issues -- such as how the president should organize the White House, or how he should seek to control the administrative process. Adopting such a practical focus restricts attention to a narrow range of factors that the president can manipulate. Broader theoretical inquiries -- which instead would address, for example, presidential use of information or bureaucratic implementation of presidential policy -- would certainly produce better social science. In the long run, by putting the manipulable factors in context, they may also improve the capacity to give practical advice.

Similarly, research and commentary should use comprehensive criteria to evaluate presidential success. A definition of success is often implicit in presidency research: for example, in discussions of whether Eisenhower's "hidden hand leadership" worked (Greenstein 1982, cf. Kernell 1983), or whether Reagan's loyalist appointees served him well. The tendency is to choose a least-common-denominator criterion -- reelection, popularity, or the sheer amount of policy change -- in the apparent belief that it avoids imposing the analyst's values. As Ceaser (1988) points out, however, presidents have complex objectives. In addition to popularity or reelection, they want their beliefs and policies to be adopted; they want the policies they put in place to be accepted and endure; and they want to feel they have helped solve the problems of the country. At any rate, these are surely requirements for the success of a presidency as judged from the public's standpoint. Research that purports to evaluate presidential success should take all of these elements into account.

Finally, I want to prescribe (as if it were so simple) methodological innovation. The presidency literature has become richer and more sophisticated as a result of methodological developments in recent years -- especially the greater use of quantitative analysis, and the exploitation of archival records. Methodologically sophisticated researchers have attempted to develop dynamic models of presidential popularity and to ground analysis of presidential influence in baseline models of Congressional voting. Innovative in a different way, Lynn's (1985) brief case studies of administrative performance by six Reagan subcabinet appointees and Hecló's (1977a) broader study of political leadership in the executive branch both rely on participants to provide complex, interpretive information at low cost.¹³ With regard to the logistics of generating evidence, a project at the University of Virginia has produced an oral history of the Carter presidency and made some of the information available for research without the usual delay.¹⁴

At the same time, a note of caution about some of the recent enthusiasms is appropriate. Detailed research in presidential documents, oral histories, and so on will be most useful when it has a reasonably narrow focus. Notwithstanding the "shroud of secrecy" supposedly surrounding the White House, there is voluminous and generally accurate journalistic coverage of many aspects of presidential activity. Primary research can illuminate, for example, decision making on a particular subject or the performance of a particular White House function -- where journalistic coverage is inevitably superficial. But it rarely will hold surprises about the general dimensions of a presidency: No one is going to find out in a library, for example, that President Reagan had a strong grasp of policy debates or that the Carter administration was well coordinated. Seemingly at odds with this suggestion, the most prominent presidential study based on archival research, Greenstein's (1982) book on Eisenhower, is a general treatment of presidential management and decision making. It is the kind of exception that proves the rule: The study's thesis is after all that Eisenhower's political role was kept hidden from the public by extraordinary, and presumably very unusual, deception. Of course the need for discriminating application of methods pertains equally, if not more, to quantitative analysis. Indeed, a presidential study of whatever variety that is advertised or cited primarily for methodological virtues, rather than new or persuasive findings, probably isn't much of an advance.

In the end, a favorable prognosis is in order. In almost every area touched upon, I have been able to describe major research projects -- often with improved methods or more thorough research than previous studies -- and to report findings that have improved our understanding of the presidency. No longer are students of the presidency, as Anthony King (1975) once complained, merely taking in each other's laundry. It is time to pronounce the presidency field, not yet exceptionally strong, but certainly in good health.

ENDNOTES

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1. Some of the useful studies include, on the White House staff, Hess (1976), Campbell, (1986); on national security, see Allison and Szanton (1976), Destler (1982), and George (1980); on economic policy, Porter (1980), Anderson and Hazelton (1985); on domestic policy, see Salamon (1982). For a study that uses organization theory to explain stable features of the White House, see Walcott and Hult (1988).
2. Societal objectives are proximate causes of a president's policy decisions, often tantamount to the decision itself. To avoid triviality, research must not simply stipulate but rather seek to explain those objectives. Personal objectives are more remote causes. It thus is defensible in principle either to assume variation in those objectives, to attempt to explain such variation, or to stipulate certain objectives as a starting point.
3. For a review of this literature, with citations to several lengthier reviews, see Weatherford (1988).
4. See, for example, Hibbs (1977). For more citations, see Weatherford (1988).
5. The principal early work was Edwards (1980). There is now a substantial literature. See in particular: Edwards (1989); Rivers and Rose (1985); Covington (1986); Peterson (1985); and Sullivan (1988).
6. On CQ's Key Votes see Shull and Vanderleeuw (1987). The bias toward close votes should limit variation in presidential success and attenuate all sources of variation in presidential influence.
7. Nor is the issue preempted (as he implies) by the difficulty of constraining the president's methods: Keeping officials from doing what they may want to do is after all the very essence of constitutionalism.
8. For general treatments, see Edwards (1983), Kernell (1986), and Kinder and Fiske (1986).
9. There is a difficult loose end here. Over time, national economic conditions powerfully affect a president's approval ratings. Yet, in cross-sectional research, neither individuals' perceptions of their own economic circumstances nor their perceptions of the nation's economic performance are strongly associated with their approval of the president. This leaves a troubling question of the mechanism of the longitudinal effect.
10. For a discussion and thorough review, see Simonton (1987).
11. Kernell (1986) covers some of the same ground, but contrasts public rhetoric with bargaining, instead of deliberation.
12. Although both deliberation and conflict resolution are associated with nonzero-sum conflict, they are distinct phenomena and depend on substantially different conditions. For example, the failure to achieve cooperation with respect to federal budget deficits is not the result of failing to understand the consequences of deficits.
13. They use interview subjects not only as sources of hard evidence, but also as expert judges of influence or causation. This violates traditional notions of rigor, but it permits relatively reliable interpretation of a large number of cases. For a useful discussion of several varieties of case study, see Thomas (1983).
14. The project, organized by James S. Young, so far has produced two useful books: Hargrove (1988) and Jones (1988).

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- Squire, Peverill, ed. The Iowa Caucuses & the Presidential Nominating Process. Boulder, CO: Westview. May 1989. 160p.
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- Thompson, Kenneth W., ed. The Virginia Papers on the Presidency, Vol. XXV. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. March 1989. 124p.

ARTICLES

- Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan & Eugene Borgida. "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience?'" American Political Science Review 83:1 (March 89): 123-141.
Candidates regularly spend a great deal of time campaigning on foreign and defense policy issues although the prevailing scholarly opinion is that the public knows little about these issues; thus, it has a negligible impact on their voting behavior. The authors address this anomaly by assuming the public is knowledgeable on foreign and defense policies. Data indicates this conclusion is appropriate for foreign and domestic issues.
- Chang, Tsan-Kuo. "The Impact of Presidential Statements on Press Editorials Regarding U.S. China Policy, 1950-1984." Communication Research 16:4 (August 1989): 486-509.
This study examines the causal relationship between foreign policy makers and media coverage of foreign policy issues in the context of U.S.-China relations from 1950 through 1984. The author found a positive and significant relationship between U.S. government policy toward China and media coverage.
- Deibel, Terry L. "Reagan's Mixed Legacy." Foreign Policy 75 (Summer 1989): 34-55.
What exactly is the legacy of the Reagan foreign policy? The Reagan administration, which began life as an extremely conservative product of profound public concern about American strength and resolve, eventually settled comfortably into the political and policy mainstream--even though it moved that stream considerable to the right. This article examines what Reagan left in terms of foreign policy, both positive and negative for this nation.
- Ducat, Craig R. & Robert L. Dudley. "Federal District Judges and Presidential Power During the Postwar Era." Journal of Politics 51:1 (February 1989): 98-118.
Analysis of nearly two hundred federal district court decisions in cases involving the exercise of presidential power during the postwar era reveals (1) that in cases concerning presidential control of foreign and military policy, judicial decisions give deference to the executive and (2) in matters of domestic concern, a greater relativism in judicial response is seen.

Erikson, Robert S. "Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote." American Political Science Review 83:2 (June 1989): 567-575.

This analysis demonstrates that the relative growth of per capita income change is an important determinant of post-World War II presidential election outcomes. Per capita income change is even a better predictor of presidential election outcomes than the electorate's attraction to the Democratic and Republican candidates.

Erikson, Robert S., Thomas D. Lancaster & David W. Romero. "Group Components of the Presidential Vote, 1952-1984." Journal of Politics 51:2 (May 1989): 337-346.

This essay examines the group basis of the presidential vote between 1952 and 1984 using a multivariate logit approach. The multivariate analysis shows that persistence of group-based divisions between Republican and Democratic voters. Among other patterns, class-based divisions have noticeably increased.

Gold, Ellen Reid. "Ronald Reagan and the Oral Tradition." The Central States Speech Journal 39:3/4 (Fall/Winter 1988): 159-176.

President Reagan's success stems from his use of rhetorical structures characteristic of the oral epic and his use of electronic media which partially replicate conditions characteristic of preliterate oral societies. These methods will have a lasting influence on American political discourse, since future politicians will emulate these techniques.

Gustafson, Merlin & Jerry Rosenberg. "The Faith of Franklin Roosevelt." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:3 (Summer 1989): 559-566.

This article examines the relationship between the political ideology and religious perspectives of Franklin D. Roosevelt with particular emphasis on his religious values. Observations are made concerning the significance of his religious affiliation, church attendance, prayer life, involvement with his church, intellectual level of his faith, and etc.

Hadley, Charles D. & Harold W. Stanley. "Super Tuesday 1988: Regional Results and National Implications." Publius: The Journal of Federalism 19:3 (Summer 1989): 19-38

Super Tuesday did not have the effect that Southern states had hoped it would. Although the same-day presidential primary did produce a slight increase in voter turnout, it did not settle the Democratic nomination or give meaningful momentum to the more moderate Democratic candidates.

Harris, William C. "Andrew Johnson's First "Swing Around the Circle": His Northern Campaign of 1863." Civil War History XXXV:2 (June 1989): 153-171.

President Andrew Jackson took to the road in 1866 to win support for his Reconstruction policies. This tour was a disaster, not only for Johnson's cause but also for his reputation in history. Johnson's 1866 decision to "swing around the circle" was partially based on his fabulously successful tour in 1863. This article examines the 1863 tour which has largely been overlooked by historians and biographers.

Holmes, Jack E. & Robert E. Elder, Jr. "Our Best and Worst Presidents: Some Possible Reasons for Perceived Performance." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:3 (Summer 1989): 529-558.

The authors used thirty-eight indicators to compare the twelve best and the twelve worst American presidents. Top presidents generally differ from bottom presidents by publishing more books before assuming office, enjoying more political consensus and prosperity during their terms, being more positive and possibly more active, and being more assertive on foreign policy issues.

Hurwitz, Jon, Mark Peffley & Paul Raymond. "Presidential Support during the Iran-Contra Affair: An Individual-Level Analysis of Presidential Reappraisal." American Politics Quarterly 17:4 (October 1989): 359-385.

The authors investigate presidential support before and after the major revelations of the Iran-Contra affair to determine the reasons behind the erosion of President Reagan's support base and the characteristics of individuals who did, and did not, adjust their views. While Reagan maintained his image of integrity, respondents did downgrade his competence; his performance was most seriously questioned by those disapproving of his Central American policy.

Johnson, H. Ludwell, III. "Abraham Lincoln and the Development of Presidential War-Making Powers: Prize Cases (1863) Revisited." Civil War History XXXV:3 (September 1989): 208-224.

The power of the executive branch to take the country into war has always been present. President Truman's move to defend South Korea, in an era of apocalyptic results, greatly expanded the executive branch's authority in war-making powers. Truman's actions were by no means without precedent in American history: Abraham Lincoln had done much the same thing in 1861. This article discusses President Lincoln's use of presidential authority in making war.

Juhnke, William E. "President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights: The Interaction of Politics, Protest, and Presidential Advisory Commission." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:3 (Summer 1989): 593-610.

In 1947, the President's Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) presented President Truman with a document which took racial discrimination and segregation head-on and called on the federal government to be the guardian of civil rights in America. While the importance of the PCCR has long been recognized in bringing racial discrimination to America's attention, little attention has been given to its actual operation and to explaining how the report took shape. This essay addressed these points.

Kegley, Charles W., Jr. "The Bush Administration and the Future of American Foreign Policy: Pragmatism, or Procrastination?" Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:4 (Fall 1989): 717-732.

President Bush has proclaimed that his foreign policy will be directed to prepare for the next century, thus implying that past policy may no longer be appropriate. However, past policy has the awesome force of momentum behind it. This article discusses this momentum and the ability or inability of any president to overcome it.

Kerbel, Matthew R. "Before the Honeymoon Ends: Presidential Leadership and Congressional Response." Congress & the Presidency 16:1 (Spring 1989): 11-22.

This article suggests that members of Congress evaluate the honeymoon period of a new President (in this case Carter and Reagan) on organizational efficiency and providing access to Congress. The analysis considers the importance of organization to future presidential effectiveness and the importance of organizational concerns with respect to personal characteristics for overall presidential success.

Kinder, Donald R., Gordon S. Adams & Paul W. Gronke. "Economics and Politics in the 1984 American Presidential Election." American Journal of Political Science 33:2 (May 1989): 491-515.

Citizens are attentive to economic conditions and reach political evaluations partly on that basis—but how do they do so? The authors examine three possibilities: voters are concerned most with their own economic well-being, the economic well-being of their group, or the economic condition of the country. It is found that an assessment of national economic well-being mattered most to voters' decisions in the 1984 presidential election.

Ladd, Everett Carl. "The 1988 Elections: Continuation of The Post-New Deal System." Political Science Quarterly 104:1 (Spring 1989): 1-18.

The author argues that the 1988 election was predictable for two reasons: 1) it was an incumbents' election and 2) it took place well into the latest of our country's greatest partisan transformations, this one having begun in the late 1960s..

Lanoue, David J. "The "Teflon Factor": Ronald Reagan & Comparative Presidential Popularity." Polity XXI:3 (Spring 1989): 481-501.

Lanoue rejects the teflon thesis as an approach to explaining Ronald Reagan's consistently high popularity ratings and asserts that the normal laws of presidential popularity were, in fact, in operation.

Lanoue, David J. & Peter R. Schrott. "Voters' Reactions to Televised Presidential Debates: Measurement of the Source and Magnitude of Opinion Change." Political Psychology 10:2 (June 1989): 275-286.

This pilot study on the first 1984 presidential debate between Mondale and Reagan sought to determine how well the candidates did in discussing the issues of greatest concern to observers. It found that Mondale's success was due largely to his skill as a debater, while Reagan effectively exploited the taxation and spending issues. Also discussed are implications of this study and suggestions to enhance further such studies.

Liebovich, Louis William. "Failed White House Press Relations in the Early Months of the Truman Administration." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:3 (Summer 1989): 583-592.

This paper examines the first seventeen months of the Truman administration and traces the steps that the president and his press aides took in dealing with newsmen, publishers, and incidents that reflected upon the president's public image. The paper illustrates how their decisions eventually led to poor press and strained relations with the White House press corps and editors and publishers back home.

Loss, Richard. "The Political Thought of President George Washington." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:3 (Summer 1989): 471-490.

Loss argues that President George Washington's political thoughts mixed elements of classical and modern republicanism, such as egalitarian virtue, liberal education, liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty. The essay calls for a reappraisal of Washington's thoughts while warning against understanding it as "the cause of everything" in the American regime.

McCaughey, Elizabeth. "Marbury v. Madison: Have We Missed the Real Meaning?" Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:3 (Summer 1989): 491-528.

Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison has always been acclaimed as an inventive, assertive declaration that the Supreme Court will uphold the tenets of the U.S. Constitution. This article suggests that in 1803, Marshall was reigning in judicial power, rather to boldly putting forward the court's review power.

Mervin, David. "Ronald Reagan's Place in History." Journal of American Studies 23:2 (August 1989): 269-287.

This article argues that far from being the "worst" of recent presidents as many officials in high office have observed; Ronald Reagan, despite his failings, was more effective in office than most who have held that position in the last fifty years.

- Moore, Maureen T. "Andrew Jackson: 'Pretty Near a Treason' to Call Him Doctor!" New England Quarterly LXII:3 (September 1989): 424-435.
This article discusses the dilemma facing Harvard President Josiah Quincy in determining whether to bestow President Andrew Jackson an honorary degree. The article also examines the political backlash that resulted from Jackson's acceptance of the degree.
- Norrander, Barbara. "Ideological Representativeness of Presidential Primary Voters." American Journal of Political Science 33:3 (August 1989): 570-587.
Contrary to conventional wisdom and previous research, this article finds little evidence that presidential primary voters are ideologically unrepresentative.
- Norris, Pippa. "The 1988 American Elections: Long, Medium and Short-term Explanations." Political Quarterly 60:2 (April-June 1989): 204-221.
This article examine Democratic defeat in the 1988 Presidential election. The author uses three alternative explanations in which a long-term, medium-term and short-term perspective are examined to explain the defeat.
- Oliver, Lawrence J. "Theodore Roosevelt, Brander Matthews, and the Campaign for Literary Americanism." American Quarterly 41:1 (March 1989): 93-111.
No President of the United States was better acquainted with and took a greater interest in literacy canon than Theodore Roosevelt. In Roosevelt's mind, the literary and the political were inextricably linked. This essay reviews Roosevelt's connection with Brander Matthews and discusses his efforts to bring American literature to the nation.
- Olson, Kathryn M. "The Controversy over President Reagan's Visit to Bitburg: Strategies of Definition and Redefinition." The Quarterly Journal of Speech 75:2 (May 1989): 129-151.
Olson examines the rhetorical strategies of President Reagan, in defense, and his opponents, in opposition, to the Presidential visit to the German war cemetery at Bitburg. Reagan's attempts to redefine the meaning of the unfolding situation and his own actions were largely unsuccessful because he proceeded from a scientific perspective while his opponents embraced a dramatic perspective.
- Ostrom, Charles W. & Dennis M. Simon. "The Man in the Teflon Suit? The Environmental Connection, Political Drama, and Popular Support in the Reagan Presidency." Public Opinion Quarterly 53 (Fall 1989): 353-387.
The authors examine the issue of public support for U.S. presidents and the inability of presidents to maintain it. The study takes the Reagan presidency, with its long-term high popularity ratings, and looks to see if the Reagan case contradicts the assertions that presidents are unable to maintain public support or if he is an exception that "proves the rule."
- Pfluger, Friedbert. "Human Rights Unbound: Carter's Human Rights Policy Reassessed." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:4 (Fall 1989): 705-716.
American foreign policy will always tend to pursue a basically idealistic policy. President Jimmy Carter exemplified this point by his strong determination to bring the issue of human rights back into U.S. foreign policy after the Nixon/Kissinger "moral vacuum" in this arena of presidential authority.
- Phelps, Glenn A. "George Washington and the Paradox of Party." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:4 (Fall 1989): 733-746.
How can one explain the rise of party feeling during George Washington's presidency which was dedicated to being 'above party?' Phelps offers two explanations: (1) the ideals of Republican ideology had long ceased to describe the dynamic factionalism of colonial

and American politics and (2) Washington was, despite a concerted effort at establishing an impartial magistracy, this country's first partisan President.

Prysbey, Charles L. "Attitudes of Southern Democratic Party Activists Toward Jesse Jackson: The Effects of the Local Context." Journal of Politics 51:2 (May 1989): 305-318.

This article examines the effect of the racial composition of the local context on the attitudes of southern Democratic Party activists towards the 1984 Jesse Jackson presidential candidacy. The analysis finds that white activists were more likely to have a negative attitude toward the Jackson candidacy when they were from a county that had a higher proportion of blacks.

Resnick, David & Norman C. Thomas. "Reagan and Jackson: Parallels in Political Time." Journal of Policy History 1:2:181-205.

This article compares the political regimes of President Andrew Jackson and of President Ronald Reagan. The author examines the similarities between the two presidencies and finds them striking. The article concludes with a wonder if the fate of Jackson's successor will also be the fate of Reagan's.

Rockman, Bert A. "What Didn't We Know & Should We Forget It? Political Science & the Reagan Presidency." Polity XXI:4 (Summer 1989): 777-792

The Reagan presidency posed more than the usual number of explanatory challenges for political science. This essay links certain aspects of the Reagan presidency to the literature of political science and concludes that political science is richer in data than theory and rather myopic in its incrementalist view of change.

Romero, David W. "The Changing American Voter Revisited: Candidate Evaluations in Presidential Elections, 1952 to 1984." American Politics Quarterly 17:4 (October 1989): 409-421.

Employing unstandardized coefficients on open-ended presidential candidate evaluations for the 1952 to 1984 elections, this article examines the manner and extent to which the relationship between issues, party, candidates, and the vote have fluctuated over time. The results suggest that party influence on the vote has declined. However, no evidence is found to support the assertion of an increase in issue influence on the vote decision.

Rozell, Mark J. "The Presidential Pardon Power: A Bibliographic Essay." The Journal of Law & Politics V:2 (Winter 1989): 459-467.

The trials of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and Admiral John Pondexter prompted serious speculation about whether President Reagan would issue pre-trial or pre-conviction pardons. This essay provides a broad range of articles, notes, books, and government documents, as well as cases, that are germane to the controversy surrounding the presidential power to pardon.

Scheele, Henry Z. "Response to the Kennedy Administration: The Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership Press Conferences." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:4 (Fall 1989): 825-846.

This paper explores the form and substance of the sixty-four press conferences conducted by the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership during the Kennedy presidency. These serial news conferences proved a rare opportunity to observe a presidential administration from the viewpoint of its opposition party leaders.

Schlichting, Kurt C. "Democratic Incumbents and the 1984 Presidential Election." Public Opinion Quarterly 53 (Summer 1989): 83-97.

This article examines the advantages a single Democratic incumbent utilized to win reelection in the 1984 Reagan landslide. The author found two types of ticket splitting in favor of the incumbent to account for victories. Also, ticket splitting was found to be associated with basic political orientation.

- Shull, Steven A. & Albert C. Ringelstein. "Presidential Attention, Support, and Symbolism in Civil Rights, 1953-1984." The Social Science Journal 26:1 (January 1989): 45-54.
The authors analyze the content of all presidential speeches, press conferences, letters and other public messages of every president from Eisenhower to Reagan in an effort to measure the extent to which these presidents truly supported increased rights for Blacks
- Sigelman, Lee & Michael M. Gant. "Anticandidate Voting in the 1984 Presidential Election." Political Behavior 11:1 (March 1989): 81-92.
Anticandidate voting, voting focused more on a candidate one opposes than on a candidate one prefers, in 1984 motivated nearly one third of all likely voters in the Reagan/Mondale presidential race; a rate similar to that observed in the Johnson/Goldwater race of 1964. However, factors related to anticandidate voting in the past were not consistently liked to anticandidate voting in 1984. This article concludes that Ronald Reagan exerted such a strong influence that processes normally observed were overridden.
- Simon, Dennis M. "Presidents, Governors, and Electoral Accountability." Journal of Politics 51:2 (May 1989): 286-309.
Simon seeks to demonstrate that citizen evaluations of presidential performance operates as an influence on voting behavior in gubernatorial elections. Using modeling, diagnostic exercises, and simulations, the author finds that the impact of the citizen evaluations does alter the voting of individuals and the outcomes of gubernatorial contests.
- Simon, Dennis M. & Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. "The Impact of Televised Speeches and Foreign Travel on Presidential Approval." Public Opinion Quarterly 53 (Summer 1989): 58-82.
A conventional wisdom has arisen that asserts that televised speeches and foreign travel by the president have increased over time, exert a positive impact on the public's evaluations of the president's performance, and can be used as a strategy for influencing the president's approval ratings. Simon and Ostrom find evidence to cast doubts on this conventional wisdom.
- Smith, Larry David. "A Narrative Analysis of the Party Platforms: The Democrats and Republicans of 1984." Communication Quarterly 37:2 (Spring 1989): 91-99.
This essay examines the 1984 party platforms from the perspective of Fisher's narrative paradigm. The work concludes that though these narratives followed different perspectives, they are both relevant to and consistent with party tradition.
- Spinelli, Lawrence. "Sailing into Dry Dock: The Harding Administration's Shipping Policy and National Prohibition." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:4 (Fall 1989): 747-768.
This article assesses the impact of national prohibition on the Harding administration's ship subsidy proposal. The author concludes that Harding's failure to address the issue of liquor sales on passenger vessels caused the delay and defeat of the subsidy legislation which was the cornerstone of the administration's shipping policy.
- Stern, Mark. "John F. Kennedy and Civil Rights: From Congress to the Presidency." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:4 (Fall 1989): 797-824.
This study examines John F. Kennedy's position on the civil rights issue during his campaign for the presidency. The analysis suggests that Kennedy's treatment of the issue was primarily as a strategic problem in the context of his goal of the presidency.
- Stern, Mark. "Presidential Strategies and Civil Rights: Eisenhower, the Early Years, 1952-54." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:4 (Fall 1989): 769-796.
The paper examines the strategic-political concerns of President Eisenhower as he grappled with the black civil rights issue during his first presidential campaign and early

years in office. The Brown decision required Eisenhower to engage in a political balancing act between the many forces involved as well as his own beliefs and abilities.

Thomas, David N. "George Bush and the Problem of Divided Government." Contemporary Review 255:1484 (September 1989): 113-117.

The government George Bush takes over is one of divisions between the parties in control in Congress and of the one running the White House. The article examines the problems facing President Bush in this period of indefinite divided government.

Uhlener, Carole Jean. "Turnout in Recent American Presidential Elections." Political Behavior 11:1 (March 1989): 57-79.

The well-noted decline in the participation of Americans in presidential elections since the early sixties reversed in the 1984 election, although only slightly. The findings of this study indicate shifts in patterns of turnout corresponding to shifts in the lines of politicized interests.

Walters, Ronald W. "The American Crisis of Credibility and the 1988 Jesse Jackson Campaign." The Black Scholar 19:2 (March/April 1989): 31-44.

The author reviews the Jesse Jackson campaign of 1988 in terms of the treatment of Jackson's issues, appeals, and winning perceptions by the public and media. Also noted is the strength of Jackson's credibility as defined by his organization, message, campaign money and personal attitudes.

Woods, Randall Bennett. "F.D.R. and the Triumph of American Nationalism." Presidential Studies Quarterly XIX:3 (Summer 1989): 567-582.

While Franklin D. Roosevelt embraced the principles expressed in the Atlantic Charter, he proved diplomatically and politically incapable of achieving them during the period from 1941-1945. His failure stemmed from his inability to confront and defeat the forces of isolationism and economic nationalism within Congress and among the American people.

Zahniser, Marvin R. & W. Michael Weis. "A Diplomatic Pearl Harbor? Richard Nixon's Goodwill Mission to Latin America in 1958." Diplomatic History 13:2 (Spring 1989): 163-190.

A "goodwill" tour of South America by Vice President Richard Nixon resulted in what columnist Walter Lippmann called a "diplomatic Pearl Harbor," due to the violently negative response to the U.S. Vice President. The tour revealed the bankruptcy of U.S. policy in Latin America. This article focuses on the mission and explores its significance as a stimulus for change in U.S. policy toward the region.

The University of Iowa
Department of Political Science
Iowa City, Iowa 52242

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